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Abstract: This dissertation addresses and then attempts to further what could be called 
the “French” Phenomenological tradition and its developments of  a phenomenology of  
eros in dialogue with—and often as a response to—older Platonic conceptions of  eros.  1
Eros, I show, had a foundational role in Plato’s ethics; becoming ethical was dependent on 
first having an erotic encounter with beauty. However, this connection between love and 
ethics has been frequently abandoned in 20th-century philosophy. I argue that this move, 
a side-effect of  the development of  a philosophy of  alterity, was ultimately founded on 
faulty assumptions about the nature of  love, as well as its connection to the good and the 
beautiful. For that reason, after first elucidating the concerns raised regarding an ethical 
eros and the reasons for the denial of  love’s foundational role, I establish a definition of  
eros that can once again play the same role as Plato saw for it while simultaneously 
addressing the 20th century’s concerns about alterity and the recognition of  the Other. 
Re-establishing this role requires arguing for three key theses: 
1. Recognition of  the Other is based on recognizing his or her beauty and goodness 
2. Love of  the Other is love of  the Other as individual, not in light of  some attribute 
3. Love of  the Other forms the basis of  our entering into the ethical attitude. 
 The title ‘French phenomenology’—widely used—is a misnomer, as many figures, including several large 1
figures, are not ethnically French, or even necessarily Francophone. Shulamith Firestone, included in this 
work, was an English-speaking Canadian raised in the United States, however, her usage of  Beauvoir’s work 
puts her in the same intellectual tradition. Nor are all those included even properly called 
phenomenologists, if  by that we mean in the lineage of  Husserl. Gabriel Marcel, for example, uses the word 
phenomenology, but had seemingly no direct familiarity with Husserl’s work (he had some knowledge of  
Heidegger’s), and is more often classified as an existentialist. 
!ii
	 Combined, these theses build towards an ethical eros in two senses. First, they 
show that eros itself is an ethical relationship, which will be defined as an encounter with 
the Other structured by signification (the reasons for this definition will be made clear 
when I examine Levinas’ ethics). Second, the erotic encounter with one beautiful Other 
(which may or may not lead to a response of  love) leads to the development of  an ethical 
disposition toward all Others. In the dissertation, these theses are developed against the 
background of  existing views about eros, in order to show their necessity, as well as to 
explore the reasons why they have so far been denied. Part I, “Platonic Eros,” therefore, is 
an in-depth reading of  eros from the Platonic point of  view, as seen primarily in the 
Symposium and Phaedrus. Part II, “Impossible Eros,” picks up on Plato’s failing to recognize 
the alterity of  the Other and begins a critique of  Plato from that point, carried out by a 
variety of  early philosophers in the French philosophical tradition, including Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Jacques Lacan, and Shulamith Firestone. Part III, “Unspeakable Eros,” is a direct 
response to Part II, dealing primarily with Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc Marion. Part 
IV, “Ethical Eros” is the conclusion of  the dissertation, in which I argue that love can 
once again take on its role, assigned to it already in Plato, as the basis of  ethics.  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To all those who have loved me,  
and who have shown me what it means to love.  
INTRODUCTION 
	 We have been told since our early childhood days that everybody is beautiful, and 
that we should do our best to see the beauty of  each person we meet. But what does this 
statement really mean? What does it mean to say that everyone is beautiful, and, if  that is 
even true, how should we act towards people upon seeing their beauty? Our normal 
responses to beauty—contemplation or love—seem an inappropriate response. We 
certainly should not simply stare at everybody as if  they were statues, nor does it seem 
possible to love (romantically or sexually, which seem to be the most accurate love-
responses to beauty) every person we encounter. Nor does the premise even seem sound. 
Not everybody seems to be beautiful to my eyes. In fact, those who are in most need of  
care from me, the sick and dying, the badly injured, or the malnourished are often nearly 
impossible to see as beautiful. Rather, the initial reaction is often one of  repulsion. It 
seems it is only by moving beyond the appearance of  the person that I can truly respond 
to her needs, and give her the care she deserve. The ethical treatment of  the other person 
seems to require the abandonment of  aesthetic judgement 
	 Perhaps, however, we can find a way around this problem. Perhaps we can better 
understand beauty so that it is not just the model, but every human being who I am able 
to see as beautiful. Perhaps I can better understand my response to beauty so that, rather 
than halting at love or contemplation, it might actually lead to the ethical response. The 
advantages, if  this is true, would be significant. Ethical training could begin at the same 
young age at which we are first told that everybody is beautiful. Children, before they are 
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old enough to rationally consider ethics, could be given the important training to 
experience beauty correctly, to understand what it really means to be beautiful, and to 
begin to develop the proper responses to beauty. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what 
Aristotle himself  envisions for the ethical training of  young people when he notes that 
they must be raised from an early age to feel pleasure and pain at the right sorts of  things
—ethical training begins with the training of  the passions. 
	 If  our immediate concern is beauty, then the passion we ought to concerned with 
is precisely love, specifically what the ancient Greeks called eros. We can therefore narrow 
down our question as follows: how does eros, if  at all, engender an ethical response? This 
question, in turn, can be asked on two levels, both of  which will be addressed here: how is 
loving somebody itself  an ethical relationship, and secondly, how does this single love 
relationship help structure or further develop my ethical relationships with others who I 
may not love? In order to answer these questions however, it will first be necessary to 
answer a preliminary question. On what basis, and to what extent, can we treat the 
ancient Greek conception of  eros as equivalent to our own use of  the word love. Only 
once this has been shown can we then turn to the discussion of  how eros can provide a 
basis for our entrance into the ethical attitude. 
§1: Love Languages 
	 This work treats eros as something like a passion, while acknowledging that its 
perfection comes in the form of  a relationship. Since both sides of  that debate rarely deny 
that the other kind of  love exists at all (and only whether it is what we primarily ought to 
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mean by the word), one’s stance on that issue should not in principle affect his or her 
ability to be convinced by my argument here.  
	 	 I also hold, following Marion, that eros includes all love in a univocal way, 
and that we should not draw strong divisions between various types of  love. In this work, 
however I treat romantic love almost exclusively. As a result the central argument of  the 
thesis ought to still convince someone (such as Nygren or Falque) who does not take eros 
to be a univocal term for love.  
	 In fact, I believe that this is one of  the great virtues of  Platonic eros, which has 
been all too often lost in more contemporary accounts of  love, is its ability to hold 
together a great many different parts. Love was for the Greeks, just as much for us, a 
multifaceted word (in fact, set of  words). In Platonist thought, the goal was not to create a 
taxonomy of  all its types and manifestations, but instead to understand them all together. 
Eros was at once the intellectual love that seeks the good of  the soul and the sensual love 
of  sexual desire. It is concerned bodies as much as it is with souls. It sought education and 
pleasure, transcendence and intimacy. Plato and his followers were perhaps not always 
clear—or even free of  contradiction—in elaborating this eros, but it seems to be their 
goal.  Personal eros is used as a starting point for philosophical eros not only because they 1
are analogous, but because they are in fact one and the same act. To love erotically is to 
love personally and philosophically at the same time. We may at times see Plato or his 
followers downplay sexuality, but he never seeks its total denial. 
	 In contemporary continental philosophy, on the other hand, we too often see eros 
fall apart.  Whether it is into passion and desire, or into love of  soul and love of  body, true 2
 These claims about Platonic eros are subject of  chapter 2, and are developed further there.1
 The theme of  Parts II and III2
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care and sentimentality or along any other such line, we repeatedly are led toward an eros 
that fails to hang together. Thus we are left with a choice: either retain a love similar to 
what the common person might have in mind when he or she says love, or describe a 
quasi- (or sometimes overtly) theological virtue, which has very little indeed to do with the 
love of  love stories and personal relationships, but instead the perfection of  the soul or the 
self. 
	 This is the trajectory pursued here, as we begin with a view love that tries to hold 
together many disparate aspects, just as the Symposium attempts to hold together seven 
different accounts of  one god, before looking at the effects of  the dissociation it has 
suffered in the last hundred years. One or another aspect of  eros is taken for the whole, 
the others rejected as inappropriate or irrelevant, often to destructive effect. As will be 
seen, a great skepticism of  love has developed in recent times, as philosophers believe 
themselves to have discovered flaws not seen by the Platonists (along with the writers of  
medieval chivalric romances and courtly love stories), and proclaim to have defeated a 
Platonic over-optimism. What they too often miss, however, is that the flaws are merely 
the holes left behind by the abandoned or forgotten portions of  eros. It is as if  they 
themselves have hewn off  two legs from a stool, and then protested that it cannot stand 
upright. 
	 In fact, this is one of  the main difficulties of  a work seeking to argue about the 
nature of  love through texts written in ancient Greek, French, and English: it is not always 
clear how the various words intersect. While the movement from French to English or 
vice versa can be handled fairly straightforwardly, bringing the ancient Greek forward is 
much more difficult. Greek is typically counted as having four different words: eros, philia, 
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agape, and sometimes storge. Storge is typically said to be the familial love of  parents to 
children. Philia is usually translated as friendship or friendly love, while agape morphs from 
affection (the verb is often translated as to cherish) into divine love in the Christian 
tradition. These categories, however, are not rigid, and the words overlap considerably. 
Plato will have no problem attributing philia related words to the erotic lovers he is 
describing. Aristotle, uses the verb form stergo but, at least in the Nicomachean Ethics, never 
the noun storge (the noun appears once in the Metaphysics, in a quotation from 
Empedocles),  uses it to describe the feeling of  affection friends (philoi) feel toward each 3
other.  Meleager, a first century BC Greek poet goes will even attribute storges, a word 4
typically used to express parental or fraternal affection, to the passion shared by sexual 
partners.  5
	 It can thus be very difficult to treat each word as if  it can be given its own 
translation or even group of  translations, without running into confusions. Eros however, 
is perhaps seen to have the most rigid meaning: it would be inappropriate to attribute a 
feeling of  eros to a love that is not in some way desirous or even outrightly sexual. It is the 
love felt between lovers (although it is not equivalent to the more emotional ‘romantic 
love’). However, for Plato this is often stretched beyond the normal usage toward 
philosophy, with Jill Gordon noting that, for the Timaeus, “eros is the moving force behind 
 All word statistics are based on search results in the Perseus Digital Library. However, as it does not contain 3
the whole Aristotelian corpus (notably missing both Physics and De Anima), I am unable to confirm whether 
storge is used more frequently in those texts. In either case, it is clear that storge-related words are significantly 
less common in the Platonic and Aristotelian corpuses than eros or philia words.
 Plato similarly uses only the verb, most often in the Laws (10 times). By comparison Eros related words 4
appear in that work over 100 times, and with even greater frequency elsewhere.
 The Greek Anthology, Book 5 166, 191 and Book 6, 476. The first reference begins “O night, O insomniac 5
longing for Heliodora, O scratches of  her curved nails that delight in drawing tears—is there any relic left 
of  her love (storges) for me? Is some memory of  my kiss still warm on her cold be?”
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our desire to know first causes.”  As it is the springboard for the work as a whole, it is 6
Plato’s own usage of  eros that I am most concerned with here. However, rather than 
simplifying the task, this focus actually makes it more difficult, precisely by limiting the 
available sources that can be referenced. As Dover admits in his work on Greek eros, 
“since Plato’s concept of  eros differed from everyone else’s, no evidence relating to his use 
of  eran and epithumeian [to desire] tells us anything about Greek usage in general.”  The 7
reverse claim is equally true. Plato is consciously reshaping and redefining the scope of  
eros in his dialogues; to look to ordinary usage as anything more than a backdrop will 
provide little clarity. 
	 Thus our first question should be what, if  anything, is the best word to translate 
eros? This question amounts to answering in quick fashion a much more difficult 
question: what are those things that eros includes and excludes? The first option is to 
avoid the problem and leave eros untranslated, letting what Plato says about eros speak 
for itself  as the meaning. While this may be possible in a strictly Platonic work, it will not 
solve the problems here. The subsequent use of  eros in other contexts, particularly its 
adoption by psychoanalysis has entered into the vernacular sufficiently to mean that eros 
cannot serve as the sort of  empty container into which we can interpret the texts 
themselves.  Thus we must accept that ‘eros’ itself  already risks becoming a translation of  8
ἔρως, and not merely a transliteration, and that it too potentially fails to avoid the 
problems of  two seemingly different cultures of  love. This will become even more 
 Jill Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World: From Cosmic Origins to Human Death (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 8.6
 K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 43n117
 The number of  books and articles written comparing Plato and Freud should be proof  enough of  this. See 8
Santas, Plato and Freud: Two Theories of  Love or Gould Platonic Love for two such analyses. In addition, both the 
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française as well as all major English dictionaries give the Freudian definition of  eros 
as instinct or drive alongside one of  sexual love or desire.
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apparent in later chapters, as theories of  eros from thinkers as different as Lacan, Levinas 
and Marion are considered. Eros has a meaning in contemporary language (or at least 
contemporary philosophical language) that is no less established than love/amour. 
	 The tradition has long been to translate ἔρως as love, while including any number 
of  qualifications and footnotes to the pitfalls it introduces. In the introduction to his 
translation of  the Symposium and Phaedrus, for instance, Cobb notes that he translates ἔρως 
as ‘love’ despite admitting that “the term [ἔρως] is primarily used of  sexual desire” and 
that “the greater ambiguity of  the English word ‘love’ may be misleading.”  Halperin calls 9
for readers to “realize that by eros Plato refers not to love in the global sense in which we 
often intend that word but to one kind or aspect of  love-or, rather, to the intense desire 
which often goes by the name of  love.”  Platonic readers are, by now, accustomed to the 10
fact that Greek contains numerous different words for different ‘kinds or aspects’ of  love, 
and the traditional translation simply puts the burden on the reader to continually 
remember that ‘love’ contains meanings that ἔρως did not. Some, however, including 
Halperin, see this burden as a reason to surrender the traditional translation (even if  they 
still employ the word), “eros is indeed inadequate to the task of  explicating the nature of  
love, and Plato never intended to put it to that use.” He continues “the various defects . . . 
in the Platonic eros when it is construed as love . . . disappear as soon as eros is conceived as 
desire.”  However, there are, I think, good reasons to continue to conceptually translate 11
Plato’s eros as ‘love,’ and to avoid conflating eros with desire.  
 Plato, The Symposium and the Phaedrus: Plato’s Erotic Dialogues (SUNY Press, 1993). 5.9
 “David M. Halperin, “Platonic Erôs and What Men Call Love,” Ancient Philosophy 5, no. 2 (October 1, 10
1985): 161—204, 164.
 Ibid., 189.11
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	 There is no denying that eros does not carry with it every variation or attribute of  
love. On the other hand, it is equally clear that eros is most properly uttered in situations 
where an English or French speaker would generally be comfortable using the word love. 
While Plato writes the Athenian Stranger in the Laws as speaking of  an “eros for food and 
drink” (782e), and Diotima admits in the Symposium that she has extended eros to 
something that everybody has, insofar as they desire happiness, Plato most frequently 
seeks to restrict it to a more local sense of  those who pursue love in a certain way.  In the 12
Phaedrus, Socrates speaks of  the eros that one has when he sees a beautiful boy. The 
description of  a person who is driven to insanity by the sight of  the other is precisely what 
we might today describe as being “madly in love” with somebody. And further, when the 
speakers of  the Symposium seek to praise the god Eros, they discuss human relationships, 
not only desires. Eros is not only a one-sided desire (even if  the pederastic relationship 
was asymmetric in this way), but the gateway to a relationship that contained more than 
this.  13
	 This second point represents perhaps the best reason for continuing to conceive of  
eros as love: even if  eros only represents the portion of  love that might be called sexual 
desire, Plato never restricts his dialogues to only addressing eros. The Symposium and 
Phaedrus frequently shift to using words in the philia group, just as the Lysis (a dialogue 
nominally on philia), will use eros-related words, leading Brian Mooney to note that “the 
background to the discussion of  philia is markedly erotic” and that “Plato employs the 
 Diotima’s assertion is that it is those who do the work [ergon] of  giving birth in beauty [206b]. We will see 12
in Chapter 1 whether this is Plato’s own position.
 As Sheffield concludes in “Beyond Eros: Friendship in the Phaedrus”: “Plato’s account of  eros is not the end 13
of  his account of  interpersonal love, but the appropriate starting point for an account of  philia,” 270. 
Although Sheffield appears to put more distance between the two terms than I would, it suffices here to 
show that eros and philia are considered together for Plato.
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terms eran, philein [and others] sometimes interchangeably, but certainly as loosely 
demarcated but closely related sub-sets of  philia.”  Dover similarly notes that, even in its 14
ordinary usage, “it is not to be expected that Greek should always distinguish explicitly 
between eros and love [i.e. philia].”  Ordinary Greek usage may indeed generally place 15
eros very close, or identical to, sexual desire, but Plato is deliberately pulling it further 
toward philia. For that reason, I think it is best to continue to understand that, although 
eros strictly speaking refers to the sexual, desirous aspects of  what we today might call 
love in a broader context, Plato is ultimately speaking of  something that does not exist in 
isolation, as if  it were a mere desire, but rather, he is speaking of  the erotic impetus or 
aspect of  a more relational sense of  philia-love.  This, then, will be the meaning I will 16
assume throughout Part I: eros is the aspect of  a relational love that might most properly 
be called sexual or desirous. It is not, however, fully distinct from a more inclusive, 
emotional sense of  love (what Plato would call philia), as if  the two are separate 
phenomena. Rather, eros and philia  are different facets of  one experience.  17
	 While it would be impractical to go through every person cited in this work in 
advance and attempt to delineate who means what by their words love, eros, amour, l’eros, 
etc., a few brief  remarks based on the preceding can be made. Every theory will operate 
between two extremes: a purely emotional love and a purely sexual desire. Different 
 T. Brian Mooney, “Plato’s Theory of  Love in the ‘Lysis’: A Defence,” Irish Philosophical Journal 7, no. 1/2 (July 1, 14
1990), 135.
 Greek Homosexuality, 50.15
 This becomes especially clear when Plato assigns the eromenos an anteros, a counter-love, in the Phaedrus. 16
There clearly is a relational aspect to this doubled desire. See Ch. 1, §4.2 for more.
 As a result, I have used both eros and love (I use the latter more frequently in the verbal form, where eros-17
related cognates are less familiar). There are numerous reasons for this, including Plato’s representation of  
common opinions of  eros (which unlike Plato’s own, often skew more heavily to desire) and the dual subject 
of  the symposium of  Eros as both god and human passion. However it is often simply a stylistic choice. The 
reader should thus not assume any distinction between claims about eros and claims about love, unless 
specifically noted.
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theories will fall at different points on this spectrum. Some thinkers will deliberately split 
the two poles, or use multiple words to indicate different portions. Typically, if  the split 
exists, it is the same claimed by Plato scholars: eros represents the sexual, while love (what 
Plato might call philein) represents the emotional. Yet as the editors of  a recent volume on 
the phenomenology of  eros have pointed out: 
The amplitude of  the multifaceted erotic phenomenon makes it very difficult to 
construct strict distinctions between eroticism and sexuality, eroticism and desire 
and furthermore between eroticism and love. This is why different 
phenomenologies of  love, desire, seduction, passions, sexuality and sexual 
difference are phenomenologies of  eros and vice-versa. The title “eros” and 
“erotic phenomenon” is often used to show the variable interconnection between 
those meanings and to evoke the platonic and neo-platonic basis for the 
philosophical treatment of  eros and the “erotic” wisdom of  philosophy (Lucy 
Irigaray, among others). From out of  different attempts toward a phenomenology 
of  eros, at least one common basis can be affirmed. In its numerous faces and 
traces, (sexuality, desire, passion, love, friendship, etc), the “erotic phenomenon” 
appears and becomes central in every attempt to grasp the condition of  
possibility for oneness and otherness, for selfhood and alterity, finitude and 
infinity.  18
Wittingly or not, all of  the thinkers referenced in this work have taken their stance on 
love, eros, or amour amid a vast web of  connotations, connections, and positions. Many 
have explicitly linked their own terms to Plato’s eros via direct citations of  the dialogues 
(which is not to say that they hold a Platonic theory of  eros). While they themselves 
maybe have only addressed or intended to address certain facets, the word bleeds, 
sometimes consciously, sometimes not, into other areas. As Jean-Luc Nancy notes,  
love and desire govern and exclude one another, each one representing both the 
finition and the infinition of  the other, each one capable of  falling outside the 
other, while neither can subsist in its essence closed off  from the other. There 
must be love in each gesture of  desire and vice versa.  19
 Jonna Bornemark and Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback, Phenomenology of  Eros (Södertörn University, 18
2012), 11.
 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality (Fordham University Press, 2013), 20.19
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When reading a phenomenology of  desire, one cannot help but ask how it connects to 
sex, love, or any number of  other terms. Eros, it seems, has a life of  its own, which has led 
Jean-Luc Marion to claim that any phenomenology of  eros must draw them together, that 
any “serious concept of  love distinguishes itself  by its unity, or rather by its power to keep 
together significations that nonerotic thought cuts apart, stretches, and tears according to 
the measure of  its prejudices.”  20
	 Although I will attempt to signal when authors are deliberately speaking to only 
some restricted aspect of  love or eros, my ultimate position on the topic will thus bear out 
the reasons for occasionally glossing over some of  the more minute distinctions that 
different thinkers are drawing between phenomena. The differences that will ultimately 
exist between Plato and contemporary views, I will argue, are not a result of  radically 
different concepts of  love, but rather a disagreement in how these different aspects can or 
should relate. Plato’s eros includes things that 20th century love or amour does not. It 
similarly excludes things that do factor in to love/amour. Each view divides the general 
term into different sub-categories. This is not a reason to surrender the hope of  a 
dialogue, but rather an opportunity to investigate what really ought to be included in the 
concept, regardless of  the name it is given.  
§2: What’s love got to do with (it)? 
	 This short discussion of  the nature of  love will suffice in order to get to the heart 
of  the issue: what are the effects of  love? Love, it is almost universally agreed, is a 
 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon (University of  Chicago Press, 2008), 4-5.20
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powerful force.  If  eros is something like a passion, its effect on us is surely greater and 21
more long-lasting than perhaps any other emotion. It is only natural to ask whether love 
exceeds itself, whether love impacts us in ways unrelated to our love-lives and, if  so, what 
it impacts and how. One of  the most common philosophical topic in this area has been a 
dispute over whether love is value-recognizing or value-granting.  Psychological and 22
scientific research has looked at love’s effect on brain chemistry, decision-making, 
childhood development, and much more.  All of  these are in fact at stake in the thesis I 23
offer here, but represent just tiny facets of  a much larger claim, which is that love answers 
the most primordial questions about who we are as humans. Love awakens us to (perhaps 
even creates in us) the reality of  intersubjectivity, and thus to the possibility of  ethics at 
all.  As such, this dissertation talks about a ‘sexual ethics’ not by way of  giving precepts 24
or maxims, but only arguing that, in its very constitution, the ethical attitude is grounded 
in a prior erotic encounter.  This does not mean that love replaces ethics, as if  I must 25
now feel a love for every person, but rather first, that my love for a specific individual is 
already an ethical relationship, and second, that my love for a specific individual makes it 
possible for me to live ethically toward every Other. That does not mean, however that no 
specific ethical claims will come out in this dissertation. On the contrary, the whole of  the 
 However, whether it is a force for good, as we will see especially in Part II, is not as commonly agreed upon.21
 Irving Singer argues for love as value-granting. Max Scheler’s middle position holds that there is a latent 22
value that is perceived, but it is also deepened. Gabriel Marcel seems to hold that love only recognizes value, 
it does not grant it. Dietrich von Hildebrand similarly speaks of  love as a value-response, indicating 
recognition rather than granting.
 Ruth Feldman, “The Neurobiology of  Human Attachments,” Trends in Cognitive Science, 21 (2007), 80-99, 23
provides an extensive review of  recent literature on the topic.  
 In my usage, I follow Levinas in treating intersubjectivity as the necessary grounds for ethics: without the 24
recognition of  the Other as other, ethics is impossible. 
 What exactly the rules of  ethics are would need to be worked out separately, if  such general rules could 25
be laid out at all. My own position leans toward one that is aretaic or sentimentalist approach, where moral 
action comes from developed dispositions, not rules of  action.
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dissertation is premised on the Levinasian thesis that alterity ought to be preserved by 
whatever system of  ethics we end up with. Thus any accounts of  love that are predicated 
on a kind of  absorption of  the other into myself, on viewing the other as merely an ‘other 
self,’ or denying him or her status prior to my granting it must be ruled out. Similarly, any 
views of  the Other that see him or her as merely a token of  a certain type, or as a 
reflection or imitation of  some general principle, or as merely dependent on some other 
reality for his or her lovableness also must be discarded. 
	 Thus, in addition to an eros that is taken to be a unified kind of  love, I also seek an 
eros or a love that is aimed directly at individuals. I love a person ‘for his own sake,’ and 
not for some principle that he or she stands in for, or some property he or she possesses. 
In the last part, I take this claim even further, and will argue there that not only do I love 
the individual, I do so without any reasons. Love could thus be taken as a kind of  
‘properly basic’ interaction: it has its beginning not in any other cause or fact, but simply 
begins. 
	 That does not mean, however, that there are not factors that are recognized in 
connection with love. Here I focus primarily on two, coming out of  the Platonic tradition: 
the goodness and beauty of  the individual loved. While a person’s being good or beautiful 
is not enough to explain my love for him or her,  these recognitions seem inextricably 26
tied up with eros. Or, to put the claim of  this dissertation even more strongly: 
Recognizing the beauty and goodness of  a person is essential for perceiving him or her as 
 I return to and develop this distinction in Part IV of  the dissertation. In brief, a thing’s being beautiful is 26
not sufficient to explain a love-response, nor is the lack of  a love-response necessary evidence of  a lack of  
beauty, and thus, although beauty-recognition is connected to love, it does not provide it a ratio.
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an Other in the first place. A person who does not appear beautiful does not appear as an 
Other to me. 
	 Thus we have the broad outline of  what is to be shown in this dissertation: 
1. Recognition of  the Other is based on recognizing his or her beauty and goodness 
2. Love of  the Other is love of  the Other as individual, not in light of  some attribute 
3. Love of  the Other forms the basis of  our entering into the ethical attitude. 
§3: General Outline 
	 In order to show the truth of  these three theses, I present the reception of  Platonic 
eros in four parts, offering four possible theories of  love, with each theory responding to 
issues raised by those prior to it. In each part, I have, for the most part, eschewed criticism 
in favor of  letting the view speak for itself. In between each section, brief  interludes serve 
as transitions from view to view, summarizing where we have arrived, and what work is 
still to be done to reach the overall conclusion of  the dissertation. 
	 The parts themselves play out as a kind of  descent and return, beginning with a 
received tradition—Platonic ethical eros—that is rejected and abandoned, before being 
partially recovered. In the final part, I provide a new interpretation that makes the full 
return of  ethical eros possible.  
	 Part I offers an in-depth reading of  eros from the Platonic point of  view, as seen, 
primarily in the Symposium and Phaedrus. Here, I show that Plato meets the first and third 
theses laid out above for an ethical eros, but fails to extricate eros from a heavily 
metaphysical view that threatens the status of  the Other, if  it doesn’t destroy him all 
together. Eros, in its origins in the Platonic dialogues, was already seen as the heart of  
ethics. Beauty and Goodness were seen as closely linked to each other and to the erotic 
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drive of  lovers. However, Plato’s ambivalence on whether one primarily ought to love 
individuals or Forms, and thus whether erotic ethics is fundamentally relational or 
individual, opens him up to critique. 
	 Part II picks up on Plato’s failing to recognize the alterity of  the Other, and begins 
a critique of  Plato from that point. Here I address Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, 
Jacques Lacan, and Shulamith Firestone as representative voices of  what I call ‘impossible 
eros.’ This view goes further than merely trying to introduce alterity into the Platonic 
account, and instead, condemns the whole Platonic view for its failure to recognize 
alterity, and in fact, sees all attempts at relational attitudes as destroying alterity, to the 
point of  declaring love itself  as impossible. The good life, settling the ambiguity in Plato, 
must be individual, and not relational. I will argue that these views fail to see the unity of  
the Good and the Beautiful, which is in part responsible for the perceived failing of  love.  
	 Part III is a direct response to Part II, reversing the decision in favor of  the self-
standing individual, and instead prioritizing the relation to the Other as a primordial 
truth. Here, I address Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jean-Luc Nancy, all of  
whom ascribe to what I have called ‘unspeakable eros.’ A simultaneous reintroduction of  
the Good, with direct reference to Plato’s works, leads to a recovery of  non-destructive 
relations to the Other, and the possibility of  love, but the failure to simultaneously recover 
beauty means love is silenced and cut off  from ethics, barely better than a necessary evil. 
	 Part IV, the conclusion of  the dissertation, attempts to recover the idea of  the 
Beautiful in similar ways to the already accomplished recovery of  the Good, and to rejoin 
what has been severed by so many since the beginning of  the 20th century. Rejoining the 
two bases for love, I argue that love can once again take on its proper role, assigned to it 
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already in Plato, as the basis of  ethics, and that, with beauty now reintroduced and 
adapted to the concerns of  alterity, love no longer needs to remain silent to remain 
possible. At long last, having gone through progressive criticisms of  the Platonic 
approach, we arrive back at an erotic ethics, which can finally account for the alterity of  
the Other, and avoid sinking into a metaphysical love of  first principles.  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PART I: PLATONIC EROS: DESIRE AND THE EROMENOS 
My weight is my love; it carries me, wherever I am carried.  1
CHAPTER 1: LOVE IN THE DIALOGUES 
	 In the opening pages of  the Symposium, we see Socrates make a somewhat 
surprising claim to knowledge, specifically to knowledge of  erotics (τὰ ἐρωτικά). That 
Socrates lays claim to any knowledge at all is in itself  an oddity, that he should do so in 
regards to the science of  eros even more so. Socrates’ later definition of  the daimon Eros as 
a philosopher perhaps explains this opening boast, with Socrates wishing to do no more 
than announce his own philosophical interest. This reading is perhaps strengthened even 
more from outside the text by his remarks in the Lysis, where Socrates notes he has an 
“erotic passion for friendship” (211e)  but that he is “so far from acquiring such a thing, 2
[he does] not even know in what way a person becomes a friend” (212a). Surely one who 
has no friends, nor who even knows how to make one, cannot possibly make a legitimate 
claim to the knowledge of  erotics, unless we divide eros and philia by a far wider chasm 
than the Greeks intended.  It may be compelling, then, to read Plato’s ‘erotic 3
dialogues’ (primarily, for my purposes here, the Symposium and Phaedrus) as being not about 
 Augustine, Confessions, XIII, 9.1
 πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν φίλων κτῆσιν πάνυ ἐρωτικῶς2
 Both Plato and Aristotle will regularly discuss the one in the context of  the other, with the clear 3
understanding that eros is, at least, a type of  friendship.
!17
actual love or desire,  but philosophy. Indeed much of  the literature on these dialogues 4
does precisely that, taking the cue from each dialogue’s apparent resolution in the sight of  
the Forms to indicate that the subject is wisdom, not erotic love. The discussions of  eros 
are thus diminished, while the references to the Forms, pedagogy and philosophy 
expanded.  5
	 However, here I wish to offer a more face-value reading. Or as Nicholson puts it, 
“[Plato] wants to declare a philosophy inadequate that has not taken its start from the 
deep recesses of  our erōs, our desire, and our memory.”  While there is no doubt that the 6
pursuit of  wisdom is a goal of  both dialogues, it is not the only goal. Or in other words, if  
both the Symposium and Phaedrus offer a theory of  wisdom, they also offer a theory of  
genuine, interpersonal love/desire. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, this reading 
is by no means novel, and there have always been proponents of  reading these dialogues 
as being theories about love. In fact, they represent, for most later philosophers, the 
beginning of  the philosophy of  love as a scholarly field.  Although certainly prior, few are 7
willing to take Empedocles’ strongly cosmological account of  love and strife as a basis for 
the topic. On the other hand, despite issues regarding the Athenian practice of  pederasty 
and the marginalization of  the feminine, the Symposium or Phaedrus remain highly relevant 
for contemporary discussions. Heidegger offers a lecture course on the Phaedrus in 1932, 
 See the introduction for a discussion of  the difficulty of  translating eros into English4
 As one recent example, see Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World. Chapters on “Cosmos,” “Questioning,” and “Self-5
Knowledge” indicate just how far beyond interpersonal love Plato’s erotic thought can be extended. Even 
more strongly, Muir proposes to “analyse the mythological language of  ‘lover and beloved’ in terms of  
their application to the ‘teacher and student,’” D. P. E. Muir, “Friendship in Education and the Desire for 
the Good: An Interpretation of  Plato’s Phaedrus,” Educational Philosophy & Theory 32, no. 2 (July 2000), 241.
 Graeme Nicholson, Plato’s Phaedrus: The Philosophy of  Love (Purdue University Press, 1999), 10.6
 Although philosophical insight can be gained by the still older works of  the poets and tragedians, it would 7
likely be wrong to say that either intended their works as a study of  love, rather than an expression of  it. 
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while references to both dialogues preoccupy Levinas in both Existence and Existents and 
Totality and Infinity. Both Luce Irigaray and Martha Nussbaum turn to Diotima’s speech as 
inspiration for their work. Thus in a work that is arguing for a contemporary 
understanding of  erotic love, it is eminently relevant to begin with the Platonic 
conception, that will, in each of  the subsequent chapters, act as a conversation partner 
and a foil, highlighting both the advances and shortcomings of  more recent theories of  
love. 
	 In particular, I will offer a broadly Platonic reading of  eros here in which the dual 
pursuit of  beauty and the eromenos results in an eros that gives birth to a Platonic 
conception of  ethics, while still functioning inside a metaphysical system. To do so I will 
explore four general theories of  love, pulled from the Symposium and Phaedrus, showing the 
development from a naive understanding to a full theory of  Socratic eros.  The first will 8
examine the discussion of  Athenian pederastic practices, with both its supporters (§1.1)—
Phaedrus, Pausanias and Agathon in the Symposium—as well as its detractors (§1.2)—
Lysias’ speech, as reported by Phaedrus and Socrates’ first speech in the Phaedrus. In the 
second sections, I will look respectively at the natural (§2.1) and mythical (§2.2) 
explanatory theories of  eros offered by Eryximachus and Aristophanes in the Symposium 
alongside dramatic parallels to each in the setting and general conversation of  the 
Phaedrus. Lastly, I will elaborate Socratic eros itself, as seen in the speeches of  Socrates and 
negatively in Alcibiades in the Symposium (§3.1), but finding its fullest expression in the 
palinode and second Socratic speech of  the Phaedrus (§3.2). These first three sections will 
be largely contextual, seeking to explore the range of  theories from which Plato attempts 
 Throughout this work I take the division of  Socratic love vs. Platonic love to be that between the theory 8
expounded in Socrates’ speeches alone, vs. a more synthetic reading of  the dialogues as wholes.
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to make his own argument and will provide in broad strokes, my own interpretation of  
the dialogues, while chapter two will seek to show, in more detail, the tension in Plato’s 
work between eros as a metaphysical relationship with Beauty and as an ethical 
relationship with the eromenos, as well as exploring one possible overall interpretation of  
Platonic eros, what is at stake between the two choices. 
§1: Cultural and Pederastic accounts of  eros 
	 It would be an enormous mistake to reduce the Symposium and Phaedrus down to 
the main Socratic speeches and declare that these represent, in their entirety and without 
hesitation, Plato’s own theory of  love. To dismiss the other speeches out of  hand as 
merely setting up Socrates’ reply overlooks a great deal of  richness in the argumentation, 
as well as significant insight into the cultural practice of  the day. This is particularly 
important in the Symposium and Phaedrus, which stand out in the Platonic corpus for giving 
large, uninterrupted speeches to Socrates’ companions. These speakers are not merely 
Meno’s slaveboy repeatedly stating simply ‘it seems so’ or even Glaucon repeatedly 
pushing Socrates to further explain. Rather, I offer a reading of  these early speeches that, 
rather than representing a naive opponent for Socrates to respond to, build the 
foundation upon which Socrates will overlay his more robust, theoretical account of  love.  9
Socrates’ speech takes up and adapts many of  the views of  the speakers before him, and 
directly targets others for rejection. To pass over those speeches, then, is to miss 
significance of  many of  Socrates’ comments. Further, I will argue that, particularly in the 
 As Ferrari notes, Socrates “manages to subsume into itself  important elements from the entire series of  9
preceding speeches,” “Platonic Love,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 253. If  we ignore the context 
from which those elements are plucked, we will fail to properly understand them.
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case of  the Symposium, we are not meant to unquestionably accept Socrates’ account and 
reject the speeches that come before his.	  
§1.1: The defense of  pederasty in the Symposium 
	 While it would be impossible to offer a complete explanation of  Athenian 
pederastic practices here,  the speeches of  Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Agathon each give 10
an insight into how pederasty, in its ideal form, was seen to benefit those that participated. 
In this form all three see pederastic eros as serving two primary functions: it was an 
unquestionably human, societal relationship, as well as a politico-ethical education for the 
younger eromenos.  Phaedrus notes that true love would inspire all people to be 11
courageous, “mak[ing the lover] as brave as if  he’d been born a hero” (179a), and that 
“the gods honor virtue most highly when it belongs to Love” (180a). Meanwhile, 
Pausanias concludes that an eromenos “is justified in performing any service for an erastes 
who can make him wise and virtuous” (184d). Lastly, Agathon, out of  a desire for 
completeness, notes at the end of  his speech that he as “spoken about the god’s [Eros’] 
 See Dover, Greek Homosexuality, which remains one of  the standard texts, for such an analysis.10
 I have chosen to generally leave this term untranslated, as the two usual translations, beloved or darling, 11
both seem to connote a much more romantic relationship than the Athenians had in mind. The younger 
eromenos was not expected to bear any romantic feelings toward the older erastes. A second word used, 
primarily in the Phaedrus, for the same person is pais, or boy. I have allowed this to be translated, as it lacks 
any major translational issues. It does, however, lose the connection to education (via words such as 
paidagogos, teacher), which does play a role in the pederastic relationship.  
	 Similarly, the translation of  erastes as lover is relatively unproblematic, as it adequately captures the feelings 
borne toward the eromenos, which were the reason one would take an eromenos, and in addition more 
immediately signals the connections Socrates is drawing between the pederastic relationship and lovers of  
wisdom, beauty, or goodness. For this reason, I have frequently use the translation ‘lovers’ in place of  the 
greek erastes, except when the use is specific to the pederastic relationship, and not extended to ‘lovers’ in 
general.  
	 When Plato speaks about the two together he simply says the erastes and his eromenos, as no common term 
adequately describes them. Any reference to ‘lovers’ in the plural is always a reference to multiple erastai, 
and not to a lover and his eromenos, a convention that I have followed here. See footnote 88 for an eventual 
exception to this rule. One further caveat to all of  this is that Socrates/Plato clearly envision that eromenoi 
eventually themselves become erastai, and claims about ‘lovers’ ought to be generally read as speaking 
about the potential of  all people, not only of  a subset.
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justice, moderation, and bravery; [only] his wisdom remains” (196d).  He thus succeeds 12
in attributing all four traditional cardinal virtues to the god Love, and by association, to 
those lovers who follow him and receive his gifts. Although certainly self-serving—all 
three speech givers are themselves involved in pederastic relationships—they nevertheless 
show us the primary case to be made for pederasty: not that it is a particularly romantic 
relationship, but instead that it is an educational one. The younger eromenos is initiated into 
city life by being taught the virtues and behaviors of  the good Athenian, and who will in 
turn, become a lover himself, ensuring the continued passing on of  virtue. It is for this 
reason that Socrates conjectures that Alcibiades has not ever taken an erastes, because 
“your own qualities, from your body right up to your soul, are so great there’s nothing you 
lack” (Alcibiades 104a). If  a person lacks nothing, then there is no reason to take an erastes, 
since the goal for the eromenos is to gain (be it in virtue, status, or wealth), not—at least 
primarily—to love.  
	 The seeds are therefore seen, already in the very first speeches, for what I am 
claiming as Plato’s own theory. Love is about ethics and education. The typical Athenian 
practice of  an older man and a younger boy feeds into this interpretation, modeling quite 
naturally the teacher-student relationship. But so far we have seen only affirmations and a 
few brief  examples to illustrate that this is the case. The early speeches keep well on the 
task of  the symposium—to praise the god of  Love—not to explain a philosophical theory. 
The praise lacks what Socrates will add later: an explanatory account for how virtue is 
inspired by eros. In addition, neither Phaedrus’ nor Agathon’s speech offers any criticism 
 Agathon’s speech is not, in the order given, one of  the early speeches. However in content, it fits best with 12
the two opening speeches, and may simply have been positioned later by Plato to return to those 
questions and have Agathon in position to be Socrates’ dialogical partner to begin his own speech.
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of  the god they praise. Love is divine, and therefore perfect, giving all good things to his 
followers. 
	 When Pausanias chooses to begin his speech by critiquing the naivety of  
Phaedrus’ overly general account (and at the same time, predicting the same naive 
idealization that will appear later in Agathon’s account), the older lawyer chooses to note 
the divisions that have to be made within love, initiating a long and contentious history of  
claiming that love does not consist of  an overall unity. There is, on the one hand, the 
heavenly Eros to whom all good things must be attributed, but also the base/common/
earthly Eros who is overly sexual and fails to live up to the high standards the speech 
givers are setting for love. These defensive divisions and classifications unsurprisingly 
come from the older erastes, while both optimistic accounts came from younger eromenoi. 
Pederasty, as I noted at the start, in its ideal form, was seen to serve a societal good. The 
reality, however was much more questionable, and it would be the elder erastai who stood 
to lose the most if  it turned out to be the embarrassment many were already claiming it to 
be. For this reason, Pausanias sets out to distinguish himself  from those who abused the 
system not as teachers of  virtue for young Athenians, but as seekers of  base pleasures. In 
the process, the notion that pederasty was not an individual relationship, but a societal 
one is highlighted and displayed. What follows in his speech is a variety of  distinctions 
and differentiations. In addition to the two loves, body and soul are divided, along with 
the male and female, and cities are sorted on the basis of  their overly strict or overly lax 
laws regarding pederasty (182a-d). 
	 This highly dualistic theory of  love is never fully overcome by Socrates’ later 
speeches, and many problematic elements first arise here: the identification of  the male 
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with heavenly love and the female with common love, and consequently the assumption 
that eros is wrapped up with, in at least its ideal, the pederastic relationship. At no point, 
in either the Symposium or the Phaedrus, does Socrates ever stop to address with any serious 
rigor the possibility of  an eros between male and female, or even, for that matter, between 
two equals.  Similarly we see the beginnings of  what slowly developed into the poorly 13
named ‘Platonic love,’ whereby pure love is separated from the ‘lewd’ sexual behavior of  
common love (181c). In addition, foreshadowing Socrates’s remarks in the Phaedrus, 
Pausanias points out that the lover is held by a kind of  madness, and that we allow 
behavior by a lover “so extraordinary, in fact, that if  they performed them for any other 
purpose [than love], they would reap the most profound contempt” (183a). The lover fails 
to be rational, makes oaths that nobody expects him to keep, and submits himself  in a 
kind of  willing slavery to the eromenos in order to gain his favors. In order that this 
relationship not harm the youth of  the city, it is, according to Pausanias, necessary and 
good that Athens has a complex set of  laws regarding these relationships. As Pausanias 
himself  notes, Athen’s laws “are designed to separate the wheat from the chaff, the proper 
love from the vile” (184a). The conclusion that proper behavior in love is not only the 
responsibility of  the lover himself, but also of  the city is a startling one, and one that will 
go largely undeveloped in later speeches. Yet it is precisely this point that I will wish to 
return to in part IV: the role of  the public in what is seen by most as a private affair. 
 This despite Socrates describing Diotima in terms that, if  it were not for the fact that she was a woman, 13
would lead a reader to suspect that the two were in a pederastic relationship themselves.
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§1.2: Critique of  Pederasty 
	 Not all of  Socrates’ interlocutors are so optimistic regarding the benefits of  love, 
most notably Lysias, whose speech is read by Phaedrus in the eponymous dialogue. In the 
speech, Lysias, takes up the sophistic task of  arguing that a young boy should give his 
sexual favors to the non-lover, rather than the lover. While the speech is presented as if  it 
were merely a rhetorical exercise, it is clear that Phaedrus himself  has become convinced 
by the argument, and the points made within, even if  in service of  a somewhat absurd 
conclusion, nevertheless represent a strong condemnation of  the typical behavior of  
lovers. 
	 The first thing to note is that Lysias’ speech implicitly endorses many of  the same 
distinctions of  love seen in Pausanias’ speech. Sex is separated from eros, as the potential 
eromenos is recommended to give his favors to the non-lover, the one who does not follow 
eros (τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἐρῶσιν). Henceforth, we have the possibility (indeed the 
recommendation) for considering sex as separate from eros. In a second division of  love, it 
is also never suggested that the non-lover is entirely disinterested in the young eromenos. 
Instead, Lysias makes clear that the one who should be gratified is the friend, as he notes 
“non-lovers . . . are friends with [the eromenos] before they achieve their goal, and you’ve 
no reason to expect that benefits received will ever detract from their friendship for 
you” (233a). Thus a division is also made between eros and philia. There is erotic love 
(which is nevertheless not defined by the sexual) and friendship love (which does not rule 
out the addition of  the sexual). Indeed, Lysias concludes his speech by asking the 
rhetorical question “have you been thinking that there can be no strong friendship in the 
absence of  erotic love?” (232c). The clear suggestion is that Lysias sees the possibility, 
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indeed the benefit, for friendship-love absent of  eros. Despite speaking of  the non-lover, 
Lysias’ speech does not argue that sexual favors should go to the disinterested person, but 
rather to the properly motivated one, the one who loves the eromenos in the ‘right’ way. 
	 What, then, is the characteristic of  this ‘right’ sort of  love, if  the sexual does not 
divide eros and philia? For Lysias, the first distinctive marker is clearly motivation. Unlike 
Pausanias, Lysias is unwilling to praise a lover for making promises with no intention of  
keeping them, or for sleeping in doorways hoping for a sight of  the eromenos. These 
actions, Lysias argues, are not a ‘willing slavery’ but an obligation placed on the eromenos. 
The erotic lover “keeps his eyes on the balance sheet” (231a), only giving as long as it is in 
his interest, as long as he benefits from the relationship himself. The non-lover (who might 
better be called the friendly lover, or even simply the friend) on the other hand “does the 
best he possibly can for [the eromenos], just as he would for his own business” (231a). The 
non-lover sees his venture of  love with clear eyes. The goal is the improvement of  his 
friend, not an exchange where he hopes to come out ahead.  In the end it will become 14
clear to the eromenos that the lover seeks not to improve the eromenos, but “the glory that 
comes from popular reputation” for having captured the best prize.  For this reason, the 15
lover “prevents the boy he loves from spending time with other people” (232c), guarding 
his claim over the boy from those who may steal him away. 
	 As a second mark of  the division, Lysias notes that eros has a fleeting nature, while 
friendship is long lasting. This results from eros’ beginning in the senses: “lovers generally 
start to desire your body before they know your character or have any experience of  your 
 One sees in this hints of  Aristotle’s later division between friendships of  use or pleasure on the one hand, 14
and friendship of  virtue on the other
 The use of  hunting metaphors throughout Plato’s discussions of  love reflect this attitude quite accurately15
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other traits, with the result that even they can’t tell whether they’ll still want to be friends 
with [the eromenos] after their desire has passed” (232e).  Eros and philia are 16
distinguished, therefore, not only by the behavior of  the lover, but by their arche, their 
beginning principle. Eros will start when the lover catches sight of  “a godlike face or 
bodily form that has captured Beauty well” (251c), as Socrates phrases it later in the 
dialogue, whereas the friend, is drawn in (Lysias implies) by an appreciation for some trait 
of  the eromenos’ soul.  17
	 A third and final division is the rationality of  the lover. In fact, as we will see in the 
third section of  this chapter, it is against this point that Socrates reacts most strongly, 
although he will ultimately accept some version of  all three points. “A lover will admit 
that he’s more sick than sound in the head. He’s well aware that he is not thinking 
straight, but he’ll say he can’t get himself  under control” (231d). This mania of  the lover, 
which Pausanias says we excuse in (but only in) those who are in love, is not seen to be 
beneficial by Lysias as it is by the symposiasts. There is no mention of  how great an army 
would be if  only it were comprised by erastai fighting beside their eromenoi (Symp. 
178e-179a), but instead, Lysias wishes to name this mania what it is, an illness, and ask 
why a eromenos would willingly take up with the sick.  
	 This final point makes up the bulk of  the second speech of  the Phaedrus, as 
Socrates sets out to offer, at the prompting of  Phaedrus, a better rhetorical speech on the 
topic than the one Phaedrus has just read.  The critique of  the speech that Lysias 18
 This is the same division drawn later by Aristotle, who notes that the arche of  eros is sight, while the 16
arche of  friendship is perceived virtue
 Lysias does not seem to strictly equate friendship with a virtuous friendship, however he does want to rule 17
out that its beginning may be in something as fleeting as physical appearance.
 Socrates is obviously speaking in an ironic tone in his first speech, but regardless of  his non-belief  in it, 18
the speech furthers the argument that the non-lover is superior to the lover, and thus merits examination.
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“seemed to [him] to be showing off, trying to demonstrate that he could say the same 
thing in two different ways, and say it just as well both times” (235a), along with the 
speech that Socrates offers in response perhaps indicates that Socrates is of  the opinion 
that the other two points are mere repetitions and rephrasing of  the discussion of  the 
lover’s illness. Here, Socrates redefines the hubris of  Pausanias’ common love  to be desire 19
taking control and overruling reason and self-control (238a). As a result, eros is 
characterized as a madness, and then quickly after, an illness: “Now a sick man takes 
pleasure in anything that does not resist him . . . that is why a lover will not willingly put 
up with an eromenos who is his equal or superior” (238e-239a). The remainder of  Socrates’ 
first speech is a litany of  those things that the sick lover looks for in a eromenos, and those 
things that he will deprive the eromenos of  in order to ensure that he can maintain his 
position of  power over him, and live unworried that he will leave him for another erastes. 
He will keep him ignorant, cowardly, and weak; he will seek out young men who have no 
family and few friends. The lover, “while he is still in love . . . is harmful and 
disgusting” (240e), while Love itself  is “like food, its purpose is to sate hunger” (241c). 
Concluding with an allusion to Homer, Socrates notes, “as the wolf  loves the lamb, so the 
lover adores his boy” (241d). 
	 The conclusion of  these two speeches is that eros is not the social good that its 
proponents claim, but instead harms Athens’ youth and stunts their development into 
good citizens in order that their older lovers may derive personal pleasure from them for 
as long as possible. Both also may be seen as taking Pausanias’ division of  love and 
developing it further, renaming the heavenly love (already defined as chaste and untainted 
 More generally, hubris was the Greek catch-all word used by the Athenians for sexual impropriety. 19
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by desire) for what it would, in fact, look like to those who saw it: friendship. The division 
of  love is no longer between good and bad eros, but instead, friendship (which is good) 
and eros (which is bad). It is, by the conclusion of  the early speeches of  the Phaedrus, no 
longer possible to have a praiseworthy eros for the eromenos. In comparison to the early 
speeches of  the Symposium, which leave us thinking that Love is the source of  all that is 
good and beautiful, the beginning of  the Phaedrus strives to convince us of  the opposite: 
love is a sickness, ugly and harmful. These contrasting views, no doubt, alter the Socratic 
speeches that will follow. There is however, another set of  preliminary sources of  love to 
examine before we turn to the Socratic: the dramatic structure of  the Phaedrus and the 
middle speeches of  the Symposium. 
§2: Explanatory accounts of  Eros 
	 If  the conclusion of  the early speeches of  the Phaedrus is that we can no longer 
turn to the supposed social benefits of  pederasty to praise eros, then perhaps we can 
instead find the solution in offering an explanation for why love exists. The Symposium 
accomplishes this by way of  the speeches of  Eryximachus and Aristophanes, while the 
Phaedrus somewhat surprisingly accomplishes it by the dramatic setting of  the dialogue as 
well as the seemingly trivial discussions that Socrates and Phaedrus have as they are 
walking to an appropriate site to begin the real philosophizing of  the day. In both cases, 
we get accounts of  eros that do not describe or explain how love between to people 
occurs, but rather explain how it came to be, what its origins are, and that seek to tie 
human love to the natural cosmos or to the lives of  the gods. This is what I mean by 
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calling these accounts cosmic or mythological. They are explanatory accounts that seek to 
situate human love into a broader cosmological and metaphysical picture. If  it is not 
unquestionably a social or ethical good, then maybe it can be defended as a natural 
process or a divine gift, either by more broadly defining love to encompass what we would 
today call natural processes (Eryximachus) or by telling of  its origins and its history 
(Aristophanes).  
§2.1: Natural Eros 
	 Eryximachus’ speech begins under somewhat inauspicious circumstances. 
Aristophanes, the next in line to follow Pausanias, has been struck by a sudden bout of  
hiccups (perhaps drawn out by his skepticism of  Pausanias’ account).  The responsibility 20
is delegated to Eryximachus to not only cure Aristophanes’ hiccups (not only is he a 
doctor, but his name itself  might be interpreted as belch-battler), but also to take his place 
in line while Aristophanes’ recovers. We might wonder how seriously the group assembled 
would have paid attention to Eryximachus’ speaking while, beside him, Aristophanes runs 
through, as he says after the fact (189a), all the possible cures Eryximachus had suggested: 
gargling, tickling his nose with a feather, and finally forcing himself  to sneeze (185d-e). 
Suggesting that Eryximachus’ speech itself  may cure his hiccups (perhaps either through 
its dullness or its laughableness), Aristophanes responds to the list of  potential cures not 
by indicating that he will make use of  them, but instead with a common Greek adage: 
“The sooner you begin to speak, the better” (185e). Whereas the transition from Phaedrus 
to Pausanias was seamless—Aristodemus as the unseen narrator notes that when he heard 
 This and the following interpretive points regarding Aristophanes’ hiccups were first suggested to me in 20
conversation by David Roochnik.
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the story, it was noted that there were speeches in between the two that could not be 
remembered, but otherwise there is no intervening scene between the two (180c)—this 
abrupt stopping of  the dramatic structure, and a change to the agreed-upon speaking 
order should draw our attention to the sudden shift that follows in the discourse about 
love.  21
	 Eryximachus begins, not by offering (as we might expect from a doctor) to heal the 
divide made by Pausanias, but by expanding it, calling it “very useful indeed” (186a). A 
scientist by trade, Eryximachus begins with a surprising claim, which he claims to have 
learned by studying medicine: “Love does not occur only in the human soul; it is not 
simply the attraction we feel toward human beauty: it is a significantly broader 
phenomenon. It certainly occurs within the animal kingdom, and even in the world of  
plants. In fact, it occurs everywhere in the universe” (186a). Among those things 
attributed to love throughout the speech are medicine, music, and farming. Eryximachus, 
mirroring what will be said later by Socrates in the Phaedrus, attributes the two loves not to 
the heavenly and the earthly, but instead to the healthy and the diseased (186b). 
Eryximachus also introduces a second point, which puts him at odds with many of  his 
fellow symposiasts: that love is between opposites, specifically, finding balance between 
two opposing elements, for example hot and cold or wet and dry (186d-e). The distinction 
drawn between healthy and unhealthy love is between the objects each desires. Healthy 
love has a proper desire for what will bring balance and concord, while unhealthy love 
desires the wrong objects, introducing and exacerbating imbalance. Here we see 
 However, what exactly this shift might represent is not agreed upon. See G.K. Plochmann “Hiccups and 21
Hangovers in the Symposium,” Steven Lowenstram, “Aristophanes’ Hiccups,” or Paul O’Mahoney “On 
the ‘Hiccuping Episode’ in Plato’s Symposium,” for some more detailed interpretations of  this scene.
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Phaedrus’ and Agathon’s optimistic views of  (healthy) love as calm and balanced, 
contrasted against the unhealthy, manic love Lysias and Socrates elaborate in the Phaedrus. 
On the whole, however, Eryximachus’ speech tells us very little about human love, focused 
instead on the broader implications of  love, with the only mention of  human sexuality 
being a reference back to Pausanias’ division of  love. Eryximachus’ speech represents 
such an explosive expansion of  eros as to make it nearly inconsequential on the individual 
person-to-person level, for if  Love is a god who rules over everything in the universe, 
surely there is little concern for individual encounters. 
	  While no similar speech is given in the Phaedrus, the far more extensive dramatic 
setting of  the dialogue provides some similar insights into how the human relates to the 
wider cosmic order. The first mention of  nature is from Phaedrus himself, who notes that 
he has been told by Acumenus that it is “more refreshing to walk along country roads 
than city streets” (227a). Acumenus is, as coincidence (or perhaps, Platonic planning) 
would have it, a relative of  Eryximachus, and a fellow doctor. The opening lines of  the 
dialogue also indicate that a clear shift has taken place, with Lysias’ own doctrines being 
expressed in the city, near the temple of  Zeus (227b), whereas Socrates’ own will soon be 
given under a tree, under the auspices of  the nymphs (230b). 	 	  
	 At first, Socrates seems to lean in to the possibility that nature may be a potential 
source of  learning about eros in this dialogue, describing in great detail the beautiful site 
to which Phaedrus has led him: 
The plane tree is tall and very broad; the chaste-tree, high as it is, is wonderfully 
shady, and since it is in full bloom, the whole place is filled with its fragrance. 
From under the plane tree the loveliest spring runs with very cool water . . . . Feel 
the freshness of  the air; 
how pretty and pleasant it is; how it echoes with the summery, sweet song of  the 
cicadas’ chorus! The most exquisite thing of  all, of  course, is the grassy slope. It 
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rises so gently that you can rest your head perfectly when you lie down on it.
(230b-c) 
But after this description, Socrates is immediately teased by Phaedrus for appearing as if  
he is a foreigner in his own land, appearing as if  “[he had] never even set foot beyond the 
city walls” (230c-d). In response, Socrates, contrary to the glowing review he has just 
given to the landscape, quickly shuts down an investigation into the scenery, noting that 
he is “devoted to learning, and landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only the 
people in the city can do that” (230d). Socrates is similarly pessimistic about giving a 
natural account of  the myth of  Borreas and Oreithuia that supposedly occurred near 
their location, namely that it may have merely been that the young girl, playing with her 
friend, was blown over the cliff  by a gust of  wind (229c). To offer this naturalization of  
the mythic, Socrates points out, leads to the problem of  having to do the same for all 
myths, at which point he notes, “I have no time for such things; and the reason, my friend, 
is this. I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really 
seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that” (229e). 
Expanding this claim, we can also conclude that it would be pointless to attempt to 
naturalize Eros, a similarly divine being. Whatever account, then, we can expect to draw 
from the Phaedrus, we should not look for one that (in the vein of  Eryximachus’ speech), 
changes Eros from a god to a natural phenomenon. Plato, too, seems to steer away from 
reliance on nature, with repeated references to the strangeness (ἀτοπώτατός, the 
superlative of  ἄτοπος, lit. out-of-place or without-place) of  Socrates. This is a person, 
Phaedrus seems to be informing us, who exists outside the place and time he currently 
inhabits; his teachings, far from being tied to the natural world, exist only on another 
plane. 
!33
	 At that point, the dialogue transitions into the human-focused speeches of  Lysias 
and Socrates. However, Socrates returns to nature immediately upon ending his first, 
ironic speech, noting that, if  he continued to speak, “the Nymphs to whom [Phaedrus] 
cleverly exposed [him] will take complete possession of  [him]” (241e). Similarly the 
position of  the sun, “straight-up” above them at noon, is presented by Phaedrus as an 
omen that they ought to remain in the place a while longer, discussing the topic (242a). 
Socrates submits to Phaedrus’ desire but only because he notes that his daimon has once 
again intervened, with Socrates noting that it occurs “just as I was about to cross the 
river” (242b). These natural markers, symbols of  something greater, compel Socrates to 
remain and offer his recantation. Nature appears again, after Socrates’ second speech, 
when he notes that the whole event has been watched over by the cicadas (mentioned 
already in Socrates’ opening description of  the place), who “will be very pleased and 
immediately give us the gift from the gods they are able to give to mortals,” namely they 
will “go to the Muses [who created them] and tell each one of  them which mortals have 
honored her” (258e-259c). Finally, at the very end of  the dialogue, Socrates attributes 
what they have learned (contrary to what he asserted at the start) to the place they have 
dwelt in, noting “how much more artful with speeches the Nymphs, daughters of  
Achelous, and Pan, son of  Hermes, are . . . than Lysias” (263d). It is thus the various gods 
of  nature to whom Socrates attributes any knowledge of  love that he has disclosed to 
Phaedrus that day, later telling him to “go and tell Lysias that we came to the spring 
which is sacred to the Nymphs and heard words charging us to deliver a message” to 
Lysias and the sophists, to Homer and the lyricists, and to Solon and the politicians to 
compose their speeches “with a knowledge of  truth,” and come to deserve the name 
!34
“philosopher” (278b-d). The dialogue finally ends with one last ode to the gods of  nature, 
a prayer that Socrates begins, “O dear Pan and all the other gods of  this place . . . ,” and 
that asks (very much in the spirit of  Eryximachus’ speech) that Socrates be “beautiful 
inside, and that his external possessions be in friendly harmony with what is 
within” (279b).  
	 We thus see, in Socrates and Phaedrus’ comments of  the setting of  the dialogue a 
shift from beginning to end, where, as the speeches take (in at least Plato’s editorial 
opinion) a turn toward the truth, nature and the gods who rule it become more and more 
central, and are attributed more and more responsibility for what knowledge is gained 
from them. Although Socrates stops short of  ever completely naturalizing eros or 
assigning an eros to nature itself, these two sources, Eryximachus and the setting of  the 
Phaedrus, begin to draw out the tensions that exist within eros. We have already seen eros 
presented as a human enterprise (even if  it owes its virtue to the divine status of  Eros), 
now we see attempts to place it within the natural cosmos, connecting the human with the 
animal and vegetal. In the following section we will see a third element come in, the 
emphasis on the divine elements of  Eros. These tensions within eros all lead to the larger 
tension (to be discussed in chapter 2) that exists in the Platonic theory of  whether eros 
exists in the realm of  metaphysics (the understanding of  how humans, nature, and gods fit 
into an ordered cosmos) or ethics. 
§2.2: Divine Eros 
	 Although the Phaedrus does not directly attribute eros to nature, it does attribute it 
to the divine, which is the subject of  a similar discussion within the dialogue’s dramatic 
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setting, as well as the topic of  Aristophanes’ lengthy speech at the midpoint of  the 
Symposium.  Rather than attempting to fit the human into its position within the natural 22
cosmos, Aristophanes’ speech and the scattered dramatic remarks of  the Phaedrus seek 
instead to situate the human realm of  eros within a divine context.  No doubt the most 23
interesting of  the early Symposium speeches, and arguably more so than Socrates’ own, 
Aristophanes’ breaks from the earlier speeches in a number of  interesting ways. Firstly, it 
takes the form of  a myth-telling, rather than an encomium, and secondly he does not seek 
to praise love, but rather, so that love can be praised properly by the others, to “explain 
[Love’s] power” (189d).  We are thus presented with a mythological/historical account 24
of  love, both as a god and as it exists between individuals, so that we may, according to 
Aristophanes, better understand him and why he deserves the greatest praise. The 
implied premise, therefore, is that the previous speakers (Phaedrus, Pausanias, and 
Eryximachus) have all misunderstood love’s nature. Aristophanes’ speech therefore, much 
like Eryximachus,’ represents a decisive break in the theory of  love being offered so far at 
the symposium. By the end of  his speech we will now have to choose between three 
different interpretations of  love: societal, natural, or mythical. 
	 Aristophanes’ highly mythological speech describes human nature as once 
doubled—each person with 2 faces, 4 arms, 4 legs, and a large, round body—before the 
 Socrates’ speech in the Phaedrus also deals at length with the eros of  the gods, which will be addressed 22
separately in the following section. The discussion here will be restricted to what Plato presents as the 
common view.
 As the many references to the Nymphs and to Pan in the last section should indicate, these are not 23
entirely exclusive categories for the ancient Greeks. However, I have chosen to address the former ‘minor 
gods’ in the context of  the natural world to which they governed, rather than placing them with the 
major Olympian gods addressed in this section.
 There are however, no clear attributions beyond his introductions of  Love itself  being a god. Hyland 24
takes this to indicate that “Eros is not a god at all! Eros is our human condition” Drew A. Hyland, Plato and 
the Question of  Beauty (Indiana University Press, 2008), 39. Whether or not this conclusion is accepted, 
there is no doubt that the divine plays a role in the creation of  human eros.
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gods grew worried that their power would be usurped by the humans. Unable to kill off  
humans (lest they lose the source of  the sacrifices and offerings they received), Zeus 
instead splits humans down the middle, dividing the doubled bodies into ones nearly 
identical to the human body today. Their faces were turned around so that they would see 
the wound and be reminded of  what would happen if  they once again threatened the 
gods. This wound, on what would have been their back, was sewed up, Aristophanes 
explained, forming the navel, and the head turned around, so that what was once the 
back became the front.  
	 The new human body was identical to its current anatomy, except for one 
important difference: since the head had been turned to face the back, the genitals now 
faced the back of  the body, rather than the front. As it transpired, this was a significant 
flaw, as the newly divided humans spent all their time seeking their other half, and, upon 
finding him or her, embraced that person and ceased eating and drinking, dying “from 
hunger and general idleness” (191a). Zeus, “taking pity on them” (191b), moved the 
genitals to the front, and changed human nature so that they reproduced via intercourse, 
rather than spawning (191c). So now, when two halves embraced, “they would at least 
have the satisfaction of  intercourse, after which they could stop embracing, return to their 
work, and look after their other needs in life” (191c). In the case that the two halves were 
a male and a female, there was the added benefit (for the gods) that children would be 
produced and more humans to offer sacrifices (it was already noted that, in splitting them 
in half, the population would be doubled, becoming “more profitable to [the gods],” who 
would receive additional offerings” [190d]). On the other hand, humans live under the 
!37
threat that, should they ever again threaten the rule of  the gods, Zeus will split them in 
half  again, so that “they’ll have to make their way on one leg, hopping” (190d). 
	 This myth serves as Aristophanes’ basis for explaining how love functions today, 
and introduces several important theses into the conversation. First, it transforms love into 
something highly nostalgic. Love does not seek a new union between two people, but a 
return to a unity that once existed in the past and was taken away. Love, although it is 
only in Aristophanes that generation and sexuality is introduced into the dialogue, is not 
about creating something new, but rather about returning to a previous state that has 
been lost. Reproduction is only for the benefit of  the gods, not the good of  humans. 
	 Second, the goal of  lovers is to become one, since they were (whether with each 
other or with others they can no longer find) doubled. Thus Aristophanes argues that if  
offered to be physically rejoined by Hephaestus, the smith-god, “no one who received 
such an offer would turn it down; no one would find anything else that he wanted” (192e). 
It is wrong, then, to think of  lovers as being two individuals, but rather as two halves of  
the same unity. 
	 Third, as mentioned above, this is the speech of  the Symposium that most directly 
introduces sexuality into love. While Pausanias discusses the sexual immorality of  hubris, 
only Aristophanes discusses the purpose of  sex, namely: to procreate, in order that a 
never-ending supply of  humans can offer sacrifices to the gods, and so that, upon feeling 
the pleasure and release of  intercourse, lovers can return to the toil of  everyday life. Sex 
gives, Aristophanes argues, a telos to the embrace of  love, so that it may be completed and 
ended. However, while this gives some pleasure to humans, it is only introduced by the 
gods for their own benefit, so that humans are not constantly dying out from starvation.  
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	 Consequently, at no point in Aristophanes’ speech is love ever connected to 
beauty, a key feature of  all of  the other speeches. This helps to show, once again, that eros 
has been introduced, not for the good of  humans, but the benefit and safety of  the gods. 
Whether it is something beautiful for man is secondary to whether it will ensure the 
continued reign of  the Olympians. This is what Aristophanes is referring to at the 
beginning when he promises to speak of  “the power of  Love (189c),” through the unity 
love brings about, humans become powerful enough to challenge the gods themselves.  25
Although Aristophanes’ speech is full of  seemingly comic descriptions of  cartwheeling, 
spherical humans, the result is an extremely tragic eros. Split in half, and threatened by 
the gods with a second division into quarters, love is the never-ending, unachievable 
search for reunification with our missing half.  
	 Finally, Aristophanes continues to divide love even further, introducing the 
premise that there were original three kinds of  humans, male, female, and androgynous, 
accounting for pederastic, heterosexual, and lesbian relationships by an appeal to a 
threefold human nature. Now, not only may there be a high and low form of  eros within 
pederasty (Pausanias), pederasty itself  represents its own form of  eros, distinct from other 
relationships. And it is not only distinct, but superior, as the young men who participate in 
pederastic relationships are “the best of  boys and lads, because they are the most manly in 
their nature . . . . They are bold and brave and masculine . . . . [T]hese are the only kind 
of  boys who grow up to be real men in politics” (192a). Again, pederasty is attributed the 
good of  forming good citizens, while those men who come from androgynous natures are 
often “lecherous” (191d). 
 In addition to beauty never being mentioned, once Aristophanes’ myth begins, Love itself  is almost never 25
referred to as a god, but only as a feeling between humans.
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	 The importance of  myths is (although to a lesser extent than nature) a focus of  the 
dramatic set-up of  the Phaedrus as well. In the reference to the Boreas myth discussed in 
the previous section, Socrates notes that, rather than naturalize and rationalize it, he will 
“accept what is generally believed” (230a). In addition, the second half  of  the dialogue 
contains a discussion (also seen above) of  the myth of  the cicadas, as well as the Egyptian 
myth of  Theuth, regarding the origins of  writing as a “potion for memory and for 
wisdom” (274e). When Phaedrus accuses Socrates of  making up the story and 
unfalsifiably attributing it instead to a foreign people (the Egyptians), Socrates asks him, 
rather than being concerned with the myth’s origins, why “don’t you just consider 
whether what [it] says is right or wrong” (275b-c). These various myths set a backdrop 
against which Socrates will give his great myth of  the charioteer in his second speech, a 
backdrop that sees myths, whether factually true or false, as telling us something true 
about the state of  the world today. As in Aristophanes’ speech, the myths are used, not 
merely to tell an origin story or a tale that has long since lost its relevance, but instead to 
give an explanation of  how things are in the present. These various mythic accounts of  
ancient gods serve, not just to present an immemorial past, but instead to justify present 
behavior.  
	 In addition, finishing his second speech, Socrates notes that they should continue 
to speak, not because he has a desire to, but because, if  they do not, the cicadas will 
report back negatively to the Muses that they serve (259a). This mirrors the earlier, more 
well-known scene when, having given his first speech, Socrates is prevented from leaving 
because “the familiar divine sign came to [him] which, whenever it occurs, holds [him] 
back from something [he is] about to do” (242b-c). His second speech then, is 
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immediately motivated, not by the shame he already felt at the first (he notes at the outset 
that he will give it with his head covered, speaking as fast as he can [237a]), but because 
the divine has intervened. Here we see the divine operating in a second way—less present 
in Aristophanes’ speech—not merely as an explanation for the origin of  the present 
condition, but as an immediate actor in events. In doing so, the dramatic setting of  the 
Phaedrus returns to the basis of  many of  the early speeches of  the Symposium: that it is the 
gods (specifically Love) responsible for giving good things to lovers. 
	 Thus, we have developed, in both dialogues on love, a third choice for how love 
operates: we first saw eros presented as a social, ethical or political relationship that 
instructed young men in virtue. When that account begins to be questioned (either by 
Lysias and Socrates’ speeches in the Phaedrus, or by the arrival of  Aristophanes’ hiccups), 
the ethical relationship is dropped for some sort of  explanatory, metaphysical account. 
Perhaps eros is something that ties us to the natural world, that links our bodies to the 
animals and the plants, which all feel the same longing.  Or, if  eros does not belong to 26
our bodies, perhaps it belongs to our souls, the divine element within us. Perhaps we can 
attribute eros to our connection with the gods. In either case, these latter accounts move 
eros away from the ethical and into the ontological. If  eros cannot be trusted to make us 
just, maybe it simply is part of  our nature. But these accounts also raise a host of  new 
questions that Socrates will have to address: is human nature complete in itself, or are we 
seeking some return and reunification? Where does man sit in between the animal and 
the divine?  And further, what are we to make of  the numerous divisions that have cut 
 One of  the few references to eros in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a quotation from Euripides, that “the 26
earth loves (ἐρᾶν) rain when the ground is dry,” 1155b. Plato is likely aware of  this quotation as well, as 
David Sansone points out at length the influence Euripides had on Plato in “Euripides and Plato,” noting 
that he is the third most commonly cited author after Homer and Simonides, “Plato and Euripides,” 
Illinois Classical Studies 21 (1996), 41.
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eros (supposedly a god, in addition to a human emotion): heavenly and common, healthy 
and sick, love and friendship, masculine, feminine, and androgynous, etc. Are we no 
longer able to speak of  eros as one concept, but only one of  many distinct phenomena, 
some deserving of  praise and others of  condemnation? If  so, how do we determine which 
ones to praise? 
§3: Socratic accounts of  Eros: Kalon and the Other 
	 Perhaps it is a sign that Socrates is unwilling or unable to answer these 
complicated questions in the Symposium that the dialogue provides as an interlude a return 
to the praise of  an ethical pederasty from Agathon. However, there is no doubt that 
Socrates takes up each of  these questions in his speech, whether or not he provides a 
compelling response to them. This is why the reader looking for a Platonic theory of  love 
cannot skip immediately to the Socratic interventions. What I have shown here is not the 
central importance of  the early speeches, but instead the smaller claim that these early 
speeches cannot be ignored. The earlier speeches raise three specific problems that will 
form the basis of  Socrates’ own speeches: the question of  pederasty as a socio-political 
institution, the situation of  human eros between nature and the divine, and in each of  
these accounts, the division of  eros into categories (heavenly/common, male/female, 
etc.). In addition, although each of  these questions is raised in both the Symposium and 
Phaedrus, the context of  each Socratic speech differs greatly. The Symposium largely praises 
pederasty and firmly situates eros as a divine element (Eryximachus’ speech is the one 
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exception here), while the Phaedrus begins with a strong critique of  pederasty, and a 
dramatic reliance on the natural setting of  the meeting between Socrates and Phaedrus.  
	 We must be careful, then, in addition to not reading Socrates’ speeches in isolation 
of  what comes before them, of  not reading them in an overly syncretic way. What 
Socrates argues in the Symposium is not, in toto, what he argues in the Phaedrus. There are 
two reasons for this. First, the standard Socratic argumentum ad hominem is at work. Socrates 
consistently targets his speeches toward his interlocutors in a specific way. A Socratic 
speech to a general will not be the same as to an aristocrat, even if  the topic is the same. 
So, it is natural that a speech reacting against those strongly praising pederasty will differ 
from one answering a Sophist who is denouncing the practice. Socrates in both cases is 
seeking an answer toward the middle, but is approaching it from opposite sides. This 
point is, I suspect, an unsurprising and uncontroversial one among Plato scholars. The 
second, more contentious reason is that the Phaedrus represents, in several respects, a 
revision or correction of  the theory of  eros in the Symposium. Here I am very much in 
agreement with A.W. Price who notes that “as an account of  love, Socrates’ contribution 
to the Symposium has deficiencies to make one glad that it does not constitute Plato’s final 
word. It invites supplementation in a number of  respects.”  In order to highlight these 27
supplementations, the current section will present a general interpretation of  each 
Socratic speech, before proceeding to more extensive evaluations of  the two objects of  
love discussed, the Kalon and the eromenos, with the relation between these two poles being 
the fundamental point underlying the difference between the two texts. 
 A. W. Price, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (Clarendon Press, 1989), 55.27
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§3.1: Socratic Eros I: The Symposium 
	 Plato makes the ad hominem nature of  Socrates’ Symposium speech immediately 
obvious. Socrates attempts twice to turn the symposium into a more familiar dialogue, 
first after Aristophanes speech, when he asks Agathon whether or not he would feel more 
shame for doing something shameful in front of  the wise than in front of  ordinary 
people.  Here, he is immediately stopped by Phaedrus who notes that if  Agathon 28
answers Socrates, the job of  each praising Eros will never be completed. However, 
Socrates immediately renews his quest for a discussion when Agathon finishes his speech, 
recanting his earlier claim to knowledge, noting that he “realized how ridiculous [he’d] 
been . . . to say that [he] was a master of  the art of  love, when [he] knew nothing 
whatever of  this business, of  anything whatever ought to be praised” (198d). Having 
negated his early claim to the knowledge of  erotics, Socrates positions himself  to attempt 
to draw the answer out of  Agathon dialectically rather than offer his own speech of  
praise. As a result, he begins by targeting the heart of  not only Agathon’s speech, but the 
entire night, leading Agathon down a path of  questioning to the conclusion that Eros 
cannot possibly be beautiful or good, since it desires these things, but nobody desires what 
he already has (201c). Having brought Agathon (whose speech, we are told, was greeted 
by a large burst of  applause by all there, “so becoming to himself  and to the god did they 
think the young man’s speech” [198a]) to admit that he did not, in fact, know what he was 
talking about either, Socrates then turns to recount a similar discussion he had with a 
priestess named Diotima, who taught him this line of  argumentation. 
 The Greek here, αἰσχρόν, is equally translated as shameful or ugly, just as καλόν can be both noble or 28
beautiful.
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§3.1.1: Eros’ Parentage 
	 Socrates’ speech proceeds in three distinct stages, the first mirrors Socrates’ own 
dialogue with Agathon, with Socrates noting that he himself  once gave the exact same 
sort of  speech as Agathon to Diotima. After Diotima takes Socrates through this line of  
argumentation, however, she does not stop, but instead shifts to an entirely different view 
point, discussing not the divinity Eros, but instead human eros itself, suggesting that eros 
is a human drive toward immortality. This too, however, comes to an end, and Diotima 
then suggests that Socrates is perhaps well-disposed “to be initiated into these rites of  love 
. . . the final and highest mystery” (210a). The suggestion here is that what precedes it is 
merely preliminary, offering not the truth about Eros but instead a convenient story that 
may give some insight into love to the common person. The idea that there is a secret 
gnosis about Eros, that love is not something available to all, is at first shocking but, as we 
shall see, not at all surprising when we discover what exactly this secret teaching holds.  
	 Despite the first portion of  Socrates’ speech repeating the argument that Eros 
cannot be good and beautiful, and therefore cannot be a god (202d)—since nobody would 
deny that the gods possess everything good and beautiful—Socrates does not separate 
Eros from the divine entirely. Eros’ lack of  beautiful and good things makes him neither 
ugly nor bad, instead, Socrates reports that Diotima teaches him that Eros is a ‘great 
daimon,’ an intermediary between the gods and mortals—between beauty and ugliness—
communicating messages and gifts from the gods and delivering sacrifices and prayers 
from mortals (202e). With that, Socrates mediates one of  the debates of  the earlier 
speeches. If  we are looking for an explanatory role of  eros, we should not look for it in the 
completely natural (the ugly and bad), nor in the completely divine (the beautiful and the 
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good), but in between. It is interesting to note here, however, that in the Symposium, it is 
not the human itself, a combination of  body and soul that is presented as the in between. 
Humanity represents the opposite pole from the divine, which needs to be mediated by 
eros.  As we will see, the account in the Phaedrus will view this slightly differently. 29
	 It is Eros’ parentage, Diotima explains, that has given Eros this role. The myth 
that follows contains the heart of  Diotima’s first description of  love. Eros was conceived 
on the day of  Aphrodite’s birth, the son of  a sleeping Poros (plenty/resource) and Penia 
(poverty), who sought to ameliorate her position by having a child by Poros. This, Diotima 
explains, is the reason why Eros always seeks after beauty, because he was conceived on 
the day of  Aphrodite’s birth. Eros’ fate to constantly seek but never obtain good and 
beautiful things is likewise explained through his parentage, thanks to his mother, he is 
“far from being delicate and beautiful . . . he is instead tough and shriveled and shoeless 
and homeless . . . always living with Need.” However, he has also received gifts from his 
father, who has made him “a schemer after the beautiful and the good; he is brave, 
impetuous, and intense, an awesome hunter . . . resourceful in his pursuit of  intelligence, 
a lover of  wisdom [i.e. a philosopher] through all his life” (203c-d). Caught between the 
natures of  his parents, Eros is “never completely without resources, nor is he ever rich . . . 
between wisdom and ignorance” (203e). We thus arrive, through Love’s origin, to a 
daimon who looks very much like Socrates himself, barefoot and seeking after wisdom. 
 One of  the primary reasons for this is that Diotima’s speech appears to present humans as without an 29
immortal soul. Whether this is true however, is debated. Price, Love and Friendship, 30-35 gives a good 
summary of  the issue. Hackforth, “Immortality in Plato’s Symposium,” reads the speech as strictly 
incompatible with the doctrine of  the immortality of  the soul given elsewhere in Plato’s corpus, while 
others, including Dover,  Symposium, and Luce, “Immortality in Plato’s Symposium: A Reply,” argue that the 
text may not be as skeptical as it seems.
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	 There are several major problems with this mythological account, however, and if  
it were taken to be the true teaching of  love, we should, rather than praise it as a seeker of  
beauty and truth, question whether it is not, in fact, ugly and bad. Firstly, we are told and 
quickly led past the fact that eros is the child of  a rape. Poros is drunk on nectar at the 
celebration for Aphrodite, and has wandered into the garden and fallen asleep. There 
Eros is conceived, not in search of  beauty or goodness, but out of  selfish desire, as Penia 
seeks to improve her situation. Eros’ conception is thus doubly ugly, the product of  rape 
and the result of  selfish greed. We perhaps should not expect anything else from an origin 
story of  love (love’s very conception could, without risk of  mythological contradiction, be 
the result of  a loving union),  however we should stop and consider that the example of  30
seeking beauty and goodness that eros receives from his mother is not as a virtuous seeker, 
as Diotima would have us believe, but instead as one who schemes out of  self-interest 
without concern for the consequence of  her actions.  
	 Second, we are told that it is due to his father, Poros that Eros received his 
scheming nature (in an attempt to cover the viciousness of  his conception), and yet it is 
Penia who is the schemer that day; Poros has everything he needs, and, although he is 
described as the son of  Metis (cunning), displays only the excess of  his own nature 
through his drunkenness in the myth. We might then ask, if  Penia already represents the 
poor beggar, scheming to improve her lot, what, if  anything, Eros has gained from his 
father. Eros seems to be his mother’s child alone.  
	 This interpretation continues the Symposium’s general debate regarding the 
parentage of  Eros, with Phaedrus noting that his parents are not mentioned anywhere in 
 This point highlights the need (as discussed in the Introduction) to not equate eros with desire, even 30
sexual desire. It may not be what we mean by ‘romantic love’ today, but nor is it merely desire.
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poetry or legend, but only (quoting Parmenides) that “the very first god [she] (sic) 
designed was Love” (178b),  attributing Eros’s birth only to an unnamed goddess. 31
Pausanias, in making his divide between heavenly and common eros, ascribes the 
distinctions to the parentage of  Aphrodite, who Eros follows, with the common Aphrodite 
sharing in both the male and the female (her parents are Zeus and Dione), while heavenly 
Aphrodite is born from Uranus directly, with no mother. Her virtue is thus attributed to 
her not sharing in the feminine.  For Diotima/Socrates to then claim that Eros effectively 32
has only a mother, shares only in the feminine, should cause us to reflect more carefully on 
the claims that follow, to ask what the significance is. At least two readings seem possible 
at this point: either what follows is not in fact a virtuous love, or that the equation of  Love 
with masculinity (and therefore also courage ) is wrong for some other reason. 33
	 A similar debate runs through the dialogue regarding Love’s age, with Phaedrus 
naming him among the oldest gods, while Agathon makes him the youngest. Pausanias’ 
division combines the two, noting that, in addition to not sharing in the feminine, 
heavenly Aphrodite’s virtue (and therefore also the virtue of  the heavenly Eros who 
follows her) comes from being “older, free from the hubris of  youth” (181c). Socrates, in 
making the setting for his myth Aphrodite’s birth, as well as mentioning the “garden of  
Zeus” (203b), is likely discussing the younger of  the Aphrodites. Here, we find another 
surprising fact in the birth of  Eros, not only is he for all intents and purposes fatherless—a 
 Bury names Birth as the goddess, perhaps due to the inclusion of  the definite article in the phrase 31
“δὲ τὴν γένεσιν” (178b), however, this reading is at odds with Phaedrus’ intended use of  the quotation, to 
show that “parents of  Love there are none, nor are any recorded in either prose or verse.” Thus, it seems 
unlikely that he would select a quote that listed any particular goddess as his mother. Indeed, even the 
interpolation of  ‘she’ in the the version quoted above 
 Pausanias glosses over the fact that, despite not having a mother, Aphrodite is herself  female.32
 Andreia, courage, could alternatively be translated as ‘manliness.’33
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sure indication, the previous speech-givers would have us believe, of  his viciousness, he is 
also among the youngest gods, which Pausanias likewise credits with the vice of  hubris. 
While Agathon, on the other hand, will credit the eternally youthful Eros with all of  the 
cardinal virtues, his excessive praise is the target of  Socrates’ questioning, and Agathon is 
in the end forced to admit that he “didn’t know what [he] was talking about in that 
speech” (201b). Thus, although Diotima describes him as the lover, rather than the object 
loved, the daimon Eros does not seem to take the form of  the old, male typical of  the 
erastes in a pederastic relationship. Despite speaking of  Eros in terms that strongly evoke 
the character of  Socrates himself, Diotima leaves us, in this first section, with a young, 
exclusively feminine Eros—a sure recipe, according to both Pausanias and Alcibiades’ 
earlier speeches, for viciousness and lewdity.   34
	 All of  these lead us to see Socrates’ speech as drawing a strict conflict, at least in 
the early portion of  his speech, between the explanatory, metaphysical account of  love 
and the social, ethical one. If  we accept the origin account of  love, then surely it has little 
concern for ethics beyond the egoistic acquisition of  the good and beautiful, through 
whatever schemes it can think of. Likewise, if  we accept the account that the pederastic 
relationship models a kind of  education of  virtue, it will be very difficult for the Athenian 
audience to accept a divinity who is young, feminine, and conniving. It seems that at this 
point Socrates is forcing us to choose one side or the other; either love improves the 
 Both Pausanias and Aristophanes criticize feminine love while praising all-male love. Pausanias, for 34
example, bases his criticisms of  common Aphrodite on the fact that she participates in both female and 
male (having been born from and similarly criticizes her followers for loving both women and boys. In 
contrast, virtuous ‘heavenly’ Aphrodite was born only from Zeus, and is “partakes only in the male and 
not the female,” the basis of  its praiseworthiness. Aristophanes similarly accuses those souls born of  a 
Female or Androgynous proto-human of  adultery,  see Phaedrus’ praise of  women.
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situation of  the lover or it improves the situation of  the one loved. It can’t do both. As we 
will see soon, this also results in a splitting of  the object of  love. 
§3.1.2: Birth in Beauty 
	 If  this transformation of  Eros into a youthful, feminine spirit went unnoticed by 
Socrates’ companions, they surely did not miss it in Diotima’s second approach to Eros, 
where these aspects are made even more apparent as the discussion eventually culminates 
in naming eros a desire for giving birth. At the end of  the discussion of  Love’s origins, 
Diotima explains that Socrates, (and by extension the other speakers) have been mistaken 
about Love’s nature as a daimon because they have mistaken Love for “being loved, rather 
than being a lover” (204c). What Love pursues—wisdom—is beautiful, “the most 
beautiful” (204b),  in fact. So, if  we want to discuss an ethical eros, the Symposium 35
speeches may be transformed into speeches in honor of  Wisdom, and its ability to bring 
about virtue, justice, and all good things (a view, Socrates would surely wholeheartedly 
agree with), but when we speak of  Love, we must instead describe the lover. It is after all, 
the lover, and not the one loved, who will benefit and gain virtue. Here, Socrates asks 
perhaps the sensible question. If  Love is not a god, if  he is not beautiful, “what use is 
Love to human beings” (204c)? This question allows us to transition to the second section 
of  Diotima’s speech, discussing not the god of  Love, but human eros.  
	 This second part of  the speech begins with a rather surprising, un-argued, claim: 
Love is a desire to possess good and beautiful things, and thus, eros is nothing other than 
 The word here is καλλίστων, the superlative form of  καλός.35
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the desire to be happy.  As Diotima states: “That’s what makes happy people happy, isn’t 36
it—possessing good things,” and further going on to clarify what she means by “this desire 
for happiness, this kind of  love” (205a). However, love, if  taken merely as a stand in for a 
desire for happiness, is as broad as poetry. Consequently, Diotima continues, we, in 
general, reserve the term lover to those who pursue happiness in a certain way (205d). So 
lovers of  money, sport or even philosophy, are not generally called lovers, although they 
each are seeking good and beautiful things.  The particular way that lovers pursue the 37
possession of  good things forever, which sets them apart from other kinds of  pursuers, is 
by “giving birth in beauty” (206b). Thus Diotima once again, without any ambiguity, 
brings Love back into the realm of  the feminine and the youthful.  
	 Giving birth, Diotima explains, “is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to 
do” (206c), and so, can only happen in beauty and harmony,  as “ugliness is out of  38
harmony with all that is godly” (206d). At this point, Diotima negates her previous 
definition of  love, suggesting that love is not, in fact, the pursuit of  possessing beauty, but 
rather “reproduction and birth in beauty” (206e). Diotima’s reasoning, here, is a 
somewhat rare one in the Platonic corpus, particularly as a viewpoint that he seemingly 
wants the reader to endorse: “it’s because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals 
have in place of  immortality” (206e). We are thus led to conclude that the human soul is 
 The relationship between the desire for beautiful things and the desire for good things is not entirely clear 36
in Diotima’s speech, and will be investigated in the section on the kalon (chapter 2).
 This despite Love himself  having been named a philosopher in the first section of  the speech.37
 The Greek ‘in’ is potentially ambiguous here. Diotima is either suggesting that it within beauty that 38
offspring are born, or else that it is in the presence of  beauty. Reeve, Plato on Love 67n96. While, for the most 
part, maintaining the ambiguous ‘in,’ I have, consistent with the interpretation I have given here of  
Diotimian love as feminine, erred on the side of  ‘in the presence of ’ to avoid the possible (in my view, 
incorrect) reading that what Diotima is discussing is impregnation, rather than birth-giving.
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not, by itself, immortal.  In order to possess ‘good things forever,’ as happiness requires, 39
we are first required to escape our mortal condition, and therefore “it follows from our 
argument that love must desire immortality” (207a). The remainder of  this second section 
contains Diotima’s explanation of  the various ways that humans seek immortality, first by 
giving birth to children (the pregnant in body), while others—the pregnant in soul—turn 
to speeches of  virtue, giving birth to children such as the works of  the Homer and 
Hesiod, or the code of  law created by Solon (209d). These children, superior to those of  
the pregnant in body, have the capacity to live on forever. There is no need for the great 
epics to produce offspring, for they will live as long as they are told. Similarly, Diotima 
explains, the pregnant in soul are at an advantage since they are able to carry with them 
the beauty from “a firmer bond of  friendship (209c)” than those who are brought 
together from a pregnancy of  the body. 
	 Thus, while the second section of  Diotima’s speech has reinforced the feminine, 
youthful nature of  love, by applying birth-giving to the philosophical pursuits of  the men 
in the room, rather than to the birth of  any actual children, the has also pushed eros 
further away from any recognizable form, instead pushing it toward the theoretical ‘eros’ 
felt by the poets, politicians, and philosophers, whose children are their works, and not 
their biological offspring. In other words, the description of  eros becomes even more 
abstract, even more metaphysical, and appears to lose its connection to what we might 
otherwise ordinarily call love. The result is that, despite defining love in terms of  giving 
birth, Diotima’s speech has made it so that the definition continues to accept (and indeed 
to be best defined by) the all-male pederastic relationship, noting that a man who “has 
 see footnote 29, above.39
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been pregnant . . . from early youth” will draw close to beauty and “if  he also has the luck 
to find a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-formed . . . such a man makes him 
instantly teem with speeches about virtue” (209b). Giving birth in beauty, the essentially 
feminine aspect of  eros finds its highest expression in an erastes has the fortune of  finding 
an eromenos who is beautiful in both body and soul with whom to associate. With that, 
Socrates has concluded the second section of  (what is allegedly) Diotima’s speech as he 
did the first: putting the philosopher—himself—at the center of  eros. In the first section, 
it was Eros himself  who was the philosopher. Here at the end of  the second, the 
philosopher is the one who gives birth to beautiful speeches in the presence of  his 
eromenos/student. It is the philosopher, more than any other, who is capable of  achieving 
happiness.  
	 Further, although Diotima once again brings up virtue, and begins to bring the 
ethical back into contact with the metaphysical, love appears to remain extremely egoistic. 
There is no discussion of  a real relationship between erastes and eromenos, only that, in the 
presence of  his eromenos, he will give birth to speeches about virtue. The relationship thus 
appears to be one of  mere use, where the erastes draws near in order to give birth to what 
has already been inside him “from early youth.” The philosopher gives birth to his own 
children. The beauty is merely the birthing room, not the father.  40
 One caveat to this would be to interpret Diotima’s description of  “pregnant from early youth” to be a 40
sign of  their impregnation from their own erastes, thus affirming the cyclical nature of  the pederastic 
relationship. But an eros where fathers are all abandoned, and children (of  necessity) are raised by step-
fathers, who are in turn impregnated to become mothers to their own children later in life. However this 
androgynous account of  love sounds nearly equally strange to the asexual reading.
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§3.1.3: The Final Mysteries 
	 Diotima then begins the final section of  her speech, a discussion of  “the final and 
highest mystery” of  love (210a). Following the same definition as before, Diotima outlines 
the ascent of  eros from a single body eventually to “the great sea of  beauty,” recognizing 
that everything that is, is beautiful (210d). All of  this is accomplished through the 
guidance of  a leader  who in one final step leads the lover “to the goal of  loving: all of  a 41
sudden he will catch sight of  something wonderfully beautiful in its nature; that, Socrates, 
is the reason for all his earlier labors.”  These earlier labors include, at each stage, the 42
speeches that the lover gives birth to, first to seduce the single beautiful body he 
encounters (201a), later, philosophical speeches at the sight of  the sea of  beauty (210d), 
and finally, upon seeing the ‘wonderfully beautiful in its nature,’ he will give birth “not to 
images of  virtue . . . but to true virtue . . . and if  any human being could become 
immortal, it would be he” (212a). Having accomplished the ascent, the lover gives birth to 
virtue, and accomplishes (as near as is possible for humans) immortality. The work of  
Love is thus fulfilled. 
	 With the reference to true virtue at the end, Socrates is clearly attempting to show 
that the metaphysical and the ethical accounts are not just able to be joined together, but 
that they must be. If  we want to attain true virtue, we can only do so by understanding 
 Who exactly this leader is is a problematic question. Socrates is clearly identifying Diotima as his guide, 41
which makes it difficult to say that it is the erastes of  a pederastic relationship, especially since the first step 
sees the person being guided become an erastes himself  (for a person to simultaneously be both eromenos 
and erastes would be highly unusual). Nehamas/Woodruff  attributes it to Love (71), but this too is 
complicated by Socrates’ identifying Diotima as his guide. A third option would be that it is simply 
someone unrelated to the lover by eros. After all it is not claimed by Socrates that he and Diotima had 
any relationship other than teacher and student, although this too would seem odd: that eros is explained 
by the non-lover.
 Precisely what this ‘wonderfully beautiful in its nature’ is, is a discussion reserved to the coming section on 42
the kalon. For now, it suffices that it seems to be Beauty Itself.
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eros and ourselves metaphysically. He thus navigates the three choices he was presented 
with by mediating between the natural and the divine explanatory accounts, while 
asserting that the explanatory and ethical accounts are not two separate options, but 
instead are two interlinked parts of  one eros. 
	 Yet notice that, aside from the problematic guide (see footnote 43), the Lover is 
alone by the time he reaches the Wonderfully Beautiful. Once again, virtue appears, not 
as something involving others, but essentially egoistic. Virtue is given birth to, not in a 
community, but in solitary contemplation of  the Beautiful.  
§3.1.4: Alcibiades’ inversion 
	 Despite the loud applause Socrates receives, Plato does not let this be the final 
word. Instead, the drunken Alcibiades enters, demanding to know “where Agathon was . . 
. to be shown Agathon at once” (212d), a rather obvious punning on Agathon’s name, 
which means ‘The Good.’ While there is more that could be said about this speech than is 
necessary here, it is important to see the dramatic function it plays with regard to 
Socrates’ speech, devolving the symposium—which has ascended to the heavens at the 
conclusion of  Socrates’ speech—back to a true, Bacchian symposium, as Alcibiades 
almost immediately has the slaves bring the wine back into the room. Pushed to offer, as 
the others have, an encomium to love, Alcibiades instead offers a speech in praise of  
Socrates (who, Alcibiades claims, will not permit him to praise anyone else in his presence 
[214d]).  Thus even as Plato ironically devolves the symposium, refusing to let Socrates’ 43
grand ascent cap the evening, he continues to blur the line even further between Eros and 
 Although Socrates himself  states that he is in love with Alcibiades, their interactions here, as well as the 43
content of  Alcibiades speech, put that claim in doubt.
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Socrates, putting the latter now in the seat of  honor to be praised in the final speech. 
After praising his many features and virtues, Alcibiades concludes by noting “[Socrates] 
presents himself  as your lover, and, before you know it, you’re in love with him 
yourself ” (222b). As a result, Diotima’s correction is inverted; if  Socrates has truly taken 
the place of  Love, his status as the pursuer, the one who loves, is only a façade. Who 
Socrates/Eros really is, is the one he was thought to be by all the previous speech givers: 
the one loved. We are also forced, more than in any of  the scheduled speeches, to 
contemplate the behavior of  the person in love. Alcibiades is driven mad by his pursuit of  
Socrates, and refuses to let even the beautiful Agathon (the person, but very clearly 
alluding to the Good itself) come between Socrates and himself  on the couch. In this 
manner the reader is refused the ability to leave the Symposium with Socrates’ soaring 
speech in mind and we are perhaps subtly told by Plato that Socrates’ speech is lacking 
some truth after all. 
§3.2: Socratic Eros II: The Phaedrus 
	 The primary source for Socratic eros in the Phaedrus similarly takes shape in three 
main divisions, the first, an argument for the soul’s immortality, followed by a myth 
regarding the structure of  the soul, and concluding with a discussion of  human eros in 
action. Socrates likewise attributes the speech to another person, in this case Stesichorus, 
son of  Euphemus (i.e. the good speaker).  This attribution plays upon Socrates’ intention 44
to offer a palinode, or recantation, of  his previous speech. It was Stesichorus who saw the 
need for such an apology after speaking ill of  Helen in his poetry, and subsequently being 
 Unlike the Symposium, however, it does not seem Socrates wants to actually attribute the words to this 44
person, but merely the ideas.
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blinded for his offense (243a). We are told that this represents “an ancient rite of  
purification” and that “as soon as he completed . . . the Palinode, he immediately 
regained his sight” (243a-b). Socrates, we are told, plans to preempt any punishment from 
Eros and offer a Palinode immediately, having been warned by his daimon not to leave his 
place (242b-c). In the preamble to his second speech, Socrates offers a guideline for 
judging his upcoming account of  love:  
Suppose a noble and gentle man, who was (or had once been) in love with a boy 
of  similar character, were to hear us say that lovers start serious quarrels for trivial 
reasons and that, jealous of  their eromenos, they do him harm—don’t you think 
that man would think we had been brought up among the most vulgar of  sailors, 
totally ignorant of  love among the freeborn? Wouldn’t he most certainly refuse to 
acknowledge the flaws we 
attributed to Love (243c)? 
We are thus instructed that any account of  love that we offer ought to be recognizable as 
such by anyone who has ever loved.  While he does not offer a definition at the outset, as 45
he did in the Symposium, we are at least left with a measuring stick, so that we may stop at 
any point in the ensuing speech and ask ‘does this seem like a recognizable love?’ This 
starting point also accounts for some of  the differences between this account and that of  
the Symposium, whereas the latter follows a string of  speeches in praise of  Love, and 
therefore seeks to temper that praise, the present speech follows two speeches highly 
critical of  love and seeks to move the conversation in the other direction, showing love to 
not be totally without merit. 
 Whether either of  Socrates’ speeches succeeds in this regard will be addressed in the concluding section 45
of  this chapter.
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§3.2.1: The Four Mania 
	 Socrates begins the first section of  his speech by stating that, while it is true that 
the lover suffers from a mania, however, “the best things we have come from madness, 
when it is given as a gift of  the god” (244a). It is not enough for Lysias to argue that the 
lover is mad and the friend sane, he further needs to make the case that the madness is 
not god-given (245b). Therefore, Socrates maintains, even in the recantation, a distinction 
as in the Symposium, a division of  Eros into a ‘virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ version, here 
accounted for by the source of  the mania. Socrates outlines at the outset three commonly 
accepted examples of  these divine maniai: first, the prophetic, divining the future and 
giving advice; second, the cathartic, discovering the cause of  present hardships and the 
purificatory rites to resolve them; third, the poetic, giving a voice to past heroes’ 
achievements and teaching future generations (244b-245b). The remainder of  Socrates 
speech will argue in favor of  love as being a forth such divine mania. 
	 To do so, however, requires (at least in Socrates’ opinion) that we first understand 
the nature of  the soul. This sudden shift in topic is not foreshadowed by Socrates, nor 
does he explain, at least at the outset, why he is including this section. What follows is a 
short argument for the immortality of  the soul, based on its self-motion. While the 
argument seems to have no immediate bearing on a theory of  love, and the claim has not 
been denied by either of  the previous two speeches, it is interesting to note that, as the 
soul is immortal in this speech, we are bound to encounter a theory of  love that differs, at 
least in some respects, from the one in the Symposium. If  the human soul is already 
immortal, then we cannot possibly define love as a mortal’s pursuit for immortality. 
Indeed this is already the second such change in the account, with Socrates unreservedly 
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considering Eros to be a god in the palinode (242d), seeing his speech in the Phaedrus as 
given to a god, and not only to a “great daimon.”  It is thus necessary to proceed with 46
caution before assuming that the two accounts of  eros will or should fit together without 
conflict. 
§3.2.2: The Charioteer Myth 
	 Satisfied that he has proven the immortality of  the soul, Socrates moves to the 
second portion of  his speech, describing the structure of  the soul. However, as such a task 
would take too long to be humanly possible, he instead proposes to describe, via a myth, 
“to say what it is like” (246a).  Socrates consequently reinforces the importance of  myth 47
for human wisdom already seen in the earlier dramatic elements (and described in §2.2). 
The soul, Socrates explains, is like a chariot being drawn by two winged horses. For the 
gods, each of  the three parts (the driver and the two horses) are “of  good stock” (246a) 
and as a result the driver’s job is easy. For humans however, while one horse “is beautiful 
and good and from stock of  the same sort . . . the other is the opposite and has the 
opposite sort of  bloodline.” The result is that the charioteer’s job “is inevitably a painfully 
difficult business” (246b).  48
 While Socrates does hedge by calling Love “a god or something divine,” at 242e, the question preceding 46
notes that Eros is the son of  Aphrodite and asks Phaedrus to agree that he is a god.
 Although he does not call it a myth at this point, in the second half  of  the Phaedrus, when proposing to 47
examine it for its use of  rhetoric he calls it a μυθικόν ὕμνον, a mythic hymn (265c). This is in keeping with 
the Greeks’ broader use of  the word myth than we generally mean it today.
 Once again, while the psychology offered by Plato in these first two sections is extremely rich, as it plays a 48
rather minor role in the theory of  eros as I am arguing for it here, I have largely omitted any analysis of  
it. See Buccioni, “The Psychical Forces in Plato’s Phaedrus” for one such analysis. Although I’m uncertain 
of  her ultimate labels for the three parts of  the chariot, she spells out in clear and convincing fashion the 
reasons for doubting that the tripartite soul of  the Republic maps neatly onto the three members here.
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	 This job, Socrates explains, is to ascend and make a circuit around the heavens. 
The gods make the circuit in an orderly procession, led by Zeus with the other Olympians 
following peacefully in line (246e-247a). Meanwhile the human charioteers—whose 
horses are made strong in the presence of  “beauty, wisdom, and everything of  that sort” 
but whose “wings shrink and disappear” in the presence of  “foulness and ugliness” (246d-
e)—struggle to make the ascent, burdened by their bad horse who drags the chariot back 
down toward the earth. 
	 For the gods, they are moved peacefully around the circuit, “stand[ing] while they 
gaze upon what is outside heaven” (247c).  There they feast on “intelligence and pure 49
knowledge . . . seeing what is real and watching what is true, feeding on all this and feeling 
wonderful.” There, each god “has a view of  Justice as it is, it has a view of  Self-control; it 
has a view of  Knowledge” (247d). All of  this, Socrates says, they see in the “truly being 
being” (247c).  Having feasted on this, they calmly descend to their homes, and return 50
their horses to their stables. The journey for mortals is not so easy, however. Although 
each person attempts to follow a god, the conflict between his horses makes his circuit a 
 The gods take their place on τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, translated variably as “the summit of  the 49
heavens” (Anderson) “the high ridge of  heaven” (Nehamas/Woodruff) or “the outer surface of  the 
heavens” (Bury) or “heaven’s rim,” (Nicholson) looking at the ὑπερουράνιος, or what is above or beyond 
the sky or the heavens. The imagery here suggests that they are looking out at something beyond the 
cosmos, outside even the world the gods inhabit.
 This phrase too is variably translated by phrases like “being that really is what it is” (Nehamas/Woodruff), 50
“truly existing essence” (Bury), or the “being that truly is” (Nicholson). None of  these quite translate the 
sense of  what Plato writes, οὐσία ὄντως οὖσα, a string of  three words derived from the verb “to be,” The 
first, the noun ‘being.’ The second an adverb, a rare word (which becomes more common in Plato’s later 
dialogues) used generally to indicate that something really is or truly is, which might literally be translated 
instead as ‘beingly,’ and finally the present active participle, ‘being.’ Thus we might say ‘the truly being 
being’ or ‘the beingly being being’ (Nicholson, 183), as long as it is parsed in the same way as ‘the truly 
running man’ and not mistaking the adverb as an adjective ‘the true man running.’  
	 Nicholson explains this by noting that it is “not only something that is—it is in a special way. It is a certain 
kind of  being or a way of  being,” 183. While I agree with Nicholson’s sentiment here, it is odd that, even 
immediately after noting that οὖσα is a participle, he repeatedly translates it as the present indicative (as 
do nearly all translators). We will have reason to revisit this translation in chapter 2, in the section on the 
Kalon.
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constant struggle. The one who “make[s] itself  most like [his] god” (248a) is able to just 
barely make it up to the top of  the circuit, but is constantly distracted by the task of  
controlling the horses, so only able to glimpse out to the truly being being. Another group, 
Socrates explains, at time reaches the top and sees some of  this highest reality, but at 
other times falls down and misses other parts. The final group are entirely unable to reach 
the heights of  reality, and do not see anything of  it (248a). In the end, all three groups 
descend, and in the process, many of  the horses are trampled and lose their wings. Thus, 
the process to re-ascend must begin with the regrowth of  wings (249a); this is 
accomplished by eros, a fourth kind of  divine mania, Socrates explains in concluding the 
second section.  51
§3.2.3: The Movement of  Eros 
	 It is therefore only in the final of  three sections that Socrates turns to the 
immediate matter at hand: eros and the question of  whom the young boy should associate 
with.  Socrates begins by acknowledging the divide between the divine form of  eros, and 52
the human madness  
condemned in the earlier speeches:  
[the one] who has become defiled is not to be moved abruptly from here to a 
vision of  Beauty itself  when he sees what we call beauty here; so instead of  
gazing at the latter reverently, he surrenders to pleasure and sets out in the 
manner of  a four-footed beast, eager to make babies; and, wallowing in vice, he 
 This section also includes an extensive discussion of  the progression of  souls from Tyrant to Philosopher, 51
as well as a description of  the cycle of  incarnation. I have omitted it here as it is only very tangentially to 
an account of  Socratic eros.
 Prior to his conclusion at 249d that eros is indeed a fourth mania, the first two sections (244a-250b) 52
contain just two real references to eros. The first (245b) when Socrates states that the goal is to prove that 
eros is a divine mania, the second (248d-e), where the philosopher (the highest stage of  the cycle of  
reincarnation) is described as “prone to erotic love.” Even the good horse, who is said to pursue beauty, is 
not explicitly attributed an eros.
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goes after unnatural pleasure too, without a trace of  fear or shame. A recent 
initiate, however, one who has seen much in heaven—when he sees a godlike face 
or bodily form that has captured Beauty well, first he shudders and a fear comes 
over him like those he felt at the earlier time; then he gazes at him with the 
reverence due a god, and if  he weren’t afraid people would think him completely 
mad, he’d even sacrifice to his boy as if  he were the image of  a god (250e-251a). 
Thus the divide is definitively struck between a human sickness-eros that pursues 
“unnatural pleasures” and a divine mania-eros that recognizes the beautiful other as if  he 
were something divine. The remainder of  Socrates’ speech offers a description of  this 
divinely inspired lover, thereby offering his recantation of  everything bad he said about 
him in the first speech. This distinction is nearly identical to that drawn by Pausanias in 
the Symposium, and which was never truly overcome in that dialogue. However, Socrates’ 
speech here will at least show the glimmer of  hope that this divide may be able to be 
overcome, or at least softened. As we see in the key passage quoted above, eros is 
unquestionably felt toward the eromenos. It is to him, Socrates claims, that the lover wishes 
to offer sacrifices. This marks a stark contrast to the lover of  the Symposium, who almost 
immediately gives up on the single eromenos when he is shown by his guide that there are 
many more beautiful things. Even if  this relationship is not best characterized as a sexual 
relationship, the divide is not a straightforwardly one between a philosophical eros for 
Beauty and a common eros for other humans either. We might therefore see how the 
speech could also be read as a partial recantation or palinode for his speech of  the 
Symposium (which by denying that Eros was a god at all, surely would cause equal offense 
to him as the first speech of  the Phaedrus). The corrective takes the form of  a truly divine 
love that responds to the individual, not to a metaphysical “wonderfully beautiful in its 
nature.”  
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	 Maintaining the structure of  the myth of  the charioteer, Socrates explains that it is 
the sight of  beauty in the individual that causes the wings to begin to regrow (mirroring 
Diotima’s remarks that giving birth is only possible in the presence of  beauty). It is then 
the pair together, erastes and eromenos, who make the ascent to the edge of  the world, and 
not, as the Symposium argues, the lover who ascends precisely by leaving the eromenos 
behind. Whereas the lover of  the Symposium did not need an eromenos, but a guide to move 
him past the love of  bodies or souls to the Form of  Beauty; here the lover needs precisely 
that one individual who “has captured Beauty well” (251a). Similarly, it is not Eros 
himself  that guides the lover in the Phaedrus, rather his behavior is shaped by the 
particular god who the erastes and eromenos choose to follow together, whether it be Zeus, 
Apollo or one of  the other Olympians (252e-253a). So long as they follow their god well, 
“this friend who has been driven mad by love will secure a consummation [or possibly ‘an 
initiation’] for the one he has befriended that is beautiful” (253c). The eromenos will 
consequently be “train[ed] . . . to follow their god’s pattern and way of  life, so far as is 
possible in each case” (253b).  
	 The point of  Socratic eros in the Phaedrus therefore becomes clear. Unlike the 
Symposium, where the goal was seeing Beauty itself  and giving birth by oneself  alone to 
‘true virtue,’ the goal of  eros in the Phaedrus takes place without leaving the mortal world: 
not seeing Beauty Itself, but “the bodily form that has captured Beauty well,” and not 
perceiving Virtue Itself, but becoming virtuous and inspiring that same virtue in the 
eromenos. It is only then, together, having sprouted wings as a result of  their mutual eros, 
that the erastes and eromenos will ascend and see Reality together.  But at no point in the 53
 See chapter 2 on the attribution of  an anteros, or counter-love to the eromenos, breaking the common 53
convention that the love of  a pederastic relationship was not mutual.
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speech does Socrates ever transform the eros, claiming (as he does in the Symposium) that 
the eros changes from being for the eromenos to being for some metaphysical principle. The 
love remains between the two individuals, while they look out together perceiving (but not 
loving) the things beyond the heavens. The speech then concludes with a discussion of  the 
relationship between eros and sex, declaring that the best lovers will refrain from sex 
altogether, instead choosing to become true philosophers, but even those lovers who 
occasionally give in to desire still have accomplished a great deal and “so the prize they 
have won from the madness of  love is considerable, because those who have begun the 
sacred journey in lower heaven may not by law be sent into darkness” (256d). Thus, 
although the Phaedrus ultimately continues to place the highest praise on the philosopher 
whose eros is divorced from the sexual, we have an admission at the very end that even 
the ordinary lover has won a great prize, and that because he has begun his ascent toward 
reality through love, will not sink back down as a result of  his surrender to desire. Further, 
in a second way, Socrates softens the divide between divine and human love. Not only are 
both aimed at another individual, but human love is not outright denied as immoral. 
Although worse than divinely-inspired love, it still carries benefits with it. It is only Lysias’ 
non-lover who leaves having achieved no benefit at all from his encounters. 
	 This account too, however, is not without issues. Most notably, if  this reading is 
correct, why is so much time devoted to a description of  the immortality and nature of  
the soul, to the circuit of  the gods seeing the perfect reality? What is the relationship 
between the face that “captures beauty well” and the “truly being being?” Similarly, why, 
at the end, does Socrates award a “great prize” to those who surrender to sexual desire, 
when earlier, he compares them to beasts seeking unnatural pleasures? There seems to be 
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a disconnect between the starting point of  the speech and its conclusion. While the 
opening seems set up quite similarly to the Symposium, with an ascent to some highest 
principle and a division between the philosopher and the sexual lover, the second half  
seems to repudiate (at least in part) this metaphysical, philosophical view of  eros through 
the highly sexually-charged metaphors of  the horses drawing near to each other. The 
result is that, although the Phaedrus offers a much more ethically concerned account of  
love, it still remains firmly attached to a metaphysical explanation of  the nature of  the 
cosmos and of  man.  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CHAPTER 2: PLATONIC EROS 
	 These interpretive problems at the end of  the Phaedrus also highlight the main 
tension between the Symposium and the Phaedrus for Plato’s theory of  love. Is the object of  
love ultimately some metaphysical principle or is it the more ordinary, everyday person on 
the street?  And if  it is another person, is it due to some unique factor that he possesses, 1
or is it merely as an avatar of  the larger metaphysical principle—in other words, how do 
we interpret the eromenos’ “capturing beauty well?”  If  we can understand this tension in 2
Plato’s works, then we can simultaneously come to understand a deeper tension regarding 
what role eros is playing in either producing “true virtue” in either the lover alone or in 
initiating the erastes and eromenos into virtue together. 
§1: The Kalon 
	 The questions revolving around the kalon, Beauty,  can be seen clearly in a 3
comparison of  the three ascents in the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedrus. Although all three 
of  these follow a similar (although not identical) structure and all seem to be elaborating 
the same point of  Plato’s thinking, they each culminate in a different principle. For the 
This question represents perhaps the interpretive question of  the Symposium, at least in the last half-century. 1
Both choices and their implications for Plato’s theory have been defended in numerous forms. Here, I am 
restricting myself  primarily to pointing to the two theories, and avoiding the debates over which one is 
Plato’s true intention, and what the implications for Platonic philosophy are. These sorts of  objections will 
be dealt with in the context of  contemporary accounts of  love, rather than within Platonic scholarship. 
For fuller accounts of  the issue see Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of  Goodness, and A.W. Price, Love and 
Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, as exemplars of  the opposing sides of  the debate.
 There are also a number of  other issues that would have to be dealt with in a full treatment of  the topic. 2
For example, is Eros a god or a daimon? Is the soul mortal or immortal? Is eros a remembering of  a 
previously seen reality, or an ascent to something previously unknown? While all of  these deserve answers, 
they are more relevant within the field of  Platonic scholarship than they will be to the following chapters.
 for both Beauty/The Beautiful and The Good, I capitalize when referring to the form as a transcendent 3
principle, rather than an immanent appearance.
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Republic, it is the Good Beyond Being; for the Symposium, the Something Wonderfully 
Beautiful in its Nature; and finally, for the Phaedrus, the truly being being. If  love really is 
of  some first principle, than it must be asked, what principle? Surely eros, as a single 
activity, also has a single end. Thus these three principles are really one, or else, love has 
one, but not the others, as its final object. 
	 To the ancients, the question was asked, not just in the context of  eros, but in 
general, of  what is the highest principle. To the Platonists and Neoplatonists, the answer 
was clear: the Good Beyond Being was the supreme principle, even if  they debated on 
how to interpret that principle.  Plato never answers the question directly, but says in the 4
Philebus that the Good has “taken refuge in the beautiful” (64e), which one may interpret 
either as saying that the Good and the Beautiful are identical, or merely that the Good is 
known through the Beautiful.  Thus, it seems that we should take the Good to be at least 5
identical to the Beautiful, but possibly beyond it.  
	 Plotinus begins to investigate the equating of  Beauty and Goodness (I.6.6 line 24), 
only to come to the conclusion that Beauty is the Intellect, and therefore beneath the 
Good, which exists prior to the second hypostasis, noting that “we must ascend again to 
the good . . . [beauty] is desired as good, and the desire for it is directed to the good” (I.
6.7.1-5), and finally concluding that “the Good . . . holds beauty as a screen before it,” 
and that it is only “in a loose and general way of  speaking [that] the Good is the primary 
beauty,” since in reality, the Good is beyond even Beauty (I.6.9 30-40). Proclus similarly, 
seems to imply that, when speaking of  these first principles, the two are distinct, and the 
 See, as one example, Mathias Baltes, “Is the Idea of  the Good in Plato’s Republic Beyond Being,” for a 4
survey of  Platonic views of  the Good and its relationship to Being.
 Riegal’s dissertation, Beauty, τὸ καλόν, and Its Relation to the Good in the Works of  Plato makes a compelling 5
argument for this latter view. 
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Good higher, as he notes, in his commentary on the Alcibiades, “let no one object that the 
good is beyond beauty, nor that the object of  love is twofold, since our discourse is not 
about the primary principles, but about what is good and beautiful in us” (330). The 
implication is that, in the world, what is good is beautiful and vice versa; it is only in the 
case of  the primary principles that this equation can be objected to (as seen in Plotinus). 
If  this interpretation is correct, the further question must then be asked, if  the two are 
distinct, which is the true object of  love? After all, Socrates at various points in the 
Symposium speaks of  both good and beautiful things as love’s object (see, for example, 201c 
and 204d-205a). F.C. White, for instance, claims that “this way of  interpreting the 
Symposium—asserting that the good is the ultimate object of  love—fits and derives 
strength from Plato’s more general doctrine of  the good as the goal of  action.”  6
	 The solution, however, is simpler than this: the Good and Beauty are in fact 
identical.  Although there are fewer explicit arguments in favor of  the thesis, it is 7
nonetheless often assumed in discussions of  Plato’s ascent passages, in an effort to relate 
the three passages. Even those who reject their identification will often admit that they 
 F. C. White, “Love and Beauty in Plato’s Symposium,” The Journal of  Hellenic Studies 109 (November 1989) 6
153. Hyland draws a similar conclusion in Question of  Beauty, 49, 63. Santas asserts that the Good is the 
object of  the ‘generic eros’ (referring to the analogy Diotima draws between eros and poetics), whereas 
Beauty is the object of  ‘eros proper.’ He thus connects the ascent of  the Republic not to the ascent in the 
Symposium as a whole, but only insofar as the Symposium ascent may address generic eros, “Plato on Love, 
Beauty and the Good” in The Greeks and The Good Life, 59.
 For some sources that support this view in the Symposium, see Robin, Théorie platonicienne de l’amour, Follon, 7
“Amour, Sexualité, et Beauté Chez Platon;” Conford, “The Doctrine of  Eros in Plato’s Symposium,” in The 
Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays, 72; Schindler “Plato and the Problem of  Love;” and Ferrari, “Platonic 
Love,” 260. While none of  these offer much argument in favor of  the position, they all either assert or 
assume it to some degree. Among those who state it most clearly are Robin who states that “les choses 
bonnes sont par là-même belles,” and pointing to reader to Symp. 197C-E as the source for 
“l’identification du bon et du beau.” Follon similarly notes without qualification that “Cette 
interchangeabilité du beau et du bien est aussi affirmée dans le Lysis (216d) . . . dans le Protagoras (360d) . 
. . et dans le Timée (87c) (63n86).” The same view is supported with reference to Meno 77b, in Scott, 
Plato’s Meno, 46 and Bluck, Plato’s Meno: Edited with Introduction and Commentary, 257-8.
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appear to be coextensive or identical in some respects.  For example, Barney takes the 8
position that they may be identical “insofar as they are jointly constituted by appropriate 
order,” but differ by how the role they play.  Beauty inspires admiration, while Goodness 9
causes desire.  This mirrors Proclus’ claim from antiquity that, when speaking of  10
anything but the principles themselves, good is not beyond beauty, nor are they twofold. 
However, I take it to be Plato’s intention, in his three parallel ascents, to be describing an 
ascent to the same principle, described in three different ways. This can be seen by the 
way that the language of  the three passages interchanges and overlaps. While the 
Symposium ends in the Wonderfully Beautiful, Diotima repeatedly turns Socrates to think 
about the Good, as a way into understanding the Beautiful. While the Phaedrus culminates 
with Being, it is traced all the way through by the perception of  and chase for Beauty, and 
while the allegory of  the Cave and the Analogy of  the Sun end in the Good, it is 
described in terms of  what is rather than what merely appears. Each ascent involves one 
of  the descriptions from the others. Consequently, there is no question about whether 
Love is of  one or the other; to love the Good is to love the Beautiful.  11
 For example, Hyland writes, “the beautiful and the good are not identical, but it may surely be the case 8
that the beautiful is good and the good beautiful,” Question of  Beauty, 49.
 Barney, 377.9
 In the same vein as Barney’s claim, Riegal concludes at one point “thus, on the one hand, goodness and 10
beauty are extensionally equivalent but, on the other, the Symposium and other passages in Plato, as we 
shall see, suggest they are not identical,” 193.
 Leaving aside, for now, the question of  whether the first principle (whatever it is) is the object of  eros at 11
all, rather than the individual.
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	 But, it may be objected, if  all three are in fact identical, why the multiplication of  
the language?  Quite simply, because Plato is trying to describe something that he says 12
himself  is “on the back of  the universe,” the peak of  an ascent that Socrates says can only 
be spoken of  “what it is like” since its nature is “a thing for the gods.” No one of  these 
principles adequately describes the reality, Socrates/Plato is aware, but together they can 
help us approximate better and better what it is in the same way that he argues in Philebus 
that we can begin to understand the Good through the combination of  “Beauty, Measure, 
and Truth” (65a). 
	 This sort of  inexactness seems quite un-Platonic, for whom the Forms were the 
most intelligible thing. Even if  I cannot say what the Good or the Beautiful is, surely I am 
able to give it a name.  But, following the Neoplatonists, it seems to be the case that, 13
whatever this principle is, it is not itself  a Form. The Good Beyond Being is, out of  
necessity, beyond the Forms, as the Forms themselves are the realm of  Being.  This leads 14
to perhaps the greater interpretive problem than the relation of  the Good and the 
 Steven Berg notes that “Socrates takes this identity of  [the beautiful and the good] . . . as the first 12
principle of  his account,” but later claims “as the argument develops, however, the assumption that the 
good and the beautiful . . . are identical is undermined and the possibility of  eros possessing the good 
emerges,” Eros and the Intoxications of  Enlightenment: On Plato’s Symposium (SUNY Press, 2010), 100. The 
second half  of  his argument seems weak, however, as it relies on saying that Eros, as a daimon, shares in 
both the good and beautiful of  the gods, and the bad and ugly of  man, as a result showing that the 
ugliness of  man can be good (109). This argument seems problematic for a number of  reasons, not least 
of  which Socrates’/Diotima’s assertion that Eros is neither good nor bad, ugly nor beautiful. Berg takes 
these statements to have a hidden, subversive meaning that I simply do not see. His second claim, that 
eros can possess the good but not the beautiful, simply assumes the point. Thus, I would argue that 
Socrates never moves beyond the first principle of  their identity.
 Hyland uses this for the basis of  his argument against their identity. Socrates is able to answer Diotima’s 13
question of  what the one who has good things has (happiness), but not her previous question where 
beautiful is substituted for good. This inability, he claims shows “once again that the two are surely not 
identical,” Question of  Beauty, 49. But this could just as easily be an issue of  Socrates not knowing the two 
have the same referent, than that they do not do so (a not impossible scenario, given that Socrates is 
apparently still quite young when he meets Diotima). In a similar way, knowing that Superman can fly, 
but not knowing that Clark Kent can does not prove that Clark Kent and Superman are not the same. 
 This itself  is a somewhat controversial position. Baltes rejects this interpretation as a Plotinian invention, 14
while Santas assumes without much question that the Good is a Form. Hitchcock equates the Good with 
Unity, but seems to assume that both indicate a Form.
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Beautiful, which is the relation of  either to the third term. If  Beauty is the same as the 
Good, and the Good is beyond Being, how can either be the “truly being being?” Here it 
is useful to look deeper at the Neoplatonic sources, which, even although they were 
explicit in the literalness of  ‘Good beyond Being,’ were not against, on occasion, 
discussing the Good as having its own proper being. Plotinus, for example, says “in this 
way the good is correctly said to be one’s own: therefore it is not necessary to seek it 
outside. For where would it be, having fallen outside of  being? Or how could one discover 
it in non-being?”  Even more strongly, Porphyry, speaking about the One (by then 15
generally assumed to be identical to the Good), states “the one, which is beyond substance 
and being, is not being, substance nor act, rather it acts and it is pure acting, with the 
result that it is the ‘to be’ that is before the being.”  The claim then, is that there is a 16
proper ‘to be’ even of  the Good Beyond Being. Thus, although Porphyry denies the noun 
form ‘ousia’ to the One in his formulation, we could easily understand Plato’s participial 
formulation  ‘truly being being,’ to be a first attempt to describe the same reality beyond 
being, a being beyond being, linking together the top of  the ascents of  the Phaedrus and 
the Republic.  If  we then accept, as I have at least briefly stated a case for, the equation of  17
the Kalon and the Agathon, all three ascents consequently become three descriptions of  the 
same movement. And therefore eros, the method of  ascending in two of  the three, can be 
understood as primarily oriented at this first principle, whether it is called the Good, the 
 Plotinus, Ennead VI 5[23] 1.20-23 “οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὀρθῶς / εἶναι λέγεται οἰκεῖον· διὸ οὐδὲ ἔξω 15
ζητεῖν αὐτὸ δεῖ. ποῦ / γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἔξω τοῦ ὄντος περιπεπτωκός; ἢ πῶς ἄν τις ἐν / τῷ μὴ ὄντι ἐξεύροι 
αὐτό” as translated by Gurtler in “Plotinus: Omnipresence and Transcendence of  the One in VI 5[23].”
 Sur Le Parmenide, in Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Études augustiniennes, 1968),104.16
 As Nicholson puts it, since ontos modifies the participle ousa, “whatever is ontos ousa is not only something 17
that is—it is in a special way,” Plato’s Phaedrus, 183.
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Beautiful, or the Truly being being. After all, surely the end of  the ascent, and the method 
of  making it, are linked together as a pair.  18
	 This interpretation of  eros is particularly compelling if  one choses to focus in on 
the ascent passages, that is, the Socratic speeches, as indicative of  Plato’s own view. It is 
difficult (although not impossible) to argue that it is an individual eromenos that is primarily 
loved, rather Beauty or Goodness itself.  What results is the affirmation of  an apparently 19
ego-centric eros, where the ascent is made for the betterment of  the self.  Immortality is 20
gained, Truth attained, ‘true virtue’ achieved, but each of  these for the self. This last is 
perhaps the most interesting here: even in the most metaphysical reading of  Platonic eros, 
ethics and virtue still show their heads, even if  only in a way that seems to completely 
negate the necessity of  any other person. The eromenos, if  he follows along at all (as he 
seems to in the Phaedrus but not the Symposium) is a means to that end. It is the sight of  the 
eromenos that allows me to grow my wings back, and to achieve what I really wanted, sight 
of  what is beyond the heavens. Hints of  this, however, can already be seen in the various 
cosmological and mythological accounts that precede Socrates’ speeches. Tying human 
eros to a first principle such as the Good or the Beautiful similarly ties the human together 
 This is, it seems, the standard interpretation of  the dialogue, starting with Vlastos’ “The Individual as the 18
Object of  Love in Plato.” Mooney, “Plato and the Love of  Individuals;” Nussbaum, The Fragility of  
Goodness; and Nehamas, “‘Only in Contemplation of  Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ Plato, 
Symposium 211d” and Gordon, Plato’s Erotic World are among those who draw similar conclusions, at least 
in general.
 Hyland and Price both attempt to argue that the eromenos is not abandoned as the lover moves up the 19
ladder in the Symposium. Gordon, in at least one place, also admits this interpretation is possible. Sheffield, 
in a lengthy discussion primarily of  Vlastos’ and Price’s arguments grants a good deal of  Vlastos’ 
conclusions but ultimately rules that many of  the complaints he has simply confuses the issue (particularly 
regarding the differences between philia and eros), and thus miss the point of  Plato’s account. She 
ultimately also partially agrees with Price that there is no immediate conflict between the ascent and the 
love of  an eromenos, with the caveat that a lovers’ eros for his eromenos is the same as his love of  the 
Beautiful (as Price seems to argue), but a separate endeavor. Frisbee Sheffield, “The Symposium and 
Platonic Ethics: Plato, Vlastos, and a Misguided Debate,” Phronesis 57, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 117—41.
 Kosman even more strongly accuses the theory of  being ‘auto-erotic,’ L. Aryeh Kosman, “Platonic 20
Love,” in Facets of  Plato’s Philosophy, ed. W. H. Werkmeister (Van Gorcum, 1976), 61.
!72
with the divine and the natural, as all spheres would now tend toward a common telos. An 
eros aimed at the Good allows for humans to fit into a larger metaphysical system in a 
simple, straightforward way.  
§2: The Individual 
	 There is, however, another contender for the object of  eros: the individual 
eromenos. This option is complicated by the fact that the individual’s role seems to be vastly 
different in the Symposium compared to in the Phaedrus.  If  readers are looking for a 21
Platonic reading of  eros that appears similar to what we mean by love today—as Socrates 
is said to be searching for (Phaed. 243c)—this is likely the view they will be searching for. 
However, it is also the more difficult case to make. The eromenos is rarely described in the 
Symposium, and it is only in the Phaedrus that the erotic relationship seems to involve both 
erastes and eromenos. However, because I agree with Price’s assertion that it represents a 
corrective, I will take the Phaedrus as the best representative Plato’s position. However 
there are already hints of  an eros aimed at the individual in the Symposium.   22
	 The early speeches about the praise of  pederasty take this position as a given: love 
is between the erastes and eromenos. It is only because Socrates moves the discussion of  eros 
toward that of  the nature of  the philosopher that this individual character falls away. 
Similarly, because Socrates transforms the god Eros from the thing loved to the lover, it 
becomes less important, in a speech in his honor, to focus on the role of  the beloved 
 Price, for example, sees the two as contradictory in parts (Love and Friendship, 55). Not everyone, however, 21
sees this as the case. Allen, on the other hand, views the differences as merely of  the language, not the 
underlying theory (“A Note on the Elenchus of  Agathon: Symposium 199c-201c,” 461).
 Although I agree with Mooney that Price’s argument that Socrates’ speech itself  is about an individual-22
oriented eros is overly optimistic (“Plato and the Love of  Individuals,” 323).
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object. Even here, however, as Price notes, it is possible to interpret the move to loving 
laws, knowledge, and eventually Beauty Itself  not as one that leads us away from loving 
an individual, but that simply leads us to love an individual for a different reason.  I no 23
longer love an individual because he is physically beautiful, but because he possesses a 
beauty of  soul, virtue or wisdom. Yet, even if  this interpretation ultimately fails to fully 
convince, we must also not make the mistake that so many do: finishing the Symposium’s 
argument at the top of  Diotima’s ascent. The introduction of  the drunken Alcibiades can 
be interpreted as a Platonic indication of  a flaw in Socrates’ metaphysical, philosophical 
interpretation.  Alcibiades reminds those gathered as well as the readers that love is 24
something carnal and sexual. Giving a speech in praise of  Socrates instead of  the god 
Eros seems humorous to the reader, but it should also be seen as reminding us that eros is 
felt toward another person.  For that reason, Nussbaum ends her critique of  Platonic 25
eros as unfocused on the individual by pointing out that, at very least Plato gives us a 
choice: “I can choose to follow Socrates . . .  [b]ut I cannot take the first step on that 
ladder as long as I see Alcibiades . . . . I can, on the other hand, follow Alcibiades . . . [b]ut 
once I have listened to Diotima, I see the loss of  light that this course, too, entails.”  26
	 Socrates’ palinode in the Phaedrus begins, as already discussed,  by laying out the 27
criterion that a lover ought to recognize love when it is described. It is unlikely that any 
love that culminates in the abandonment of  people for the sake of  a first principle will 
 Price, Love and Friendship, 45-49.23
 Nussbaum interprets the speech this way.24
 Even if, in the process, Alcibiades makes it clear that he himself  has failed at eros.25
 Nussbaum, Fragility of  Goodness, 198. Unfortunately, Nussbaum continues, “at the same time, it makes us 26
see so clearly that we cannot choose anything . . . It is our tragedy: it floods us with light and takes away 
action.” Both choices force us to surrender too much.
 See Chapter 1, §3.2.27
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sound familiar to the lover.  It will look familiar only to the philosopher—who may, 28
according to the more metaphysical readings of  Plato, be the true lover anyway. Perhaps 
for this reason, Plotinus is clearer in his description of  the lover, in commenting on the 
Phaedrus, clearly separating the philosopher and the lover as two distinct lives (along with a 
third, the musician), all of  whom make the ascent in their own way. He notes that “the 
lover (into whom the musician may turn and then either stay at that stage or go on 
farther) . . . ” (I.3.2 line 1), clearly indicating that we should not mistake the Platonic lover 
to be simply the philosopher in disguise. Plotinus thus refuses the possibility of  claiming 
that the ‘true lover’ is the philosopher. There is therefore reason to hold, even if  Socrates 
appears to be arguing the opposite in the Symposium, that love is of  the individual, not of  a 
first principle. 
 	 There is less ambiguity in the Phaedrus, where, as already briefly outlined above, 
the eromenos plays a central and continuous role in the ascent of  eros. This can again be 
attributed to the context, where Socrates is more directly addressing the pederastic 
relationship, rather than the divinity Eros.The lover reacts toward the eromenos when he 
perceives a reflection of  beauty. It is to the eromenos, and not the beauty that he reflects, 
that he desires to sacrifice. The erotic relationship leads them to ascend together, to work 
together so that both better reflect the god they follow. As a consequence, while the lover 
may indeed be ascending to the Really Real, the Good, or the Beautiful, the eros is felt 
toward the eromenos, and they together, out of  love for each other, begin to ascend. What 
the lover desires is the Other; what he achieves—through his pursuit of  him—is the 
 And therefore, will likely fail his own test, discussed above, that love ought to be recognizable to anybody 28
who has ever loved, Phaed. 243c.
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Beautiful. In other words, as I stated at the outset, philosophy and education may be an 
end of  Platonic eros, but it should not be taken to be the only end.  
	 This is not the case unequivocally, however. The individual, even if  he is the 
object of  love, is a mere ‘reflection’ of  something greater than him; it does not seem Plato 
envisions the eromenos being loved for his own sake.  I love him because he reflects Beauty 29
well. Thus a Platonic love of  the individual in the Phaedrus runs directly into the complaint 
Vlastos levels against the Symposium: it seems that, if  I love the individual for beauty, what 
I love is not really the individual at all, but only that which I love him for, in this case, 
Beauty itself.  If  he were to lose that one aspect, regardless of  everything else about him, 30
I would no longer love him.  
	 Even if  this is the case as it seems to be in the Phaedrus, however, given the 
identification drawn in the last section of  Beauty, Goodness and Being, it becomes 
difficult to claim that a person could lose his beauty while still remaining identical to 
himself. For Plato, an object that ceases to be good, ceases to be.  Consequently, when we 31
speak of  an object losing its beauty, we do so in one of  only two ways. In the first, we 
understand beauty, incorrectly, to be something very surface-level and ephemeral. But it is 
precisely the “recent initiate . . . who has seen much in heaven,” and thus the one who 
best understands beauty, who has this experience. In this case, it is the flaw of  the lover, 
who fails to understand the beauty of  the beloved, and not the flaw of  the beloved, on 
 It is possible to give an account of  love in which “loving a person who reflects beauty well” does not need 29
to be interpreted as “loving a person because he reflects beauty well,” particularly by ascribing to a no-
reasons account of  love, such as is argued for convincingly by Smuts in a different context in “In Defense 
of  the No-Reasons View of  Love.” However, given Plato’s broader metaphysical assumptions about 
participation, such a view becomes very difficult to see in the texts considered here. 
 Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as Object of  Love in Plato,” in Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the 30
Soul, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford University Press, 1999).
 See the Analogy of  the Sun, Rep 507b-509c.31
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which the ending of  love is to be blamed. In the second, the individual truly does become 
less beautiful, and, as a result, slowly ceases to be himself, as in the case of  the vicious 
man, who sinks lower than the beasts. In this case, nobody would fault the lover for 
ceasing to love the beloved, nor are they likely to say that his love for the person never 
existed since it ended with the loss of  beauty.  32
	 It is for this reason that the end of  the Phaedrus continues to see the best expression 
of  eros as one that does not participate in sexuality, but which is two lovers turned toward 
something higher. Love of  the individual must always remain tied to the first principles 
that lurk in the background. I love the individual because I see something in him, and the 
closer we draw to that ultimate Beauty, the better I will perceive the beauty the individual 
has captured. However, it would be wrong to interpret this (as some have), as indicating 
that the two turn away from each other, and instead turn toward the Beautiful itself, 
sharing in this contemplative life.  This is clear from the fact that Socrates attributes to 33
the eromenos an anteros, a ‘counter-love,’ (255d-e), a strange attribution when discussing a 
pederastic relationship, in which the eromenos is meant to not feel an eros or affection 
toward the erastes, but only give his disinterested favors in exchange for some sort of  
education or initiation (thus the reason for the argument of  the first two speeches of  the 
Phaedrus: if  the eromenos is to be disinterested, why should he choose one who has an erotic 
ulterior motive?).  It is even odder—in fact it would be impossible—to attribute anteros to 34
 This distinction between a rightly and wrongly understood sense of  beauty, and its link to personal 32
identity, will be crucial in the recovery of  an ethical eros offered in Part IV of  the dissertation.
 As seems to be the case in Aristotle’s accounts of  friendship and contemplation in Nicomachean Ethics VIII-33
X.
 See Halperin, “Plato and Erotic Reciprocity” for a detailed account. For example “according to the 34
customary Greek idiom, the senior partner in a paederastic love-affair has a monopoly of  eros; the junior 
partner . . . expresses philia . . . and is moved to antiphilein, ‘to feel affection for him in return’ (only women 
are said to anteran, to return their lovers’ sexual desire),” “Plato and Erotic Reciprocity,” Classical Antiquity 
5, no. 1 (1986), 66.
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the eromenos, however, if  Socrates/Plato intends the object of  eros to be the Beautiful, and 
not the individual. Unless there is love directed toward the eromenos, it is impossible to 
speak of  the eromenos feeling a ‘counter-eros’ or ‘eros-in-return.’ For the first time, as 
Halperin notes, “it becomes permissible to speak of  the lover and beloved as two 
lovers.”   35
	 Therefore, choosing between love of  the Beautiful and love of  the individual will 
not settle the debate between a metaphysical love and an ethical love. Love of  the 
Beautiful—although fundamentally metaphysical, through its concern for ascending 
toward first principles—still gives birth to ‘true virtue’ and love of  the individual—
although fundamentally ethical, through its concern for intersubjectivity—still leads us to 
a metaphysical first principle. Unsurprisingly for Plato, the ethical and the metaphysical 
remain tightly intertwined.  
§3: A Final Interpretation 
	 At this point then, I will offer, in summary form, what I see as Plato’s conception 
of  eros, which will allow us to proceed through the following chapters and examine how 
the differences in interpretation have led to a variety of  different reactions and responses 
to Plato. Although I have consciously put many of  the evaluations about ethics and 
intersubjectivity into language that foreshadows and will make easier many of  the debates 
to come over Otherness and authenticity, this also serves as an interpretation of  Plato’s 
 Halperin, “Erotic Reciprocity,” 75. Halperin also takes this as evidence that the sexual is to be completely 35
erased from Plato’s account of  eros, “no erotic desire, no matter how intense, should (or, indeed, can) be 
sexually gratified,” in order that the two lovers can avoid the censure from the city for their 
“shamelessness and perversion,” 67. But as was pointed out in §3.2.3, Plato does not refuse the benefits of  
eros even to those who engage in sexual gratification (256c-e)
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works themselves. Eros to be the very basis of  a possible ethics and of  human action. Eros’ 
proper object is the individual, although through this relationship, both the erastes and his 
eromenos are given the opportunity to be turned toward Beauty and the Good. This 
argument can be traced throughout the various parts of  the dialogues, but can be seen 
most clearly in a passage at the end of  Socrates’s account in the Phaedrus: 
When the charioteer sees the vision of  his eromenos, his entire soul is warmed by 
the perception and is filled with longing’s tickling and pricking . . .  At first the 
two indignantly resist being compelled to do terrible, unlawful things; but they 
finally give in to the unending harassment and where they are being led, agreeing 
to do what is demanded. Thus they come close to the eromenos and see his radiant 
face. When the charioteer sees him, he is reminded of  the nature of  beauty and 
sees it again, standing on its sacred pedestal beside judiciousness. Fearful and 
awestricken at the sight, he falls back, and this forces him to pull on the reins with 
sufficient violence to set both horses back on their haunches (253e-254b). 
Plato acknowledges here that it is possible to profane the eromenos. The eromenos is the 
‘pedestal of  chastity’ in Plato (254b). Because of  this, eros has a clandestine nature, since 
“if  he were not afraid that people would think he was a raving maniac, he would offer sacrifice to his 
eromenos as to a sacred statue or a god” (251a, emphasis added). Consequently, we must 
understand that eros, at its heart is concerned with the ethical interaction between lover 
and beloved, and only secondarily (or in service of  this primary goal) with contemplating 
first principles. Likewise, the anteros the eromenos returns his lover is at least scandalous, and 
at worst grounds for legal censure. Eros is done in secret, away from the eye of  the public 
that is not able to separate eros from possible profanation. Here the divisions of  love made 
in the early speeches of  the Symposium once again appear; no longer as two kinds of  love, 
but instead as its two possibilities: love succeeds or fails to the extent that it manages to 
avoid profanation. 
!79
 	 Nevertheless, Platonic eros lunges at the eromenos “as although the eromenos were 
himself  the god” (252d). When eros succeeds, the lover does not make the eromenos into an 
object, but the lunging of  eros is precisely the profane offerings of  sacrifice to a god. The 
eromenos retreats and becomes something that cannot be possessed. He becomes a new god 
in the pantheon from whom the lover can only fall back in wonder. Again, the 
cosmological and the mythological portions of  the Symposium can be senses in the 
background. Love connects us to something greater than ourselves, the pantheon of  the 
gods and the world around us. But as in Aristophanes’ account, it does not do so by 
turning us away from the particular beloved, but it is our very relationship to the 
individual that creates the connection. The lover does not turn away from the eromenos and 
to the Form of  Beauty, or even to the traditional gods, but even more it turns the lover to 
the eromenos whom he wishes to make a god himself, “adorning it and holding ritual 
celebrations in its honor” (252d). The lover in the Phaedrus never performs rites to the 
Beautiful, but rather performs new rites in honor of  the eromenos, at most merely modeled 
after the old ways. Nor does the eromenos ever cease to be the violable other, despite being 
elevated to godhood, as Socrates notes, “the two indignantly resist being compelled to do 
terrible, unlawful things, but they finally give in to the unending harassment and go where 
they are led, agreeing to do what is demanded” (254b). Demanded, that is, by eros itself. 
	 It is here that eros makes the turn to ethics. “[The lover] come[s] close to the 
eromenos and see[s] his radiant face” (254b). The face shines and the lover sees the eromenos 
anew as a god who may not be violated and the lover must pull back on the reins of  his 
chariot. The eromenos also maintains his distance, and what is more, moves both lovers into 
the realm of  the ethical. This is seen when Plato begins to introduce language of  the 
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cardinal virtues, noting that the eromenos’ face shines and the lover “not pretending but 
truly lov[ing] him” (255a) begins to live, along with his eromenos “with modesty and reason 
[so that] the better aspects of  the mind prevail by leading them into an orderly life and a 
friendship with wisdom, [and] they will lead a blessed and harmonious life here” (256a) 
The passage thus links back to the early praises of  pederasty, and indeed to the 
completion of  the Symposium’s ascent. However it also differs in one significant fact: 
Socrates here does not attribute the gaining of  modesty and wisdom only to the erastes, but 
to both together. No longer is eros merely a transference of  what the lover has to an 
impoverished eromenos, but instead the erotic relationship they share inspires ethical 
growth in both. As a result, we are brought back to the Symposium where we get a 
statement of  a possible Platonic, eudaimonistic ethics, when Diotima gets Socrates to 
answer that to possess good things brings happiness—an answer that, by extension, 
applies to the previous question of  what possessing beautiful things gives a person, and 
thus answering the larger question of  what those who love have (204d-205a). At the end 
of  the ascent, we discover that the primary beautiful thing for man is true virtue. Thus, to 
possess virtue makes one happy. It should therefore not surprise us that eros, which pursues 
beauty, gives birth to ethics. The lovers are compelled, because of  their love, to live a life 
of  virtue. Further it is only because of  their love that they are able to do so. For the 
speakers of  the Symposium, this generally took the form of  Eros inspiring courage in the 
lovers.  Here in the Phaedrus, however, Socrates instead interestingly locates the birth of  36
ethics in a kind of  double piety toward the traditional gods and toward the eromenos. This 
is followed by the moderation of  the lovers, who hold their horses at bay, refraining from 
 See 178d-179c for one example. There Phaedrus asserts that the best army would be one composed of  36
erastai and their eromenoi.
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sexual immorality. This difference can perhaps be explained by the change from the 
egocentric ethics of  the Symposium  and the interpersonal ethics that is put forward in the 37
Phaedrus. Piety is impossible without first assuming the existence of  an Other who deserves 
our reverence.  38
	 The amorous relationship, therefore, gives birth to the ethical relationship, by 
leading both the lover and the beloved to discover the virtues. By living this erotic 
relationship, each is taught to live piously, modestly, and wisely. Just as for Agathon in the 
Symposium, Eros contained all of  the cardinal virtues, here too in the Phaedrus, loving 
transforms those in the relationship into ethical beings, providing each for the tools to live 
a virtuous life, not only with the beloved, but in all of  their interpersonal interactions. 
	 However, if  eros in the Phaedrus is directed first toward the particular beloved, it still 
retains some of  the metaphysical qualities common to Plato’s thought. The Beautiful 
maintains a place as a guiding principle for action, as well as providing for the possibility 
of  eros in the first place (in the eromenos who reflects Beauty Itself). Virtue is gained, not 
directly from the sight of  the beloved, but by their mutual ascent to the divine. Similarly, 
the deification of  the eromenos, even if  it is not objectification, is sure to give pause to an 
account of  ethics  Nevertheless, if  this interpretation of  Plato’s thought is possible, we 
have at least a baseline for what an ethical eros may look like, an interpretation that 
rejects eros as merely a metaphysical relationship of  the self  to some first principle. 
 See the end of  chapter 1.37
 Whether that other is divine or human. The only certainty is that we need not be pious toward the 38
Forms.
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§4: The Stakes 
	 It would be impossible to say without question that Plato intended one or the 
other of  these objects to be the definitive answer to what we love. While I favor a reading 
of  eros that is oriented toward the particular beloved, and that, through this relationship, 
fosters the ethical growth of  both lover and beloved, as we saw, each interpretation 
includes portions of  the other. The metaphysical relationship to Beauty still gives birth to 
virtue, while the interpersonal eros still assumes some first principle that the eromenos 
resembles, and toward which the lovers are drawn. The question at this point then, is 
what are the stakes between these two possible interpretations, between the love of  the 
Beautiful versus the love of  the individual, or between other interpretative questions such 
as the divinity of  love or the immortality of  the soul? Put simply, these questions put 
Plato’s ethics and his metaphysics in an uncomfortable tension, one that, as future 
chapters will show, will cause a problem for the philosophers trying to break from a 
traditional metaphysical reading of  the person as determined by categories of  being and 
essence.  
	 If  love is of  the Beautiful, eros is a metaphysical relationship, that is, one 
concerned with revealing the true nature of  reality, and the place of  the person within 
that totality. Everything else, including the Other, is nothing but a means to my own 
eudaimonia, my own accomplishment of  my ultimate telos, within a scheme of  the eternal 
being of  the Forms. In addition, the daimonic eros of  the Symposium as an in-between 
offers a route to comprehending the Other, or to negating the gap between Self  and 
Other that many seek to make impossible. These problems are mirrored in the question 
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of  the immortality of  the soul. If  the process of  love is best understood as a soul’s return 
to a prior state, we are led back to metaphysical understandings about the nature of  the 
Self  that elicits a strong reaction from contemporary philosophy. As I will hope to show in 
the following chapters, the disparate descriptions of  love and the reactions to Platonic 
theories can largely be explained by interpretive differences.  
	 While Plato is not innocent of  all charges levied against him by contemporary 
philosophy, I will show that contemporary philosophy's rejections of  eros as either 
impossible and destructive (Part II) or mute, and therefore excluded from an ethics 
defined as discourse (Part III), both rest on an incorrect division of  the Good and the 
Beautiful, which, as we have seen above, Plato considers to be either identical or closely 
connected. By offering a new phenomenological definition of  beauty in Part IV, I will 
once again make it possible to draw the link between a person’s beauty and his or her 
goodness, and show that we can return to a theory that is still ‘Platonic’ in spirit, modified 
to deal with 20th century concerns: an eros that, by providing the basis for the recognition 
of  the Face of  the Other although the encounter with beauty, serves as the grounds for 
opening the ethical attitude, seen as the encounter with the good.  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INTERLUDE 1: A NOTE ON METHOD 
	 Having spelled out a general conception of  a Platonic eros, let us now look at a 
first group of  contemporary conceptions of  love. Historically, this view is the older of  the 
two general positions I discuss, and represents many of  the earliest 20th century attempts 
to come to terms with love in a new philosophical vocabulary concerned with alterity.  It 1
can be found, in some form or another, in the early developments of  psychoanalysis, 
phenomenology, existentialism, and in second-wave feminism. Here, I focus almost 
exclusively on what might be called the ‘French tradition.’  This is not to say that others 2
did not contribute to a ‘continental eros,’  rather the decision is a pragmatic one: my goal 3
is not to elaborate what any one historical figure said about eros, but to present two live 
options regarding the philosophy of  eros, and ultimately (in part IV) to offer a rebuttal of  
both of  these general views. Thus the authors mentioned are not intended to be thought 
of  as the sole holders of  a single theory, but rather examples of  a family of  closely related 
views. I have chosen these particular philosophers for three reasons: first, I find them 
exceptionally clear proponents of  the views I am seeking to refute. Second, they are some 
of  the most important figures in their respective fields, and as a result their works have 
circulated widely, and thus have had a large (and I would argue destructive) impact on the 
philosophy of  love more broadly. Finally, there is a web of  connections between those 
philosophers I have included, which has made it possible to draw more definitive 
 Although by no means was it the only such origin point. As is always the case, alternate views existed from 1
the very start.
 However, the shared language is by no means the primary unifying force among these traditions, but a 2
shared set of  questions.
 Two recent works have surveyed several of  the important figures and ideas not addressed in this 3
dissertation, Enns and Calcagno, Thinking About Love: Essays in Contemporary Continental Philosophy and 
Bournemark and Schuback, Phenomenology of  Eros.
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conclusions about the ways that these views have responded to and built on top of  each 
other. 
	 Nor will I take great pains to argue that the reading I give of  their texts is the only 
possible one. Debates internal to each philosopher have largely been relegated to the 
footnotes. Many have been defended and argued for differently at various points.  While I 4
certainly hold my own interpretations here to be at least fair, if  not the most accurate 
interpretation of  each writer’s position, the reader may wish to be more sympathetic to 
any of  the individual philosophers covered here. But removing any particular philosopher 
will not destroy the general thesis; what is at stake is not what view a particular 
philosopher holds, but rather, that the view itself  that (on my reading) they hold needs to 
be rejected. That such important philosophers hold and disseminate this view is all the 
more dangerous to our understanding of  love.  
	 However, the reader should not expect that all parts of  this chapter equally apply 
to all of  the people mentioned within it. While all of  the philosophers included agree on 
the general conclusion that love is impossible, there is disagreement and occasionally even 
open contradiction in the particular details of  how each fleshes out this claim. I have not 
attempted to resolve these tensions, but instead presented them side-by-side, 
acknowledging the distinctions, but reaffirming that each, in his or her own way, is 
arguing toward a common point. These disagreements reaffirm that what is at stake is a 
widely-held view, that, despite occasionally differing in the details, has pervaded 
contemporary philosophy’s thinking about love. Although certain boundary disputes 
 It appears to be a favorite pastime of  philosophers of  love to seek it even where it does not seem to be. 4
One common example is the many articles written about the theory of  love espoused by Heidegger in Being 
and Time, a text where the word only appears a handful of  time in footnotes, always in reference to other 
thinkers, and never of  direct interest to Heidegger’s main point. For one recent example of  this, see the 
chapter “Heideggarian Love” by Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback in Phenomenology of  Eros.
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provide a fluid set of  positions, they all target a common core: loves’ impossibility and 
destructive nature.  
	 Finally, the views presented in both Parts II and III will be given their own chance 
to speak, with my own criticisms coming up only occasionally. I have attempted to let the 
views speak for themselves, to make their own case, before finally offering my own 
alternative in Part IV. These four parts tell a single story: a progression of  views that have 
developed in direct response to what has come before them. Thus I am not concerned 
first with countering the views directly, but rather locating precisely why the criticism 
appeared in the first place, so that, in each successive chapter, we can see how a successful 
response could be offered. As a result, the reader should not take conclusions such as 
“love is x” in these middle two parts to be my own views, but rather, the conclusions of  
those who hold the view in question. The interludes following Parts II and III will offer 
clearer explanations of  my own opposition to the views in question, what ought to be kept 
and what ought to be rejected, as we move toward the final explication of  my own 
interpretation of  eros in Part IV. 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PART II: UNETHICAL EROS: THE FAILURE TO CONSUMMATE 
This is the torture of  the impossible love [ . . . ]: a free being cannot be had.  1
CHAPTER 3: THE FAILURE OF LOVE 
	 What then, is this general position? I have called it here ‘impossible eros,’ which 
may be slightly misleading. It certainly is not impossible on a metaphysical level. Love is 
not a square circle, it unquestionably exists. Lacan, who infamously stated matter-of-factly 
that “there is no sexual relation,”  was himself  twice married and the father of  four 2
children. It would be difficult indeed to claim that, in philosophy, much less in culture 
more generally, a large portion of  people think love is nonexistent, a pure fiction that has 
been perpetuated by at best, misguided—and at worst, nefarious—actors.  Rather, it is 3
impossible in one of  two formulations:  
• ‘it is impossible for . . . to love’ where the blank ought to be filled by an otherwise 
privileged situation (generally, what Socrates might call the ‘best human’ or ‘best life’), 
or 
• ‘It is impossible for eros to . . . ,’ where the blank ought to be filled by the true goal of  
eros (generally, as for Aristophanes, some form of  unification of  the lovers)  
Love is impossible because it runs counter to something about what makes us most 
human, or because it fails to achieve its goal. Thus both the reason—and the irony—of  
 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (SS), 658.1
 Jacques Lacan, Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of  Love and Knowledge, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller and 2
Bruce Fink, (New York, NY London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 12.
 Although it would not be impossible to find at least some.3
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the subtitle ‘a failure to consummate’: ‘love’ (or something like it) is undoubtedly 
consummated (in the ordinary sense) the world over, and yet, as we shall see, this is never 
enough. Love, eros, sex (different thinkers will pick a different term) is in fact aimed at 
something more subtle than this, and in pursuit of  that, it never reaches completion. We 
are thus given only two options. Either abandon love altogether, in favor of  some other 
life which has a better chance to reach its goal or, persevere despite it, as Beauvoir 
commands: “love . . . always impl[ies] a failure, but this failure must not keep us from 
loving.”   4
	 This latter sentiment, in fact, should be held as the constant refrain throughout 
the chapter. Love’s impossibility is not contradicted by the evidence of  love’s prevalence. 
The very people who repeatedly criticizes love in its philosophy as well as its popular 
media, returns every day and convinces itself  that their love is different, their love can 
succeed. This hope, they claim, is not merely a delusion, but a conviction that the 
eventuality of  love’s demise cannot stop us from loving, any more than the inevitability of  
defeat can stop the patriot from fighting against those wanting to destroy his country.  5
However, we should consider, along the way, whether we are right to do so, or whether the 
measures taken to continue loving in fact contribute to the fact that love is excluded from 
‘the best life.’ 
 Kristana Arp and Simone de Beauvoir, “An Eye for an Eye,” in Philosophical Writings (University of  Illinois 4
Press, 2004), 258.
 A typical example employed by Marcel, when discussing the difference between hope and delusion (cf  5
Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator)
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	 We can see, in the two formulations of  love’s impossibility,  the germ for using 6
Plato’s view of  eros as the starting point. The two impossibilities correspond directly to 
the final choice between Aristophanes and Socrates. Either love is part of  the virtuous life, 
or it is what makes us whole. It was within this division that a second split was discovered: 
either love unites us with a beloved, or it helps us attain some first principle (for example 
True Virtue or Beauty). This choice will be raised again and again in the 20th century 
texts, often with direct reference to the erotic dialogues of  Plato.  It is rarely, however, in 7
praise or agreement; rather, we find out that love’s impossibility ensures that love can 
neither gain us virtue nor make us whole. Nor can (given its impossibility) love remain the 
vehicle of  transcendence. Instead, these early views will see humans as naturally capable 
of  transcending as a lone individual—achieving their status as transcendentally free, 
authentic subjects—only for love, in its failing, to inhibit that movement. 
	 Thus, we can treat these views of  eros as an alternative to, and in fact a criticism 
of, Platonic eros even when it has been additionally been shaped by the further 
developments that have taken place in the interval between Plato and the 20th century. 
We should ask throughout the whole chapter: ‘for what reason has contemporary 
philosophy and culture soured on love?’ If  we can identify the points to which they object, 
we can then also see whether a new formulation of  Platonic eros could be found to 
overcome the objections. We can discover which interpretations of  Plato—and what parts 
 I have so far been using love and eros fairly interchangeably. However, it is not always the case that a 6
person who believes eros to be impossible will also think love is therefore also impossible or vice versa. 
These two might not necessarily tied the same fate. I will always clarify, for particular authors, the 
distinction to be drawn, if  one exists. 
 Lacan’s seminar dedicated most explicitly to love (Transference) spends nearly the first half  of  the course on 7
a fairly straightforward commentary on the Symposium before delving into psychoanalytic theory itself. Sartre 
names Plato’s eros a prototype of  Bad Faith (Being and Nothingness, 56).
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of  his eros—need to be corrected, adjusted, or eliminated to save the core what I am 
seeking to save: an eros which opens to ethics. 
	 With that goal in mind, let us examine the two ways in which eros might be found 
to be impossible: in §1, because the lover has nothing (good) to give the beloved.  Love 8
reaches its object but fails because it is not virtuous (this is the first formulation of  
impossibility). Then, in §2, because the objects of  desire and admiration (goodness and 
beauty) cannot be unified. Love and Sex become split,  only to discover that, as a result, 9
neither finds it is capable of  doing what it sets out to (this is the second formulation of  
impossibility). Finally, in §3, I will gather together some of  the conclusions to be drawn 
from these positions, to be taken into the rest of  the work: what are the failures they find 
(rightly or wrongly) in Platonic eros, and what has happened to eros and to ethics as a 
result? 
 Now removed from the Platonic discussion of  pederasty, it is now possible to speak of  lover and beloved—8
or in fact, of  two lovers together—as well as to place any person, male or female, in either position. 
However, we should not let this stop us from comparing contemporary views to Plato. As Lacan points out 
(perhaps not unproblematically), Pederasty offers us a microcosm of  all forms of  love, simplified by 
removing questions about sexual difference. Thus modern love is not different than ancient pederasty by 
kind, but only in its details. Some of  these details, such as the passivity of  the beloved, will be questioned in 
the main text from various positions. Others, in particular the analogousness of  heterosexual and 
homosexual love, have largely been left aside, except insofar as it factors into discussions of  the previous 
point of  activity and passivity. I take it as a simple, uncontroversial point that Platonic eros can, in practice, 
be extended to heterosexual and lesbian love, and that none of  the claims of  Platonic speakers to the 
contrary hold any water.  
However, that is not to say the terms are always necessarily played by men and women equally. Both 
psychoanalysis and feminism argue that very specific roles are played by men and women. Beauvoir, for 
instance, will argue that it is not capable for the contemporary woman to play the role of  Sartre’s lover, 
while the beloved of  Greer’s and Firestone’s feminist critique is necessarily the woman, and never the man. 
Since the same issue may carry specific gendered terms for some thinkers, but not for others, gender neutral 
examples extremely difficult. I have made an attempt to distribute pronouns when possible, but otherwise, I 
do not note every time when the pronouns used are necessary, and rely on the context to indicate when 
pronouns can be swapped or not. 
 This fact will already be presumed by many of  the discussions in §1, insofar as it will generally treat love to 9
the exclusion of  sex
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§1: The Failure of  the Lovers 
	 The first way that these views of  love can be seen as criticizing love is by 
contesting Plato’s claim that it is the lover who provides benefit to the beloved. As we saw 
in the first chapter, the lover was the virtuous man, who by loving, was able to instill a 
similar sense of  virtue in the beloved, leading to their mutual transcendence. This is 
summarized in the Phaedrus as the process of  pyschogogia—soul-leading—with the lover 
“leading them [i.e. the lover and eromenos] into an orderly life and a friendship with 
wisdom, [so that] they will lead a blessed and harmonious life here” (256a), while Diotima 
promised to ‘initiate,’ ‘teach,’ or ‘instruct’ Socrates in the higher mysteries of  eros 
(210a).  However, by the early 20th century this supposition had begun to be questioned. 10
The sources of  this questioning are likely varied and impossible to fully uncover, but 
undoubtedly include—in addition to the questioning of  Plato I am focusing on here—the 
push toward a scientific, rational philosophy in modernity which would not have room for 
an emotion such as ‘love’ being the source of  education, in addition to a growing 
skepticism regarding the existence of  such fully mind-independent, external, universal 
moral truths, discoverable by any means, whether emotion or reason. But whatever the 
case for the skepticism, it became clear to several people that, without this purpose, love 
loses its essential role in the life of  the virtuous person. In its absence, philosophers began 
to question whether love had a place in the virtuous life at all, or if  it actually worked 
counter to the achievement of  virtue. After all, it was the reaching toward virtue that 
separated the divine manic love from the human sickness in Socrates’ second speech of  
 The Greek verb is μυέω, which was first specifically “to initiate into the mysteries” (i.e. the hidden or 10
secret—usually divine—truth), before coming to more general usage of  initiation or instruction.
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the Phaedrus, as well as being the basis for the distinction between Pausanias’ heavenly and 
common loves in the Symposium. 
	 This objection to love is not always uniform, but exists along a spectrum of  views. 
The mildest position, seen in Lacan’s thought, takes a relatively mild stance advocating 
only that “love is giving what you don’t have,”  and thus (ignoring for now his stronger 11
critiques of  the sexual aspects of  eros), only that whatever the work of  eros, it is distinct 
from the work of  becoming virtuous. A middle view, such as Sartre’s or Beauvoir’s argues 
that love is an offer or call to inauthenticity and bad faith which must be rejected in order 
to live virtuously. Lastly, in the harshest critique of  a virtuous love, Shulamith Firestone 
and several other second-wave feminists suggest that love “is the pivot of  women’s 
oppression today,”  and that love not only offers, but forces a life deprived of  12
transcendence on women. Regardless of  the variance of  the first stance, there is a second, 
more commonly shared belief  that it is impossible for love to be mutual (§1.3), and at least 
the suggestion (sometimes more fully embraced than others) that it is impossible for love 
to be purified or cured (§1.4). 
§1.1: Some Clarifications 
	 Before delving into the argument for this failure of  love, it is necessary to take note 
of  some shifts that have taken place in the philosophical discourse, as well as some 
equivocations and simplifications that will have to be made in order for the sake of  
brevity. The first is the shift that has taken place in the word love itself. For Plato, as I have 
 Jacques Lacan, Transference: The Seminar of  Jacques Lacan, Book VIII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce 11
Fink, 1 edition (S.l.: Polity, 2017), 129. 
 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of  Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 12
2003), 126.
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already explained (see the Introduction), the primary meaning of  eros contains both the 
sexual desire and the relational, passion/affective aspects of  what we might call love.  13
That is, for Plato, Love—eros in the broad sense—is best exemplified by a combination of  
the more restricted senses of  eros and philia, while many of  the speakers in his dialogue 
take eros only in the more restricted sense of  sexual desire, with no expectation that it is 
relation or passion. However, due to the expansion of  literature about romantic and 
courtly love in the interval, by the early 20th century, ‘love’ is decidedly emotional, even 
sentimental, while sexual desire is excised almost entirely.  When eros is talked about, it is 14
no longer used as an umbrella term, but rather a related (and usually distinct) experience. 
We no longer speak of  ‘erotically loving’ (at least not in polite society), but of  
‘romantically loving.’ Thus, Lacan states that “the jouissance of  the Other [as we will see, 
closely connected to eros] is not the sign of  love,”  while Sartre primarily discusses love 15
in his section on ‘Concrete Relation with Others,’ with his descriptions and illustrations 
(as well as its link to the following section on hate) making it clear that the fault that he 
finds exists, primarily, in an emotion felt toward another, not in erotic desire or the sexual 
act. It is only the feminist writers who refuse to draw this sharp distinction, seeing the 
sexual roles that women find themselves in as indicative or perhaps even constitutive of  
the wider cultural, relational roles they find themselves in. As a result, they hold perhaps 
 Despite the possible confusion, I opt to use ‘passion’ throughout instead of  affect or emotion, as this is the 13
word which ties most directly back to the pathos of  Plato, and which indicates in its origins the aspect of  
undergoing or suffering, rather than falsely hinting at some kind of  activity. Speaking only about this aspect 
of  eros, love is something that comes over us, it is not something we do. If  “love is a verb,” its action is done 
to us, not by us.
 Charity, or agape, tends to be mostly absent from the accounts discussed in this chapter. It reappears 14
prominently in the group discussed in the following chapter, where we will be forced to reconsider the 
boundary lines once more.
 Lacan, Ecncore, 4, cf  Jean Allouch, Lacan Love: And Other Works (Lituraterre - Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 15
2007), 87.
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the closest view to Platonic eros regarding the integration of  the two parts (although they 
also most strongly disagree with his praise for eros).  In this chapter, the love discussed is 16
primarily passion or relational love. Chapter 4 will take up the same group of  authors 
with regard to their views of  sexual desire, where a second impossibility of  love will 
appear. Although various authors discussed in this chapter will not always agree with each 
other on the precise location of  this division, that disagreement is inconsequential to the 
larger umbrella view. It will be enough to note that the authors do draw divisions, without 
pinpointing their exact location. As I will briefly address throughout this chapter (in 
particular in §4), before returning to it in chapter 4, this split is not entirely incidental to 
the objections raised; to the contrary, the split is generally made as a last ditch attempt to 
save some part of  love, only to instead end up sealing its fate as impossible.  
	 The second equivocation involves phrases such as ‘virtuous’ and ‘transcendence’ 
which I have already employed several times. These are words which, even when they 
reappear across texts, do not map perfectly from Plato to new philosophies. For example, 
Sartre claims that the issue of  authenticity is distinct from that of  ethics. Bad faith is not 
morally bad faith. Similarly, although Sartre, Beauvoir and the later feminists all speak of  
authenticity, the same theory does not underlie all of  them. The same is true of  
transcendence, an idea that already takes on a far different meaning in Sartre than in 
Plato, and which begins to sound completely foreign to the Marxist-influenced writings of  
 This view, largely shared by the particular authors I highlight here, was not, however, uniformly agreed 16
upon by feminists, and in fact was made clear in the ending of  second-wave feminism as a result of  the so 
called “sex wars,” an internal debate about whether sexual liberation, including prostitution and 
pornography, were signs of  the liberation or oppression of  women, with the former opinion being often 
based upon the possibility of  splitting love and sex completely. For one source on this topic, see Ann 
Ferguson, “Sex War: The Debate Between Radical and Libertarian Feminists.” 
As we will see in later chapters, other feminists (in particular, I will address Luce Irigaray and Audre Lorde) 
do not share the same critique of  eros, and in fact find it a fruitful tool to draw upon.
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later feminists. Lastly Lacan, as primarily a psychoanalyst, is not immediately concerned 
with virtue at all, but health. Yet even he will eventually offer a seminar on The Ethics of  
Psychoanalysis, looking directly at the question of  what the field can offer to ethics. While 
he admits that the analyst cannot make his patient virtuous, he does not deny that this is 
the goal of  the patient.  Despite these difficulties, I have allowed some equivocation on 17
these terms.  I will occasionally continue to refer to ‘the virtuous life’ when dealing with 
parallels to Plato, but more often simply subsume all of  the views under the label ‘the best 
life.’ This is due to the fact that, as already outlined, my goal is not total faithfulness to a 
single text or author, but the outline of  a unified view which has many varied descriptions. 
I take it that all of  the authors discussed here, in their various vocabularies, are aiming at 
what could eventually be summed up as “the best life.” Whether they would agree that 
this ‘best life’ is the virtuous man, the healthy patient, the authentic transcendentally free 
subject, or the concretely free woman can be bracketed for the time being. We could 
translate the opening claim of  the chapter from Plato’s language “it is impossible for the 
virtuous person to love” to a more specific “it is impossible for the authentic person, the 
just man, or the equal woman to love,” for each author, but all of  these, I take it, resolve 
into a shared umbrella position “it is impossible for the person living ‘the best life’ to 
love.” Although it being impossible for Sartre’s authentic subject to love does not 
immediately mean it is impossible for the virtuous person to love, I will bracket this 
question for the current chapter. While it is my ultimate position that the best life is the 
virtuous life, this is an equation which will be argued for in the following chapter, due 
 See Mark de Kesel’s Eros and Ethics for a thorough commentary on what this ethics might look like. I 17
return to this part of  Lacan at the end of  chapter 4, to show how Lacan’s conception is quite different than 
my own.
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precisely to the critique of  authors discussed here,  at which point we can re-raise the 18
question of  whether the recovery of  the virtuous life as best life results in a similar 
recovery of  the importance of  love.  19
§2: Love’s Separation From the Best Life 
	 This first objection to love is no doubt the most cynical, and perhaps the most 
difficult to see as culturally relevant in the face of  what seems like a relentless onslaught of  
‘romance’ novels, movies, and expectations. And yet, there has been a not-insignificant 
reaction against the ‘culture of  love’ which has done nothing but expand, first through the 
birth of  courtly and romantic love during the medieval and renaissance periods, to the 
recovery of  these same themes in the poetry of  the Victorian era (seen, if  not best, at least 
most familiarly, in the poetry of  Elizabeth Barrett Browning), to the continuing market of  
paperback romance novels, popular love songs, and Hallmark holidays.  
	 The reaction, for many, likely starts as a simple question ‘why has love become so 
important?’ Upon probing for an answer, however, many seem to have found that not 
only has love been over-emphasized in culture, but in fact, is not deserving of  any of  the 
praise we have given it. These cracks might first appear when we stop to ask someone 
“why do you love me?” When Barrett Browning offers to “count the ways” that she loves 
her beloved, we are perhaps struck by the beauty of  her devotion, but upon reflection we 
 For example, Levinas’ critique of  Heidegerrian (and Sartrean) phenomenology as being too ontological 18
and not focusing on ethics.
 The answer to this hypothetical, at least for those discussed in the following chapter, continues to be ‘no, it 19
does not.’ The need for this interluding chapter then, is to find out what changed in philosophy between 
Plato and recent accounts of  the virtuous life, that lead them to disagree about its relationship to love. I 
hope to show that it is as a result of  the arguments in this chapter, despite them not immediately addressing 
the virtuous life.
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become aware that the beloved could in fact be anyone. We have learned nothing of  the 
beloved himself, a phenomenon that has become even more pronounced in popular 
music, so that fans all over the world can hear it as a love song sung to them. If  I am too 
specific, if  I, like Shakespeare, sing of  my love of  the “dark lady,”  how can I expect to 20
appeal to fans of  fair skin and blonde hair? How are they to imagine themselves as 
substitutable for the one person the artist has in mind? So instead, we praise her for traits 
that are not so particular. The beloved is beautiful, but not due to any too-specific trait. 
She is kind and gentle (a trait few would deny themselves), her eyes or her hair have 
captured my heart (but I won’t mention how, lest I am forced to specify what he or she 
actually looks like).  But while this may work for record sales, we discover that this 21
substitution happens no less frequently in our explanations of  our own love. All of  the 
good traits I praise in my beloved are found, and likely to a higher degree in other men or 
women around the globe. In other words, we are back to one of  the original interpretive 
problems of  the Platonic dialogues: if  I love the beloved because she reflects Beauty well, 
do I really love her at all? Or do I simply love what she stands for and—if  I were to find a 
better representative—I would find it no problem to offer my love toward the new 
exemplar instead. After all, I never loved the original beloved, only what she stood for, 
and while I may seem to be acting unfaithfully toward the person, I have in fact remained 
faithful in my love of  Beauty.  Or is it that I love my beloved more than those others due 22
 Sonnets 127-15420
 Comedian Bo Burnham recently satarized this phenomenon in his own ‘pop song,’ “Repeat Stuff ”: 21
“I love my baby and you know I couldn't live without her 
But now I need to make every girl think this song's about her 
Just to make sure that they spread it like the plague 
So I describe my dream girl as really really vague.”
 See Price’s claim that the latter “leaves little ground for fidelity,” Love and Friendship, 46-7, as well as 22
Nehamas’ rejection in “‘Only in the Contemplation of  Beauty is Human Life Worth Living’ Plato, 
Symposium 211d,” 4.
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only to some accidental reason, such as having seen her first, or having shared a mutual 
acquaintance? In either case we are caught in the paradox of  wanting to be ‘the only one’ 
and recognizing that our explanations of  love seem to contradict that. 
§2.1: The Best Life and Love’s Offer 
	 Although we often speak of  “love being blind” or loving “despite one’s flaws,” we 
cannot, it seems, love merely “in spite of ” flaws, but must love because of  them. Nothing 
else deserves the name. Love of  beauty is aesthetics; love of  wisdom, philosophy. No, for 
love to last—love of  a person, not an idea—I will demand that the lover love me for me. It 
is this point that Jacques Lacan says will never work: what makes me me—short of  a new 
essentialism—are the very things I find unlovable. With Lacan, like many philosophers, 
rejecting recourse to some positive individuating property (for example, Scotus’ haecceitas), 
he instead has to resort to one’s symptoms and flaws. As Bruce Fink describes it, “in 
certain cases, this could even go as far as wanting to be loved for being essentially unlovable, 
disgusting or repulsive (a lazy good-for-nothing or a turd).”   23
	 Sartre and Beauvoir also arrive at this same conclusion, with Sartre noting that 
“love can not exist except in the form of  a demand on the part of  the lover.”  Love 24
demands me to surrender my existence as transcendent subject, and instead tie my own 
existence as a concrete, contingent, factical being directly to the lover’s transcendent being. 
My freedom is unreachable and therefore unlovable, and instead the lover reduces me to 
 Bruce Fink, Lacan on Love: An Exploration of  Lacan’s Seminar VIII, Transference (John Wiley & Sons, 23
2015), 41.
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (Simon and Schuster, 1992), 375 (from here on cited as BN). Sartre’s 24
discussions here are of  the relational aspects of  love, primarily. Although he does not draw as strong a 
divide between love and eros as Lacan, the impossibilities of  each do take different forms, and thus will be 
addressed separately in §2.
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what he can love, to those flaws and finitudes of  my bodily existence. Love always 
demands that I become an object—my body-object, first of  all—and that I identify 
myself  with my concrete existence, rather than my transcendental freedom. It is no 
surprise that love as a demand—love for the sake of  our imperfections—does not appeal 
to the potential beloved, and for that reason Lacan is often cited as clarifying his 
definition of  love by adding that it is, by nature, always given “to someone who doesn’t 
want it.”   25
	 Whatever the philosophical framework, all three authors close in on the same 
cultural fact: the way in which we sing our praises of  love make it impossible to actually 
love an individual. With that love, I love only an idealized idea of  their traits. Their projects 
thus take up a purpose parallel to Plato’s, a description of  a person’s transcendent 
movement. For them—as for many interpreters of  Plato—relationships with individuals 
are only stand-ins for our desire for something greater, such as our relationship to Being.  26
Thus we could read these views as endorsing the exclusive reading of  the Symposium’s 
ascent. In order to reach the higher levels we must leave behind the lower levels.  27
Perhaps consciously, I want to be loved for my beauty, virtue, or intelligence. And yet, at 
some point, Lacan’s idea will always pop into my head: Surely there are others out there 
handsomer, funnier, or more mentally stable than I. Will you leave me the second you find 
them? Will you, like Socrates, move from the love of  me, the single beautiful body, to the 
 See Fink, Lacan on Love, 216n15. There, Fink explains that the remark was originally made by a seminar 25
participant, and not Lacan, although he does later employ it once in seminar XII with reference to Socrates 
and Alcibiades.
 See the debate sketched out in §1 and §2 of  Chapter 2.26
  Sartre, in one of  his few direct references to Plato, refers to eros as a prototype of  bad faith, perhaps 27
precisely because remaining in the relationship of  love was to keep from making the movement of  
transcendence. BN, 56.
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love of  all bodies, the second you realize that beauty is not my own (or, at least, not mine 
alone)? The only alternative, the only real individual love, rests on a demand that will go 
undesired by all who recognize it. At best, what we look for in romantic partners is 
someone who tolerates or understands my flaws, not who actively seeks them out. If  
someone were to tell me he loved me because my nose were off-center, or because I’m a 
little too obsessive about people moving my things or eating my food, I would be 
offended, not flattered. After all, what if  I decide to have my nose fixed, or seek treatment 
for my obsessions? Must I keep from improving myself  in order to continue to be loved (a 
strange inversion of  Lysias’ position that the lover keeps the beloved from improving so 
that he will not outgrow the lover)?  
	 There is no response to the question “why do you love me” that will satisfy. At best 
(according to these views) I will be acutely aware—if  I stop to think about it—that the 
answers are hardly particular to me, or at worst, that they are nothing but a list of  my 
flaws. Nor are we truly satisfied with remaining in ignorance about the object of  love; 
‘love is ineffable’ may be philosophically compelling, but it is rarely (if  ever) romantically 
enticing.  We demand that the ignorance be resolved, only to be disappointed by what 28
we find behind the curtain. As Lacan points out, love, when taken separately from 
sexuality (a division he thinks is unquestionable), “is a passion that involves ignorance of  
desire”;  it is “impotent . . . because it is not aware” of  what it really is.   29 30
 Even Scotus’ haecceitas is unknowable in this life. And thus, to love for some ‘individual essence,’ either 28
reduces to “it’s ineffable” or else a list of  personal attributes, circling back to the first problem.
 Encore, 4. Lacan here uses passion in the same way I have, to signal what is emotional or affective, not 29
what is ‘sexually passionate’
 Encore, 6. For Lacan, what it really is is jouissance, sexual desire. But this too, turns out to be impossible, as 30
we will see in chapter 4.
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	 Beauvoir highlights the same conclusion regarding the impossibility of  love: 
“many women in love permit themselves to be deluded.”  The only way of  loving, of  31
refusing to let love end, is to perpetrate a continual self-delusion, refusing to acknowledge 
the truth that is right in front of  us. This same desire to maintain ignorance is the driving 
force behind Sartre’s view, premised on bad faith. Love is impossible because it boils down 
to a pretense; I must pretend to not be aware that the Lover’s love disgusts me. The 
second I admit to myself  what I know lurks behind her love—an offer to be reduced to an 
object of  sexual desire, to be trapped in bad faith and inauthenticity—and assert myself  
as a free subject, I no longer find any reason to accept the advance of  the lover.  “In love, 32
the Lover wants to be ‘the whole World’ for the beloved” but by this very desire “demands 
that this freedom [the beloved] as freedom should no longer be free.”   33
§2.2: The Lover’s Empty Promise 
	 But love is not only impossible for the beloved; it turns out to be equally 
impossible for the lover.  In the unlikely scenario that the potential beloved was not 
already revolted by the thought of  being loved only for his or her flaws, a second defect 
hides behind the lover’s advance. The lover is doomed by the same universality of  goods 
that the beloved is, so that any gift the lover may believe themselves capable of  offering 
could be given even more perfectly by numerous other suitors. As Sartre says, highlighting 
part of  a “triple destructibility of  love,” if  what we offer is some good, the lover is 
 SS, 659.31
 Beyond the simple problem here of  being reduced to an object being undesirable, I will take up a further 32
discussion on this point in the following chapter, as the reduction from object of  love to object of  sexual 
desire runs into additional impossibilities of  the sexual relation.
 BN, 367.33
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“perpetually made relative by others . . . hence the lover’s perpetual shame.” If  what I offer 
is some good, I “would have to be alone in the world with the beloved for love to preserve 
its character as an absolute axis of  reference.”  Otherwise, I always risk being relativized 34
and destroyed by the appearance of  another who offers the same, or perhaps even better. 
Instead, the lover must search for something that only she can offer, a reason to be 
differentiated from the crowd.  
	 For Socrates, solving the issue was as simple as convincing the young boy that the 
erastes could instill virtue in him or increase his social standing. However, on Lacan’s 
reading, this Socratic intervention is undercut by its ironic delivery. Socrates’ speech is not 
the final praise of  love, but an ironic reversal of  the praise that precedes it. None of  the 
symposiasts truly have what they profess to give through their love. Contrary to Socrates’ 
claim (so the argument goes), we are not capable of  passing on virtue through love. This 
should be no surprise, given the preceding; if  love is that which attempts to reduce the 
beloved to her flaws or to an object, it is unlikely to also turn her into virtuous subjects. 
Once again, where the lover was praised in Plato’s dialogues for initiating the beloved into 
a life of  virtue, he now stands accused of  degrading the beloved, depriving her of  a 
transcendent freedom.  
	 Even Lacan, who takes a somewhat milder position than this, still does not allow 
love any greater power than “giving what you don’t have.” As Lacan reads the Symposium, 
love was defined by a lover who has a lack, and a beloved who has something that the lover 
desires, or even needs. Otherwise, the lover would not find any reason to desire the 
beloved. Contrary to Socrates’ claims that the lover was the one who offered something in 
 BN, 377.34
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the relationship (virtue), it is in fact the beloved who is expected to have a ‘something’ to 
offer. All the lover has to offer was a ‘lack,’ an empty void which he hopes to be filled by 
the beloved. In essence, Lacan sees the whole Platonic project as resembling what 
Alcibiades accuses Socrates of  doing: appearing as the lover (the one with something to 
offer), only to be revealed as the beloved (for Alcibiades, this was the one desired, for 
Lacan, it is the one who needs to be fulfilled).  The lover promises virtue, only to be 35
revealed to not possess anything at all, instead forcing the lack on the beloved; requiring 
him or her to fill the gap. For Sartre this represents a second part of  love’s “triple 
destructibility,” as the lover will remain in a state of  “perpetual dissatisfaction,”  since “to 36
love is in essence the project of  making oneself  be loved.”  But, strengthening the 37
scandal of  becoming the beloved, Sartre notes that this requires that I objectify myself  for 
the Other: 
The lover’s freedom, in his very effort to make himself  be loved as an object by 
the Other, is alienated by slipping into body-for-others . . . . Here in fact we 
encounter the true ideal of  love’s enterprise: alienated freedom . . . . Each one is 
alienated only to the exact extent to which he demands the alienation of  the 
other.  38
For Lacan, this transforming from ‘lover’ to ‘beloved’ was as simple as appearing as the 
one who has, only to be discovered as the one who needs, but Sartre goes further, accusing 
the lover of  a desire for self-alienation or self-objectification through love that he calls 
masochism. But it is important to realize that neither is arguing this thesis as one deviant 
form of  love, but as love’s very essence. Love’s desire is truly only ‘to be loved,’ which in 
 Socrates/Diotima similarly accuse the prior speech-givers of  confusing the lover and the beloved.35
 BN, 377. I will return to the third part of  this destructibility in §2.36
 BN, 375.37
 BN, 375-6.38
!104
turn is the desire to be either completed or alienated. “But masochism is and must be 
itself  a failure,”  Sartre concludes, stating the case definitively for the impossibility of  39
love for the authentic person. 
	 Already skeptical when I am given a gap by another and told that only I can fill it, 
I am mortified when I find out what he desires that I fill it with. What first appeared as 
perhaps a romantic confession of  the lover “I am imperfect, lacking” turns to a source of  
anxiety as I am forced to confront either the mirror of  all my flaws, a person who desires 
to be objectified, or else the fact that I am a mere stand-in for what is really loved (beauty, 
virtue, etc) which may be found in any number of  other places.  Love fails—love is 
impossible—because the lover has nothing to offer me, offers me only a lack which I do 
not want to complete. This impossibility, it ought to be clear, is also a direct confrontation 
with Plato’s view (although one that is undoubtedly mediated by modern philosophy’s 
similar rejection in favor of  rationalism). Love is no longer a route to knowledge. For 
Plato, it was precisely eros which brought us to better knowledge, both of  the world and 
ourselves (thus why one of  Socrates’ only claims of  knowledge is to ta erotika). As we saw in 
the Symposium, Eros himself  came to be described as the ideal philosopher. Now, love 
serves the purpose, for as long as it continues, of  perpetuating ignorance, often willfully, as 
the lover is secretly aware that admitting knowledge is to admit that love is denying them 
the possibility of  further self-flourishing. When Beauvoir admonishes that the failure of  
love “must not keep us from loving,”  there seems to be no other logical way of  40
interpreting this except as a call to remain in ignorance as long as possible.  Love endures 41
 BN, 376.39
 Beauvoir, “Eye for an Eye,” 259.40
 Beauvoir does not outrightly say this in the essay, but rather sees this as a positive exhortation to love as 41
long as possible until it fails. But, and this is my point, the only way to continue is to continue in ignorance.
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only as long as I remain ignorant of  what it really involves. Upon discovering that fact, I 
am sure to find it repulsive and abandon it all together; it becomes impossible for the 
virtuous person, the one living the best life, to love.  42
	 But what has it become instead? The view clearly falls on the side of  Nussbaum’s 
or Vlastos’ interpretation of  the Symposium, choosing to see a strong dissidence between 
our love for an individual and our movement toward transcendence. If  we want to 
maintain the goal of  human life as some form of  transcendent movement, we have to 
surrender our individual loves.  However, we now draw an even stronger distinction here 43
than Plato does. Even in this individualistic reading, Plato describes how individual loves 
might represent at least the first step to transcendence, opening the lover and beloved up 
to something beyond themselves. It may need to be outgrown and left behind, but it is at 
least the beginning of  the movement. Sartre and Beauvoir, however, see love as not an 
entrance to transcendence, but to immanence. This should come as no surprise, as Sartre 
himself  refers to Plato’s eros as “a prototype of  bad faith”  The beloved is called and 44
enticed to fall into bad faith, as the woman in Sartre’s example does, “seek[ing] to affirm 
their [i.e transcendence and facticity] identity while preserving their difference.”  The 45
beloved desires the love of  the lover, and sensing that any exercise of  his own 
transcendence will cause the relation to crumble, laying bare the desire of  the lover,  the 46
 It may not yet be fully convincing that Lacan’s interpretation of  love is wholly incompatible with the best 42
life, rather than merely irrelevant to it. However, we will see in chapter 4 that even greater problems arise 
when looking at the sexual aspect of  eros.
 As pointed out in §1.1, the form of  this movement varies greatly between philosophers, but there always 43
exists some goal of  actualization or fulfillment.
 BN, 56.44
 Ibid.45
 Sartre’s views on this offer of  love are deeply entwined with his belief  that love always misses the Other. 46
We will therefore return to his thought in more depth in chapter 4.
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beloved instead takes the offer to postpone and surrender his own transcendent freedom. 
Lacan’s lover similarly offers nothing to the beloved for his troubles, and in fact, fails even 
to fulfill the Aristophanic goal of  completion.  I give my lack to the beloved in hopes that 47
she will fill it, but what could I possibly offer to the lover except those same things, flaws 
and psychoses? Surely, if  what the lover needed was beauty, she could more easily find it 
in art or music. If  she has turned to me, it must be because what she desires is my flaws 
and failings. What I love is not some thing that will complete me, but a lack, 
complimentary to my own, but which will make me no more complete than I am already. 
Lacan’s love gains us nothing, while Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s seeks to deprive us of  our 
transcendent freedom. 
§2.3: The Best Life and Sexual Difference 
	 But if  all of  this still seems quite theoretical, and unlikely to find any foothold in 
our actual, every-day thinking about love, we need only turn to the way that these 
critiques have been not only adopted by, but in fact strengthened by the feminist cultural 
critiques of  the mid-twentieth century. Starting once again from the basic critique of  
Platonic eros as a barrier, not an introduction, to transcendence, these writers further 
strengthen the critique by arguing that the whole project of  the 20th century push toward 
authenticity and transcendental freedom assumes a privileged situation from which the 
‘self-supporting man’ might reach his own transcendence, if  he simply ignored the 
distraction of  love. But this, as Beauvoir makes us question, is a view which seems to 
exclude the feminine. From the sending away of  the flute girls to Lacan’s claim that the 
 Again, a point to be returned to in chapter 4.47
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all-male of  love of  the Symposium offers us a simplified view of  a universal love by simply 
removing sexual difference,  Beauvoir has raised the question of  whether we must 48
consider the cultural position more seriously, whether transcendence, even if  it does not 
begin from love, does begin from a certain concrete position in the world. 
	 The first impossibility of  love for Beauvoir is seen in the unequal nature of  love. 
Quoting Lord Byron, Beauvoir claims that “man’s love is of  man’s life a thing apart; ’Tis 
woman’s whole existence.”  Authenticity is possible for man because he can excise his 49
erotic/amorous dimension, and carry on with his life relatively unaffected. Woman, on 
the other hand, is entirely defined by love. Woman’s particular situation means that she is 
always dependent, immanent, “an inessential creature” condemned to search for a figure 
to “enthrone . . . as supreme value and reality.”  However, Beauvoir is adamant that this 50
passivity is not a mere biological or even psychoanalytic fact, but is also dependent “upon 
her social and economic situation as a whole.”  Woman’s love, she argues, is not just a 51
relation among other relations, but instead a desperate search for something essential, 
something which can ground her contingency.  The lover must be deified, made absolute 52
in order to satisfy the complete inessentiality of  woman.  But it is impossible for any 53
finite subject to bear the weight placed upon him by the woman in love, and as a result, 
the whole project will inevitably fail. It is impossible for woman to love, for in her love, she 
 Transference, 34.48
 SS, 642.49
 SS, 643.50
 SS, 402.51
 Men, on the other hand, can ground their own contingency through their various social and economic 52
projects.
 This also explains, Beauvoir claims, the large tradition of  female mystics, who channel their eros into 53
religious life.
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necessarily destroys herself  and her beloved.  “This is the torture of  the impossible love; . 54
. . a free being cannot be had.”  55
	 Thus while Lacan and Sartre both see the impossibility of  love as a universal fact, 
Beauvoir complicates the situation by arguing that not only is love impossible as such, but 
it contains an additional impossibility for woman, who is unable to merely leave it behind 
without denying herself. Woman’s position is “fraught with difficulty and danger, and [is] 
one that often fails . . . whether she adjust herself  more or less exactly to her passive role, 
woman is always frustrated as an active individual.”  Woman’s situation makes it impossible 56
to escape it. The offer of  love, the offer to see oneself  as a passive subject, is an offer 
which invites the woman to abandon the possibility of  becoming an active subject. 
	 This initial criticism began a broader cultural movement which saw these 
consequences as even more sinister, even more unavoidable, than did Beauvoir. Beauvoir 
admits that it is not only man who condemns woman to this fate; rather, “she herself  
usually forges the chains with which he has no wish to load her: she takes toward him the 
attitude of  the amoureuse, the woman in love.”  This may be a perverse desire, treatable by 57
some form of  psychological or cultural change, but the offer is (in woman’s current 
situation) too often willingly taken on, unable or afraid to face society unprotected. But 
whereas Beauvoir suggests that love offers a safety net which allowed us to escape 
(however illicitly) from the demands of  authenticity, for the feminists who followed, love 
was a prison which held women back, not by offering safety but by force. Influenced 
 One interesting alternative to this is Audre Lorde, “The Use of  the Erotic,” where she suggests that it is 54
precisely by recovering the power of  the erotic, that women can flourish. 
  SS, 658.55
 SS, 402-3, emphasis mine.56
 SS, 695.57
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heavily by Marxism and psychoanalysis,  these writers represent some of  the harshest 58
critiques of  love, writing in the 1970s at the height of  second-wave feminism, which saw 
issues such as sexuality, marriage, and family take center stage following the successes in 
establishing more basic equality in suffrage and property law. 
	 No longer are women simply disposed by society to be especially susceptible to the 
offer of  inauthentic love, rather as Shulamith Firestone begins: “Love . . . is the pivot of  
women’s oppression today.”  Women’s forced preoccupation with love freed men up to 59
create culture and society; it is only because of women’s preoccupation that men are able to 
succeed. Thus, far from the praises that the symposiasts sang of, Firestone is clear that 
“love is not altruistic,”  a view shared by Germaine Greer, who notes that love is simply 60
an “enlarged egotism,” and that what little true altruism does exist in love—particularly 
on the part of  women—is “an absurdity,” “spurious,” and ultimately “merely the 
inauthenticity of  the feminine person carried over into behavior.”  Woman’s position as 61
less than man has ensured that any sacrifice that she makes, any supposedly genuine 
offering is a mistake, ultimately misguided because the woman fails to recognize that her 
gesture is one-directional. Love is said to be an equal exchange of  self, but women soon 
find out that they have received nothing in exchange for their sacrifices, while men have 
profited in all aspects of  life from the sacrifices made by their lovers.  62
 In addition, Firestone’s book is dedicated to—and makes frequent reference to—Beauvoir.58
 Dialectics of  Sex, 126.59
 Dialectics of  Sex, 12860
 all quotes, Greer Greer and Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch, (McGraw-Hill: 1971), 148-9.61
 To be clear, this is only one trend of  feminism. Many others, including Irigaray and Lorde, both of  whom 62
will be addressed later, will praise love and desire.
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	 Woman’s inauthenticity, for these authors, is not something unwittingly offered by 
the man who would not wish to give it,  to be taken or not, but instead it is forced on her 63
by a hostile other. Women are aware that, in the classical romantic love, they are only 
loved as an idealized image, and that “this idealization, which she works so hard to 
produce, is a lie.”  And yet they are forced to perpetuate this idealizing love by the need 64
to escape their “class subjugation.”  If  woman is to escape the fate which has been 
imposed on her by society, it can only be accomplished via a different sort of  subjugation, 
that of  being reduced to an idealized object by an individual man, in love. Thus, 
Firestone, notes, “her life is a hell,” while Greer concludes in no uncertain terms:  
love, love, love—all the wretched cant of  it, masking egotism, lust, masochism, 
fantasy under a mythology of  sentimental postures, a welter of  self-induced 
miseries and joys, blinding and masking the essential personalities in the frozen 
gestures of  courtship, in the kissing and the dating and the desire, compliments 
and the quarrels which vivify its barrenness.  65
We have returned then, to the outright rejection of  the various praises of  love sung by 
Plato’s characters—to the strident criticisms originally voiced by Lysias’ speech in the 
Phaedrus. Love is ultimately a dominant party imposing his will on a subservient one (for 
him it was adult males and the young boys of  Athens, for Greer and Firestone it is men 
and women), forcing her to become a mere object for the advancement of  the man’s own 
status. The woman is forced to be inauthentic, so that the man can take up his own 
position of  power.  
 cf  SS, 695.63
 Dialectic of  Sex, 132. On the other hand, Firestone later adds a caution that there are “special difficulties 64
of  attacking the sex class system through its means of  cultural indoctrination. Sex objects are beautiful. An 
attack on them can be confused with an attack on beauty itself. Feminists need not get so pious in their 
efforts that they feel they must flatly deny the beauty of  the face on the cover of  Vogue,” 155. This remark 
will become particularly interesting when we see in §2.3 how little heed philosophy has paid to this warning.
 Female Eunuch, 165.65
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	 One need only read the lengthy criticisms of  the Disney Princess, the damsel in 
distress model of  story and its impact on the psyches of  young girls to see how thoroughly 
this particular criticism of  love as it pertains to feminine subjectivity in particular has 
permeated our culture far more widely than the academic theories of  a few philosophers. 
It similarly appears in the widespread belief  that romantic love was an invention of  a 
medieval religious and political society with a vested interest in ensuring the populace did 
not become too powerful or too free (echoing the gods’ punishment of  prelapsarian 
humans in Aristophanes’ myth), love is often viewed as an institution which will prevent 
‘the common person’ (or in this case, women in particular) from asserting their rights too 
stridently. Perhaps this view could be seen most glaringly in the antebellum American 
South, where slaveholders tolerated and even encouraged the marriages of  their slaves, on 
the basis that a slave would be less willing to flee or rebel if  he has a family who might be 
endangered by his actions.  Far from Phaedrus’ assertion that an army made up of  lovers 66
would be strongest of  all, slaveholders were aware that a threat to loved ones would 
paralyzes a population. We see it equally from the other side as well, from those sources 
that caution us against love, such as when St. Paul cautions that we should marry only if  
we find it impossible to control ourselves. It is best to be single, but better, he continues, to 
be married than to burn.  Many strands of  Buddhism will similarly call love the sort of  67
attachment which threatens to prevent or postpone the achievement of  enlightenment.  68
 This despite the fact that slaves were seen as holding no legal right to marriage, a right which the same 66
slaveowners actively campaigned to prevent, in the interest of  slaves being held to be persons capable of  
entering into contracts (thus endangering the supposed ‘right’ to hold them as ‘human chattel’), see Darlene 
Goring, “The History of  Slave Marriage in the United States,” particularly section III.
 1 Cor. 7:8-9. Many translations clarify “to burn/to be aflame with passion,” although the allusion to 67
hellfire seems clear as well. In either case, the message seems to be that marriage is for those who cannot 
control their love who’s love would otherwise prevent them from attaining salvation.
 Buddhist monks are almost universally expected to remain celibate, while lay Buddhists are merely 68
expected to avoid an over-attachment to sexual desire.
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Far from love conquering all, these sources would have us believe that we are doomed the 
moment we begin to love. Love holds us back, prevents us from achieving what we could, 
if  only we could deny our desires. 
	 This, as Lee Comer points out, is why for so long the institution of  marriage and 
the feeling of  love were kept separate. The ideals of  monogamy and a love-filled marriage 
are impossible to fulfill at the same time. We marry those who are like us in societal status 
and roles, and “optimistically, love is the last additional factor,” but even this is rarely the 
case.  And over time, this is just further confirmed, as it is within marriage when the 69
primary social oppressions of  women commence. The single woman is turned into wife, 
mother, caretaker, cook, housekeeper, etc. When at one time it may have been, if  only 
rarely, possible for woman to enter society as man’s equal, marriage spells the end, once 
and for all. Ultimately, even the woman who succeeds, becomes a wife, of  whom the 
husband says ‘what would I do without you?’, her victory “is Pyrrhic . . . both of  them 
have sacrificed so much of  what initially made them lovable to promote the symbiosis of  
mutual dependence that they scarcely make up one human being between them.”  Love, 70
if  it does not fail straight-away, will nevertheless ultimately destroy itself  when it realizes 
what has been sacrificed to attain it. Love is impossible, it is doomed to failure before it 
begins, even if  this fact does not prevent us from continuing to love in spite of  its 
impending collapse. 
 Lee Comer, Wedlocked Women (Feminist Books, 1974), 223.69
 Ibid., 157.70
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§3: Non-mutual Love 
	 What Sartre calls masochism—what the feminist writers see as the fundamental 
ways male and female loves differ—also hides a second impossibility: love is never mutual. 
Each lover desires only to be loved, while neither actually loves the other.  We are instead 71
left with dual seductions or conflicts. One party’s love is never equaled by the other’s and 
thus we are left to turn to what Sartre calls the second series of  attitudes toward the other: 
indifference, desire, hate and sadism.  Love is impossible because it appears to me (as 72
either lover or beloved), that the other will never actually love me, but only give me an 
offer to become otherwise than myself. Thus my fledgling love (of  which I am not self-
aware enough to realize it is not, in fact, any purer than the other’s) turns to hatred.  73
Beauvoir, as we saw, goes further, locating the non-mutuality in the unequal status of  men 
and women in eros. For each, erotic life is a kind of  surrender. However, for the man, this 
surrender is not total, nor does it go uncompensated. The man receives enjoyment as a 
definitive end of  sex. This is not the case, Beauvoir holds, for women. For woman, there is 
no single moment, no single locus of  pleasure.  The goal of  sex is less certain, less clear 74
than for the man. This is in part due to the fact that the ends of  pleasure and 
reproduction are split for woman. Neither is required for the other, whereas both are 
accomplished for the man in climax. Thus it is possible (and as we will see in chapter four, 
perhaps necessary) that what the woman gives in eros is not reciprocated, cannot be 
 There is again an interesting parallel here to what Alcibiades accuses Socrates of: “he presents himself  as 71
your lover, and, before you know it, you’re in love with him yourself,” (222b).
 BN, 379.72
 Even this mood is impossible, as Sartre finally concludes “hate too is in turn a failure,” BN, 417.73
 This idea is expanded on even further in Irigaray, “The Sex Which is not One.”74
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reciprocated. These same biological facts also account for the temptation for the woman 
to be seen (and to see herself) as an object, reduced to a passive role while the man 
assumes the active one.  75
	 Later feminists continue Beauvoir’s thought, with Greer summarizing that—
following the Platonist tradition—“women were not capable of  love at all, because they 
were men’s inferiors.”  This view, both Greer and Firestone agree, is in practice accurate; 76
women have been forcibly made men’s inferiors (even if  they are not so by nature), and, 
as a result, it is impossible for woman to love. She is not capable, due to the erasure of  her 
self-standing, to take on the egotistic, narcissistic role of  the masculine lover. It is thus 
impossible for woman to love. But that very description shows us why it is also impossible, 
as Firestone elaborates, for men to love.  They cannot love because they will eventually 77
discover that their idealized image is a lie, and that there is, in fact, nothing lovable about 
a woman who has been degraded into an inferior position. He will instead shift from 
woman to woman, attempting to keep from discovering their flaws for as long as possible, 
in order to maintain the image of  a being worthy of  his love. 
	 In contrast, Lacan suggests that “love is always mutual.”  However, it seems that 78
even here the hypocrisy of  the lover will always come out, as a result of  Lacan’s reliance 
on the ‘split subject.’ I am both lover and beloved. Part of  me lacks, while part of  me has 
what the other needs. Perhaps I even accept the lover’s demand because I feel the same 
(or at least, an equivalent) lack. Thus the relation is not the straightforward one of  
 Again, a fact which Beauvoir sees not as biological but based “upon her social and economic situation as 75
a whole,” SS, 402.
 Female Eunuch, 136.76
 “Men can’t love,” a conclusion she draws from various psychoanalytic accounts as well as Beauvoir’s 77
claim that “the word love has by no means the same sense for both sexes,” cited from SS, 642.
 Encore, 4.78
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abundance and lack (as with the erastes and eromenos), but rather a complex relationship 
where (as lover) I have a lack I cannot fill myself, but also (as beloved) have a something 
which, despite not being able to resolve my own lack, might resolve another’s. But this is 
not the same movement, but rather, two distinct movements of  my ‘split self.’ I will seek 
out whatever I need to fill the lack I feel as a lover, without any real concern for how that 
appears to the beloved, but when it comes to myself, I become disgusted if  I discover I am 
loved for my ‘unlovableness.’ Loving is easy, but love is impossible, barring the appeal to 
the miraculous,  because nobody would respond to such a disturbing demand on 79
themselves. The lover offers a lack, and as a result, will always be rejected. Thus, although 
Lacan calls love mutual, we might better picture it as two love one-directional 
relationships, running parallel, but in opposite directions. 
	 We can therefore see a second way, in addition to its inability to offer anything 
good, that these views raise issues for Plato’s view of  eros, this time going back to the very 
heart of  the issue: the definition of  eros. As I highlighted in the introduction, and further 
developed in part I during the discussion of  anteros, for Plato, eros was something which 
was naturally directed toward mutuality, at least in the Phaedrus. However (in a theme that 
is common throughout the 20th century), these accounts have instead chosen to draw 
Platonic eros from the Symposium, a text which is far less clear regarding the issue of  
mutuality, and lends itself  to an interpretation where love becomes a one-directional use 
 “The miracle of  love” is the fact that “it is always inexplicable that anything whatsoever responds to 79
[love].” Jacques Lacan, Transference: The Seminar of  Jacques Lacan, Book VIII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
Bruce Fink (S.l.: Polity, 2017). cf  Fink, Lacan on Love, 44.
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of  the other, or at best, two symmetric, but separate, erotes.  But by doing so, these 80
commentators once again open eros up to the dangers of  an overly strong individualism 
which sees the beloved as a mere tool for the lover’s own advancement. Lacking the 
philosophic grounding for a sense of  mutuality between the self  and the other (or more 
concretely, between the man and the woman), the dynamic of  the powerful self  against 
the weaker other suddenly makes it more difficult to explain why the best life includes 
love. No longer does this imbalanced power dynamic aid the older man in educating and 
improving the younger eromenos, but instead, transformed into the love of  supposedly 
equal, consenting adults, the remaining inequality of  the two lovers (according to the 
feminist writers) highlights the social dynamic at work, while for Sartre and Lacan, the 
inability to unite the two loves results in a failed endeavor which is unable to achieve what 
it desires. Love becomes impossible for the best life, not only because it in itself  is 
destructive, but in addition because, even in this destructive form, love turns out to be 
impossible to return, a fundamental part of  what it means to love.  Thus, even if  we 81
were somehow able to reconcile love’s draw toward immanence with the subject’s goal of  
transcendence, we are nonetheless prevented from making love possible as a result of  its 
reciprocity being found supposedly impossible.  As we will see in the following chapter, it 
is the return of  mutuality, or at least, the reversal of  the power dynamic that reintroduces 
the most sustained discussions of  love. But for these authors, the account of  otherness as 
 Lacan, for example, explicitly engages the Symposium for the whole of  his lecture course Transference, Sartre 80
mentions “Platonic Eros” without specifying which text he is thinking of  (BN, 56), although his account of  
eros contains many parallels (noted also by Hazel Barnes in her introduction to the translation) to the 
account of  the Symposium. Beauvoir engages Aristophanes’ myth while discussing the idea of  sexual 
difference (SS, 43 and 215).
 This claim, while commonly made of  love, is not necessarily universal. I ask the reader extend a credit 81
regarding this claim until the final chapter, where I offer an argument in favor of  its requirement for a 
coherent theory of  love.
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strictly what is unrelatable and irreconcilable leads to a denial that love is necessary (or 
indeed even possible) for the best life. 
§4: Unfixable Love 
	 It may at this point be objected that Plato too agreed that some forms of  ‘love’ 
would be ruled out for the virtuous man. For the current view to truly be a critique of  
Plato, we must see whether the various statements that “it is impossible for the virtuous 
man/woman/person to love” rule out love as such, or merely those common erotes or sick 
loves discussed by Pausanias in the Symposium and Socrates in the Phaedrus. If  it is the 
latter, we may find a simple solution to the apparent tension between a Platonic ethical 
love and an impossible love by acknowledging that love contains both possibilities. 
	 Despite the fact, however, that many do seem to claim such a way out of  this 
impossibility, in every case, we see that the solution differs in significant and important 
ways from Plato’s own solution to the duality that exists within eros. Lacan, for instance, 
appeals to the “miracle of  love,” the fact that “it is always inexplicable that anything 
whatsoever responds to [love].”  Loving is easy, but love is impossible, barring the appeal 82
to the miraculous, because nobody would respond to such a disturbing demand on 
themselves. The lover offers a lack, and as a result, will always be rejected. Although 
Lacan himself  counts on this miracle (after all, he was a therapist who continually saw 
 Transference, 52.82
!118
patients who were, in fact in love, and who sought to be loved),  we will see in the next 83
chapter, this was not the only difficulty that love encounters for Lacan. But even here, 
Lacan’s miracle is not, as it might be for Plato, one that will save love; it does not 
transform love, but only makes a love that, due to its elements, ought to never exist, to 
nonetheless endure. If  we were to describe a ‘miracle of  love’ for Plato, it would be that 
some maniae are divinely inspired—made good by their good origin. But Lacan’s 
miraculous love is not a good and virtuous love cured of  the psychoses of  ordinary love. 
In fact, it is the exact same love; the miracle changes nothing, but only makes the 
impossible love itself  exist. Thus we cannot speak of  a good and bad eros for Lacan, but 
only of  one bad, impossible love, which through some miracle, seems to exist. 
	 Both Sartre and Beauvoir rely on a similar ‘miracle’ to Lacan’s. Sartre’s takes the 
form of  “a radical conversion,”  about which he defers in Being and Nothingness, and only 84
later discusses in his posthumously published Cahiers pour une morale, while Beauvoir’s is to 
be found in the ideal of  cultural revolution, seen best in “what the Soviet Revolution 
promised.”  However, it seems to be that at best Beauvoir’s woman may be able to move 85
from the particular impossibility of  woman’s situation to Sartre’s general impossibility of  
all authentic subjects, while Sartre’s “radical conversion,” is similarly unsatisfying as a 
parallel to Plato’s eros. Both ultimately give authentic love the same basic form: man and 
woman must be able to love freely, in a way that does not confine the other, take away 
their freedom, or inhibit their self-transcendence. Beauvoir goes so far as to describe it as 
 Although, it is worth pointing out that those he saw were obsessives and neurotics, what love would look 83
like for healthy people, Lacan could not say. However as Fink points out, in Freud’s (and likely Lacan’s as 
well) view there are very few “normal men,” referencing “On the universal tendency to debasement in the 
sphere of  love,” Lacan on Love, 17.
 BN, 417n1484
 SS, 724.85
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no longer being love at all, but in fact simply friendship,  philia cleansed of  eros.  86 87
However, this is antithetical to Plato’s position, where philia and eros are inseparable. We 
may have friendships which are not strictly speaking erotic, but they involve eros 
nonetheless.  Further, what friendship does remain must be incidental to self-fulfillment, 88
rather than essential to it. For those holding this view, transcendence is still ultimately an 
individual project. It may simply be possible that others are alongside us as we each work 
on our own project. We will return to this point in both Parts III and IV, but it is enough 
to note here that, from the perspective of  those who most strongly reject it, love can only 
be saved by being made weaker. Sartre and Beauvoir’s authentic love turns out to be 
similar to what we found in Lacan: a love which plays no role in the self-standing subject’s 
transcendent movement. Whereas for Plato, love was the vehicle of  transcendence, now, 
in order to bring it back in at all, we must do so in a way which will simply prevent it from 
interfering with an already possible self-transcendence. 
	 It may further be objected that, for Beauvoir, as for the feminists who followed her, 
the discussions were not about a metaphysical reality, but a cultural one. Beauvoir’s work 
is not one on the essence of  woman, but on her “life today,” as the subtitle of  her work 
states. So, again, it may well be that the claims of  ‘impossible love’ are not absolute, but 
only relative to a changeable situation. However, for all of  them, it is not enough (or even 
possible) for an individual woman to be ‘liberated’ from the aggressions of  today’s love. As 
 For example, she praises marital fidelity, through which erotic attraction “dies . . . in esteem and 86
friendship; two human beings who come together in the very movement of  their transcendence through the 
world and their common projects no longer need carnal union; and further, because this union has lost its 
meaning, they are repelled by it,” SS, 467.
 There is an interesting parallel here to Aristotle, who in bks VIII and IX of  the NE, repeatedly refers to 87
eros as an excess of  friendship, seeming to indicate that philia (which he says is, or at least involves virtue) is 
put on the same excess-mean-deficiency schema, with eros being the excessive vice.
 Thus why he can say in the Lysis that he has an erotic longing for friendship.88
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Comer concludes her work, “there are no personal solutions. As long as the majority of  
women are underpaid and overworked . . . no woman can proclaim herself  liberated.”  89
Not until all love is transformed, can any individual love be saved.  Thus we cannot 90
simply say that ‘while it may still be impossible for some base men to love, and thus for 
women to love them back, on the whole, feminism has succeeded and love has been made 
better.’ Feminism’s victory must—all three are clear—be total, before it can be considered 
a victory at all.  What is needed is nothing short of  a total cultural revolution. Beauvoir 
prophecies that only  
on the day when it will be possible for woman to love not in her weakness but in 
her strength . . . on that day love will become for her, as for man, a source of  life 
and not of  mortal danger. In the meantime, love represents in its most touching 
form the curse that lies heavily upon woman confined in the feminine universe, 
woman mutilated, insufficient unto herself.   91
But it is unclear whether “that day” will ever actually arrive. Beauvoir says that it will 
come for woman ‘as it is for man,’ and yet the analyses of  Sartre have drawn into 
question whether even men can both love and attain freedom. While she has raised 
additional gendered issues to the impossibility of  love, it is not clear that Beauvoir’s 
optimism that ending the gendered issues will end all issues is well placed. She at one point 
locates this possibility in “what the Soviet Revolution promised,”  however, even if  it were 92
possible to deliver culture in this way, we are already talking about a different sort of  
distinction than Plato’s. For Socrates, it is entirely possible that the philosopher has a 
virtuous love, even if  everyone around him is living by a vicious one. For Plato, both loves 
 Wedlocked Women, 273. Firestone similarly states that “when love takes place in a power context, everyone’s 89
‘love life’ must be affected,” Dialectic of  Sex, 146.
 An interesting prelude of  the thesis I am attempting to build to, that love and ethics cannot be separated.90
 SS, 669.91
 SS, 724.92
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can live side-by-side, whereas the feminists see that impossible love must first be entirely 
torn down, to be entirely replaced by virtuous love. For Plato, it was the responsibility of  
each individual to love rightly or wrongly, regardless of  what society around him does; the 
solution now is all or nothing, either all love will be virtuous, or else all love remains 
vicious. Thus, for the holders of  this view, any evidence of  any non-virtuous love (of  which 
there undoubtedly continue to be many), is enough evidence to show that virtuous love 
remains—at least for the time being —an impossibility.  93
 And it remains, at least for me, an open question whether such a radical change in culture is actually 93
achievable. It seems any change will be incremental and unfinished.
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CHAPTER 4: THE FAILURE OF SEX 
	 However, as seen in the introduction and first chapter, there is more to eros than 
just affection. In fact, it perhaps plays only a secondary role to the more important sexual 
aspect. While Socrates and Plato made an attempt to link eros more closely with philia, it 
is possible that it is only this linking that is impossible. Perhaps Aristophanes and the 
others were correct, and eros should be understood not as romantic love, but as the sexual 
relation. If  this is the case, it may still be possible that eros remains possible, even in the 
face of  the failure of  love. After all, the failure of  love returned again and again to the 
claim that love cannot offer anything to the beloved. In sex however, nothing is offered. 
Rejecting the Socratic thesis altogether, sex can be seen not as an expression of  love or an 
admiration for the beloved, but—true to the Aristophanic myth—an attempt to become 
one. Sex desires, it does not offer.  
	 Many authors have indeed attempted to save eros in this way; seeing the failure of  
love, they excised it from eros, hoping that, separated from love, sexual desire and the 
sexual relation might be protected from the impending collapse of  love. However, as we 
shall see, this too turns out to be impossible, but here, not under the formulation in the 
first section “it is impossible for . . . to love” but rather, under the second form, “it is 
impossible for eros to . . . .” Here, the issue is not the lovers who fail to live the best life if  
they submit to love, but rather it is love itself  that fails, under the guise of  sexual desire, to 
attain the object that it seeks. This happens for a number of  reasons; the primary, and 
most obvious, was apparent already in Plato’s (re)telling of  Aristophanes’ position: two 
people are not made one through sex. If  unification is what is actually sought, sex fails 
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(§2). This, as we shall see, is true whether the unification sought is physical or spiritual.  1
These original problems become all the more troubling, as we shall see when sexual 
difference is accounted for (§3) and the problem of  unification becomes further specified. 
However, even if  we were to find some way to overcome this obstacle (Aristophanes 
appeals to the blacksmith-god Hephaestus), additional problems remain.  The very split 2
of  sex and love condemns it to a failure: desire for a good (sex) and admiration of  beauty 
(love) become separated, and thus, their objects, the Good and the Beautiful, also become 
separated. As I have argued in chapter one, this is already a view contrary to Plato’s,  but 3
further, I will attempt to show here, their separation inescapably condemns each side to 
failure. The good cannot be reached when it is separated from the beautiful, and vice 
versa (§4). This third section will force us to confront the relationship between eros and 
desire more directly and to see how desire functions as a motivational force. All of  this 
will show us that, if  unification is a goal, it can only be accomplished by the destruction of  
the other. 
§1: Some Preliminary Remarks 
	 In chapter three, we saw that the apparent impossibility of  love that resulted from 
a confrontation with Plato’s theory of  eros—i.e that eros was a key component of  the 
virtuous or best life, either by initiating the beloved, or by identification with the principle 
 There is actually a third possibility as well, that unification is brought by the birth of  the child. However, 1
this view has not typically been seen as an option for the thinkers included here. I will return to it in Part 
III, however.
 Notice that, similar to the recurring theme of  chapter 3, the saving of  an impossible eros happens only as 2
the result to the appeal to the miraculous.
 It is, in fact, a contrary view even to the more moderate position that the Good and the Beautiful are 3
related or even co-extensive, but in some way distinct, as many interpreters have claimed.
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of  virtue. However, this was not the only theory of  eros advanced in the Platonic 
dialogues. As we saw there is also the possibility that love seeks unification with an ‘other 
half ’ (see Ch. 1, §2.2), a view raised primarily by Aristophanes in the Symposium. So if  the 
first option turns out to lead to an impossibility, we might still be able to choose the 
second. Eros’ impossibility in the life of  ethics might simply help us solve the puzzle of  
what eros’ true purpose is (as pointed out in chapter one, the Good and the Beautiful are 
conspicuously absent from Aristophanes’ speech).  
	 Having said that, however, many of  the same authors who discovered the 
(apparent) impossibility of  eros in the first sense, similarly found the goal of  unification to 
be impossible. For Aristophanes, the goal of  unification was closely linked to desire and 
sexuality. Aristophanes does not have in mind a mere ‘two souls intertwining,’ but rather 
the physical unification of  two people, in an effort to heal the physical division dealt out 
by Zeus. The impossibility of  this model ought to be (as it was already to Aristophanes) 
immediately obvious. Sex does not meld two people together. It is only in the face of  this 
first impossibility that Aristophanes (and those who will follow him), turn to spiritual 
unification in its place. Perhaps we can never be made whole in body, but we can have 
hope that some unification is still possible. Aristophanes himself  suggests that, if  we live in 
this way, the gods will “restore us to our ancient life and heal and help us into the 
happiness of  the blest” (193d). If  we live as if  we are united, perhaps some relief  will 
eventually come. 
	 This, as I have said already, is not an option for the early 20th century 
philosophers of  love. Lacan most forcefully expresses his opposition with his simple 
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declaration that “il n’y a pas un rapport sexuel / there is no sexual relation.”  The heart of  4
the impossibility in the 20th century spawns from an issue not sufficiently addressed by 
Plato, and which became a more and more urgent issue for contemporary philosophy: 
alterity. The defining feature of  the 20th century’s alterity principle is that the Other 
always repels any attempt of  synthesis with the Self  or the Same.  They cannot be 
brought under any umbrella term—the Other always remains other, logically and 
metaphysically.  But for the Platonists, the self  and other are brought together under the 5
Good, and our separation  is something temporary, a result of  the soul’s descent into 6
matter. But matter is also something unintelligible, and therefore unlovable.  If  love is 7
about unification, then—for Plato—the only option is that what I desire to be unified with 
is not the beloved herself, but something that she shares in (the Good, the Beautiful, etc.) as 
we see when Diotima prophetically rejects Aristophanes’ argument on the basis that 
“what men love is simply and solely the good” (206a).  8
	 However Diotima’s claim has a more subtle conclusion: A love that seeks 
unification with the beloved is impossible for Plato not (as is the tragic conclusion of  
Aristophanes himself, as well as of  the early 20th-century philosophers) because 
separation could not be overcome, but because there is, in reality, no relevant separation 
 Translated by Lacan and his translators as “There is no sexual relation.” However, as we will see in part 4
III, the term rapport contains other translation options 
 This covers over a myriad of  differences between various notions of  alterity, however those differences are 5
not essential at this point.
 Both from the Good, and ultimately, from each other.6
 Plotinus also posits individual forms (see Ennead V.7), which could conceivably be thought of  as that which 7
we desire unity with. However, these are, at best, implicit in Plato’s own works, and seems to be a somewhat 
minority view among early Platonists (Rist, “Forms of  Individuals in Plotinus,” 229). Even if  they do exist 
however, the transparency of  individual forms to each other and all other Forms will create a similar 
problem for a unificatory love, which could be based around a distinction between individual and separate.
 This statement does not necessarily imply that love is not between individuals. Only that, if  love is about 8
unification, what I desire must be unified with must be something the beloved has, not the beloved herself.
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to begin with. As Diotima says just prior, “love is neither for half  nor for whole, unless, of  
course, my dear sir, this happens to be something good” (205e), and, ultimately, as we saw 
in chapter one, not only ‘something good’ but the Good Itself.  But for Plato, on the level 9
of  reality, nothing is ever separate from the Good; if  what I love is the-Good-in-the-
beloved, there is no need for unification—I eventually recognize that the goodness in her 
is the goodness in me, revealing (in experience) the unity in the Good that we have shared 
(in reality) from the beginning.  As the lover proceeds up Diotima’s ladder, reaching the 10
great sea of  Beauty, the lover will realize not just that all things have a share in the same 
Beauty as the beloved, but more importantly, that the lover himself already has a share in it. 
His desire for the Beautiful (or the Good) will be resolved not by acquiring the beloved’s 
beauty, but by recognizing he already has it. Having rejected Aristophanes’ halves and 
wholes argument, Plato can only appeal to the Good as the basis of  love, and this, in turn, 
will always threaten to destroy the Other and transform love into a metaphysical 
relationship of  the Self  to the Good.  And it is precisely this transformation that the 20th 11
century philosophers seek to prevent by introducing alterity. 
	 Recognizing the full philosophical urgency—both metaphysically and ethically—
of  developing an account of  alterity, 20th century philosophers rapidly developed the 
concept, but found that, rather than saving eros from collapsing into egoism, their new 
 As Schroeder points out in his study on this point, “there is no suggestion . . . in Diotima’s account that we 9
may appropriate Goodness or Beauty as our own because it was our former nature or because it is a whole 
of  which our present existence is a sundered part,” “Prophecy and Remembrance in Plotinus,” Proceedings of  
the Boston Area Colloquium of  Ancient Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1996), 7. However, it is clear that for Plato (and 
Plotinus) that the Good is already something which “is indeed our own” (ibid.).
 Cf. Plato’s discussion of  the Forms in Parmenides, 131b “it might be like day, which is one and the same, is 10
in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself.”
 Schroeder, who at times attributes to Plotinus a view which seems similar to what I have expressed here, 11
ultimately concludes that, “he is not discussing a relationship between two persons, but the relationship 
between the soul and the Good,” “Prophecy and Remembrance in Plotinus,” 19-20.
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insights were putting the failures of  an eros seeking unification into sharp relief. While 
they all agree on this conclusion, the rapid development also means that authors in broad 
agreement about love in chapter three have more significant differences regarding alterity. 
Whereas the trio of  philosophers I have primarily been making reference to so far (Sartre, 
Beauvoir, and Lacan) could be more or less treated as emblematic of  a single wider school 
of  thought, circling around the same impossibility of  love, their accounts of  alterity have 
rapidly departed from each other. This means that the impossibilities seen in an early 
account such as Sartre’s are quickly refined and strengthened, with later authors finding 
even more serious difficulties lurking beneath. Thus, while these three authors were 
treated as largely in agreement in chapter three, here they will be treated as separate, each 
representing a different web of  conclusions.  In addition, I will paint the accounts in 12
somewhat broader strokes, as alterity in these accounts remains somewhat fluid. While it 
is still too early to draw any conclusions about the general positions of  Otherness, I will 
take up this task again in Part III, where we will see Levinas’ and Marion's further 
developments regarding alterity.   13
§2: Naive Otherness and Objectification  
	 For Sartre, the question of  the other is raised when he realizes that, in the attempt 
to become ‘one’ with the beloved, I actually destroy the reason I wanted to unite with her 
in the first place. For example, he gives as the final principle in the “triple destructibility 
 Nevertheless, each person should still be seen as emblematic. That is, Sartre’s view, for example, although 12
it is different than Beauvoir and Lacan’s, is nevertheless shared by a wider group of  philosophers and 
popular writers.
 We will also see in that chapter, as a result of  its head start in development, how love is saved from its 13
impossibility much sooner than sex.
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of  love” that “at any moment he can make me appear as an object—hence the lover’s 
perpetual insecurity.”  This problem, which we could locate even in the love relationship, 14
becomes all the more pronounced in the sexual relationship. Sex is defined and structured 
by desire (a point to which we will return to in §4), and as such there is the constant risk 
that the other will be reduced to an object used to fulfill desire, a tool for experiencing 
pleasure. As Sartre points out, this is not something we can avoid, even by recourse to a 
division of  good and bad or right and wrong intercourse. The threat always looms over 
love, and thus always makes me insecure, regardless of  whether it ever actually occurs. It is 
precisely in light of  this, Sartre claims, that we make “a new attempt to realize the 
identification of  the Other and myself.”  This new attempt tries to reverse the 15
intentionality of  love. Our first attempts at unification (seen in what Plato says as much as 
in what precedes in Sartre) are always attempts to assimilate the Other into the self, into 
the Same, where we discover that, rather than assimilating, we annihilate. Thus, Sartre 
attempts an erotic Copernican turn, instead seeking to assimilate Self  into Otherness; 
attempting (this will become a primary feature of  the theories in Part III) to transform 
eros from a desire into a gift. If  I cannot achieve this unification for myself, perhaps I can 
offer it to the beloved, and in the process, achieve unity, so to speak, through the beloved. 
	 This reversal represents more a departure from than an objection to the Platonic 
project, since—as we have seen—there is no true ‘Otherness’ in Plato, all unification must 
become unification into the Same and the One. It also represents one of  the first attempts 
 BN, 377. See chapter 3 for a discussion of  the other two parts of  this schema14
 Ibid.15
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at thematizing Otherness as its own concept, alongside the Identity of  the Self.  As a 16
result, Sartre’s definition of  Otherness remains somewhat naive, largely defined negatively 
as simply what refuses assimilation into the Self: I cannot make the Other mine, me, in the 
same way as I might make food mine by consuming it, or my house by identifying myself  
with my possessions.  
	 This description should already make it apparent, however, that Sartre’s 
attempted turn will not work. The Self  cannot be unified into the Other any more than 
the Other can be unified into the Self. The reversal is simply an effort—which Sartre calls 
masochism (see chapter one, §2, where this was already briefly discussed in a different 
context)—to prompt the willful annihilation of  Self  for the sake of  preserving the Other, 
“but masochism is and must be itself  a failure.”  It is not enough, in masochistic love, to 17
debase myself, to make myself  an object. My true desire is to make of  myself  an object-
for.  However, in order to maintain the intentionality of  myself  as object, I must posit 18
myself  as transcendent; the very directedness of  my self-object demands that it exist as 
more than object, more than in-itself, lest it be available for any and all equally. Ultimately, 
Sartre concludes, masochism reverts to the original problem of  love and sex. In the 
contradictory transcendent movement toward his own objectivity, “the masochist 
ultimately treats the Other as an object.”  The Other becomes nothing more than a tool, 19
whose debasing actions are used by the masochist to become an object. It is not—as we 
 Sartre’s analyses are developments of  Husserl’s own, which appeared roughly a decade earlier in Cartesian 16
Meditations. Although there are certainly forerunners to phenomenological accounts of  Otherness, including, 
perhaps most preeminently, Hegel. Hegel’s project of  otherness, however, was not primarily the Otherness 
of  intersubjectivity.
 BN, 378.17
 cf  BN, 378: “this object such as it is for the Other”18
 BN, 379.19
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might suspect it to be—the Other who objectifies the masochist, but quite the reverse; the 
masochist objectifies the one who abuses him. 
	 This impossibility of  unification between Self  and Other in the Sartrean ontology 
is a result of  the ambiguity of  the subject. It exists equally as subject and object, being-
for-itself  and being-in-itself. But our intentions cannot ever be directed accurately. Our 
initial feeling of  love, the desire to be unified, is always directed toward the Other as 
subject. Yet in attempting to reach him, we always fall short, reaching instead the Other 
as object. Intentionality, at least as it was available to Sartre (we will see in Part III how 
intentionality begins to be described as reversible) always intends an object.  Common 20
language reveals this fact, speaking of  “the object of  desire,” and a language of  love 
which posits the beloved as the object possessed: she is my beloved, or when (in a light 
form of  Sartrean masochism) we promise the beloved that “I am yours; I belong to 
you.”  As it is especially defined by desire, sex—even more than romantic love—is 21
particularly guilty of  this sin; sex, in its seeking pleasure, will inevitably result in the 
objectification of  the Other. Either directly, by turning the beloved into the object to 
satisfy me, or indirectly, through the masochist desire to offer pleasure—that is, to 
objectify myself  for the beloved—which will inevitably revert to objectification. 
 For more general descriptions of  this phenomena in Sartre, see his examples of  bad faith, and in 20
particular, that of  the woman on a date.
 Irigaray highlights this point well in her essay “I love to you.”21
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§3: Sexual Difference and Otherness 
	 However, it was quickly recognized that this naive, negative conception of  alterity 
was not sufficient for the weight it had to hold. Thus, almost immediately, work turned to 
trying to develop a more rigorous, positive account of  how alterity is constituted. Among 
the first developments was the recognition that one of  the most apparent sources of  
otherness was sexual difference.  In a direct parallel to the impossibility of  love, this 22
version of  the impossibility of  sex was critiqued by feminists, beginning with Beauvoir, for 
similarly being androcentric. It begins to become apparent that Plato’s account of  love 
and sex, predicated on a homosexual relationship, can only speak about love from a male 
point of  view.  Thus, Sartre’s account of  alterity and objectification must be seen as the 23
particularly male phenomenology of  sex. If  we are to give an accurate account of  
otherness and unification in sex, Beauvoir argues, we will need to give two accounts, the 
male and the female. 
	  As she explains, the idea of  objectification in sex is peculiar to men, for whom 
“erotic pleasure is objectified, desire being directed toward another person . . . . Erection 
is the expression of  this need; with penis, hands, mouth, with his whole body a man 
reaches out toward his partner.”  Erection, the male role of  penetration in intercourse, 24
 Although seemingly based on the same recognition, accounts, such as Levinas,’ which specifically 22
identified the Feminine as the principle of  alterity represent a slightly different argument, to be dealt with in 
chapter three.
 Although it is true that the eromenos was seen as a passive role, it was seen as dishonorable for him to take 23
on a feminine role, a rule which, among other things, was meant to prevent penetrative sex. See Dover, Greek 
Homosexuality, 103: “an honorable eromenos . . . never assimilates himself  to a woman by playing a 
subordinate role in a position of  contact” and “it is not only by assimilating himself  to a woman in the 
sexual act that the submissive male rejects his role as a male citizen, but also by deliberately choosing to be 
the victim of  what would be, if  the victim were unwilling, hubris.” ‘Hubris’ being the catchall term for a 
variety of  illegal sexual acts.
 SS, 371.24
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functions to indicate to the man that he needs to find an object, outside of  himself, by 
which to fulfill his desire. Woman, on the other hand, is not this way. Female sexual desire 
is not as outwardly directed, not as oriented toward a single moment (as male desire is 
oriented toward ejaculation) , but instead seems to always take on the role of  “the prey 25
of  the species.” For the woman, penetration “always constitutes a kind of  violation.”  26
Woman’s autonomy is violated, disrupted by the male penetration. 
	 This description, although perhaps exaggerated, further highlights the 
impossibility of  sex. The woman, unlike the man, actually can lay claim to the 
‘assimilation of  the other.’ The woman receives the Other within her. But this is felt, 
Beauvoir and others have argued, not as success but as violation. The Other never ceases 
to be Other, foreign to the woman’s self.  What may originate from a desire for unification 
is instead completed in a feeling of  being violated, invaded.  This point adds an 27
important step in the trajectory of  the phenomenon of  alterity. It is recognized that Same 
and Other,  can exist ‘together’ without being united.  The Self  can impose itself  on the 28 29
Other, but it cannot successfully join itself  with alterity. The Other, under the guise of  the 
feminine, may play a passive role, but it does not simply receive the Self  without difficulty 
or objection. 
 See again, Irigaray’s “The Sex which is not One,” which further develops the consequences of  this 25
difference in particular
 SS, 372.26
 One can speak of  a woman he has slept with as one of  his “conquests,” as having “had her.”27
 Or Self and Other, the meaning is the same here28
 As briefly argued in chapter 3, this is precisely why Plato’s From of  Difference is not comparable. The 29
great paradox of  Platonism is that the Forms of  Same and Different already do exist in unity, not that they 
can’t be unified.
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	 Lacan similarly draws on the idea of  sexual difference to level perhaps the 
strongest critique of  love or sex’s ability to unite self  and other.  He is also the one who 30
most forcefully investigates the hypothesis that love seeks fusion, attributing this 
particularly to the imaginary order, when I form my identity by what I see of  my body-
image.  Essential to this is the narcissism which leads to attempting to conquer and 31
incorporate the other into myself.  It is in the movement to the symbolic order, to speech 32
and language from this initial step, that the hypothesis of  unification is left behind, and 
the impossibilities of  love discussed in chapter three return. However, this drive does not 
disappear entirely, and instead remains in the background, removed from love, but 
remaining instead as the goal of  eros. 
	 This division shows how for Lacan, following Freud more than Plato, eros ceases 
to be able to be used relatively interchangeably with love, and instead takes on a more 
specific meaning. Love is the passion, the concrete experience felt and sought after by the 
patients the psychoanalyst treats. Eros, on the other hand, is the drive (in Freud’s sense), 
connected to the ‘mythical’ explanations of  human desires and decisions (although there 
 Despite the psychoanalytic background of  Beauvoir, and many of  her fellow second-wave feminists, 30
Lacan’s ideas about sexual difference and Woman have been met with harsh criticism as well as high praise. 
In particular, concerns are often raised about whether his work is problematically phallocentric, relegating 
women to a secondary status not by a mere cultural or psychoanalytic fact, but by a normative fact based on 
natural, biological differences between the sexes. Beauvoir and Lacan were familiar with each other and 
their respective works, and seem to have shared at least some common ground in their separate readings of  
Freud; however, the work focused on here—Lacan’s Encore—appeared relatively late in Beauvoir’s life, and 
there seems to be no direct response from her regarding the arguments it contains.
 It would be impossible to fully examine the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real here, for treatments of  their 31
relation to love and eros, see Fink Lacan on Love and Marc De Kesel, Eros and Ethics: Reading Jacques Lacan’s 
Seminar VII (SUNY Press, 2009), both of  which I have relied on heavily for what I say here.
 Other becomes a very technical term in Lacan, and in particular the difference between ‘le grand Autre’ 32
and ‘le petit autre’ or, the Other with a capital O and the other, lower case o. The former is always 
language, symbolic associations of  the other person, while the other is the imaginary, the altar ego of  the 
mirror stage.
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is not an identification of  eros and desire,  and at times, Lacan asserts that they are in 33
fact opposed. ) and defined by jouissance—sexual pleasure.  34
	 It is the idea of  jouissance that stands at the heart of  the impossibility of  the 
sexual relation for Lacan, and, even deeper, the distinction between masculine and 
feminine jouissance. Lacan separately addresses the failure of  the sexual relation from 
both the masculine and feminine perspectives, noting how each partner’s particular form 
of  jouissance causes their sexual endeavor to fail. The sexual relation fails “in the male 
manner” by turning into love and language. Discussing how romantic writing is a 
substitute for a physical relation, Lacan notes that “the alternation [of  the epithalamion, the 
nuptial song], the love letter, they are not the sexual relationship. They revolve around the 
fact that there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship.”  Sensing the impossibility of  35
unification through the sexual relationship, the male jouissance turns to language and to 
mastery. If  I cannot physically possess the other, then I will comprehend her by creating a 
symbolic Other, a system of  symbols I can master. Male jouissance, then, as we shall see 
further on, turns from sexual eros to romantic love (one of  Lacan’s recurring examples is 
the development of  courtly love in response the prohibition of  sex), which will inevitably 
fail for the reasons already seen in chapter three. Lacan says “the universe is the place 
where” the sexual relationship fails, precisely because Male love fails by creating a world 
of  meaning.  The Male—male jouissance—is everything, it is the whole (as opposed to 36
the female, who is dependent on the male, a parallel to Beauvoir’s point regarding the 
 Fink, Lacan on Love, 132.33
 Fink, Eros and Ethics, 48.34
 Encore, 57.35
 Encore, 56.36
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‘default’ and second sexes). For male jouissance, everything is understood, including itself, 
in a web of  meanings and symbols, because (again paralleling the claims made by 
Beauvoir), male jouissance represents desire—an outward impulse. It is able to subsist on 
its own, reaching out to form its world around itself. 
	 Female jouissance—and the woman herself—on the other hand, is characterized 
by the not-whole, the pas-tout. As a result, it is also has a different cause for the failure of  
sex; next to the ‘male manner’ of  failure is another: “the female way. It is elaborated on 
the basis of  the not-whole.”  The whole of  Encore, his 1972-73 lecture course, is devoted 37
to this way of  failure. The ‘not-whole’ of  female jouissance is in part responsible for the 
failure of  unification. Drawing on the story of  Don Juan, Lacan explains that the essential 
fact is that he has his women “one by one,”  without ever being able to say that he has had 38
‘woman’ (as a universal or a whole), and without having become unified with any of  
them. They remain listable, nameable, countable. Each of  Don Juan’s conquests remains 
separate from all the others and resists being unified, either with each other or with 
himself.   On the contrary, “woman does not exist, woman is not whole,”  later clarifying:  39 40
Woman can only be written with a bar through it. There’s no such thing as 
Woman, Woman with a capital W indicating the universal. There’s no such thing 
as Woman because, in her essence—I’ve already risked using that term, so why 
should I think twice about using it again?—she is not-whole.  41
As the translator, Bruce Fink, notes in his footnote, the French does not ask to bar 
‘Woman’ (although this is how Fink employs it in the chapter title), but rather the ‘la’ of  
 Encore, 57.37
 Encore, 10.38
 Encore, 10.39
 Encore, 7.40
 Encore, 72-3.41
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‘la femme.’ As Lacan’s clarifications show, he does not want to deny that there are 
women;  it is the universal Woman, the Platonic, ideal Woman, that does not exist. 42
There is no essence of  Woman because every woman remains a not-whole, a non-unity.  
	 Already failing to be a unity of  her own, it is also impossible for a woman to 
become unified with another person in sex; on the contrary, the male remains the whole, 
the self-unity, who does not need the woman; “there is no woman except excluded, by the 
nature of  things . . . being not-whole, she has a supplementary jouissance compared to 
what the phallic function designates by way of  jouissance.”  Woman—woman’s 43
jouissance—is excluded by the sexual relation because it is supplementary, extra, 
excessive.  Phallic jouissance self-constitutes its own whole and gains nothing from 44
woman’s jouissance. This, for Lacan, is the meaning of  the statement “there is no sexual 
relation.”  Not that sex does not take place, but that it does not constitute a relation. 45
Male jouissance and woman’s jouissance are not two poles of  a relationship, one self-
complete pole (male jouissance), and another excluded altogether (feminine jouissance). 
As Lacan puts it at one point, “man does not come (n’arrive pas), I would say, to enjoy 
woman’s body, precisely because what he enjoys is the jouissance of  the organ.”  All sex, 46
from the male point of  view, is ultimately masturbatory, self-enjoyment. 
	 Thus we return to something very similar to the feminist account where the 
absolute otherness of  the other is accounted for by sexual difference,  with the 47
 As he claims some feminists of  the time accused him of  (Encore, 57).42
 Encore, 73, substituting in, for the first phrase, the alternate translation provided in 73n30.43
 Ibid.44
 Encore, 126.45
 Encore, 7. The meaning of  “n’arrive pas” is as euphemistic in French as it is in English46
 Although as already pointed out, the two do not necessarily agree on the meaning or origin of  this, and 47
some are quite opposed to Lacan’s reading
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differences between male and female marking out the basis for two fundamentally 
different ways of  interacting with the world around them, and with each other. Further, 
this absolute difference between man and woman, the un-relatability of  the two jouissances, 
makes the unification of  bodies impossible. Male jouissance will always exclude the 
female, treat it as unnecessary or extra. In response to this impossibility, Lacan moves 
from the chapter on woman’s jouissance to one on ‘A love letter,’ that is, from eros back to 
love. But as we saw already, “love is impotent” precisely because “it is not aware that it is 
but the desire to be One.”  The love that replaces eros (see chapter three) fails because it 48
tries to replace eros, tries to exist without it.  
§4: Jouissance, Desire, The Good and the Beautiful 
	 Both of  these accounts of  otherness have questions of  desire and jouissance at 
their heart, which leads to the perceived impossibility of  sex. It is because sex is desire, 
because it is structured by jouissance that it fails, by destroying the other. In the same way, 
we can look back at love in Chapter Three and say that it is because love was reduced to 
admiration of  beauty that it fails; as mere admiration, love failed to be a motivating factor 
for ethics (since desire, following the Platonic model, only desires the good, not the 
beautiful).  One of  the key features of  Plato’s account of  eros was that it combined 49
admiration and desire by combining their objects, the Good and the Beautiful (see 
Chapter Two). But in the 20th century, this hypothesis is no longer commonly held, and 
 Encore, 6.48
 Rachel Barney, “Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good” has had a significant influence on the 49
development of  the argument in this section. “Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good,” Classical 
Philology 105, no. 4 (October 1, 2010): 363—77.
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by separating them, philosophers have also separated (as we have seen in the divisions of  
this Part) love and sex. Having seen the reasons specific to each for their failure, beginning 
with the failure of  love, which as we have now seen in this chapter only came about as a 
result of  the original failure of  sex, and the attempt to salvage at least a portion of  eros, 
we can now peel the layers back even further to see how both were doomed to failure by 
their very splitting.  
§4.1: Beauty’s Divorce 
	 As we saw especially in the way that Sartre and Beauvoir speak of  the alleged 
possibility of  authentic love,  the ideal of  love is defined in this group of  thinkers by its 50
separation from desire. But is it truly possible to reshape our thinking of  love to be 
divorced from sexual desire, and instead be based on respect, admiration, and 
recognition? To do this, love had to be separated from sex (even if  they may both be 
directed toward the same person). Now that we have seen the impossibilities raised by 
sexual desire for accounts of  otherness, we can better see what the reason for this divorce 
is: early accounts of  otherness, whether in the abstract or based more narrowly on sexual 
difference, are negative formulations of  that which we cannot come into a relation with, 
that which opposes our attempts to incorporate it into the self  or the ego. But love, even 
more than sex, is predicated on the idea that it is love of  another person. Self-love simply will 
not do.  Eros is ecstatic, it requires something outside of  us. That sex apparently wants, 51
 See Chapter 3, §4 for the explanation of  their position and why, ultimately, I think that their solutions 50
would not work.
 Nor, I think, will seeing interpersonal love (as Augustine, in late antiquity, and Marion more recently see 51
it) as a hidden form of  love of  God. However, the refutation of  this will have to wait until Part IV..
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on the contrary, to envelop or consume what it sees, makes it unfit to remain in a theory 
of  love as long as it retains only this naive, negative understanding of  otherness.   52
	 So, removed from desire, only half  of  the Platonic picture can remain in an 
account of  love: admiration.  Gone is the possibility that love begins in lust after the 53
body of  a beautiful boy, the desire of  the pegasus that lurched and pulled the charioteer 
nearer and nearer to his beloved. In its place remains only the contemplation of  beauty; 
the looking out toward what is beyond the heavens or contemplating together with the 
beloved. The lover, if  he is to respect the otherness of  the beloved, can no longer look at 
her as a good to be possessed, something that is good-for him. But shorn of  this good-for 
aspect, it no longer makes sense to speak of  the beloved as being good as she relates to the 
lover (whether she is—on her own—‘a good person,’ is irrelevant). Rather, she is beloved 
because she is beautiful (remember that, for Plato, a person could be beautiful not just in 
sight, but also because she was just, or honorable, or wise). If  I were to see her 
complexion, or her virtue as good—that is, good-for me—in some way (either because she 
might teach me virtue by association, or more cynically because people might simply think 
me more virtuous or beautiful due to our association), love quickly turns the beloved into 
an object to be had, a tool to better myself. Worse still, as we have seen in Chapter Three, 
even if  I attempt to love her because I perceive her as good-for, this turns out to be a 
 It is interesting to note here, although somewhat tangential to the argument, that Plato too tries to limit 52
desire’s role in eros by encouraging lovers from refraining to indulge in sexual pleasure. Pleasure for Plato 
does not play nearly as central a role as jouissance does for 20th century philosophers. However, Plato never 
attempts to rid eros of  desire. The desire for the beloved remains a central facet of  Platonic love, even when 
its fulfillment is discouraged. As we saw in chapter one, Plato does not deny the benefits of  eros even to 
those who do occasionally indulge in sexual pleasure.
 This love can, at this point, be called eros only equivocally. It now refers to a very different set of  principles 53
than it did for Plato. Nevertheless, it remains true that both are speaking of  the same phenomenon. 
Contemporary philosophers have drawn the division line differently than Plato, but they are still attempting 
to carve up the same bit of  reality.
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mistake. Love cannot offer me any good. At best, it offers me nothing, and at worst it 
offers evil. No—I must love her virtue because it is virtue, love her beauty because it is beauty, 
and not because it may impact or benefit me. But this, as I have said, reduces love to the 
mere admiration of  beauty.  54
	 It is this constriction that leads Beauvoir to define authentic love in what sounds 
very much like terms of  friendship, where each lover is called on to respect the other’s 
freedom. It is why authentic love’s highest command becomes not interfering with, 
confining, or inhibiting the other’s self-transcendence. I am good without my beloved, and 
he has nothing which can make me better, nothing that is good-for. Instead, I recognize in 
him what I see in myself. Self-achieved authenticity and transcendence. I admire him for 
it, but I do not desire it. Even Lacan, who ordinarily (as we saw) wishes to show that a love 
that seeks beauty ends up being unsuccessful, notes that beauty (as the object of  love in 
Plato), is “the last barrier or mask before death,” that it halts desire, and is closer to the 
Real—and therefore Evil, as we shall soon address in more detail—than it is to the 
Good.  Thus, even before we discover that beauty too is unsatisfying, we have already 55
brought a halt to the desire of  the Good, placing love (and in particular, the sexual 
restrictions of  courtly love) as a mask and a barrier, holding back the terror of  the Real, 
of  evil and of  death.  56
 Barney speaks of  this as “‘dead’ admiration” ( “Notes on Plato,” 374), a view she attributes to Polus in the 54
Gorgias, when he claims that injustice is shameful (aischion, the antonym of  kalon), but better (ameinon, the 
comparative of  agathon), at 368e-374d (371), i.e. indicating that justice may be beautiful, but it is not good, 
or at least, not good in proportion to its beauty.
 Fink, Lacan on Love, 129, also cf  134. Referencing Lacan, Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, 217: “the beautiful is 55
closer to evil than to the good.”
 As noted previously, there is not space to go in depth about the Real in opposition to the Imaginary or 56
Symbolic, except to note here that Lacan sees it as the unmediated experience of  otherness. It is the body, not 
as seen or signified, but as pure flesh. It is against this void of  meaning that we construct the barriers of  
taboos, ethical commands, and a system of  symbols such as beauty.
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	 The Good instead remains with what remains of  eros once the interpersonal, 
philia-aspects have been torn away from it: sexual desire or jouissance.  Plato, as I have 57
shown in Part I, would not endorse this connection in whole: There, eros—sexual desire
—led to the Good because it was transformed through its joining together with philia and 
the admiration of  the beautiful that constitutes contemplation.  Without that 58
transformation, eros is never a divine mania, it is never the heavenly eros that Pausanias 
speaks of. Instead it is all too human: the pursuit of  pleasure or benefit; the erastes finds an 
eromenos in order to relieve his desires, to find pleasure. The eromenos consents because 
society tells him it is a requirement if  he is to become a good citizen. He can expect favors 
and consideration for socially and politically respectable positions in return for 
submission. What good remains is at best lesser goods and more often than not merely 
perceived goods. 
	 The Platonic rejection is continued by the authors considered in these chapters, 
who—with the notable exception of  Lacan, who we will discuss separately—all see ethics 
as something separate from eros. They are separate, not just because ethics doesn’t involve 
eros but because, by its very nature, eros presents itself  as unethical. It is the erosion of  
alterity, which becomes for the 20th-century continental writers the new basis for ethics. 
In this context ethics is too often portrayed as the rejection of  a communal dependence 
and the assertion that each person, in his or her own self-standing, can achieve 
authenticity/transcendence/etc. Ethics becomes characterized by a “letting-be” which 
leaves no room for the desire for unification. ‘Desire and Ethics’ becomes an opposition 
 The potential differences between these terms, and how they are employed across different authors, is 57
irrelevant for this point.
 That is to say, as Barney argues, admiration is not dead for Plato, precisely because Beauty is not 58
disconnected from the Good.
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never anticipated by Plato, for whom desire for the Good is the vehicle for leading us to 
virtue. 
	 So it is clear that, if  eros-as-sexuality retains a hold on the good, it does not keep 
hold of  the ethical good, the ultimate good for the best life. But nor are we able to return this 
to love-as-relation, except that we might perhaps love someone because she is ethically 
good (a possible kind of  beauty). But this cannot mean, as I have just argued, that we love 
her because by loving her, I might be made ethically good. To do this would illicitly return 
the good-for to love. Admiration will never result in conversion; I am not made beautiful by 
observing beauty, whether it is a painting or an ethical person.  
	 But doesn’t admiration motivate us to become beautiful? Perhaps by loving the 
virtuous person, I will come to desire to also be beautiful. Perhaps. But the cause of  this 
motivation is not essentially based in love. I could just as easily gain this same desire by 
observing a total stranger. Nor is the motivation itself  erotic. My love is not my motivation 
to better myself; it is only my admiration of  something already beautiful. Thus, if  love 
inspires us to desire to become better, it is only in a tangential sense; only in a way that 
would cause us to say that anything that might cause us to become motivated is the basis 
of  betterment. For example, I might become motivated to get in better physical shape if, 
upon climbing a flight of  stairs, I find myself  exhausted. But none, I suspect, are willing to 
call climbing stairs (or the exhaustion caused by it) the basis or cause of  physical fitness; it 
is merely the occasion during which an independent motivation arose. Just as I could 
desire physical fitness without ever encountering stairs, I could desire to become the 
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ethical person without ever having loved. And this latter point is a thesis which Plato 
would never accept.  59
	 Thus, sex and love not only both ultimately fail to accomplish their individual 
goals, they are both predicated on a more original failure: a failure of  the Platonic 
project’s overall goal of  developing ethics, as a result of  the separation of  the good and 
the beautiful, of  desire and admiration. If  love-as-relational cannot give rise to ethics, it is 
no surprise that it fails to play any role of  importance in the best life, and in fact turns out 
(as seen in Chapter Three), to often be directly opposed to the best life. Similarly if, as 
pure desire, sexual-eros turns out to be directly unethical by erasing otherness, it is no 
surprise that we find it impossible to unite with the beloved in a way that lets each remain 
their own self. Eros, it turns out, was doomed to failure and impossibility the moment it 
was split into two halves. 
§4.2: Lacan and Psychoanalytic Ethics 
	 There is one apparent exception to this final claim about eros and ethics, however: 
Lacan’s account, which has led at least one commentator to claim that “our relation to 
the moral law is profoundly ‘erotic.’”  But to see how this claim does no better in terms 60
of  salvaging a Platonically erotic ethics, we will have to dive further into what Lacan 
might mean by this. 
 While Plato does think that loving something beautiful will lead us to want to become more beautiful, this 59
is only because he has already linked the good and beauty, admiration and desire. Without this link there is 
no sense to something like “creative desire,” (seen, for example, in Diotima’s turn to eros as a desire to give 
birth) and the division of  the two partially explains the focus on desire as lack in Levinas and others we will 
see in the next part. As Barney explains her main thesis, for Plato, our recognition of  a things beauty should 
lead us to recognize that it must, as a result, be good as well.
 Kesel, Eros and Ethics, 6.60
!144
	 For Lacan, ethics is erotic, not because it is through eros that we become ethical, 
but because eros—desire—is the very content of  ethics. The goal of  the analyst, he says, 
is not to instruct the analysand in the nature of  the Good, but to reveal his desires,  to 61
make his desires explicit, so that he can openly desire. For this reason, he upholds the 
Marquis de Sade’s ‘erotic’ stories as the “truth” of  Kantian ethics.  Similarly, at the very 62
start of  his seminar, Lacan makes clear that the ‘truth’ of  Aristotelian ethics is not in 
eudaimonia, the good, or the beautiful, but in its opening statement that all pursuits “aim 
at” the good (or even more clearly, that all men desire to know, in the Physics).  Ethics is 63
about desire not—as Aristotle himself  claims—because its origin is in the ordering of  
desire, but because its very content and goal is desire.  64
	 That the goal of  this desire cannot be the Good—which is to say that Lacan’s 
erotic ethics is not Plato’s erotic ethics—is most clear in the ways that Lacan develops and 
departs from Freud in saying that desire, jouissance, reaches beyond the pleasure principle, 
beyond happiness, beyond the Good, eventually reaching toward pure evil. It is for this 
reason, as we saw with love, that Lacan notes that Beauty is more closely connected to 
Evil than to the Good.  Instead, Lacan speaks of  desire circling a lack, enjoying its own 65
enjoyment, perverting any object presented as the supreme good. Desire perverts it 
 Kesel, Eros and Ethics, 5.61
 Kesel, Eros and Ethics, 104. Cf, for example, The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, 80: “in brief, Kant is of  the same 62
opinion as Sade,” or Lacan’s essay “Kant with Sade.”
 Lacan sets as a goal for the seminar as a whole “to consider why he [Aristotle] emphasized the problem 63
of  pleasure, its function in the mental economy of  ethics from the beginning. Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of  
Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960 (Norton: 1992).
 This change also exemplifies why the very word ‘eros’ has become problematic post-psychoanalysis, as in 64
their content, Platonic and Psychoanalytic eros share almost nothing in common, except a basic link to 
passion and sexuality.
 Lacan on Love, 129, referencing Lacan, The Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, 217: “When one aims for the center of  65
moral experience, the beautiful is closer to evil than to good.”
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because it treats the object (whether it is an object or a person), as a sexual object. It desires 
it not to possess, but to derive enjoyment from it. 
	 Thus, our desire will never be satisfied by an achievement of  happiness, nor of  the 
Good; our ethical commands are not (as they would be for Plato, or a more traditional 
reading of  Aristotle) designed to aid in the achievement of  happiness, but instead, for the 
creation of  pleasure. Ethical laws are nothing but taboos, placing a protective wall 
between us and the Evil toward which desire moves. The Supreme Good (which is only a 
created fiction), Lacan explains, is like a dam that protects us from the suffering that 
would result from surpassing it, from reaching toward evil.  And yet, the dam fails to do 66
what it intends because, precisely by putting the prohibition in place, the possibility of  
enjoyment through violating the command is created. In the creation of  courtly love, for 
example, we create a sexual enjoyment—jouissance—that can be found in romantic 
pursuit itself  by erecting barriers against actual consummation by substituting in the 
woman to the place of  the Real—the Evil toward which our desire really aims.  This 67
pleasure would not exist, Lacan argues, if  the taboo against sex were not in place. It is not 
the possibility of  sex which excites us, but the possibility of  prohibited sex, the possibility of  
what we cannot have. 
	 Much more can be said of  Lacan’s psychoanalytic ethics and his theory of  drives, 
but we can already pull out the two relevant conclusions from this short digression. Firstly, 
Lacan, just like those thinkers discussed in the previous section, sees that the Good will 
always be reduced to an economy of  the goods in eros. He does not, however, wish to 
 Kesel, Eros and Ethics, 134.66
 “The ‘elevation’ of  the woman in courtly love is not because she represents an absolute value in herself  67
but precisely because she does not. Eros and Ethics, 179. See Lacan’s section “Courtly Love as Anamorphosis” 
in Ethics of  Psychoanalysis. 
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separate eros from the Beautiful entirely. It is true that beauty is what is sought in love, 
and, Lacan concludes from this, ethics is found in “the function of  the beautiful,” and not 
“the function of  the good.”  Immediately clear from this is that—whatever else Lacan 68
believes—the original point that the Good and the Beautiful have been split apart remains 
true even in his account. Less clear is that Beauty has become separated from eros. 
However, Lacan does not view the “function of  beauty” as grounding an erotic ethics by 
being its object, but quite the contrary, as we have seen. Beauty is admired, not desired, 
and as a result, Lacan says, it has the power to paralyze us, to stop us from pursuing any 
further.  69
	 Eros and ethics are created by the admiration of  beauty (which is the proper 
object of  love), not because either is connected to beauty, but because beauty marks out 
our eros’ territory.  By erecting the mask of  beauty in front of  the Evil or the Real, a 70
space is created in which we can construct our taboos and seek our erotic, desiring 
pleasure without reaching all the way toward the Real. For example, in love we may 
admire the beautiful Lady, which in turn creates the rules of  courtly love to provide us 
with a perverse jouissance of  romantic pursuit in the absence of  the possibility of  sex. 
Beauty tells us where the limit is; where we must stop to avoid transgression, and thus, 
creates ethical prohibitions. Within that realm, eros creates a new economy of  goods 
through its taboos and prohibitions. Eros therefore does not admire beauty, it desires the 
 See the sections with these names in Ethics of  Psychoanalysis.68
 “It keeps us under the spell of  a beauty that paralyzes, for a moment, our envious struggle for the good,” 69
Kesel, Eros and Ethics, 200.
 “At the level of  sublimation the object is inseparable from imaginary and especially cultural elaborations. 70
It is not just that the collectivity recognizes in them useful objects; it finds rather a space of  relaxation where 
it may in a way delude itself  on the subject of  das Ding, colonize the field of  das Ding with imaginary 
schemes. That is how collective, socially accepted sublimations operate.” Ethics of  Psychoanalysis, 99. Cf. 
Kesel, Ethics of  Eros, 153 “the law, precisely through its prohibition, makes jouissance possible.”
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Good; and further, it substitutes (sublimates)—in place of  the Good—a series of  sexual 
goods. The ‘Function of  Beauty’ that Lacan specifies is therefore merely to mark out a 
safe realm within which to pursue those goods without the risk of  shooting too far, and 
ending up instead in Evil. Love and Eros work in tandem, but they do not ever become 
joined. We love (romantically) beauty (see Chapter Three), and out of  this falls an 
economy of  goods to be desired by (sexual) Eros.  Sexual-eros, as in the previous 71
discussion, remains a pursuit of  goods, and passion-love remains an admiration of  the 
beautiful, even if, for Lacan these two functions have a causal link not seen by the others. 
	 In this context, we can once again see how the splitting of  love and eros set each 
up for failure. Love, pretending to be a noble admiration of  beauty, turns out to merely be 
a set of  rules for creating eros, and, as Lacan says is “impotent . . . because it is not aware 
that it is but the desire to be One.”  We love without realizing that its very function is to 72
create an economy of  sexual desire, to pervert the loved-object into a source of  pleasure. 
Similarly, when the enjoyment of  eros is linked so closely to taboo, and only seeks after its 
own enjoyment, we see that eros is doomed to fail the minute that the taboos fall. Every 
sexual object is at constant risk of  becoming boring. It is no surprise, then, that Lacan will 
build an account of  sex where the Other cannot be reached, cannot be transgressed, and 
yet, as we saw, this is not enough to save eros, and in fact, dooms it from the other 
direction. 
 It is important to note here that the economy of  goods is not necessarily those things we find beautiful. In 71
fact, both Freud and Lacan suggest that the mixing of  the love object and sex object is perhaps impossible, 
there are “Madonnas” and there are “whores,” and the two “can never be united in any one woman. 
Where such a man loves, he does not desire, and vice versa,” Fink, Lacan on Love, 20, referencing Freud, “On 
the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of  Love,”183.
 Encore, 6.72
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	 Secondly, following from this, we see that Lacan reverses the structure that Plato 
asserts: ethical culture grows out of  eros. For Lacan, the opposite is true. Erotic 
enjoyment, jouissance, grows out of  culture. It is cultural taboos that lead to the space for 
erotic pleasure. For the Platonic lover in the Phaedrus, it is the recognition of  the beautiful 
boy as divine that leads to ethics, leads to the desire to erect an altar in the boy’s honor, as 
well as the cultivation of  modesty and wisdom. The lover’s piety grows from his eros, the 
lover and beloved situate themselves in a newly created ethical community as a result of  
their original erotic encounter. For Lacan, the lover would desire to erect the altar precisely 
and only because society says he ought not. The boy would not appear desirable in this way 
if  it were not for the fact that his approach would be considered a transgression. He is not 
led to ethics through his eros, but led to eros through the ethical commands and taboos.  
§5 Conclusions and Stakes 
	 Now that we have seen the various causes and features of  an impossible eros, let us 
gather together some of  the preceding points to look at the importance of  this apparent 
rejection of  Platonic eros. As I asked at the outset of  Part II, ‘for what reason has 
contemporary philosophy and culture soured on love?’ If  we can overcome this 
impossibility, it can only be by understanding and responding to the legitimate puzzles it 
has raised.  We can now answer that question, having seen that the abandonment of  a 
Platonic, erotic ethics resulted from two main developments: the more apparent reversal is 
the recognition of  the need for an account of  otherness. As seen at the end of  Part I, this 
was already a problem within Plato’s own work, when attempting to mediate between love 
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of  an individual and love of  some first principle. However, the urgency of  this problem 
has now been amplified thanks to the more subtle reversal of  the Platonic view seen in 
Chapter Four: the abandonment of  any metaphysical aspects of  love. The views discussed 
within the last two chapters largely eschew anything akin to Plato’s Good beyond Being, 
and, as a result, Plato’s connection between the Good and the Beautiful can no longer be 
maintained. What remained were simply good things and beautiful things. Without a 
common origin, there is no longer any reason to maintain that these are identical, or even 
necessarily coextensive categories. With eros now limited to being expressed toward 
specific beings, rather than a first principle, it becomes all the more urgent, in the case of  
love of  persons, that we account for what love is about. No longer is the problem disguised 
by an ambiguity of  whether love is about individuals or metaphysical principles. It has 
been judged (at least according to those holding to this theory) that only love of  
individuals is possible. 
	 In part, these reversals have advanced our thinking of  love, and there is a great 
deal to be commended. Again, as I stated at the outset, the goal here was not just to 
elaborate a new theory, but to see what it revealed about Plato’s position and our 
interpretations of  his texts. Here I want to suggest that we have seen three, interconnected 
points. The first point, which I have only hinted at throughout this part (and which will 
become an even larger issue in Part III) is that many of  the flaws found in Plato seem to 
have the Symposium as their reference point. As I suggested in Part I, there may be a good 
reason to instead turn to the Phaedrus as our ground for a Platonic eros. The reason for 
this is clear in the second point clarified in this chapter: Plato’s eros, they claim, cannot 
explain the love of  individuals without it collapsing into love of  a first principle. As we 
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saw in Part I, this was particularly problematic in the Symposium, where the text has 
traditionally lent itself  to seeing the individual beloved falling away at the first stage of  
love’s ascent. The rejection of  ‘philosophical eros’ calls on us to reject the highly divisive 
interpretations (such as those of  Vlastos or Nussbaum) that put Socrates and Alcibiades in 
direct opposition. Rather, we should be attempting to read the two together, seeing how 
philosophical and common love go together. However, as I argued there, and will 
continue to argue throughout the dissertation, this tension is better handled in the 
Phaedrus, and Plato’s position is done a disservice when we do not take his remarks there 
into consideration. The failure of  eros in this part is (I will argue) not necessarily a 
condemnation of  Platonic eros, but more narrowly of  certain interpretations of  Socrates’ 
intervention in the Symposium; they are simply more evidence that we should be turning 
instead to Plato’s later dialogue, and taking seriously the changes we see in it. However, 
not all will be saved even in that case. This is due to the third issue raised here: in stressing 
the necessity that a philosophy of  love be able to explain interpersonal love, these thinkers 
saw the need to make an addition to the philosophical vocabulary with the concept of  
alterity. Plato’s eros (in either formulation) lent itself  too easily to substitution, and alterity 
was proposed as one way of  avoiding the relativization of  love.  73
	 But, in these early accounts of  alterity, we have seen that the introduction of  a 
concept of  otherness, rather than solidifying Platonic eros against its flaws, destroyed it all 
together. This was true in the general case, but exasperated when otherness was further 
developed to also refer to the otherness of  sexual difference. Contrary to Lacan’s claim 
that the Symposium could be a useful guiding light so long as we “assume that Greek love 
 It is not, however, the only possible explanation. It would, for instance, be a worthwhile endeavor to 73
examine to what extent something like Scotus’ haecceitas might similarly resolve the issue.
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allows us to isolate in a love relationship the two partners in the neuter,”  we saw that we 74
cannot take sexual difference for granted, and that male and female experiences of  eros 
must each be understood in their own way, if  we are to ever hope of  returning to a 
Platonic eros. This problem carried over also into the romantic aspects of  love, as we saw 
that, given the presuppositions here, it is impossible for love to ever be mutual. The strict, 
negatively defined accounts of  alterity leads to the conclusion that love cannot be ‘shared’ 
between two lovers—that two loves always remain two loves. 
	 Further we saw how the erasure of  a guiding principle akin to Plato’s Good 
beyond Being resulted in the two parts of  eros—passion-love and sexual desire—coming 
unglued. One of  the great benefits of  Plato’s joining of  the Good and the Beautiful is that 
it resolves a motivational problem: we are attracted to beautiful things, but only desire 
things that we perceive as good for us. Without the necessary link between the two, we are 
left to admit that there may well be beautiful things (such as virtue) that do not create a 
desire in us.  We could therefore conceivably love a virtuous person (that is, admire her 75
beauty), without desiring to possess what she possess or to become like her. Without this 
connection, love cannot make a person ethical, except accidentally. For this reason we saw 
the explicit claims that love failed to give any benefit—and may in fact cause harm—to 
the beloved, resulting in its inevitable failure. To refute this claim, and return once more 
to an ethical eros, we will now have to move on to more recent accounts of  alterity, to see 
how we might resurrect the possibility of  eros.  
 Transference, 34.74
 See Barney, “Notes on Plato,” 371ff, where she discusses the example of  Polus in the Gorgias, who finds it 75
more beautiful to suffer injustice than to commit it, but that it is better to commit injustice than to suffer it 
(468e-474d). This indicates that, despite recognizing the beauty of  being just, Polus does not necessarily 
recognize its goodness, and is thus not motivated to live the just life. 
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INTERLUDE 2: REFOUNDING EROS 
 	 Having seen how far early 20th century accounts of  love differ from Plato’s, we 
have now arrived at the lowest foundation of  the question erotic ethics, and can begin to 
reconstruct a positive argument for Plato’s overall position, while correcting for the errors 
rightly noticed in his own theory. Recall the three theses that will structure the ultimate 
claims of  this dissertation: 
1. Recognition of  the Other is based on recognizing his or her beauty and goodness 
2. Love of  the Other is love of  the Other as individual, not in light of  some attribute 
3. Love of  the Other forms the basis of  our entering into the ethical attitude. 
While we saw that Plato held that eros leads to the formation of  the ethical attitude in at 
least some form, in the case of  each of  these three theses, Plato’s account failed to 
sufficiently delineate love of  the other person as an individual from love of  the form of  
Beauty or the Good beyond Being as metaphysical first principles.  
	 In Part II, this failure has been problematized, and as a result, the Platonic praise 
of  eros has been inverted. Far from being a route to wisdom, Sartre, Lacan and others 
claim that love endures only on the basis of  the ignorance of  the lovers, ignorance of  who 
they really are, of  what the best life is, and what the lover is promising and capable of  
delivering. What I have argued so far is that this inversion takes place because, unlike 
Plato, these philosophers no longer see a link between goodness and beauty. Rather than 
arguing for a broad definition of  eros that responds to both, sexual desire and emotional 
love have been split in two, with the former responding to goods, attempting to posses 
them, while the latter responds to beautiful objects, always holding them at the distance 
of  admiration. As a result neither half  is able to succeed in leading to ethics. On the 
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contrary, sexual desire reduces the other into an object, while love places an impossible 
demand on the other, forcing him to choose between his own freedom and becoming the 
idealized object of  love. In brief, from both sides of  the issue, the first thesis has been 
strongly rejected: neither the recognition of  a person as good (now always good-for) nor 
beautiful enabled us to reach the other person as Other. Without this first thesis, the 
second and third must necessarily fall. 
	 The first step in overcoming these objections must therefore be to offer what has 
so far been missed: a description of  non-destructive relations with the Other. Part II’s split 
of  goodness and beauty, on the other hand, is an indirect rejection of  the Platonic project 
as a whole. The rejection of  the Platonic role of  love took eros to be essentially tied to an 
outdated metaphysics. Once the metaphysics (in particular the metaphysical link of  the 
Good and the Beautiful) fell, it was seen as a necessary conclusion that Plato’s eros fell 
with it. Thus, love was not directly attacked, but only the victim of  a more fundamental 
criticism. To resurrect the ethical role of  eros, then, I will attempt to show that it is 
possible to relink the good and the beautiful without reinstating them as Platonic Ideas, 
and therefore that it is possible to hold the first thesis from the phenomenological and 
hermeneutic traditions of  the 20th and 21st century. In accomplishing this, the truth of  
the third thesis will also be shown, and I will conclude by showing that the Platonic role 
of  eros in ethics can still find a home in a decidedly non-Platonic form of  philosophical 
description. That is, it will no longer be possible to reject Platonic eros and ethics simply 
by rejecting his metaphysical project. 
	 Yet, as we shall see in Part III, these goals have so far not been accomplished at an 
equal rate. As accounts of  alterity have been further developed, the claim regarding love’s 
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failure—its impossibility—has frequently been rejected as a misjudgment due to deficient 
accounts of  alterity. This new account of  alterity is given in terms which bear a striking 
similarity, and occasionally a direct link to, Plato’s discussions about the Good beyond 
Being. Despite these connections however, it will become clear that Levinas’ Good and 
Marion’s God, although discussed in the context of  Platonic and later Neoplatonic 
patristic discussions of  the Good, are not mere reassertions of  the Platonic Forms, but 
rather, a critical adaptation and re-development of  the term in a radically new context  
	 However, this success will highlight just how far removed these new discussions are 
from the Platonic position, as a result of  the continued split between goodness and beauty. 
Neither Levinas nor Marion performs a similar recovery of  the beautiful, and instead, the 
division between the good and the beautiful becomes the basis of  a split between ethics 
and love. In separating love and ethics, philosophy has effectively separated the public and 
private spheres. Further, eros has been separated from the public sphere in such a way 
that eros can no longer exert an influence on ethical development. The continued division 
between goodness and the beauty has made it impossible for the link between eros and 
ethics to be seen. As we shall now see, love has so far been saved only at the expense of  
hiding it away. 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PART III: UNSPEAKABLE EROS: A FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE 
A Frenchman does not philosophize when he is writing 
pornography. Most of  the time he is satisfied with a happy  
Epicureanism which takes pleasures for what they are  1
CHAPTER 5: THE RECOVERY OF THE GOOD 
	 The pushback against the Sartrean project of  the authentic ego began almost 
immediately  with Levinas’ Existence and Existents.  However, it would be more extensively 2 3
attacked in his later works Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974). It is in 
these works that Levinas began his own project arguing for ethics, rather than ontology, as 
first philosophy. For the purposes here, we will need to deal only obliquely with this 
inversion, insofar as it directly impacts the question of  eros. What will be of  importance 
for this section (before shifting, in the following chapter, to Levinas’ account of  love and 
eros themselves), is that, with the focus shifted to ethics, Levinas’ own reading of  
Neoplatonism saw the idea of  the Good beyond Being returned to a place of  prominence, 
although now understood, not in a system of  Forms, but in connection with 
phenomenology, and, in particular, to Levinas’ careful development of  alterity as a 
 Emmanuel Levinas, “The Understanding of  Spirituality in French and German Culture,” 5.1
 And, along the same line, against Heidegger’s focus on the being of  dasein.2
 Published in 1947, it was written during Levinas’ imprisonment during World War II. This time spent in 3
the stalag, Levinas offers in the preface, is the “explanation for the absence of  any consideration of  those 
philosophical works published, with so much impact, between 1940 and 1945.” We must assume he means, 
among others, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, published in 1943.
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principle part of  philosophy. It is this idea of  the Good, which I will address in §1 of  the 
current chapter.  4
	 However, whereas Levinas’ Good beyond Being has unquestionable Platonic roots, 
there is a second, more recent attempt to return the Good beyond Being to its former 
place which also deserves attention: Jean-Luc Marion’s early development of  a God 
Without Being, the title of  one of  his early works, that is, a God beyond Being. While this too, 
has neoplatonic roots, they are more primarily Christian Neoplatonic roots, unquestionably 
rooted in scriptural discussion and the writings of  the patristic period and the early 
middle ages, in particular the work of  Dionysius. While this second account, which we 
will address in §2, differs significantly from Levinas,’ both show the possibility of  
returning to something like Plato’s Good beyond Being within the new vocabulary of  
phenomenology. While this recovery makes it possible to speak of  ethics from the point of  
view of  phenomenology, as we shall see in the following chapter, neither Levinas nor 
Marion will return eros fully to its position alongside ethics. Both authors ultimately 
conclude that while ethics involves participation in a realm of  discourse, eros remains 
mute. 
	 This continued ‘unspeakability’ of  eros—which as we will see in the first two 
sections is closely connected to its being outside of  ethics—results, it seems to me, from 
the overlooked need of  recovering the Beautiful alongside of  the Good. The beautiful, 
addressed in §3, is still seen as tied to Platonic notions of  Form and being, and in 
philosophies that are now trying to overcome ontology in favor of  ethics, that means it 
must be left behind. But as we have seen in the first two parts, beauty plays a crucial role 
 The discussions of  Levinas’ alterity will be reserved, in large part, to the following chapter.4
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in the success of  eros, and its continued absence will account for the view of  eros that we 
will see as we transition into the second chapter of  this part.  
	 In contrast the previous part, which presented a theory of  love as largely contrary 
to Plato’s, a roadblock which needs to be overcome if  we are to return to a form of  
Platonism, this chapter and the one that follow it will, it become clear, represent a partial 
overcoming. My disagreements in this part will largely be in the form of  minor 
corrections or calls to go further, rather than a call to begin anew from the ground up, as 
was often the case in Part II. There, love failed as a result of  the premises it was based on. 
Goodness and beauty have been split apart and removed from their roles explaining 
ethics, eros, and the connection between the two. What we will see in this chapter is that 
phenomenology has found new ways of  speaking of  the Good as the experience of  
alterity, but failed to find a similar phenomenological explanation of  the role of  beauty. As 
a result, in the following chapter, we will see that these later phenomenologists read eros 
in a more positive light than the philosophers addressed in Part II, but still do not see it as 
playing a role in ethics. finally, in the final Part, offering a new account of  
phenomenological beauty as well as the effects of  the erotic encounter with it. 
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§1: Levinas’ Good Beyond Being  
	 One of  Levinas’ most revolutionary ideas for phenomenology is his recovery of  
Plato’s Good beyond Being as a model for the encounter with alterity.  Interestingly, 5
despite being an important metaphor in each of  his three main books: Existence and 
Existents, Totality and Infinity, and Otherwise than Being, it is not until the third that we truly 
get lengthy analysis of  the term itself. In the first two texts, the references remain much 
more oblique, and require the reader to be familiar with the Platonic discussions of  the 
Good to fully see how it is employed in Levinas’ writings. Here, looking forward to 
chapter 6, where love will be described as taking place in “the night of  the erotic”  it will 6
be most important to look at how Levinas uses the Platonic imagery of  light and distance 
to develop the Good beyond Being, changing it from Plato’s metaphysical first principle 
and into the description of  what is always behind the encounter with alterity in the face 
of  the Other. The Good is one of  Levinas’ most common names for that which leaves its 
trace on the face of  the Other.  7
 Marry-Ann Webb, “Eros and Ethics: Levinas’ Reading of  Plato’s Good Beyond Being” is perhaps the 5
fullest account on Levinas’ reading of  the Good beyond Being, but there are substantial differences between 
the account offered there from my own, particularly regarding the role of  eros. It also does not contain any 
references to Existence and Existents. Deborah Achtenberg, “The Eternal and the New: Socrates and Levinas 
on Desire and Need,” in Levinas and the Ancients contains a thesis closer to my own regarding differing views 
of  eros, although the section directly involving the Good Beyond Being is quite short. The last important 
source, Sarah Allen, The philosophical sense of  transcendence : Levinas and Plato on loving beyond being, takes up the 
question of  the Good Beyond Being in and through the questions of  eros, desire and transcendence. On 
many points I am in tacit agreement with her work, although here I focus instead on the importance of  the 
Good in the immanent life, rather than as the target of  Metaphysical Desire or the end point of  
Transcendence.
 TI, 2586
 Levinas will later speak of  the ‘Trace of  God’ or the Holy as additional names for this. 7
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§1.1: Existence and Existents 
	 Levinas’ recovery of  the Good is made clear already in the preface of  Existence and 
Existents (EE), where he states that “the Platonic formula that situates the Good beyond 
Being serves as the general guideline for this research.”  For Levinas to complete his 8
project of  ethics as first philosophy, he will need, first and foremost to dislodge Being from 
the privileged place at the top of  food chain. Plato’s formulation of  the Good beyond 
Being, the Good without Being, provides just that, a principle, at once ethical and ‘non-
existent.’ The good neither simply ‘unreal’ nor a transcendence as if  raised to a higher 
kind of  existence or being, but an ‘ex-cendence,’ a “departure from Being and from the 
categories which describe it.”  9
	 Despite this guideline, Levinas, true to the second half  of  his prefatory remark, 
the Good beyond Being “does not make up [the book’s] content,” and Levinas mentions 
the Good directly only three times in the rest of  the work.  Levinas’ goal is not to recover 10
the Good by redescribing it or investing it with a new meaning, but by using it. The 
question of  what the Good is is already misleading, since the Good isn’t (it is otherwise 
than being). What is important is how it functions. Thus, the larger focus of  EE is not the 
Good itself, but its light. As he says toward the beginning of  chapter two: “the wonder 
 Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents (Duquesne University Press, 1978). 15 (from now on, cited as 8
EE). For more general accounts of  Levinas’ encounter with ancient philosophy, and Plato in particular, see 
Brian Schroeder and Silvia Benso eds., Levinas and the Ancients (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); 
Tanja Staehler, Plato and Levinas: The Ambiguous Out-Side of  Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2010); Adriaan 
Peperzak, Platonic Transformations with and after Hegel, Heidegger and Levinas (New York: Rowman and Littlefied, 
1997).
 EE, 15. One should contrast the language of  the Phaedrus here of  the ontos ousia ousa, which I have, in Part 9
I, equated to the Good Beyond Being. I do not, however, see this as a refutation of  either my argument in 
Part I, nor of  Levinas’ own here. As I attempted to argue there, we need not hold Plato to a standard of  
clarity that simply cannot be met due to its subject matter. Even the ontos ousia ousa, despite the triplet of  
being-words, is clearly ex-cendent, resting outside the cosmos, outside of  the whole. And, as Levinas notes, 
“excendence and the Good necessarily have a foothold in being.”
 Excluding irrelevant usages, and a few references to the ‘good will.’10
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which Plato put at the origin of  philosophy is an astonishment before the natural and the 
intelligible. It is the very intelligibility of  light that is astonishing.”  Here we have 11
returned, unquestionably, to the analogy of  the sun in the Republic, the Good which shone 
on everything giving it its being and truth. 
	 The light comes from the beyond, beyond truth and being, and therefore, our 
response to it “do[es] not take form like answers to questions,” since it is the very 
condition for intelligibility. It is only within the light that questioning becomes possible, 
illuminating a space of  possible relations. For Levinas, illumination is the right word here, 
as the light does not shine into the void, but into the dark; “light is doubled up with a 
night,” the night of  being.  The night (an important concept in itself, which we will 12
return to when we discuss Levinas’ phenomenology of  eros, where he speaks of  a second, 
erotic night)—what will soon be linked to the il y a —is the realm of  Being, which “is 13
essentially alien and strikes against us. We undergo its suffering embrace like the night . . . 
There is a pain in Being.”  Being, like the dark, closes in on us and traps us, and it is only 14
the shining of  the Good, astonishment, which free us. Not in order to understand the 
darkness, but to escape it, to escape to the light of  the Good. Philosophy as the 
questioning of  being (pace Heidegger, Sartre, and others) is to do nothing but grope 
around in the dark, never even trying to escape it. To ‘shine light’ on the darkness is to 
destroy it and leave it behind. 
 EE, 22.11
 Importantly, however, Levinas will move away from this illumination and light metaphor in Totality and 12
Infinity, replacing it with discourse.
 the portion of  EE cited here was originally published as an article entitled “Il y a.”13
 All quotes, EE, 22.14
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	 Levinas notes that, not realizing this destructive nature of  the light of  the Good, 
“Western philosophy and civilization never gets out of  ‘numbers and beings’ . . . . The 
problem of  the Good is formulated as a problem of  ends.”  This structure of  ‘negative 15
desire,’ the desire qua lack going all the way back to Diotima’s speech in the Symposium is 
exactly what Levinas will seek to overturn throughout his work. We are not led steadily 
along a path to the Good, we do not transcend to another place; there is a moment of  
rupture and shock as we are dislocated, removed, and separated from our comfortable 
surroundings, without arriving at another ‘place.’ The light of  the Good does not draw us 
to it, nor do we follow it like the magi to its origin. The light breaks in and overcomes us. 
These moments are “events that break with the world, such as the encounter with the 
other.”  This last quote shows that Levinas is already thinking of  the Good in connection 16
to the other in EE, although its meaning is not as clear as in later texts. The Good, ever 
only seen through its trace left in the world, breaks us out of  the egoistic night of  being. 
As he notes in his preface, “the relationship with the other [that is] a movement toward 
the Good.”  Thus, we can already begin to situate Levinas’ repurposing of  Platonism in 17
the context of  what we have said in Part I. The Good is not achieved alone, nor directly. 
Our route to the Good is always inscribed in the world of  beings, as “excendence and the 
Good necessarily have a foothold in being.”  Our relation to the Good is always 18
mediated— experienced not directly, but through the other, the one who (as he will 
develop much later in Otherwise than Being) has been marked by the Good: “the trace [of  
 EE, 38.15
 EE, 39.16
 EE, 15.17
 EE, 15.18
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the Good] lights up as the face of  a neighbor.”  He has also strongly broken with 19
Diotima’s description of  desire (including the desire for the Good) as a desire born of  
lack. Instead, the Good breaks with and begins reversing intentionality  and desire 20
completely, overwhelming rather than calling.  
	 As Levinas notes later in EE that “in Plato, Love, a child of  need, retains the 
features of  destitution. Its negativity is the simple ‘less’ of  need, and not the very 
movement unto alterity.”  That is, Platonic eros will fail the test (as we saw through the 21
analyses of  Part II) if  we are looking for our relation to the Other—and, by transposition, 
to the Good—because it fails to break out of  the desire of  means and ends. “Even love,” 
he notes earlier “is conceived as the attraction of  the desirable, and the ‘young man’ and 
the ‘beautiful girl’ only pretexts.”  Thus, Levinas’ reading of  Platonism, already in the 22
brief  discussions of  EE, is clearly targeted at recovering the ethical aspects discussed by 
Plato in light of  the criticism seen in the previous part, and even already in the 
interpretive questions raised at the end of  Part I. A clear choice for the individual other 
over the universal Form is made, and interpretations that would see the beloved used as a 
tool for my own transcendence are rejected.  
	 Levinas then promises, cryptically, that “eros, when separated from the Platonic 
interpretation which completely fails to recognize the feminine, can be the theme of  a 
 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 12 19
(cited as OB).
 Marion develops the idea of  a ‘reversed intentionality’ even further in his own work.20
 EE, 85. Although Plato never seems to have broken out of  the intentionality structure, we could see the 21
origins for such an overturning in the being overcome by beauty in the Phaedrus (251a).
 EE, 38.22
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philosophy which . . . will concern us elsewhere.”  What is clear from this is that the 23
standard ‘Platonic eros,’ the way it is ordinarily interpreted, will not work. If  eros is to 
lead us to the Good, it will have to be reinterpreted and redeveloped. What remains 
unclear, as we will see in the following sections, is whether Levinas actually delivers on this 
promise, or if  his views on eros have shifted even further in the interim. 
§1.2: Totality and Infinity 
	 It is not until his next major work, Totality and Infinity (TI), that these themes 
regarding the Good start to take on their full significance.  While the text is now 24
dominated by the titular concept of  Infinity, as the name for what transcends the totality 
of  being, frequent mention to the same light-metaphor of  EE is maintained, while the 
Good or Good beyond Being remains a term more often alluded to than directly 
referenced.  
	 Although the Good is absent from the original preface, there is a discussion of  the 
infinite as the subject of  an “eschatology [that] institutes a relation with being beyond the 
totality,” and which “is a relationship with a surplus always exterior to the totality.”  The totality 25
is Levinas’ term for the realm of  being, and thus it is safe to say that the infinite here 
 Some remarks are worth making here, but which affect the current analysis only tangentially: as I 23
attempted to show in Part I, Platonic eros in the Symposium does not completely ignore the feminine, making 
it increasingly, young, feminine, and child-bearing as Diotima’s speech progresses. I am thus inclined to 
interpret Levinas’ remark regarding eros’ “Platonic interpretation” to be read as an ‘interpretation of  
Platonic eros’ rather than ‘Plato’s interpretation of  eros.’
 As Perperzak notes, “the Good beyond Being [continues] to dominate all of  Levinas’s work, but Platonic 24
reminiscences are less frequent in the later work. They are found in his early writings, and they abound in 
Totalité et Infini . . . but diminish thereafter . . . .This reticence did not undo the Platonism of  his earlier work, 
however. We may therefore conclude that Plato’s actuality is proven by at least one of  the key figures of  
twentieth-century philosophy.” “The Platonism of  Emmanuel Levinas” in Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, 
Platonic Transformations: With and after Hegel, Heidegger, and Levinas (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997),119-120.
 TI, 22, emphasis original.25
!164
names the same thing the Good did in EE.  The role of  light is also developed further, 26
with TI taking up the ethical question in a much more direct way than EE did. Levinas 
speaks of  the “‘vision’ of  eschatology,” that is, of  the beyond being, and explains that “the 
experience of  morality does not proceed from this vision—it consummates this vision; ethics 
is an optics.”  As we will see shortly, this statement foreshadows Levinas’ switch from 27
visual to auditory language, replacing the ‘light’ with ‘discourse.’ The vision of  the Good 
does not lead us to the ‘true virtue’ of  Plato in successive process; the Good does not 
transform us into ethical persons, sending us back down into the cave. Rather, the 
experience of  ‘true virtue’ and the vision of  the Good are concomitant. The one is the 
other. As he says shortly after, this claim amounts to attempting to destroy the division 
drawn between theory and practice. Learning about (that is, having a vision of) the Good 
cannot be accomplished except through practice, and morality cannot be practiced 
without simultaneously experiencing a vision of  (that is, learning about) the Good itself.  28
The whole of  TI, Levinas notes in the preface, is aimed at describing the nature and 
method of  this vision.  As we will see shortly, the concomitance of  theory and practice is 29
a result (as was already the case in EE) of  Levinas’ location of  the Good behind the face 
of  the Other. As he says much later, “things have a form, are seen in the light—silhouettes 
or profiles; the face signifies itself.”  This means that, for Levinas, the face is not shone 30
 Ignoring the question of  whether Levinas’ understanding of  the underlying reality has changed or 26
developed in any way between the two texts.
 Totality and Infinity (TI), 23, emphasis original.27
 TI, 29.28
 TI, 23.29
 TI, 140.30
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upon by the Sun, but shines as an appearance of  (or, in the later language of  OB, a trace 
of) the Sun itself.   31
	 That is not to say that the face is the Good Beyond Being, as if  the Good has 
entered into the world or that the transcendent has become immanent but that our 
‘vision’ of  the face opens up the vision of  transcendence. As Levinas says in Part III of  TI, 
finally specifying the nature of  this vision:  
if  the transcendent cuts across sensibility, if  it is openness preeminently, if  its 
vision is the vision of  the very openness of  being, it cuts across the vision of  forms 
and can be stated neither in terms of  contemplation nor in terms of  practice. It is 
the face; its revelation is speech. The relation with the Other alone introduces a 
dimension of  transcendence.  32
The Other leads us to recognize the transcendent, just as was the case in the preface of  
EE, where “the relationship with the other [is] a movement toward the Good.”  The 33
transcendent only ‘enters into’ the immanent as a rupture, as a break with the immanence 
of  being. Not as the descent of  the infinite into the finite, or the Good into being, as the 
Incarnation of  the God-man.  The other “introduces the dimension of  transcendence,” 34
he is not the transcendent made immanent. 
	 Even more interestingly in that quote, however, Levinas here abandons the 
metaphor of  ‘vision’ altogether. The ‘vision’ of  the Infinite (the Good Beyond Being, the 
 This claim also amounts to (as will become important in §3) saying that the face does not have a Form, as 31
it was the sun shining on the world that gave them their being, their form, in the Republic.
 TI, 193.32
 EE, 15.33
 As Levinas says, “the Other is not the incarnation of  God, but precisely by his face, in which he is 34
disincarnate, is the manifestation of  the height in which God is revealed.” TI, 79. Elsewhere, in a talk 
entitled “The God-Man,” Levinas remarks that “The relation with the Infinite is not a knowledge, but a 
proximity, preserving the excessiveness of  the uncontainable which grazes the surface,” again affirming that 
the “transcendent . . . is the face” only as showing what can’t truly enter into being. Emmanuel Lévinas, 
Entre Nous : On Thinking-of-the-Other (Columbia University Press, 1998), 58.
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Other) isn’t actually a vision at all, but discourse.  It is in speech that we ‘see’ the face of  35
the Other. Levinas thus links vision of  the Good to the discourse with the Other, tying 
together the two halves of  ethics. As he says, this vision, this discourse “can be stated 
neither in terms of  contemplation nor in terms of  practice.” True to his word in the 
preface, ethics no longer contains two halves: theory-vision and practice-discourse, but 
one, combined element; theory-as-practice, vision-as-discourse. 
	 With ethics now ‘defined’ as discourse, we can see more of  Levinas’ 
reinterpretation of  Platonism: what Levinas sees as important from Plato is not the sight 
of  the Good, the Beautiful, or the ‘truly being being,’ but the account of  the speeches 
they produce. In the case of  the Republic, the descriptions given when the philosopher 
returns to the cave, in the Symposium, the speeches that are birthed all along the ascent, 
until we reach the top, when instead of  speeches (or, as Levinas sees it, as a kind of  
speech) the philosopher gives birth to “True Virtue.” Similarly, the whole of  the Phaedrus 
happens in the context of  speech giving, culminating in an extended treatment of  rhetoric 
and dialectic. For Levinas, the question of  the unity of  the Phaedrus, then, would be easy: 
it is the unity of  ethics as theory and practice: speaking and the science of  speaking, the 
two halves of  ethics itself.  36
	 Given that our contact with the Good is now in discourse, and not in vision, it is 
perhaps surprising that we do not get a more extended treatment of  the Good in Totality 
and Infinity, with the explicit references to the Good being no more numerous than the 
 Discourse already played a small role in Existence and Existents, but it is less clearly developed as the main 35
way of  knowing the Good, in large part due to the concept of  the other playing a much more minor role 
there. We will revisit his comments about discourse in that text in chapter 6, as they play a much more 
direct role in his comments on eros in that text.
 Levinas, on the other hand (as we shall shortly see) would be less comfortable putting eros at the center of  36
ethical speech-giving.
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much briefer EE. But Levinas will inevitably depart from Plato, however, is that we can no 
longer talk of  speeches apart from their speakers. Levinas’ discourse is not philosophical 
dialogue, but the direct face-to-face with the Other, the command that says ‘thou shalt not 
kill.’ Thus, to write about the Good is of  no interest to Levinas’ project. Nevertheless, he 
rhetorically asks at the end of  his 1987 preface to the German edition whether the project 
of  TI had  
not been foreshadowed by the Good beyond essence and above the Ideas of  Book 
VI of  Plato’s Republic? A Good in relation to which being itself  appears. A Good, 
from which being draws the illumination of  its manifestation and its ontological 
force. A Good in view of  which “every soul does all that it does.”  37
Once again, just as in EE, we have Levinas stating in a preface to his work that the whole 
project is captured, in some form, by what Plato means by the Good beyond Being. Thus, 
we should continue to look at the text itself  to ask, if  Levinas believes this to be the case, 
what can we discern regarding Levinas’ interpretation of  the Good, and how he has 
repurposed it in service of  a phenomenological description of  alterity. 
	 In the text itself, the Good itself  makes its first meaningful appearance in the 
section “The Face to Face—an Irreducible Relation,” in which Levinas sets out to 
indicate precisely how he understands the idea of  the Infinite, indicating that “in Plato it 
is found in the transcendence of  the Good with respect to being,” and lamenting that “it 
should have served as a foundation for a pluralist philosophy in which the plurality of  
being would not disappear into the unity of  number nor integrated into a totality.”  It is 38
precisely this sort of  pluralist philosophy that Levinas himself  seeks to build. 
 “Preface to the German Edition of  Totality and Infinity,” 200, published in Entre Nous. Levinas’ change from 37
writing, in EE “le Bien au-delà de l’être” to “le Bien au-delà de l’essence,” i.e. from the Good beyond being 
to the Good beyond essence is mediated by the publication of  Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 15 years 
prior to the publication of  the preface in question.
 TI, 80.38
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	 Levinas’ most explicit description of  the Good, however, comes in the section 
“Separation and Absoluteness,” where he once again tries to describe the nature of  the 
separation, the nature of  the ‘irreducible relation’ of  Self  and Other. As he says, “Greek 
metaphysics conceived the Good as separate from the totality of  essences, and in this 
way . . . it caught sight of  a structure such that totality could admit of  a beyond.”  39
Levinas thus recovers from Greek metaphysics, not necessarily a ontological first principle 
but a way of  talking about the un-totalizable, that which escapes return to the same. In 
other places, Levinas employs Descartes’ idea of  the Infinite to the same end, in both 
cases using both as stand-ins, on the level of  experience, not of  some transcendent God or 
reality toward which we go, but for what stands behind the face of  the Other we confront 
in the streets. The Other signals transcendency, Infinity, the Good—signals to us that our 
egoist drive toward the Totality of  the Same is unethical, which is only possible through 
violence.   40
	 Thus, Levinas once again attacks the philosophical discourse of  ontology and 
sameness not by exploiting a flaw in the arguments, but by inverting the whole orientation 
of  the self. Whereas someone like Sartre asks the question of  how the self-standing ego 
relate to the Other, Levinas instead asks the rhetorical question of  how there could ever 
be a self-standing ego apart from the Other in the first place. To be a self  is to always be 
related to—or better, confronted by—the Other, just as beings were always related to the 
Good, or as the Cartesian ego is always related to the Infinite, the source of  its certainty 
(and, ultimately, existence), and the one thing it could not have invented as part of  its own 
effort. While shedding the metaphysical aspects of  these examples, Levinas retains this 
 TI,102.39
 The original preface draws an extended analogy between ontology and war.40
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idea that the question of  relating to the Other has been founded on a faulty premise: 
there never was a self-standing, transcendentally free ego. We take on our true selfhood 
only as a response to the Other who calls me, and to the Good that he or she reveals to us. 
	 The Good, in one sense, then, is negatively defined, that which cannot be 
subsumed into the Same of  being. However, Levinas explicitly rejects the more common 
negative formulation of  the Good as relating to lack, averring that “the Good is Good in 
itself and not by relation to the need to which it is wanting; it is a luxury with respect to 
needs. It is precisely in this that it is beyond being.”  The Good is the Good in itself, and 41
therefore, it is impossible for us to suppose that the Good is merely a lack, a ‘void’ outside 
the totality, beyond the cosmos. The Good is neither a void itself, nor is it only for filling 
the void of  lack or penia. Just as in Existence and Existents, however, Levinas still does not try 
to offer a metaphysical description of  the Good, referring back, instead to an earlier 
discussion on the difference between disclosure and revelation, a reference that seems to 
make it clear that the Good should not be thought of  as a metaphysical first principle, but 
one rooted in discourse and signifyingness.  
	 To signify, Levinas says there, “is not to give” but instead “the presence of  
exteriority,” that is to signify is to point to something beyond. It is no longer the mere giving 
of  names, or presentation of  forms, but revelation, presentation. As he says much later, in 
the section on the “phenomenology of  eros” (a point we will return to more in depth in 
chapter 6), “exteriority is signifyingness itself  . . . . To signify is . . . [equivalent] to 
expressing oneself, that is, presenting oneself  in person.”  The Good, then, hides behind 42
 TI, 103. As we will see in chapter 6, Levinas draws careful distinctions between need and various kinds of  41
desire. Here Levinas has in mind the most ordinary sense of  the hungry man needing food, and the sick 
man needing medicine.
 TI, 262.42
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the face of  the Other, which in turn, is found in language, discourse.  It is only through 43
‘seeing’ its trace in the face the Other that we can hope to glimpse the Good, and to ‘see’ 
the face is, in turn, nothing other than to be in dialogue with the Other.   44
	 This is why Levinas concludes a brief  discussion of  Plato’s Good by noting that it 
is not ontology that is at issue when we speak of  the good, but “an order where the very 
notion of  the Good first takes on meaning; what is at issue is society.”  The Good is not 45
the subject of  an ontological metaphysics, but as Levinas is seeking to develop, an ethical 
metaphysics. Our goal can thus never be to simply ‘describe’ the nature of  the Good, but 
instead for it to serve as the basis for the possibility of  discourse with what is other than 
the self. The Good, through the cry of  the other, calls me to speak, not about it, but to it. 
The face of  the Other calls me to respond. It is with this understanding of  the Good that 
Levinas affirms that “the Place of  the Good above every essence is the most profound 
teaching, the definitive teaching, not of  theology, but of  philosophy.”  The Good, the 46
beyond being, is that which is completely separate from the self  and the same. Its position 
there prevents us from ever giving it a definitive description, but at the same time, enables 
the possibility of  contact between Self  and Other.  
	 Levinas’ point is made even more strongly in his “Conclusions” section on “The 
Finite and the Infinite” where he states definitively that “the social relation engenders this 
surplus of  the Good over being, multiplicity over the One.” It is not only in society that 
 The Good as ‘signifyingness’ is greater than any single signifying face, but also unencounterable except 43
through the individual face. 
 As can be seen here (and as we will return to shortly) this resurrected Good will manage, by its very 44
formulation, escape the critique of  Plato raised in Part II, that the individual was abandoned for first 
principles.
 TI, 103.	45
 TI, 103.46
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the Good “first takes on meaning” as was said originally, but society births the Good itself, 
creates the Good, via “a rigorous concept of  creation, which would be neither a negation 
nor a limitation nor an emanation of  the One.” Not as a mere concept or artificial value, 
and not as the offspring of  the Sameness of  Being, but a true exteriority outside Being, “a 
marvel.”  In other words, the Good is engendered or created by the existence of  47
discourse. If  there were no possibility discourse, there would be no possibility of  contact 
with what is outside the Same. The Good is engendered by the very reality of  something 
outside the totality. 
	 While it is not necessary (nor indeed possible) in this dissertation to take up the 
question of  what discourse is in depth, two short remarks are necessary here. First on the 
source of  discourse, Levinas repeatedly turns to the second half  of  Plato’s Phaedrus, 
frequently enough for Tanja Staehler to remark that it is the most alluded-to dialogue in 
Levinas’ work.  For example, he repeatedly makes use of  “Plato’s expression,” pulled, 48
uncited, from the Phaedrus, “to come to his own assistance.” The full phrase appears three 
times (uncited, but referenced to Plato each time).  It also appears, in various modified 49
forms several more times throughout the text, without the nod toward Plato.  Each time, 50
Levinas makes use of  this to speak of  the one who ‘comes to his own aid’ by speaking, by 
manifesting him or herself  in discourse. This adoption of  the Platonic reference (in fact, 
Phaedrus 275e), which Socrates uses to critique the writing of  speeches which—apart from 
 All quotes TI, 292, emphasis added.47
 Tanja Staehler, Plato and Levinas: The Ambiguous Out-Side of  Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2015). This will be 48
in stark contrast to the sections on eros, where Levinas alludes almost exclusively to the Symposium instead.
 TI, 66, 71, 181. The grammar is slightly changed, according to the sentence containing it, the first time 49
“ . . . porte, selon le mot de Platon, secours à lui même,” the second “ . . . pour Platon, peut se porter 
secours à lui-même,” the third, referenced negatively, “ . . . n’a pas porté secours à lui même.” 
“ . . . peut porter secours à son discours,” (96); “ . . . se porte secours, assiste à sa propre 50
manifestation,” (98); “ . . . peut ‘porter secours’ à sa propre manifestation,” (298)
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their ‘fathers’—have “no power to protect or help” themselves, solidifies Levinas’ own 
argument that it is in discourse, specifically, between the self  and Other, that ethics takes 
place. The signification involved is always in the face-to-face, never the second hand 
accounts of  ethics or anthropology. To separate discourse in this way is to illicitly separate 
the ‘said’ from its ‘saying.’ “True discourse,” he says, echoing Plato, “is inseparable from 
him who has thought it—which means that the author of  the discourse responds to 
questions.”  In this way, Levinas reaffirms the point that the Good is not to be spoken 51
about, elaborated or defined, but rather, that it should serve as the basis for the possibility 
of  discourse with the Other. 
	 Second, a short remark on the content of  this discourse. According to Levinas, the 
face of  the Other speaks first; speaks to me—in fact, commands me. The Other appears, 
first of  all the one “over whom I cannot have power [je ne peux pas pouvoir] whom I 
cannot kill,”  and later “this infinity . . . is the primordial expression, is the first word: ‘you 52
shall not commit murder.’”  The face, however, issues this command in virtue of  its 53
Infinity, in virtue of  it being the shining of  the Good and nothing more. This means, inter 
alia, that every face (which is to say every possible person) issues the same command 
equally. The invasion of  the Good shocks me, shining through—overcoming and 
cancelling out—whatever finite good or evil a particular person represents. The Other is 
spoken of  repeatedly by Levinas as “the widow, the orphan, and the stranger,” but is 
equally the murderer, the rapist, and the terrorist. Each and every one has “power” over 
me, as each reveals themselves to me as Other than myself. Just as with Plato’s 
 TI, 71.51
 TI, 84, the bracketed French and italicization appear in the translation cited.52
 TI, 199, emphasis original.53
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formulation of  the Good, as beyond being, it is beyond every ethical distinction. The 
Good that leaves its trace in the face is not moral good opposed to moral evil, the goodness 
of  character or of  talent, but the pure, unadulterated—unadulterable—Good of  alterity. 
	 This, for Levinas, is the primordial ethical encounter, structured by nonviolence, 
by the negative command ‘thou shall not . . . .’ But this encounter never remains at the 
level of  ethics, but instead immediately erupts into a Justice that is concerned for all 
others, as “everything that takes place here ‘between us’ [i.e. between me and the face of  
the Other] concerns everyone, the face that looks at it places itself  in the full light of  the 
public order . . . . The epiphany of  the face qua face opens humanity.”  The singular 54
ethical relation of  the face is never truly singular, but is always one that is doubly 
‘universal.’ It could have been anyone, and it involves—from the very first moment—
everyone. That the face that shocks me from my egoism is this one rather than that one is a 
point of  circumstance and coincidence, not because anything about the other as Other—
including his relation to me as Other—is unique.   55
§1.3: Otherwise than Being 
	 While Levinas is hesitant to address the Good in EE and TI, Otherwise than Being 
(OB) makes frequent, direct use of  it—a result, in part of  OB breaking with Levinas’ ties to 
the phenomenological method, attempting to describe his ethical metaphysics in a 
different, less constricted register. In this however, OB also represents the most difficult 
challenge of  the three texts, as it gropes for new expressions, partially fulfilling Levinas’ 
 TI, 212-213.54
 I am indebted to Jean-Luc Marion’s reading of  Levinas on this point. See for example “The 55
Intentionality of  Love,” in Prolegomena of  Charity for one version of  Marion’s critique on this point (this essay 
will be discussed further in the following section)
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promise in EE that “a philosophy which, detached from the solitude of  light, and 
consequently from phenomenology properly speaking, will concern us elsewhere.”  Here, 56
as the subtitle announces, the focus is explicitly on the “beyond essence,” about which he 
indicates, the the opening lines, that “since the Republic there had been question of  what is 
beyond essence,” showing that once again, we will be circling around Plato’s Good 
beyond Being.  OB also represents, however, the text where Levinas shows his breaks with 57
what would traditionally be labelled “Platonism” the most clearly. Despite indicating that 
Plato’s Good is once again at the heart, it quickly becomes clear that much of  the 
meaning Plato invested the Good with has been altered or abandoned altogether. 
	 Echoing the language of  TI’s preface, Levinas first introduces the Good in OB 
through the context of  war and peace, noting that while “war is the deed or the drama of  
the essence’s interest [i.e. esse’s interesse] . . . . in peace the Good has already reigned.”  58
Ontology—the conatus of  Being—is, for Levinas, always the strife of  the same and of  
totality. It is only in the ‘peace’ of  ethics, when the Other is allowed to remain other, that 
the Good reigns. 
	 However, Levinas’ formulation of  this ‘peace’ is not uncontroversial. As he begins 
to explain soon after, combatting the interpretation that our relationship to the Good may 
be one of  fall and recovery, of  bringing the Good into the presence, we do not choose the 
 But, at least in my view, only partially, as there he asserts that this new philosophy will have “Eros, when 56
separated from the Platonic interpretation which completely fails to recognize the role of  the feminine,” as 
its theme. The erotic however, is almost entirely missing from OB, and is explicitly differentiated from the 
grounds of  discourse given there.
 Otherwise Than Being (OB), 2. As Levinas says in the opening note to the text, essence merely indicates esse 57
as opposed to ens or Sein as opposed to seiendes (xli). This language is thus does not seem a significant 
change from his earlier discussions of  the “Beyond being,” where he similarly did not merely mean beyond 
beings, nor from Plato’s definition of  the Good epekeina tou ontos, as Plato and the Neoplatonists understood 
it.
 OB, 4-5.58
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Good, nor are we free with respect to it. The Good is an immemorial past which is always 
past, “a non-origin, an-archical,” We are linked to the Good as an origin before every 
origin; at the first moment of  our existence, we have already entered being, and become 
separated from the Good. While we may be free in Being, this primordial choosing 
ensures that we are never free with respect to the Good: “it has chosen me before I have 
chosen it,” before I even existed in order to choose.  And yet Levinas says, “subjectivity 59
sees this nonfreedom redeemed, exceptionally, by the goodness of  the Good. The 
exception is unique. And if  no one is good voluntarily, no one is enslaved to the Good,”  60
later adding that “such service is not slavery but it is a necessity, because this obedience is 
prior to any voluntary decision.”  61
	 The Good, then, is not a tyrant or slavemaster, not because we are free with 
respect to it, but because it is the Good. by its nature, our indebtedness to it is not 
(Levinas claims) a slavery, even if  it is not a freedom either. In slightly softer language, he 
parses this in a footnote as “the Good invests freedom—it loves me before I love it.”  62
Even in this softer formulation, however, Levinas comes dangerously close to asserting 
that the benevolent dictator is not a dictator at all, that our non-freedom with respect to 
the Good should not be taken as an enslavement, not because of  some characteristic of  
the relationship, but only because the Good (despite all evidence to the contrary when the 
relationship is investigated) is not the sort of  thing capable of  enslaving; “being the Good 
 The similarity of  this formulation to God’s calling of  Jeremiah was unlikely to have escaped Levinas’ 59
notice: “Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, before you were born I set you apart,” (Jer 1:5).
 All quotes OB, 11.60
 OB, 54.61
 OB, 187n8. However this apparent softening raises only additional problems, and, as I will try to argue in 62
part IV, turns out to be an impossible formulation: to love before being loved is in fact not possible, a 
mistaken formulation which both Levinas and (as we will shortly see) Marion both adopt.
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it redeems the violence of  its alterity.”  He makes his point even stronger later, when he 63
declares that “its value, that is its excellence or goodness, the goodness of  goodness, is 
alone able to counterbalance the violence.”  As it stands, the Peace where the Good 64
reigns is one that is enforced, this is not the peace of  coming to terms with the Other, but 
of  being restrained and held back.  65
	 We can note here the difference in language between Plato or the Platonists on the 
one hand and Levinas on the other. The Good for Plato was an arche to which we were 
called, toward which we moved as our telos.  It did not, however pull us to itself. Our 66
movement toward or away from the Good was our own, even if  it was not proper to call 
us ‘free’ to pursue or not pursue our telos. Levinas, on the other hand, does not put the 
Good in front of  us, something toward which we are called or even pulled, but behind us. 
It is the “immemorial . . . the past that bypasses the present, the pluperfect past [that] falls 
into a past that is a gratuitous lapse. It cannot be recuperated by reminiscence . . . because 
of  its incommensurability with the present.”  In this way, the structure of  beings to the 67
Good is not one of  being called into the future, toward a telos, but of  being held captive 
from the beginning.  “It provokes this responsibility against my will, that is, by 68
substituting me fro the other as a hostage.”  No longer do I move toward or away from 69
 OB, 15.63
 OB, 57.64
 This, in turn should remind us that the primary command of  the face in Totality and Infinity was always 65
“thou shall not . . . ,” a command to restraint, not a call to action. 
 Which is not to deny that it was also (especially for the Neoplatonists) an origin, something from which we 66
have descended.
 OB, 11.67
 An odd inversion of  the Allegory of  the Cave, where there is a movement from chained imprisonment to 68
freedom in the ascent to the Good. There it is Being by which we are imprisoned, and the Good in which 
we are freed.
 OB, 11.69
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the Good as if  from a neutral point; movement toward is no movement at all, being 
already possessed, held hostage, while movement away is escape (although, in this ‘unique 
exception’) not an escape toward freedom, but condemnation.  It is this very reversal of  70
the future-always-future to the past-always-past that accounts for the Good appearing in 
Levinas not as the telos of  man but his an-arche, his originary non-freedom.  
	 Thus, the Good also does not appear as rest, as it typically would have for the 
Platonists. The activity that we are called to in the Good is not of  peaceful contemplation, 
but of  substitionary justice. the necessity of  our relation to the Good “overflows the same 
that is at rest, the life that enjoys life, since it is the necessity of  a service. But, in this 
restlessness, it is better than rest. Such an antinomy bears witness to the Good.”  Thus, 71
the Good is no longer telos, and is no longer a call ‘to be at home’ in any sense, but instead 
a call to arms; the Peace over which the Good rules is thus additionally not one of  a life at 
ease, of  relaxation, but of  constant movement outside oneself.  72
	 It is this same reversal that accounts (at least in part) for the separation of  the 
Good from eros (a topic which will be addressed more in depth next chapter). As he says 
in the same footnote cited earlier, “The Good could not be the term of  a need susceptible 
of  being satisfied, it is not the term of  an erotic need.”  The change from future to past 73
can thus be seen as part of  the project of  removing the Good from Plato’s more general 
schema of  desire for what one lacks. So long as the Good remains in the future, our 
relation of  the Good is inevitably susceptible (as was clear in Plato’s dialogues themselves), 
 Again in a mirror of  the Allegory of  the Cave, the escape of  this time would be going down into the cave, 70
not as a return to help those who left behind, but as an abandoning of  the Good and taking refuge in Being.
 OB, 54.71
 One could contrast here Aristotle’s comments at the end of  the NE of  the role of  war and peace with 72
respect to virtues like justice compared to contemplation.
 OB, 187n873
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as merely the erotic pursuit for what I lack, and thus susceptible to an egoist pursuit for 
completeness and totality, not—as Levinas is trying to develop—a term that refuses such 
receptions, a term that is structured not by lack but by surplus, by being something extra. 
Its position, instead, in the past, something to which we have always belonged, breaks 
with desire, ensures that the Good cannot be misunderstood as just the Self ’s search for 
wholeness. 
	 Additionally, it remains clear in OB that the Good does not call everything to it in 
the same way. Although he is occasionally more willing to use reciprocal language than he 
was in TI, Levinas insists on the unique election of  the subject, of  the I, in respect to the 
Others. It is the exposure to, the being held hostage by the Other that first makes me a 
subject, it “is not something added to the one [i.e. to the self] to bring it from the inward 
to the outward.”  Rather, this exposure is always in the first person, it is always my 74
exposure to the Other (even if, rarely, Levinas admits that I may also represent an Other 
to others). The name ‘I’ is “only the mask or the person of  the unique one.”  The 75
subject, the I is unique among all Others.  But as the chosen one, the responsible subject, 76
he is not a volunteer, his “uniqueness not assumed, not subsumed, is traumatic; it is an 
election in persecution. Chosen without assuming the choice!”  The subject of  77
responsibility is thrust into his situation from before he could choose it, hostage to the 
Good and to the other from the very start. Indeed, it is this very being-held-hostage which 
makes him a subject, which structures his identity.  
 OB, 56.74
 OB, 56.75
 Cf  the description at the end of  TI of  the chosen son among chosen sons for a similar sense of  the 76
possible reversal, if  not reciprocality, of  this structure.
 OB, 56.77
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	 Although seemingly extreme, it is this being-held-hostage which is necessary for 
Levinas to achieve his project, since having been elected “he cannot evade without 
denying himself.”  Election guarantees that ethics is established as first philosophy, and 78
that the Good rules, rather than being. Were the Good a choice, were there an option to 
be free or not free, we would have to speak of  a subject existing before the call of  ethics. To 
speak of  being free or enslaved is to already assume a subject, a being toward which the 
Good acts. It is only without these terms that Levinas guarantees that the Good is beyond
—before—essence. 
	 This before, the past-always-past, is, as in TI, seen in the present through the face. 
The Good “bypasses the present,” leaving a “trace [that] lights up as the face of  a 
neighbor.”  As with TI, the face should be understood also as the ‘saying’ of  the Other, 79
his speech, which call us, toward which we respond as responsible. Thus, for OB, it is once 
again that “signification” is the meaning of  subjectivity and of  the for-the-other of  
substitution.  Not as language specifically, but as the pre-linguistic having-been-called; 80
“signification is witness or martyrdom.”  However, this is no longer simply the negative 81
command to leave the Other alone, the ‘thou shall not kill’ as it was in TI, we are now 
held hostage, we are put into the service of  the other, such that the signification of  the 
face is “to give, to-be-for-another, despite oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself, is to 
take the bread out of  one’s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of  another with one’s own 
 OB, 122.78
 OB, 12.79
 OB, 77.80
 OB, 77-8. As nearly the entirety of  OB is dedicated to the meaning of  signification, it would be impossible 81
to do a proper study here. For our purposes here, it suffices to take note of  the fact that ethics is 
signification, as Levinas’ claim about eros will be precisely that it does not signify.
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fasting.”  OB clearly leaves behind the possibility that the ethical command (as it often 82
appears in TI) is one of  letting-be. Instead, it is the martyrdom or sacrifice of  substituting 
my own suffering for the others, to give from my own lack. Just as it is not letting-be, it is 
not the charity of  surplus. “One has to first enjoy one’s bread,”  it cannot be “the 83
superfluxion of  the superfluous, but the bread taken from one’s own mouth.”  To be 84
hostage of  the Good—that is, hostage of  the Other—is to be infinitely indebted, to owe 
everything. 
§2: Marion’s God Beyond Being 
	 Marion, following Levinas, retains many of  the same features of  the now-
recovered Good itself, however, his description of  our approach toward it, and our way of  
relating to it is significantly altered. At the heart of  the differences is the fact that Levinas 
is reluctant to mix theology and philosophy, and thus hesitant to name the Good as God 
in anything but a general sense. To the extent that his theology does influence his 
philosophy, we can see his insistence on the separation of  the Transcendent and the 
immanent as based in his Judaism. As discussed above, the idea of  the God-Man, 
transcendence made finite seems impossible. At most what we have is transcendence 
entering into, as a breaking into or disrupting, the immanent, but never taking on finitude 
itself. Marion, on the other hand, directly identifies the Good with God of  Catholicism, 
and thus is fully willing to consider the possibility that the Good enters the world, both as 
 OB, 56.82
 OB, 72.83
 OB, 77.84
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the Incarnation of  the Son, and as the ongoing entrance into finitude of  
transubstantiation. The result is that, unlike in Levinas, in Marion, there is the possibility 
of  encountering the Good through its own face (what Marion will develop as the ‘Icon’), 
rather than only through its trace left in the face of  the Other. While ultimately both of  
these are still structured by a similar discussion of  discourse, these differences shed light 
on differing interactions with Platonism that warrant their own elaboration here. 
Although the texts addressed here represent some of  Marion’s earliest works on topics 
that have become his primary focus, I focus on them primarily due to their more direct 
focus on Dionysius and other patristic writers, through whom Marion interacts with the 
Platonic idea of  the Good.  85
§2.1: The Idol and Distance 
	 Marion first takes up the issue of  the Good in dialogue with Dionysius’ negative or 
mystical theology as an equally inapplicable name for God, quoting Dionysius that “nor 
One, nor Unity, nor Divinity, nor Goodness.”  However, what is at issue here is that even 86
the Good can become an idol, in the sense that it deflates God into a concept-object, or 
perhaps even a being. Marion will draw out his idol/icon distinction further in his later 
texts, in relation to his development of  the ‘saturated phenomenon,’ however at this point 
the crucial point is that the icon captures our gaze, and holds it there, while the icon 
 See Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of  Marion’s Philosophy of  Religion: Apparent Darkness (Bloomington: Indiana 85
University Press, 2011), for a more in-depth discussion of  the Patristic sources that Marion uses. As she 
points out in her first chapter, Marion makes a “unsupported” claim that Dionysius work “has no reliance 
on Platonic or Neoplatonic thought,” nevertheless,  Jones counters that“an indebtedness to Neoplatonic 
ontology is necessary to understand Dionysius’ use of  the term.” Genealogy of  Marion’s Philosophy of  Religion, 
23. It is this indebtedness of  his sources that I take as Marion’s link to the Platonic Good, whether he 
himself  acknowledges it or not. Naturally, given that he refuses the connection himself, what Marion 
ultimately makes of  the Good, or of  the aitia will be quite different than any standard Platonic account.
 Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies (Fordham Univ Press, 2001), 146, quoting Mystical 86
Theology, III.
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moves beyond the image, and in fact serves as a screen of  the Infinite.  In fact, Marion 87
notes that rather than looking at the icon, the icon gazes at us. Thus, any attempt to name 
God, to give him a concept, turns that concept into a placeholder that maintains our 
gaze, rather than allowing us to see beyond it. What is at issue then, is not that God is not 
Good, but only that God exceeds our understanding of  the Good. In this, although the 
language is quite different, we should not take Marion to be too far from Levinas, who 
sees the Good, the Infinite, as exceeding our thinking.  88
	 The Good for Levinas, as it was for the Platonists themselves, was not something 
understood and contained, but only glimpsed in its trace left by its shining on the world. 
The Good is never seen directly, never seen fully. We see only the mark it has left behind. 
It is in this sense that Marion will later reference Levinas in a footnote, quoting from TI, 
“the good is transcendence itself,” as expressing what Dionysius means by the hyperbole 
of  the Good, and approvingly noting that it is this transcendence that he discusses 
throughout Idol and Distance under the name “distance.”  For Marion, reading Dionysius, 89
God is Good as the cause (aitia) of  everything, and in the first place, the cause of  the 
distance between Himself  and the world. This separation of  the cause from the effect 
ensures that God remains distant, he remains withdrawn from the world. As he adds, “the 
hyperbole of  Goodness, become synonymous with the transcendence of  the cause, 
requires that one perceive that very transcendence as the face proper to Goodness.” Thus, 
 I will say more regarding the saturated phenomenon when I turn to beauty, and then finally the erotic 87
phenomenon, which will take us to Marion’s later texts, where the saturated phenomenon plays a more 
prominent role.
 Recall that one of  Levinas’ frequent examples for the Infinite is Descartes, for whom the infinite was 88
precisely that thing which we could not have thought or imagined.
 ID, 155n32.89
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for Marion, as for Levinas, the Good is the Transcendent, our recognition of  the Good is 
(or is only possible) as the transcendent, that which is beyond the realm of  beings.  
	 However, this quote also shows the departure from Levinas. The Good no longer 
is seen in the face of  the Other [person], but takes on its own face.  That is, the ‘face’ of  90
the Good is its own face—distance; it does not need the human face to show itself; “the 
unthinkable distance, as cause, manifests Goodness, or better manifests itself  as 
Goodness.”  Here we see the distinctly Catholic nature of  Marion’s engagement with 91
neoplatonism, God shows himself  to us in his transcendence.  We are no longer confined 92
to the ‘traces’ of  a Good which has passed over (“bypassed”) the present, but which 
manifests its distance to us in the present.  He thus quotes from the Gospel of  John to 93
note that this Good-as-transcendence “came down [to us] from heaven.”  God, the 94
hyperbole of  Good, becomes the Other par excellence for Marion, in a way he never 
could be for Levinas, and our relationship to the Good is spelled out directly with the 
‘Good itself ’ and no longer through the mediation of  others.  Because God became (a 95
particular) man, we no longer need people (in general) to see him.  96
	 With this God-Other, however, our relationship of  inequality is still similarly 
structured as the self-Other relation of  Levinas. That, is, it is still structured by discourse, 
 Or in fact, many faces. We are seen by God through the Icon, one of  his saturated phenomena. We feel 90
our gazes and our intentions overwhelmed and reversed, until it is not us who look at the icon, but God who 
looks at us through the icon. 
 All quotes ID, 154-5, Dionysius quoted from Divine Names, I.91
 Again, a neoplatonism that Marion himself  denies is neoplatonic.92
 Manifests as the hyperbole of  Goodness, perhaps as the hyperousia, the heart of  Derrida’s critique of  93
“metaphysics of  presence” as it pertains to Marion.
 ID, 155, quoting John 6:50. Brackets in original.94
 If  anything, Marion reverses this order, when, in his later readings of  Augustine, he parses love of  95
neighbor (as Augustine does) as a kind of  love of  God, as only possible through a love of  God.
 As we will see in the following chapter, this reversal also means that Marion will have to account for our 96
relation to others differently, coming closer to a relationship structured by love.
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so that God speaks (reveals himself) to us, “in order to ascend,”  that is, so that we can 97
break out of  the realm of  beings and witness Transcendence. In the same way, our 
response to the Other is similarly structured by discourse, not inscribing him or her in 
description, but prayer. We move beyond the predication of  attributes to God, and further 
beyond their denial, until finally we get to a speech that does not signify, but rather ‘speaks 
to.’ Prayer is the address of  love that does not attempt to signify at all: “[by] praying, man 
acknowledges the unthinkable, which anteriorly exceeds the traverse where its perpetuity 
is attested.”  Constantly resisting the urge to ‘idolize’ God by containing him in 98
description, Marion builds on his understanding of  God through apophatic, negative, 
theology. God is unable to be spoken about, but instead is praised.   99
	 This distinction is important because this means that, for Marion, even the 
discourse of  the good does not signify, as it did for Levinas. The face of  the Other 
signified itself, by presenting itself  to myself. For Marion however, even the interaction of  
self  and Other occurs without signifying anything. This change, as we will examine in the 
next chapter, is due to Marion’s altered account of  the encounter with the face within 
eros, rather than within ethics. Eros, even in its much broader equation with caritas, does 
not signify. Nevertheless, it is as if  Marion has shifted the whole discussion. Whereas for 
 ID, 159.97
 ID, 160.98
 See especially the first section of  the chapter “Of  the Eucharistic Site of  Theology,” “let it be said . . . ” 99
Elsewhere in that chapter, Marion quotes Dionysius approvingly that “before all things, and particularly 
before theology, one must begin by prayer,” 157, quoting Divine Names, III, 1. This is made clearer in In the 
Self ’s Place, where Marion notes that praise is not only “one speech act among others . . . [but] offers the sole 
way, the sole royal road of  access to [God’s] presence,” (14).
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Levinas, ethics is the site of  the Good eros the site of  beauty, for Marion, the Good (God) 
is discovered in love, while beauty falls short of  even this.  100
	 While the specific nature of  prayer will inevitably result in changes compared to 
the discourse with the neighbor (notably, prayer is conceived by Marion as an expression 
of  love, where discourse with the other is the event of  ethics), in both cases, we see the 
abandoning of  metaphysics of  the Good in favor of  a dialogically-conceived Goodness. 
The Good is not, it speaks and is spoken to. Similarly, it should be clear from the 
theological nature of  Marion’s discourse, that it is God as supreme Other, who always 
calls first, a point made even clearer in his later discussion of  Augustine’s Confessions.  For 101
both Levinas and Marion, the Other (be it the individual or God) speaks first and is met 
in dialogue, not understood by explanation. 
§2.2: God Without Being 
	 Marion re-enforces the notion of  the God-Other in his next published work, God 
Without Being, which presents itself  as an non-Thomist (perhaps even anti-Thomist) work 
of  philosophy and theology. Signaling his on-going reliance on Dionysius, Marion notes 
in the introduction that  
in the tradition of  Denys’s treatise On Divine Names and its commentaries, Saint 
Thomas certainly marks a rupture: contrary to most of  his predecessors 
(including Saint Bonaventure), as well as to several of  his successors (including 
 As Milbank says, “Marion protects the eroticization of  the flesh from the seductions of  bodily beauty in 100
order to save its sublime impulse toward the infinite,” John Milbank, “The Gift and the Mirror: On the 
Philosophy of  Love,” in Kevin Hart, ed., Counter-Experiences: Reading Jean-Luc Marion,(Notre Dame, Ind: 
University of  Notre Dame Press, 2007), 272.
 Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self ’s Place: The Approach of  Saint Augustine (Stanford University Press, 2012), but 101
see also, already in God Without Being, “one could not do a ‘Theology of  the Word,’ because if  a logos 
pretends to precede the Logos, this logos blasphemes the Word (of) God,” 143.
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Duns Scotus), he substitutes esse for the good (bonum, summum bonum) as the first 
divine name.  102
While Marion has, over time, softened his stance on Thomas’ appellation of  God as esse, 
it has remained true that, for Marion, we should still prefer the name Good over Being, 
when speaking of  God.  103
	 By linking the Good to God,  however Marion undoes and changes Levinas’ 104
determination of  the Good as only past, tying it to the statement that “God is Love,”  105
and quoting from Dionysius the fact that God “‘charms’ all beings at once by ‘goodness, 
charity and desire.’”  Indeed it is precisely this idea of  ‘charming,’ of  calling into the 106
future that marks the real debate between the Good and Being, as “the debate between 
the ens and the good, in a sense [is] the debate between the ens and agape, which crops up 
therein.”  When Thomas speaks of  the Good, it is only as static, the Good ‘thing.’ It is 107
only with the appellation of  the Good over Being that the Good is infused with the sense 
of  desiring as well as desired, calling and charming. 
	 However, if  Levinas’ interaction with Platonism is one that retrieved and 
reformulated the Good by ridding it of  its teleological ‘calling,’ Marion develops it by 
 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being: Hors-Texte, Second Edition (University of  Chicago Press, 2012), xxv 102
(from now, cited as GWB ).
 See the essay “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, 38-74 for this partial 103
recantation.
 In most of  GWB, Marion has styled ‘God’ as crossed out (similar to Heidegger’s crossing out of  Being) to 104
signal the distinction between an idolatrous and iconic God, a practice I have not mirrored here, as the 
idol/icon distinction will not be a focus.
 Agape in the Greek, Caritas in the Latin, we shall see in the following chapter to what extent it is correct to 105
call this love, or to consider it erotically. In this section, I wish to address the Agapic God only insofar as it 
pertains to Marion’s conception of  the Good.
 GWB, 74, quoting from Treatise on the Divine Names.106
 GWB, 74.107
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downplaying the role of  the individual person.  As will become even clearer in the 108
following chapter, love of  the individual is only possible due to a prior love of  God.  We 109
are therefore seemingly returning to those interpretations that imperiled Platonism in the 
previous chapters, one which privileged a first principle, over the individuals we encounter 
every day.  
	 This is seen particularly in what Marion calls the “gaze of  boredom,”  a gaze 110
which is not destructive or nihilistic, but simply uninterested. It sees nothing in the world, 
in the sense of  not caring, not distinguishing, what it sees. It sees no Goodness in the 
world, insofar as it sees nothing beyond the finite, immanent world it gazes at. As a result, 
the whole world appears as vanity.  To save us from this is only the loving vision of  God: 111
“for God loves, and from the gaze of  charity comes the ‘goodness’ of  the gazed at.”  112
The world thus appears good, rather than vain, not of  its own accord but because it is 
being ‘gazed at,’ ‘shone upon’ by the Good, by God. 
	 As the Principle of  the Good is now personal in a way that it was not for Plato nor 
for Levinas (but was for Marion’s later, Christian neo-Platonic sources), it is now possible to 
speak of  the Good not only as static beloved but as loving.  Although even Plotinus 113
 It may be noted that Marion seems to think himself  opposed to Neoplatonism in some way, perhaps 108
most strongly in the “Nietzsche” chapter of  Idol and Distance, where he equates (certain conceptions of) 
Platonism and onto-theology (see also Hankey, “Jean-Luc Marion’s Dionysian Neoplatonism”). However, 
his main reason for this seems to be that the ‘Good’ is also to conceptual, too ‘ontological’ to avoid 
becoming an idol. In reality, his naming of  God as ‘love without being’ or ‘love before being’ is not so 
different from what the Neoplatonists had in mind.
 “Creatures, myself  or my brother, can therefore be loved, and even loved with enjoyment, provided that 109
they come to be loved in the enjoyment of  God,” In the Self ’s Place 277.
 GWB, 115.110
 The idea of  vanity returns to play a significant role in Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon, which I will 111
address in the next chapter.
 GWB, 132.112
 Recall Diotima’s criticism of  Socrates (and by allusion all the Symposium speakers) for thinking of  eros as 113
the beloved rather than the lover.
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occasionally would speak of  the eros of  the One and the Good, these were never personal. 
By making the Good personal, Marion could respond to the possible objection raised in a 
different context by Sartre, Lacan, and others, that he is putting love of  the ‘Universal’ 
above love of  individuals by reminding his objectors that God is not a Universal Good, 
but a person; God is Love, not a static metaphysical entity. To love the Good is not to 
abandon individuals, it is not to love a property that makes individuals lovable, but to love 
the Person who makes them lovable. 
	 Lastly, it should be noted that Marion is opening up a possibility not seen by 
Levinas, through his personalization of  the Good. We can now relate to the Good, to 
God, through his own face that appears in the icon. God gazes at us directly and 
envisages us, overwhelming and reversing out intentionality. We no longer deal exclusively 
with the intermediary of  human faces; we no longer must content ourselves with ‘traces’ 
which will never lead us to the Good itself. instead we can speak to God himself  in praise. 
Fitting in with Marion’s apparent tendency to fall back into a Platonism which abandons 
the individual for the sake of  the universal,  Marion no longer focuses on the 114
relationship to the other (person) as our relation to the Good, but instead on our direct 
relationship to God. To the extent that the individual shows us the Good, he seems to be 
abandoned (just as in certain readings of  the Symposium) as a first step toward a more 
perfect relationship. 
 Which is redeemed, for Marion, by the fact that the universal is God himself.114
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§3: The Refusal of  Beauty 
	 While both Levinas and Marion have found their own ways to recover the Good 
in service of  an anti-metaphysical project, neither has attempted a similar 
phenomenological description of  beauty. Having been split apart, as shown in the 
previous part, it is not possible to assume that a recovery of  the Good necessitates a 
similar recovery of  the Beautiful. Thus, we cannot, in advance, take the relative silence of  
each on the topic of  beauty to be an indication that we should think of  the arguments 
regarding the Good to likewise apply also to beauty.  As we will see, the few times that 115
each does address beauty, it is clear that for neither thinker does the Beautiful warrant the 
same praise that the Good does. 
§3.1: The Beautiful in Levinas 
	 Beauty is almost entirely unthematized in Levinas’ work, beginning with EE, 
where it receives only one, slightly cryptic, direct reference: “Beauty, perfect form, is form 
par excellence.” Beings, he says just prior, “are clothed with a form.” This, in turn is in 
contrast to real Otherness, where “the relationship with nudity is the true experience of  
the otherness of  the other.”  When we experience the Other, we experience him as 116
nude, in both senses: we experience the nude-Other, and we are denuded by the 
experience of  the Other. The “clothes” of  form hide us in the universal language of  
 While Marion has written extensively on the work of  art he has only recently offered an extended 115
treatment of  beauty itself, in the essay “le phénomène de la beauté.” More often (as I will detail below) he 
prefers to use other words to describe the experience of  the work of  art. In addition, what Marion does 
have to say about beauty makes it clear that it cannot serve as well as the good as a name for God.
 All quotes EE, 40.116
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being, but in the nudity of  the experience of  alterity, I encounter the Other outside of  
being. 
	 This contrast of  nudity and beauty is continued in later texts, with Levinas 
expanding that the being who is “kath’auto,” is “completely naked.”  Language itself  117
consists in entering into a relationship with a nudity disengaged from every form, 
but having meaning by itself, kath’auto, signifying before we have projected light 
upon it, appearing not as a privation on the ground of  an ambivalence of  values . 
. . .but as an always positive value. Such a nudity is the face.   118
Thus, the nude Other, that is, the face, bears the trace of  the Good.  This explains the 119
Other’s appearance as vulnerable, violable.  In contrast, beauty is once again the prime 120
Form. It “introduces a new finality, an internal finality, into the naked world . . . [we] find 
a place for [a thing] in the whole by apperceiving its function or its beauty.”  This is the 121
flaw in beauty: it reintroduces the teleology and the drive to totality that Levinas is seeking 
to escape. To see a person as beautiful is to fail to see him as the Other.  Everything is 122
beautiful in the same way (the quote makes clear) that it is useful: it has a part to play in a 
whole. We can thus see certain ancient assumptions about beauty being retained, that 
beauty has something to do with symmetry or being “fitting” in the sense not only of  
 In another inversion of  Plato. One of  the places the phrase “auto kath’auto” appears there is in the 117
Symposium, where it is precisely Beauty that is described as “itself  with [or ‘by’] itself.” Symp. 211b.
 TI, 74.118
 And not in reference to some form. Here, Levinas is critiquing the Platonist view that individuals, 119
material things, are ugly except in reference to universal forms.
 Peperzak explains this shift to the Good as vulnerable rather than desirable, by arguing that Levinas has 120
shifted the meaning of  the Good to “the God of  another, pre-Platonic and non-Greek tradition: the God of  
intersubjective goodness (bonté) and social justice; the Good of  human proximity.” “The Platonism of  
Emmanuel Levinas,” 118. In other words, Levinas has shifted the discourse of  the Good from Platonism 
back to the Jewish tradition.
 TI, 74.121
 Levinas makes this point in extremely strong language much later in life, when he declares that “the best 122
way to meet others is to not even notice the color of  his eyes.”
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appropriate, but “fitted to the purpose.”  Levinas has thus seemingly reversed the 123
situation in Plato (and described, through contrast, in the last part), where the Good is 
good for while beauty is beauty simply.  Now it is the Good which is absolute and without 124
relation or reference, while beauty forces the other back into its part to play in a totality, 
its beauty in relation to the whole.  
	 However, beauty still does not relate to me, except insofar as I am also part of  the 
totality. It is still Expression, the Good, “radiates” by “invok[ing] the interlocutor and 
expos[ing] oneself  to his response and his questioning . . . The being that expresses itself  
imposes itself.”  In other words, the Good is Good for me in the sense that it “solicits” 125
me, places a demand on me (prefiguring the un-freedom language of  OB). It is still not in 
a relation with me, but its shining is always purposeful (Levinas would hesitate to call it 
intentional or conscious) command on the self. Beauty, Levinas says in contrast could 
potentially be defined as a radiation or “a splendor that spreads unbeknown to the 
radiating being.”  Beauty shines, in the most banal sense of  artwork, simply as a thing to 126
be beheld, to be admired and fit into something. A beautiful painting does not shine for 
me, it shines indiscriminately to the whole crowd or to the empty room; it does not issue 
forth deliberately, nor does it place any command on me, it is simply an appearance. And 
as art paintings “offer themselves to enjoyment . . . they are playthings [jouets] . . . they are 
immersed in the beautiful, where every going beyond enjoyment reverts to enjoyment [où 
 As Rachel Barney argues to great effect (“Plato on the Kalon and the Good”), we can see this view 123
throughout Plato’s dialogues, perhaps most clearly in the Hippias Major, where Socrates argues that a 
wooden ladle is more beautiful than a golden one, since it will better function as a ladle (290d-291b).
 See Ousager, “Plotinus on the Relationally of  Plato’s Good” for an extended argument that “‘the Good’ 124
always will be a relational notion,” (141).
 TI, 200.125
 TI, 200.126
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tout dépassement de la jouissance, retourne à la jouissance].”  Thus the Beautiful, as it was for 127
Lacan, is a screen, which invites the transgression of  sexual pleasure and use, jouissance, 
not an introduction into alterity.  Again reversing the Platonic distinction of  Good and 128
Beauty, we see that it is beauty, not the good, that leads to sex, while the Good (to the 
extent that Levinas seeks a ‘love without eros’ ) is the source of  love. This is equally a 129
reversal of  the role of  the principles as read by the philosophers discussed in the previous 
part: where the Beautiful, the admirability of  a person, led to no motivation or desire at 
all (sexual included), thus failing to engender ethics, whereas the good lead to the use and 
abuse of  the other. 
	 Levinas’ critique is strengthened even further in OB, where the notion of  nudity 
takes a central role, and where Beauty is denounced as the root of  metaphysics: “The said 
is reduced to the Beautiful, which supports Western ontology. Through art, essence and 
temporality begin to resound with poetry or song.”  While the discussion of  art will 130
eventually also lead Levinas to the reduction, it is only by going underneath it, by 
speaking of  something otherwise than the display of  essence in art, by abandoning the 
saying of  essences seen in poetry, and getting at a “saying without the said.”  What 131
matters is not what the poem says, or what the artwork depicts, but only speaking and 
depicting as activities. Likewise, Levinas later marks out beauty as something that should 
be left behind with the method of  phenomenology, the science of  essences, if  we are to 
get to the “otherwise than being,” since a phenomenology of  the face is always betrayed 
 TI, 140. The first bracketed text appears in the original, the second is added.127
 A theme which will return next chapter.128
 In “Philosophy, Justice and Love,” an interview published in Entre-Nous, 105.129
 OB, 40.130
 OB, 45.131
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by “the still essential beauty of  a face.”  In other words: phenomenology cannot 132
separate the face from its appearing as a physical face, confusing the saying and the speaker 
and finding—instead of  the true face of  the Other—the physical visage of  the particular 
other. 
	 Beauty then gets its final condemnation (once again tracing very closely the same 
view developed in Lacan ), where the Beautiful becomes the last idol, our attempt at 133
essentializing the Good, so that we can “go seek it, like an idol, or assume it like a 
logos.”  As he elaborates in the footnote attached to that sentence: 134
The immemorial past is intolerable for thought. Thus there is an exigency to stop: 
anagkè stenai. The movement beyond being becomes ontology and theology. And 
thus there is also an idolatry of  the beautiful . . . . The movement beyond being is 
fixed in beauty. Theology and art “retain” the immemorial past.  135
That is, just as in Lacan, the dread of  a truly beyond being, a truly immemorial past, an 
infinite regress without end, is unthinkable, and thus, to put our minds at ease, we 
substitute for the Good a mask of  beauty, a thing on which we can fix our intentions. 
Beauty is therefore not a way of  understanding the world and the individual that merely 
not yet the ethical but instead it is a betrayal of  ethical thinking, a reducing of  the Good 
beyond Being itself  into the beautiful as the reducing of  a God into an idol.  136
 OB, 90.132
 See Chapter 4, §4.1 133
 OB, 150.134
 OB, 199n21.135
 Peperzak summarizes this by noting that “[The Good] is moral, much less aesthetic than Plato’s Agathon. 136
It demands justice before beauty,” “The Platonism of  Emmanuel Levinas,” 118.
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§3.2: The Beautiful in Marion 
	 Whereas Beauty as the idol of  the Good occurs only at the very end of  Levinas’ 
remarks on beauty, the idol/icon distinction is at the very heart of  Marion’s discussion of  
beauty. The Beautiful, just as the Good, when used as a name of  God, turns out to be an 
idol, and thus we could substitute the critique of  the Good for one of  Beauty when 
Marion (as already discussed in the section above), notes that “the debate between the ens 
and the good, in a sense, [is] the debate between the ens and agape, which crops up 
therein,” and that, for Thomas “the good does not add anything to being [the ens] either 
really or conceptually, nec re nec ratione.”  The Good, recall, was not saved for Marion 137
until it was turned into an iconic good, a loving good. In the icon, intentionality is 
reversed, and we are looked at by the gaze of  the icon. When instead it remains 
considered as a static or impersonal ‘first principle,’ it remains an idol. However, Marion 
has more recently directly identified the phenomenon of  beauty with the idol, and so 
there does not seem to be the same possibility of  an ‘iconic beauty’ as there is for the 
‘iconic good.’   138
	 In God Without Being, the argument is between Thomas and Dionysius, between 
whether Being or the Good is the first name of  God. Neither, however, was willing to give 
Beauty the status of  the first name. The beautiful did not benefit, as the Good did, from a 
long Platonic tradition of  being named as “beyond being.” Indeed, for most of  its history, 
the Beautiful had been taken as the Form of  Forms, or the most perfect form. Beauty was 
 GWB, 74.137
 “Phénomène de la beauté.” The relation of  beauty and the idol had been made earlier, for example in 138
Being Givein, however, this article is noteworthy, as it directly denies that beauty can serve as an example of  
any of  the other types of  saturated phenomenon.
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intimately connected to the esse of  a thing, as a result of  beauty being understood as its 
imitating well the form it exhibited. 
	 It is this formliness (which appeared in the critique by Levinas as well) that dooms 
beauty. If  we compare what Marion has to say about the idol vs the icon, they are spelled 
out precisely in this sense of  form, with statements that “the infinite depth of  the icon . . . 
withdraws the icon from all aesthetics: only the idol can and must be apprehended, since 
it alone results from the human gaze, and hence supposes an aisthesis that precisely 
imposes its measure on the idol.”  This final phrase indicates that it is not merely 139
sensation, or the fact that the idol, unlike the icon, is seen by us, captures our gaze, that is 
at issue here, lest we say that beauty can be saved simply by removing it to the kinds of  
moral beauty Plato speaks of: “the icon recognizes no other measure than its own and 
infinite excessiveness.”  To be “without measure,” is to say the icon is without Form. 140
There is no exemplar or template against which to judge it, physical or conceptual. On 
the contrary, it is the face: “only the icon shows us a face (in other words . . . every face is 
given as an icon).”  And just as we saw for Levinas in the way phenomenology betrays 141
the face of  the Other by seeing a particular human face, Marion remarks that “a face 
appears only inasmuch as the perfect and polished opacity of  a mirror does not close it; that 
a face closes up implies nothing but its enclosure in a radiant mirror: precisely, nothing 
closes a face by a mask more than a radiant smile.”  The moment we do not allow us to 142
 GWB, 20.139
 GWB, 21.140
 GWB, 19. In Being Given, Marion further explains that the icon “no longer offers any spectacle to the gaze 141
and tolerates no gaze from the spectator, but rather exerts its own gaze over that which meets it. The gazer 
takes the place of  the gazed upon,” Being Given, 232. That is to say, when we encounter the icon, the face, 
we do not see it, rather, we are seen by it.
 GWB, 19, emphasis mine. Marion here plays with the idea of  a persona, a mask, as compared to a visage, a 142
face.
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be seen by the face, the encounter with the icon fails. The moment we contain it within 
our gaze, as soon as one of  its features catches our eye; that is, as soon as it appears 
beautiful, it ceases to play its role as face. Our gaze turns to it as a thing, and refuses to let 
ourselves be seen by the face, as a way to see and be seen by the infinite that stands behind 
it.  143
	 It is likewise in the ‘radiance’ of  the smile that we see what Marion thinks of  
beauty. While beauty itself  never appears in these early works, we can now see in his 
earlier section on “Dazzling Return,” the place of  beauty, the idol at which we gaze.  144
There we get the description of  the visible idol “dazzling” and “ravishing,” we read of  the 
idol’s “brilliance” and “splendor,” but most of  all we read of  the ways in which it “freezes 
the gaze.”  Once again, we see beauty (if  we are right to read this as a description of  the 145
role of  beauty) playing an identical role to that of  Levinas and Lacan: Beauty freezes us, 
stops us from going further than the painting in front of  us, from going toward the 
infinite.  Even if  it is possible to cross the infinite for Marion, it is no less the stuff  of  146
dread than it is for Lacan and Levinas; beauty allows us to stop, to put an end to an 
endless drive and to reach a comfortable landing spot. Beauty presents a mask for the 
Good, for God, a place which we can contain him and enclose him. But this containing is 
 The word ‘thing’ here would, in a more extended treatment need to be qualified for Marion. In Being 143
Given (42-53), Marion discusses beauty and artwork in a slightly different context, seeking to remove the idea 
of  ‘being’ and ‘thing’ from the ‘givenness’ of  the phenomenon. However, we should not take this ‘without 
being’ to be the same as the ‘without being’ or ‘beyond being’ proper to God. At the conclusion of  that 
work, Marion counts both the idol and the icon among the kinds of  ‘saturated phenomena.’ But we should 
not think of  the ‘idol’ as being ‘without being’ in the sense of  the hyperousia or hyperbole of  the Good or 
God, but of  some more banal sort.
 GWB, 14-15.144
 GWB, 14.145
 As he says in Being Given, “[the idol’s] splendor stops intentionality for the first time; and this first visible 146
fils it, stops it and even blocks it,” Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of  Givenness (Stanford University Press, 
2002), 229. This being stopped or frozen does not completely halt us, but rather, is indicative of  the reversal 
that occurs in saturation. We no longer intend the painting or the idol, but are overwhelmed by it.
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always the sign of  idolization. In Plato, it was the sight of  the something wonderfully 
beautiful that threw us back toward the vision of  the Forms and inspired the birth of  true 
virtue. In fact, Diotima outlines how we only give birth at all as we draw near to beauty, as 
if  beauty induces birth.  On the contrary, we now see that for Marion, as for those 147
before him, beauty paralyzes us. It doesn’t inspire action (ethical or otherwise) but brings 
an artificial end to our pursuit. For Marion, the ‘contemplation’ of  beauty brings all other 
activity to a halt.  We become possessed by the painting, and (insofar as the painting 148
saturates and overwhelms us), we return to it again and again.  But as a result, it should 149
be clear, cannot be included in any description of  the birth of  ethics. It is only the Good, 
the appearance of  the face as face, as formless pointing toward infinity, that inspires the 
birth of  action. 
§4: Transitions 
	 What we have seen in this chapter is the recovery of  the Good as an ethical ‘first 
principle’ which remains divorced from the question of  being (and thus, the question of  
whether the universal Good exists is irrelevant), whether through Levinas’ appearance of  
the Infinite in the face of  every Other, or in the particular case of  Marion’s God. Both 
developments resituate the Good in the context of  the face of  the Other, whether it be the 
 Symp. 206d.147
 Milbank, in a strong critique of  Marion’s view of  beauty, notes that “for Marion, beauty does not 148
mediate in its visibility the invisible, but rather forecloses a world of  idols or the merely visible and radically 
finite as reduced to our representing awareness,” “The Gift and the Mirror,” 272. It is this separation, 
between the visible and invisible, or between the infinite and the finite, that I ultimately wish to heal by 
reconnecting the Good and Beautiful.
 Again, as he says in Being Given, “the intuitive given of  the idol imposes on us the demand to change our 149
gaze again and again, continually, be this only so as to confront its unbearable bedazzlement,” 230. We are 
continually called back to the painting, but never called to move past it.
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human face or the icon, and thus the possibility of  ethics as the confrontation with 
something outside the self/same becomes possible, partially resolving the problems seen 
in Part II. It can no longer be an issue (as it was in Sartre) of  reducing the being-for-itself  
to the in-itself, since the Other is not a being at all. The Other is interacted with as 
absolutely Other, who first places the command on me. At this point, however, it remains 
to be seen whether this encounter with the Other structured by the Other as the face of  
the Good can lead us to recover the specifically erotic relation.  In advance of  the full 150
treatment we can already see the issue arising that Beauty has not been resurrected 
alongside the Good. Beauty has remained (to the extent that it is said to be a real 
‘universal’ at all) a matter of  being and of  fittedness and formliness. It is beauty that 
mistakes the Other for a particular other, fails to see the Other, and instead interacts with 
the individual in the realm of  totality and being. Thus, if  eros is to come back at all, it will 
have to be a much different account than Plato’s, which linked these two together so 
necessarily. Rather (as we have already occasionally foreshadowed here), it seems that love 
will have to choose: will it relate to the Other as Good or as Beautiful; will it relate to the 
other as unconditioned Other, or will it, as it was already claimed by Sartre, Lacan and 
others in Part II, reduce him to an object of  perception and forms to be possessed?  
 We have, thus far, largely eschewed the question of  how the relation with the Other is structured as, in 150
itself, it is irrelevant to the current work beyond noting its origin as a relation to the Good, and insofar as it 
is relevant, will be taken on in the following chapter in comparison and contrast to the erotic relationship.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SILENCE OF EROS 
	 Although we have seen a renewed interest in the Good beyond Being once again 
raise the possibility of  a non-destructive encounter with the other within a 
phenomenological tradition of  alterity and discourse, any idea of  beauty has been 
removed from the encounter. For both Levinas and Marion, as we saw, it was the function 
of  the Good or of  God that enabled us to encounter the Other, whether it be in hearing 
the call, or in being seen by the Other’s gaze. To see the other person as beautiful, on the 
other hand, is to reduce him to my horizons and to wrongfully exert a power over him. 
For Plato, it was the intimate connection between beauty and the good that made eros a 
privileged route to the ethical life: recognizing the beauty of  a thing, person, or action 
keyed us in to the fact that it was also good. The truly beautiful person was the virtuous 
person; the truly beautiful act, a virtuous act. For Marion and Levinas, on the other hand, 
seeing the Other as beautiful prevents us from seeing the face of  the Other, prevents us 
from encountering her as Other. Thus, Marion and Levinas have continued the divide 
seen in Part II, and although they re-establish the possibility of  relating to the Other, we 
no longer can guarantee that beauty indicates goodness, nor even that beauty leads us to 
recognize beauty. As a result it becomes questionable that eros similarly can lead us to 
ethics. 
	 Paralleling the trajectory of  chapter 5, this unerotic ethics similarly takes two 
different (although closely related) forms; the first, represented by Levinas sees eros as 
outside ethics, eros relates us to the Other in a way that is not necessarily unethical, but it is 
an-ethical, otherwise than ethical (§1). The second form, championed by Jean-Luc Marion 
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(and also Jean-Luc Nancy, who plays a more minor role here), does not put eros outside of  
ethics, but privileges it over ethics. (§2). In essence, Levinas excludes eros from ethics, 
while Marion excludes ethics from eros. Although their appearances will be quite 
different, the result will be the same, eros is returned only to be silenced. As we will see at 
the end of  this chapter (§3) it is only the return of  a Beauty parallel to the Good that we 
will enable us to once again speak of  our love. 
§1: Levinasian Eros 
	 As we saw in chapter five, one of  the key ways that Levinas discusses the Good in 
his early works was by reference to the light. Thus, one of  the first ways we can get a 
sense for what Levinas means by eros, and its relation to ethics is by looking at his 
discussions of  light in relation to eros.  What we find, in fact, is that eros must be hidden 151
from the light—or, perhaps more accurately, the light does not shine on eros (§1.1). 
Disconnected from the light and the Good it represents, we then discover, unsurprisingly, 
that it is also cut off  from the way of  seeing the Good—discourse and signification (§1.2). 
It is only through fecundity, which results from—but breaks with—eros that we can re-
enter ethics, having diverted, temporarily, into the un-seriousness of  eros (§1.3). 
	 Although eros turns up in all of  Levinas’ works, its most extensive treatment 
occurs at the end of  Totality and Infinity, a text where the Good was already understood to 
 For Levinas, amour and eros are distinct. Eros concerns the specifically sexual encounter. amour, on the 151
other hand, is connected to justice and, at least at times, to charity. He thus (like many in Part III) has 
something far more restricted in mind than Plato did. Here we will focus only on his remarks on eros, which 
are significantly less positive, ignoring his more positive (at times) claims regarding amour. The split, however, 
will be taken up in part IV, as my ultimate claim will be that—just as in Part III—the split of  love and eros is 
wrong to make in the first place. All references to love in this chapter, unless otherwise noted, should be read 
as regarding specifically erotic love, in Levinas’ restricted sense.
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show itself  in the face of  the Other but, importantly, where Levinas consistently denies 
the possibility of  the reversibility of  the ethical relationship. In that text, I am never an 
Other for others.  However, it is similarly before Levinas’ strongest statements about 152
being un-free with respect to the Good or to the Other. The command remains ‘thou 
shall not . . . ,’ and not the later forms such as ‘the bread from my very mouth,’ or 
substitution. It is thus primarily with this conception of  ethics which we will need to 
contrast his remarks regarding eros. In comparison, in Existence and Existents, eros has not 
quite been formulated fully, while in Otherwise than Being, eros is silenced nearly to the point 
of  non-existence (as we will see in §1.2). 
§1.1: Sex in the Dark 
	 For Levinas (at least in Totality and Infinity), the location of  eros is somewhat 
unclear. It appears at the end of  his work in a section titled “Beyond the Face,” but the 
‘place’ of  this beyond remains unclarified. Despite being the concluding section of  the 
book, Levinas makes it clear throughout that it is not that toward which ethics and the face 
point; it is not ‘beyond’ in the sense of  being further. Nor can it possibly be (as we will see 
clearly once we discuss the section ‘The Ambiguity of  Love’) the beyond of  
transcendence, even less of  ex-cendence. Rather, it seems only that this beyond must 
mean ‘outside of.’  Eros is ‘beyond the face’ in the way that a shadowy corner is beyond 153
 Although Levinas continues to insist on the asymmetry of  the relation throughout his work, he does note 152
in OB that justice depends on the possibility of  the I “becom[ing] an other like the others,” 161.
 For a more in-depth analysis of  this point, see Richard Cohen, “The Family and Ethics: The 153
Metaphysics of  Eros in Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity.” For example, he notes that eros comes 
“from ‘below’ or ‘beyond’ ethical responsibility. To be sure, this does not make the encounter with erotic 
nudity immoral or unethical. It rather places it outside, otherwise, differently than the straightforwardness 
of  the ethical encounter,” 1. Much of  what follows in this section follows Cohen’s analysis closely.
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the reach of  the light.  Not, it should be clear, as an object in the corner, which could be 154
illuminated if  only we redirected the light, rather it is the shadowy corner itself. To shine light 
on it would not be to welcome eros into the light, but to destroy it. The moment the light 
touches it, it ceases to be a shadowy corner. The significance of  this fact, as I will explore 
throughout the rest of  this chapter, is as an indication of  eros’ an-ethical nature, its 
inability to participate in the signifying vision-discourse of  ethics. 
	 However it is not a shadowy corner simply because ethics refuses to admit it into 
the ‘light’ of  signification. Rather eros conspires to remain hidden as much as ethics works 
to stop it from entering into ethics. This is the ambiguity of  love, as “in love, 
transcendence goes both further and less far than language,” that is, than ethics. It is in 
this ambiguity that Levinas says “through the face filters the obscure light coming from 
beyond the face.” Eros, as the dark corner, sees the light in the distance which does not 
quite reach it. However, it is enticed by this light and attempts to draw near it; but in 
seeing it from ‘beyond the face,’ it does not do so in the same manner as ethics. Eros does 
not let the face shine but “goes beyond the beloved.” Love transgresses because, in 
reaching toward the light, it does not let the Other shine, but instead reaches out, as if  
attempting to reach the transcendent Good itself  directly.  As we will see further down, 155
this reaching out threatens to profane the Other, to fail to respect her as other than 
myself. The ambiguity brings together a legitimate metaphysical desire for transcendence 
with a Platonic or Sartrean model of  love that Levinas calls “the most egoist and cruelest 
of  needs.” As Levinas says, this is the moral of  Aristophanes’ Symposium speech, where 
 One of  Levinas’ primary metaphors throughout the sections on eros concerns the “night of  the erotic,” 154
TI, 258.
 Jeffrey Bloechl explains this by noting that“erotic desire seeks eternity. It lusts after the absolute,” “How 155
Best to Keep a Secret?,” Man and World 29, no. 1 (January 1, 1996),9.
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“love reunites the two halves of  one sole being, interpret[ing] the adventure as a return to 
self.”  Thus, eros transgresses not by going too far, but by going ‘less far’ than ethics, 156
failing to go beyond the sameness of  the same, failing to reach the Other in his or her 
alterity. 
	 Aware of  its own ambiguity, love’s “‘intention’ no longer goes forth unto the 
light,”  but instead opts to remain in the dark, attempting to enjoy transcendence 157
without ever attaining it.  However, this is not the night of  the il y a, described at length 158
in Existence and Existents,  where the night was the weight of  Being bearing down on us, 159
the night that signified the solipsistic drive of  ontology, but another night “alongside” the 
first, “the night of  the erotic . . . the night of  the hidden, the clandestine, the 
mysterious.”  Inside this night, eros “does not see. An intentionality without vision, discovery 160
does not shed light: what it discovers . . . illuminates no horizon.”  Not only does the 161
night of  eros keep the face hidden and mysterious, but the erotic intention does not even 
seek to find it, does not seek to shed light into the darkness.  These many references to 162
light and darkness within Levinas’ discussion of  eros are by no means accidental to his 
project. Rather they directly connect back to what we saw in chapter 5, regarding the 
 All quotes, TI, 254. Here we begin to get a sense of  how Levinas read’s Plato’s love: it is one which goes 156
beyond the individual, aiming at the Good itself. The individual, the first step of  Diotima’s ladder, is 
sacrificed in my attempts to move higher.
 TI, 257.157
 Again, Bloechl notes that “erotic love is individual desire born from and aiming toward the face of  the 158
other. It is irremissible egoism testing its own limits,” “How Best to Keep a Secret?,” 7.
 see chapter 5, §1.1159
 TI, 258-9.160
 TI, 260.161
 Levinas is far more liberal with vision-metaphors in this section of  Totality and Infinity than perhaps any 162
other. In the first three sections of  the books, Levinas tries to distance ethical discourse from ethics, but it is 
not that ethics ‘does not see,’ in a similar way as eros’ own blindness. Rather ethics speaks and hears (see the 
previous chapter for a discussion of  the shift from vision to discourse). As we will see below, the same shift is 
presumed here, Eros’ blindness is nothing other than its inability to speak and to hear the call of  the Other.
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connection of  the Good, of  the vision-discourse of  ethics, and the encounter with the 
face of  the Other. We see here, by the denial of  the possibility of  sight, the exclusion from 
the light, that eros cannot serve as a possible route to the discovery of  the face. In fact, as 
we will see in the following section, eros must presuppose the face, even in its failure to 
properly see it, that is, its failure to hear the call of  the Other. 
§1.2: Speechlessness	  
	 If  there be any question that this erotic night represents its distance from the 
Good and from ethics, Levinas notes that in “no longer go[ing] forth unto the light,” eros 
no longer goes “unto the meaningful.” As we saw in the previous chapter, it was the realm 
of  meaning and signification which defined ethics; it was the move from vision to 
discourse that enabled Levinas to recover and adapt Plato’s Good beyond Being to its new 
purpose. Likewise, eros’ avoidance of  the light, its inability to move toward the light 
signals that eros will not provide the possibility of  encountering the face and hearing the 
signifying call of  ethics. Instead, eros “play[s] . . . between speech and the renouncement 
of  speech, between the signifyingness [significance] of  language and the non-
signifyingness of  the lustful which silence yet dissimulates.” Eros, according to Levinas, is 
characterized by “voluptuosity” and “profanation,” and rather than encountering the 
ethical face, instead encounters “the feminine . . . a face that goes beyond the face.”  163
The feminine, for Levinas (at least in this section of  TI) seems to stand for 
nonsignifyingness itself, as  
the face of  the beloved does not express the secret that Eros profanes; it ceases to 
express, or, if  one prefers, it expresses only this refusal to express, this end of  
 TI, 260.163
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discourse and of  decency . . . . In the feminine face the purity of  expression is 
already troubled by the equivocation of  the voluptuous, already laughter and 
raillery.  164
This equation is the locus of  a significant feminist criticism, including by Luce Irigarary, 
who asks first of  all “is there otherness outside of  sexual difference?”  repeating the 165
same question raised by the feminists addressed in Part II: is it not first of  all sexual 
difference which accounts for alterity? However, Irigaray takes this question in radically 
new ways, in “re-reading” and responding to Levinas. Irigaray sees once again the same 
sort of  concrete implications in a concept of  the feminine that “appears as the underside 
or reverse side of  man’s aspiration toward the light.”  The captivity of  women is now no 166
longer framed as merely the (im)possibility of  authenticity, but the split between eros and 
ethics. Seeing the same problems which will be expanded upon in the next subsection, 
Irigaray notes that “Levinas substitutes the son for the feminine,”  and as such, the 167
transition from eros to ethics is the transition also from the feminine to the masculine. Out 
of  a feminine-structured eros, Levinas  
abandons the feminine other, leaves her to sink, in particular into the darkness of  
a pseudoanimaility, in order to return to his responsibilities in the world of  men-
amongst-themselves. For him, the feminine does not stand for an other to be 
respected in her human freedom and human identity. The feminine other is left 
without her own specific face.  168
Here, Irigaray takes ‘feminine’ to stand for women as a sex or gender class, and thus 
women, as women, are left to participate only in the dark and speechless eros, while men 
 All quotes, TI, 259-260.164
 Luce Irigaray, “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas on the Divinity of  Love,” Re-Reading Levinas, 109. In his 165
earliest works, including Time and the Other, Levinas draws this exact equation between the feminine and 
alterity. His use of  the feminine here, however, differs significantly, and no longer represents a true alterity at 
all.
 Irigaray, “Questions,” 109.166
 Irigaray, “Questions,”111.167
 Irigaray, “Questions,” 113.168
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(and only men) and their sons (and only sons) are free to return to the serious world of  
ethics.  
	 While others have defended Levinas’ employment of  the feminine as a category 
term rather than a a classification of  women specifically in opposition to men, it is clear 
that the feminine—the erotic—is understood as outside of  ethics.  As Levinas says, “the 169
principle ‘you shall not commit murder,’ the very signifyingness of  the face, seems 
contrary to the mystery which Eros profanes.”  As Irigaray interprets this, “when the 170
lovers, male or female, substitute for, occupy or possess the site of  those who conceived 
them, they founder in the unethical, in profanation.”  Thus, while Levinas could 171
perhaps be defended against a strong reading of  gender or sex essentialism of  his claims 
of  alterity, Irigaray’s broader claims still land with full force: a deep division is drawn 
between the Good and ethics, which were structured by discourse and light on the one 
hand, and eros and the feminine, which find themselves structured (or perhaps better, 
without structure) by the absence of  the same on the other.   172
	 Although eros, in various ways, assumes the ethical, Levinas draws a strict division 
between ethics as a public, social, signifying relationship, and eros, which remains private, 
asocial, and does not speak.  Our relationship to the Good—our ethical relationship to 173
 Levinas himself  seems to try to pre-empt this criticism when he writes in an earlier section that “the 169
empirical absence of  the human being of  ‘feminine sex’ in a dwelling nowise affects the dimension of  
femininity which remains open there.,” TI, 158. For various discussions of  this point, see Tina Chanter, 
Feminist Interpretations of  Emmanuel Levinas and Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley, Re-reading Levinas.
 TI, 262.170
 “The Fecundity of  the Caress: A Reading of  Levinas, Totality and Infinity, ‘Phenomenology of  Eros,’” in 171
Feminist Interpretations of  Emmanuel Levinas, 187.
 A significant part of  Irigaray’s work in this area has been to outline a feminine way of  discourse. When 172
applied to Levinas’ readings of  eros, we can see that this could amount to an erotic way of  discourse, and 
thus, will be a point to which I will return in the final part.
 Levinas draws a connection between all of  those when he notes that “social life in the world is 173
communication or communion,” EE, 41. Eros, on the other hand is characterized as an “asocial relation,” 
or an “inverted signification, a signification that signifies falsely,” TI, 263.
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the other—is always one structured by language and speech. Love is characterized, 
contrary to ethics, by “the non-sociality of  the society of  lovers.” Unlike in Plato, eros in 
Levinas “excludes the third party, it remains intimacy, dual solitude, closed society, the 
supremely non-public.”  Levinas’ criticism of  a Platonic eros—the sense of  eros that I 174
am attempting to restore—could not be more complete: eros will never lead to ethics, 
because by its nature, it desires to stay hidden, to stay between the lovers themselves. Eros 
does not turn outward to the world, but returns always to itself. 
	 But this is far from a neutral proposition for Levinas, given his link of  community 
and ethics. Rather, in eros, “the beloved, returned to the stage of  infancy . . . has quit her 
status as a person.” Rather than through communication and communion, eros meets the 
other only in play.  This is the second characteristic of  eros alongside voluptuosity/175
profanation. The feminine face is not met in serious discourse, but rather “‘discovered’ in 
the non-signifyingness of  the wanton.”  Similarly, it does not speak the command ‘do 176
not kill,’ but merely “laughs . . . signaling the less than nothing.”  It is not unethical, 177
since Levinas warns us that “disrespect presupposes the face . . . . In the inversion of  the 
face in femininity, in this disfigurement that refers to the face, non-signifyingness abides in 
the signifyingness of  the face,”  but is an-ethical. It is a withdrawnness from ethics which 178
does not necessarily contradict it. The tension between profanation and true 
transcendence is built upon the premises that make ethics possible: the existence of  the 
 TI, 265. 174
 “relations with the Other are enacted in play; one plays with the Other as with a young animal,” TI, 175
263.
 TI, 261.176
 TI, 264. As Richard Cohen puts it, “eros, then, stands to the fully human tasks of  ethic and justice as an 177
interlude, intermission, or vacation. It is play, the lighter side of  life,”“The Family and Ethics: The 
Metaphysics of  Eros in Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity,” Contemporary Philosophy 15 (1993), 2.
 TI, 262-3.178
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ex-cendent Good, and a face which makes it visible. If  it were not for this, eros would be 
impossible. And yet, eros does not do the work of  the Good either. It is for that reason 
that, “in its frankness [language as the presence of  the face] refuses the clandestinity of  
love, where it loses its frankness and meaning and turns into laughter or cooing.”  Love 179
is excluded from ethics because love is excluded from discourse.  Love laughs and coos, 180
it does not speak. As a result eros, it seems, is incapable of  seeing (that is hearing and 
speaking) the Good.  181
	 Levinas’ stance on this is more severe in the earlier Existence and Existents, where he 
already discusses loves ambiguity and its voluptuousity: 
There is also the ridiculous and tragic simulation of  devouring in kissing and 
love-bites. It is as although one had made a mistake about the nature of  one's 
desire and had confused it with hunger which aims at something, but which one 
later found out was a hunger for nothing. The other is precisely this objectless 
dimension. Voluptuousness is the pursuit of  an ever richer promise; it is made up 
of  an ever growing hunger which pulls away from every being. There is no goal, 
no end in view. Voluptuousness launches forth into an unlimited, empty; 
vertiginous future. It consumes pure time which no object fills nor even stakes 
out.  182
Here (in slight contrast to TI ) the ambiguity is presented as a misunderstanding, a 183
confusion about what love really is. Along the same model of  anxiety and fear, 
voluptuousness, endless desire, is reduced and inscribed into desire-as-lack, hunger. A goal 
is created where previously there wasn’t one, not out of  necessity on the part of  love, but 
 TI, 213.179
 This point is the topic of  the following chapter, and the reasons for it will be taken up more fully there.180
 Levinas here uses “l’amour” but when he takes it up again in the final section, transposes instead to 181
“l’eros.”
 EE, 43-4, emphasis original.182
 The change can, I think, be at least in part be attributed to the Good becoming more immanently 183
discoverable in the face of  the Other in Totality and Infinity than in Existence and Existents. The choice between 
the Good and enjoyment is no longer so strongly dualistic between a here and a there, and thus, the 
ambiguity is not between two choices, but two ways of  seeing the same thing.
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for the lover, who cannot contain voluptuous love, who cannot understand a desire that 
does not consume. Love itself  is not ambiguous, but the lover makes it so. His inability to 
communicate with the beloved (because the love doesn’t aim at the beloved qua object or 
goal) compels him to change the relationship. Just as for Sartre, love turns to masochism 
and then to hate and sadism as each failed, so for Levinas, voluptuous love turns to 
possessive, desirous, or acquisitive love in order to provide structure and 
comprehensibility. But communication fails here too; the other qua other is destroyed by 
being transformed (just as in Sartre) into an object to be had. This Sartrean attitude of  
eros is seen, perhaps most clearly, in the final epigraph to Otherwise than Being, taken from 
Pascal: “they have used concupiscence as best as they could for the general good; but it is 
nothing but a pretense and a false image of  charity; for at bottom it is simply a form of  
hatred.”  For love to succeed, it must remain voluptuous, without goal, but also without 184
communication. 
	 In TI, on the other hand, voluptuosity does not lead back down to possession, it is 
not a mistaken hunger-pang, but enjoys precisely because of  its ambiguous nature. It can 
only profane when it first understands the feminine other as both “violable and 
inviolable” as “virginity,” “the untouchable,” the “ungraspable,” “modesty,” “tenderness,” 
and “frailty.”  Eros bears witness to the inviolable nature of  the Other even when it 185
transgresses it. It does not quite yet pay heed to the ethical command, but in an inverted 
way, is aware of  its existence. Its ambiguity, then, is not in turning away from ethics or 
 The clarity of  the connection of  Pascal’s concupiscence and Levinas’ eros can be seen in his declaration 184
in an interview that he is searching for a “love without eros . . . [a] love without concupiscence” (Entre-Nous, 
103) In general, OB seems more directly opposed to eros than TI (as I will briefly explore at the conclusion 
of  the next subsection), however, even in TI it is clear that eros is a poor substitute for justice.
 We once again see in these words, scattered throughout “Phenomenology of  Eros,” the locus of  the 185
critique of  Levinas’ employment of  the word ‘feminine.’ Whether it is intended to be the woman herself  as 
opposed to the man, it is undoubtedly one that links femininity to weakness.
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turning back to totality and metaphysics, but in remaining speechless. It hovers in 
between the two poles, not really speaking and not really hearing the call of  the face. 
§1.3: The Escape to Ethics  186
	 However, in the final pages of  the “Phenomenology of  Eros,” we learn that 
despite its an-ethical nature, eros does actually give birth, quite literally, to ethics with the 
birth of  the child.  However, this birth is not the goal of  eros, nor is it the work of  eros, 187
rather the child comes from “beyond every possible project, beyond every meaningful and 
intelligent power.” Thus we have to understand eros in its two directions, first, what it 
itself  aims at: “voluptuosity of  voluptuosity,”  and secondly what it creates, as if  by 188
accident: a community of  sons.  189
	 In its work, the voluptuosity of  eros is the same jouissance as seen in Sartre and 
Lacan. Eros is pleasure seeking pleasure. Eros, for Levinas as for Lacan, does not seek an 
object beyond its enjoyment. In fact it is “the enjoyment” [la jouissance] of  reunion that 
Levinas points out is used to justify the Aristophanic interpretation of  return to self.  190
There is a pleasure in finding our other half, but this is precisely the definition of  love that 
Levinas seeks to overturn by instead claiming that “my voluptuosity delights in [se réjouit] 
 Much of  this section was previously presented in a different context as part of  a paper “Paternity and 186
Responsibility in Levinas and Marcel,” presented at a joint SIREL/NALS conference “The Neighbor and 
Stranger,” in 2016.
 At the end of  “Phenomenology  of  Eros,” Levinas speaks of  “l’enfant,” before immediately switching to 187
“le fils” at the beginning of  the next section, “Fecundity.” Here I follow Levinas’ usage and speak always of  
the child in masculine terms.
 TI, 266.188
 A second locus of  criticism, Levinas switches almost immediately from ‘the child’ to ‘the son,’ reinforcing 189
Irigaray’s (and others) criticism that the move from eros to ethics leaves the feminine and women behind.
 TI, 254.190
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in his voluptuosity.”  Voluptuosity, jouissance, does not enjoy an object, it enjoys 191
enjoyment, a never-ending perpetuation of  itself. This, Levinas says, is in contrast to 
friendship, which does go “unto the Other.”  Eros’ enjoyment is based on an “erotic 192
nudity” that “delineates the original phenomenon of  immodesty and profanation.”  In 193
this erotic nudity, we see the final reason that eros can be only an accidental ground of  
ethics. Unlike the nudity of  the face, as a freedom from Form,  erotic nudity is not the 194
pure experience of  alterity and the Good, nor, as it becomes in Otherwise than Being, the 
nudity that signals the leaving of  our shelter  and the exposure to the possibility of  195
harm.  Instead, erotic nudity is “exhibitionist,” or “wanton.”  Thus, eros can be the 196 197
direct source of  nothing but profanation and enjoyment. All “moral perspectives” opened 
up in eros “are situated already in the singular dimension” that nudity creates.  How, 198
then, could we ever hope that eros leads to ethics if  it will forever be entrapped in the 
dimension of  exhibitionist enjoyment and profanation? After all, this erotic nudity does 
not even “precede the signifyingness of  the face as the obscurity of  formless matter 
precedes the artist’s forms.”  Here we have the most direct rejection of  the thesis I am 199
drawing from Plato, and to which I intend to return: for Levinas, eros is (despite its 
 TI, 266. Not coincidentally, Levinas, just as Sartre before him, thinks this unificatory goal is inherent to 191
Plato’s account of  eros, that on this point Plato and Aristophanes align, even if  the myth is rejected by 
Socrates.
 TI, 266.192
 TI, 257.193
 See chapter 5, §3.1 for the discussion of  this prior sense of  nudity194
 OB, 49.195
 OB, 72 Levinas also speaks in that work of  a “non-erotic openness,” further demonstrating that the 196
nudity which is the possibility of  being wounded is not the one which contains the possibility of  the erotic 
encounter
 all quotes, TI, 256-7.197
 TI, 257.198
 TI, 261.199
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appearance) not ‘beneath’ ethics in a way that it could bring it into existence, being 
shaped or sculpted into an ethical attitude; ethics does not bloom from eros. Rather ethics 
‘comes back’ from the future. The birth of  ethics is always a rebirth, a re-entry after exiting 
into the erotic attitude. “The chaste nudity [that is, the nudity which shows the Form-less 
face of  the Other] does not vanish in the exhibitionism of  the erotic,” or, in other words, 
as we saw in the previous section, eros is not quite un-ethical, it does not destroy the face, 
and yet eros “remains mysterious and ineffable” because of  “the exorbitant 
inordinateness of  this indiscretion.”  To be erotic, we saw, presumes that the face, the 200
vulnerable nudity of  ethics, is already there, but precisely because eros denudes in 
another, exhibitionist way, it must remain silent. To provide an account of  eros would be 
to destroy the face, to reduce it to an object of  enjoyment. It is only in its silence that eros 
can maintain its harmless character as an-ethical. 
	 This silence is rewarded when finally, “beyond every possible project, beyond 
every meaningful and intelligent power—[the lovers] engender the child.”  While the 201
lovers aim at their own enjoyment, at their shared erotic nudity, endeavoring to keep their 
actions an unspoken “secret,”  even from themselves, the child comes upon them. The 202
child, “a future never future enough, more remote than the possible”  appears, not as 203
the accomplishment of  the lovers, but as their salvation. It is not truly accomplished (a 
word he hesitantly uses at the end of  ‘Phenomenology’), but—as he begins the following 
 TI, 261.200
 TI, 266. As with the move from child to son, Levinas moves from speaking of  the lover and beloved 201
together here at the end of  “Phenomenology of  Eros” to speaking only of  fathers in the sections which 
follow it.
 TI, 267.202
 TI, 254-5. Note here that the directionality of  time is changed from how Levinas generally talks about 203
the Good: The good was the past always past, eros, and particularly the child it engenders, come to us from 
an always future.
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section (‘Fecundity’)—discovered.  The child arrives for the parents as it does for the 204
readers, as a surprise, as something beyond every intention. “No anticipation represents 
him nor . . . projects him.” Rather, “the child come[s] to pass from beyond the 
possible.”  Transcendence, in the form of  the child, comes upon the lovers.  205
	 Although it provides for the transcendence of  the self, the child of  Levinasian 
eros, as it does for Diotima, represents an immortality that is only vicarious. The future 
that is created “is the child, mine in a certain sense or, more exactly, me, but not myself; it 
does not fall back upon my past to fuse with it and delineate a fate . . . [an] alteration and 
identification in fecundity.” In the fecundity of  paternity, the self  seeks to engender itself  
again, only to discover that, beyond its every capacity, it has engendered something 
radically new. As Levinas concludes, “Fecundity continues history without producing old 
age . . . across the discontinuity of  generations, punctuated by the inexhaustible youths of  
the child.” The child is Other, even while remaining the same. To give birth returns us to 
the realm of  ethics and of  discourse; gives birth—just as the Platonic lover does—at the 
same time to the Child and to logoi (in this case no longer rehearsed speeches, but the 
open signification of  the face). Arriving once more at the top of  the Platonic ascent, 
Levinas notes that “fecundity engendering fecundity accomplishes goodness;” not only 
the “goodness correlative of  the face,” but beyond even this to “a more profound relation: 
the goodness of  goodness.”  However, for the father, the ambiguity of  desire and ethics 206
remains; Self  and Other exist in uneasy tension in the child. Levinas is quick to dismiss 
 TI, 267: “The profanation . . . does not ‘discover,’ beyond the face, another more profound I which this 204
face would express; it discovers the child.” This is also precisely why we can call eros an accidental ground 
of  ethics, but not an essential one.
 TI, 267.205
 All quotes TI, 269.206
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the possibility that the child represents a mere ‘avatar’ of  the self, but it is impossible, as 
he points out, for the Father to not see “himself  not only in the gestures of  his son, but in 
his substance and his unicity.” The son is not found like the ‘stranger, the widow, and the 
orphan’ already in the world at the limit of  the ego, but rather “his I qua filial commences 
. . . in election. He is unique for himself  because he is unique for his father.” The father 
initiates the son, wholly Other despite being the Father, not only biologically into life, but 
into the realm of  language and discourse. “The I engendered exists at the same time as 
unique in the world and as a brother among brothers.” Paternity engenders in the son the 
ethical command, “because it does not place [the son] among the other chosen ones, but 
rather in face of  them, to serve them.”  In other words, ethics results from eros, not for 207
the lovers themselves, as the son is still too much of  themselves to properly appear as the 
Other. It is only for the son that ethics arises. Ethics, just like the son, is born out of  eros 
as a new entity, same and other to eros.  
	 Without eros, the community of  elected sons would never exist, the brotherhood 
which necessarily underlies ethical relationships depends on fathers (and mothers) who 
give birth to their sons. And yet, for those involved in the erotic, the third (the child) does 
not bring them into an ethical relationship that would fan out from their singular erotic 
one. The lovers remain under their vow of  silence. They may, at any moment return to the 
ethical situation they have been in since their own birth and election, but they have gained 
no ethical insight from their eros. Nor does the son, as a radically new being, share any 
part of  his parent’s eros. He does not serve as a record of  eros, nor is his ethical being in 
any way tied to the eros of  his parents, rather it is tied to his ‘election.’ The child’s 
 All quotes TI, 279.207
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inauguration into Ethics, into the light of  the Good, is also his separation from what came 
before him—his separation from eros. 
§2: Marion’s Erotic Reduction 
	 Although the strongest apparent critique of  Levinas by Marion regards the 
relative exclusion of  love from ethics,  Marion himself  does not actually end up at a 208
position significantly different from his predecessor. His early critiques of  Levinas’ overly 
general account of  the face and its role in ethics (§2.1) is followed not by accounts of  eros’ 
more direct or public role in ethics (despite arguments for the univocity of  love), but 
instead Marion’s ‘erotic reduction’ eventually ends up similarly placing eros as an ‘erased 
phenomenon,’ something that disappears before it is made public (§2.2). Eros then 
remains useless for providing insights for a community ethics: it continues to withdraw 
from society, and to constitute an essentially private union between only the lovers 
themselves. Finally, Marion returns to a discussion of  the connection of  human and 
divine love, and therefore (following the analysis of  the previous chapter), establishes  a 
second form of  eros’ relation to the Good alongside Levinas’ account (§2.3).  
 A critique that Marion repeats against Descartes in particular (“of  all the supposed errors for which 208
Descartes has been taken to task, this one alone [i.e. omitting amans from the list of  capacities of  thinking 
substance]—doubtless his only error . . . ,” 7) and against philosophy in general (“philosophers have 
forsaken love,” 1) in his work Erotic Phenomenon.
!216
§2.1: The Critique of  Universality 
	 One of  Marion’s first critiques of  Levinas appears in the essay “The Intentionality 
of  Love,” which he dedicates “in honor of  Emmanuel Levinas.”  Here, Marion 209
critiques a Levinasian position in which “we love arbitrarily, or rather, we believe that this 
arbitrariness still deserves the name love.”  In other words, that every face presents itself  210
as a face, every face equally shows forth the light of  the Good, and our being struck by 
any particular face is a matter of  accidental circumstance, and not of  any fact regarding 
the other person or her relation to myself. As we saw in part II, this brings about the 
perpetual relativization of  our love seen by Sartre.  Nothing certifies my love as being 211
genuinely for this one here. Recalling Levinas’ (and even earlier, Pascal’s) hesitancy that love 
may in fact be one of  the worst forms of  immanence—what he terms “amorous 
autism” —Marion is determined to find a love that will escape this paradox, that will 212
not only truly love myself  in the other. In doing so, the other will have to exceed any 
intention or consciousness I have in regards to her “beauty, loyalty, intelligences, riches,” 
etc.  I cannot love the other for something I desire in her and “thus it becomes 213
definitively clear that the other, which my love claims to love, will always have to 
transcend my consciousness by overstepping it.”  Here, Marion is constructing his own 214
account of  the appearance of  the Other—of  the face—as that which opposes the Self-
same, who takes on an infinite character over and above my own consciousness, and who 
 Published in Jean-Luc Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham 209
University Press, 2002).
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cannot (without being killed or destroyed) by contained by my consciousness. Like 
Levinas, Marion sees the Other as primary, as constituting the Self  of  the I, investing or 
disclosing myself  to myself;  however, unlike Levinas, he notes (playing on a French 215
double meaning) that the Other both is and is not le premier venu. This phrase, in its positive 
usage, takes its literal meaning—to be le premier venu is to be the first to arrive— however, 
when it is employed in a negative phrase, it takes an idiomatic meaning—il n’est pas le 
premier venu describes someone who is not ‘just anybody.’  According to Marion, 216
therefore, the one who comes first is a specific person not just the anonymous Other put 
forward by Levinas. 
	 Thus we do not arrive, Marion claims, at duty, at “the injunction [that] enjoins to 
any other whatsoever, indeed to every possible other, simply inasmuch as it offers the face 
of  a man,”  nor, as Marion interprets Levinas as mistakenly holding, at an ethical 217
attitude which sees the Other as ‘any other,’ and not ‘this one here.’ To say this is to 
anonymize the other, to substitute—in place of  persons—universals and abstractions. 
This would also rule out the possibility that it is love (remember that, here, Marion is 
thinking love as univocally both eros and charity), since we never love people in general, 
nor humanity in the abstract, but individual humans.  
	 Levinas’ Other, Marion sustains, is simply a partial incarnation of  Humanity, 
specific enough to take root in a living person, but never so specific that we can attribute 
anything of  its obligations on me as merely particular to this one here. That the Other in 
front of  me has the rights to ‘the bread from my very mouth’ immediately commands me 
 Prolegomena, 83-85.215
 Marion’s translator points out this double meaning, and its polemical usage against Levinas in 216
Prolegomena, 83n10.
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that all Others have a right to my bread. The immediate hunger of  the one in front of  
me, in short, may make me aware of  my obligation, but the obligation is in no way tied to 
the particulars of  this other here and now. This leads the Levinasian to two difficulties, 
the second and more formidable being “can the other, designated to me by a face, 
individualize himself  to the point of  becoming unsubstitutable for every other other?”  218
	 Here we see re-appear, within a whole new vocabulary, the question that has been 
plaguing love ever since Plato’s Symposium (and which, in that context, continues to plague 
scholars of  Plato): can I love an individual, or do I only love him under the guise of  some 
universal concept? Do I love the person, or do I ‘love’ the Good, Beauty, Alterity, etc.? 
And, if  the latter, by what right can we even call this experience love? According to many, 
it seems that love must be directed at individuals rather than abstractions or generalities; 
but many also doubt that this can ever truly happen (thus the complaints against love 
lodged in Part II). The question takes on a new problem here (and one which will have to 
be returned to in the final part), since, even if  we arrive at the possibility that love of  an 
individual is possible in the first place, have we not now so individuated it that it will 
become impossible to see it transformed into the basis for ethics? Isn’t the move from love 
to ethics just one that admits that what I loved in the individual can somehow be 
expanded and universalized to a sense of  justice or duty to all other Others? After all, 
“ethical responsibility cannot, and even must not make distinctions between faces.”  To 219
base my ethics off  of  a love particularized to a single individual is to go against this, it is to 
 Prolegomena, 94. The first difficulty for Marion is how the disfigured face can appear as a face; what 218
distinguishes a face appearing as disfigured from a face not appearing? But this seems to be answered 
precisely by Marion’s critique of  Levinas: the face is something universal. Anything (as I also addressed in 
chapter 5) can appear as a face, and in fact, the disfigured face appears perhaps more than any other, since 
it shows my obligation most strongly to substitute myself  for him.
 Prolegomena, 94-5.219
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pick and choose those faces that seem similar to my beloved’s in some way. Love (so it 
seems on this account) can never lead us to ethics as formulated by Levinas. Instead, love 
itself  provides us with all the necessary tools to encounter the Other. Indeed, it does it, 
according to Marion, in a more perfect way than in Levinas’ ethical description.  220
	 Who then, is the other we meet in love?  For Marion, “if  we want to secure 221
responsibility all the way to the point of  love,” the other must be “unsubstitutable and 
strictly irreplaceable.”  However, this also means that he or she would be radically 222
individual, containing nothing of  universals (Marion here is subjecting Levinas’ concept 
of  the face of  the Other to the same critique Levinas levies against Forms and being), and 
as such are also unknowable. The other is a named individual, a grammatical subject who 
cannot be subsumed to any predicate in a proposition ‘X is Y,’ since any such proposition 
would subsume him or her in a universal. Marion pulls the name for this radical 
individuation from Duns Scotus: haecceitas.  223
	 Marion thus finishes his critique of  Levinas by locating the call that exposes us in 
love (as charity) rather than ethics. We stand together, the other and myself, not as two 
random passers-by in the street, but two beings uniquely related in an unrepeatable 
moment of  interaction. However, in the process, Marion has also put forth his own 
 For a further exploration of  the differences between ethics and caritas, and an argument that the 220
difference is not as severe as Marion (and I) makes it to be, see Christina Gschwandtner, “Ethics, Eros, or 
Caritas? Levinas and Marion on Individuation of  the Other,” Philosophy Today 49, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 
70—87.
 The answer here differs greatly from what eventually becomes the case in Marion’s Erotic Phenomenon. 221
The answer to this question given in that work will be addressed in §2.3
 Prolegomena, 95.222
 Marion does not reference Scotus (or any who used the word after him) directly, but his usage certainly 223
fits with the Scotian definition, as a radical this-ness principle responsible for the individuation of  members 
in a species, not a negation, but not a form either. For Scotus, although in principle knowable, it was 
unknowable in this life, as it was undiscoverable through any sense impression, which always led to universal 
thoughts.
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account of  love: it no longer loves—as Plato, but also Sartre, Levinas, and much of  the 
tradition would argue—because the beloved is good or because he or she is beautiful, but 
it aims at the individuality of  the individual. Thus again (from the Platonic argument), we 
see why love does not lead to ethics: love of  the individual does not bring me to anything 
beyond the individual to show me something like the Good or True Virtue. Love always 
remains at this particularized level. 
§2.2: The Erased Phenomenon 
	 But, even as particularized, Marion speaks of  charity not eros. Why is this love not 
simply universalizable? Why is the argument not only a rather minor one about whether 
charity or ethics is the best name for the same relationship? After all, Levinas’ critique was 
particular to eros, it said nothing in regards to charity. The answer to this comes in 
Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon. There, Marion announces that the Erotic Phenomenon is the 
book that had  
obsessed [him] since the publication of  The Idol and Distance in 1977. All the books 
published since then bear the mark, explicit or hidden, of  this concern. In 
particular, Prolegomena to Charity was published in 1986 only to give witness to the 
fact that I had not given up on the project, despite the delay in completing it. All 
of  my books, above all the last three, have been just so many steps toward the 
question of  the erotic phenomenon.  224
In short then, despite the prior work being a prolegomena to charity, the whole trajectory 
of  Marion’s work had been one extended prolegomena to eros. 
 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon (University of  Chicago Press, 2008), 10.224
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	 Nor do these truly represent two separate projects, as Marion reaffirms in EP his 
radical claim for the univocity of  love, unified particularly under eros.  As he says, “a 225
serious concept of  love distinguishes itself  by its unity, or rather its power to keep together 
significations that nonerotic thought cuts apart.”  Thus, the heart of  all love, including 226
the charity discussed in the previous subsection, is always eros. Thus, the encounter with 
the other is always structured as an erotic encounter, even if  in its more general 
appearance, we might call it one of  charity, friendship, fraternity, etc. Marion doubles 
down on this claim in In the Self ’s Place, where he says that (in direct opposition to Nygren’s 
Eros and Agape) “the univocity of  love thus permits converting cupiditas (which wants to 
enjoy without ever succeeding in it) into caritas (which alone permits enjoyment because it 
alone enjoys God, the sole enjoyable),”  and again that “we can conclude that love for the 227
other . . . authorizes the passage, which univocity maintained, from caritas to dilectio and 
back. Nothing but the erotic reduction itself  is at issue.”  Love is univocal in its 228
convertibility, with eros (or cupiditas) being its primary name.  229
	 Yet, these quotes also show that sexual love is not the only expression of  eros. 
While Marion at times has the same sort of  sexual, desirous love in mind for eros as 
Levinas, univocity also opens eros up to possibilities that Levinas did not see. But when 
 Marion is hesitant to define love, however, its univocity under the name eros is clear from two statements 225
in the introduction. The first, is his apparently paralleling of  “amour et charité (eros et agape)” and second 
a more clearly, his conclusion that “love falls under an erotic rationality” (EP, 5, emphasis original). For more 
on the univocity of  love, a position I share with Marion, see the general discussion regarding various love 
terms in the introduction. For further discussions of  Marion’s claims for univocity, see, Kyle Hubbard, “The 
Unity of  Eros and Agape: On Jean-Luc Marion’s Erotic Phenomenon,” and Natalie Depraz, “Théo-
phénoménologie I: L’amour—Jean-Luc Marion et Christos Yannaras.”
 EP, 5.226
 In the Self ’s Place, 277, emphasis original. Cupiditas here is love defined as desire, and therefore akin to the 227
Greek eros. In contrast, Caritas (and also dilectio, which Marion also discusses) both translate the Greek agape 
(a claim Augustine makes himself, cf. 275).
 In the Self ’s Place, 280.228
 Although not necessarily its highest expression.229
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instead we take eros in its form as caritas, when the erotic reduction structures our 
relationship to the Other, not in sexuality, but in kenotic self-giving, charity becomes a 
kind of  parallel to Levinas’ ethical project. It is now in the erotic reduction, rather than 
the ethical face-to-face that the self  is granted to me. What I am in search of  (or better, in 
need of, since there is in fact no I before the question is answered) is the single instance of  
the one who loves me. On the answering of  this question, the world is given to me, not as 
the mathematical, flat world of  certainty, but a space, time and ipseity structured by the 
love I am waiting for, and eventually, the love that I am given.  The love of  a single 230
other opens up the very possibility of  relating to other others. 
	 However, it is as if  the sexual aspect of  eros is lost in this opening up of  caritas. 
The sexual encounter of  eros, the event of  the erotic reduction, is not the primordial 
origin of  the past always past, but neither is it an origin that continues into its future. 
Rather, Marion introduces a new concept to phenomenology, labeling it the ‘erased 
phenomenon.’  It seems that sexual eros, if  it is to transform into caritas, must also 231
disappear in the process. Eroticization, the orgasm itself  (“the only miracle that the 
poorest human condition can definitely experience” ), is like an apotheosis of  the self. I 232
move from the physical body of  an object, to the flesh of  a person, and further to pure 
eroticization. In the aftermath, we forget what we have experienced and are thrust back 
into the real world. I become aware that I am a body here and now, no longer even flesh. 
La petite mort leaves us as just two corpses, objects to be touched, but no longer fleshes to 
 ‘Space,’ ‘Time,’ and ‘Ipseity’ correspond to the titles of  the final three sections of  the first ‘meditation’ of  230
EP.
 EP, 138. To the best of  my knowledge, this concept is invented by Marion, and first appears in The Erotic 231
Phenomenon, so far its only appearance in his work. In the French, it is a play on the saturated phenomenon 
(raturé versus saturé).
 EP, 138.232
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feel and be felt, even less so eroticized fleshes to kiss.  Orgasm represents as much a 233
consuming as it does a consummating, and as Marion notes, “orgasm is not a summit, 
from which one would descend in stages; it resembles a cliff  that opens onto a void, where 
one falls all at once. All at once, then, nothing remains.”  And here lies the problem for 234
sexual eros in Marion: it disappears as soon as it is completed. We are not left with the 
indelible mark of  the erotic experience, but as one who has lost and forgotten from where 
he came. 
	 In forgetting what happened, we also find ourselves unable to speak of  it. Our 
language in the world is completely foreign to the experience of  eroticization, and 
therefore of  it, “one can say nothing, even to oneself, even from lover to lover. The words 
are lacking.”  The various vocabularies of  “erotic speech” that Marion delineates are all 235
grounded in a kind of  meaninglessness. Eros speaks without saying anything.  The first 236
way it does so (the same as Levinas’ raillery or cooing) is through “puerile words . . . those 
words said by those who do not yet know how to speak correctly.”  Eros speaks in a 237
direct way, “freed from” the need to theorize or conceptualize any of  the lovers’ 
experiences. The childish babbling of  lovers is pure immediacy and as such 
meaningless.  When we enter back into the seriousness of  the world, however, we set 238
 This progression is the best way to understand the movement of  the erotic reduction: from being 233
touched, to being felt, to being baisé (politely, to be kissed, but almost universally used in France now to 
mean [and the double meaning is clearly intended by Marion] to be fucked.) A similar progression could be 
read into Levinas, although his eros culminates in a much less vulgar ‘la caresse’-the caress.
 EP, 135.234
 EP, 144.235
 In “What Cannot Be Said: Apophasis and the Discourse of  Love,” the sixth chapter of  The Visible and the 236
Revealed, Marion parses this by arguing that “I love you” is a perlocutionary act, not a locutionary one. That 
is, love puts a demand on the other to respond, rather than saying anything in a predicative way. Jean-Luc 
Marion, The Visible and the Revealed (Fordham Univ Press, 2009), 101-118.
 EP, 149. In Marion’s presentation, this is in fact the second lexicon he gives, but the order of  them is in 237
no way essential.
 EP, 149.238
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aside childish things, no longer finding it appropriate for the ‘serious man’ to speak in 
such a direct way of  everything that impresses upon him. But in doing so, we also lose our 
first way of  speaking about eros. 
	 The second ‘lexicon’ of  erotic speech is no more successful in making the 
transition erotic experience to meaningful speech: “the language that is called obscene, 
the language that reduces each one to his or her sexual organs.”  Here, vulgar language 239
serves a direct purpose to eroticize flesh, in naming these organs, and identifying the other 
with her very sexuality, I eroticize the other, I denude her by speaking of  her in the 
language of  the naked body. The dirty talk of  the bedroom does not so much name or 
describe parts of  a body, but calls for them to be performative: I speak in order to provoke 
action.  But again, in re-entering the world, this vocabulary is forced to disappear. The 240
sexualization of  the body that occurs in this kind of  speech, when it comes too soon or 
too late, does nor arouse us but disgusts us. Bedroom language, outside the bedroom, 
comes as an assault on our very self; the same words which once invested me with my 
eroticized flesh now reduce me to an object. Once again the erotic language fails to 
describe, in public, what came before in private. 
	 The final lexicon, Marion admits, comes “in apparent contradiction with the first 
two;”  eros speaks with the language of  mystical theology.  Eros expresses itself  as in 241 242
search of  union of  lovers, but this is nothing else (for Marion, at least) than the same 
speech that speaks of  the “spiritual union of  man with God.” Eros, which in this register 
 EP, 148.239
 In other essays, Marion speaks of  this explicitly as the perlocutionary speech act.240
 EP, 149.241
 There is an interesting inversion here. Many choose to interpret mysticism as making use of  erotic 242
language, if  not reducing it to eroticism altogether. Marion on the other hand, comes close to reducing 
eroticism to nothing but theological mysticism.
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speaks of  a never ending future, of  a revelation of  a yet to come. Indeed, Marion 
describes the progression of  language in here as asking “Again,” which is in reality only 
an announcement “here I am,” which in turn is the command to the other “come!”, also 
announcing, at the same time “I am coming.”  This is nothing less, Marion says, than 243
the very last word of  the Book of  Revelation (Rev. 22:20 “He who testifies to these things 
says, “Yes, I am coming soon.” Amen. Come, Lord Jesus.”). This last lexicon is in many 
ways the most perfect way to express the erotic, as it speaks always of  a future yet to 
come, about to come. It puts the present in suspension, always aiming at a beyond, an 
enjoyment without end—as Marion says, “according to the erotic future, one question 
appears meaningless—the one that asks: “When will this be enough?”; for the correct 
measure in love must pass beyond ever measure: unless there is too much, it is still not 
enough. In the erotic future, “Here I am!” says, “Come!”  Thus we arrive back by an 244
eros structured by jouissance (the last quote comes from a section entitled “To 
Enjoy”/“Jouir”) an eros that seeks enjoyment in enjoying, an activity without fulfillment or 
telos. This aiming beyond every finitude explains why mystical language comes in as the 
third vocabulary of  love.  
	 In all three languages however, we see the common thread of  language that is 
performative, not indicative, and as a result remains radically individual. I speak my love 
to the beloved directly in terms that signify nothing to the outside world. As a result, we 
find that the language of  eros needs to be excluded from discourse ethics. The speech of  
lovers will never give way to the call of  the Other as it is seen by Levinas, nor even to the 
 The French verb venir can be used in many of  the same sexual contexts as the English ‘to come.’243
 EP, 130.244
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more particularized form of  caritas in Marion. It speak only of  the immediacy of  love, it 
performs love itself  without signifying anything. 
 	 In this final point, Marion comes to the same conclusion that Jean-Luc Nancy will 
by reinterpreting Lacan’s slogan that “there is no sexual relation/il n’y a pas un rapport 
sexuel” by taking up the secondary sense of  the French word rapport; not a relation, but a 
relating or a report: “the oldest senses of  the word [rapport] have to do with ‘revenue,’ or 
‘giving an account’ or ‘narrative.’”  The issue is thus no longer (as it was for Sartre and 245
Lacan) that it is impossible for lovers to overcome their differences and come together, but 
instead, having come together, the lovers find it impossible to speak (to others, to each 
other, or even to themselves) of  what has taken place. Intimacy, Lacan says, again mixing 
the erotic and the mystical, “is the superlative of  interiority (interior intimo meo: perhaps the 
whole history of  sex in the West has to do with this Augustinian god who is so intimate 
with the subject).”  But how are we to share something so intimate? How can we 246
possible make the most interior of  experiences external in a report, the language of  sex 
“is itself  in fact nothing but a saying, although a saying whose sense is jouissance, not 
signification.”  247
	 Thus we see in Nancy clearly what is implicit in Marion: eros is made possible by its 
being made silent. Sexual relation becomes possible because sexual reporting is 
impossible. We salvage the possibility of  eros at the expense of  its speakability. What 
happens in eros, if  anything happens at all, is transgressive of  social norms, and thus, to 
 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality (Fordham University Press, 2013), 4.245
 Corpus II, 12.246
 Corpus II, 12.247
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allow it to happen, we must have it in secret.  The world of  ethics or of  charity cannot 248
handle the erotic, which as Marion points out, takes place precisely by transgressing the 
command of  the face: “in hearing ‘thou shalt not kill,’ I can and must, by virtue of  being 
a lover, hear ‘Do not touch me.’”  While at first, this command holds for the lover (who, 249
according to Marion, must wait, must be loved before he can love) it is inevitably crossed, 
the lovers touch, they each advance to the place of  the other, receiving their flesh, their 
selves, from the very ‘place’ of  the other.  The command of  the lover “do not touch 250
me,” is not the unbreakable law of  Levinas’ ethics, but the transgressable (and necessarily 
transgressed) taboo of  Lacan: it locates jouissance, and makes it possible, so long as it hides 
what it has done. The moment that the lover tries to provide an account of  what has 
happened, he reduces the beloved to an object, and fails to address her in her haecceitas.  
	 As a result, for Marion as for Levinas, eros succeeds only by keeping its silence; 
eros stays between the lovers themselves. As Marion notes: 
The lovers pass to the child in order to radicalize the apparition of  their own 
shared erotic phenomenon—not first in order to show it publicly and socially to 
others remaining outside of  the erotic reduction, but in order to show it to 
themselves and thus render themselves visible to themselves.  251
The lovers are not able to assure themselves of  their eros in front of  a third party, nor to 
use any insights gained through their erotic encounter to relate to any other Others. 
Despite recovering the value of  eros for itself, Levinas and Marion, have not fully 
returned the role that Plato ascribes to it as a method of  ethical awakening or 
 “Erotic speech thus provokes a transgressive language—because it transgress objectivity, transports us out 248
of  the world and also, by simple consequence, transgresses the social conditions (the decency of  
conversation) and the public finalities (the evidence of  knowing) of  worldly language.” EP, 148.
 EP, 101.249
 Cf. EP, 129.250
 EP, 197, emphasis original.251
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education.  Instead, eros and ethics (which I continue to define, following Levinas, in the 252
context of  the signifying encounter with the face of  the Other in language) remain walled 
off  from each other. 
§2.3: Loving Through the Good 
There is however, one other that Marion allows to break into the erotic experience, in 
fact, which must break into the erotic experience in order to render it possible:   
The lovers accomplish their oath in the adieu—in the passage unto God [à Dieu], 
whom they summon as their final witness, their first witness, the one who never 
leaves and never lies. For the first time, they say “adieu” to one another: next year 
in Jerusalem—next time in God. Thinking unto God [penser à Dieu] can be done, 
erotically, in this “adieu.”  253
Now thinking of  eros eschatologically, the question “does anybody love me?” has only one 
original answer, one first case of  being loved which enables me to love as if  eternally: 
God. In moving from that first question to the second, “can I love first?”  we discovered 254
that the best we could do is to love as if  I could love first, to love as if  I could love at all. 
And then, in the end, we discover that only God can definitively be the referent of  the 
“final swing of  the center of  gravity [that] can be expressed thus: ‘You loved me first.’  255
‘For God so loved the world’ that it was made possible for the world to love. 
	 In fact, it is not only love’s possibility, but the very question of  love’s possibility that 
requires this divine love. I could not have even entered into this erotic reduction “could 
 This is not to say that every ethical encounter must be an erotic one, but rather only that any single erotic 252
encounter can provide the lovers an ethical formation. The lovers, when their shared eros is allowed to 
speak publicly, can directly enable both to turn toward a wider public in an ethical way. The explanation of  
this transition will be the subject of  the final part of  this dissertation.
 EP, 212. The bracketed texts appear in the cited translation.253
 This question is first asked on page 71, and repeated throughout the text.254
 EP, 215.255
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[never] have asked myself  ‘does anyone out there love me?’ if  another did not love me 
first.”  Thus, not only the answer, but the question itself, is only raised on account of  256
God first loving. Thus the first instance of  love, the most true instance (just as was the case 
for the Other in general, in chapter 5) is God. It is also this fact which secures Marion’s 
arguments for the univocity of  love: all love is made possible by this first love. While 
Marion’s arguments in favor of  the univocity of  eros and philia are somewhat more 
hesitant,  he concludes with a strong push for the univocity of  eros and agape, between 257
my love for any other other, and God’s love. For if  “God names himself  with the very 
name of  love,” it is a necessary conclusion that “God loves like we love, with the same 
love as us, according to the unique erotic reduction.” There can therefore be no question 
that God is the first and the best lover, for  
when God loves (and indeed he never ceases to love), he simply loves infinitely 
better than do we. He loves to perfection, without fault, without an error, from 
beginning to end. He loves first and last. He loves like no one else. In the end, I 
not only discover that another was loving before me, but above all I discover that 
this first lover, from the beginning is named God . . .  
God precedes and transcends us, but first of  all in the fact that he loves us 
infinitely better than we love, and than we love him. God surpasses us as the best 
lover.  258
We are able to love other people because God himself, The Good beyond being, who is 
Love beyond being loves us first and most of  all. All of  our loves are just so many attempts 
at returning this first love. Our loves for humans multiply and redirect the love that we 
have received from God.  
 EP, 215.256
 EP, 219-220.257
 EP, 222, the closing words of  the book.258
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§3: Conclusions 
	 We have now seen, through two very different (yet linked) approaches which have 
sought to recover eros as a serious philosophical concept, but where are we left as regards 
the possibility of  erotic ethics, or ethical eros? In both cases, we have seen that eros’ 
return came from a prior resurrection of  the Good beyond Being, not as a purely Platonic 
Idea, but in a renewed register of  phenomenological description.  With the recovery of  259
the Good seen in Part III, the objections of  Part II that all other-relations boiled down to 
relations of  use, that the other is good only as good-for, can be overcome. Our 
relationship with the Other, whether Levinas’ ethics or Marion’s charity, is made possible 
as a result of  the Other’s connection to the Good, whether this is the Other as the trace 
of  the Good, or the making possible of  love by first being loved by God.  
	 Both Levinas and Marion were then led, for their own reasons, to give an account 
of  eros within this new framework. Notably absent however, is any attempt to resurrect 
the Beautiful to once again join the Good. In its place, eros continues to be structured by 
the same jouissance introduced to eros by Sartre and Lacan: eros is no longer a pull 
between Good and Beauty, but between the Good and enjoyment. In this tension, both 
Levinas and Marion essentialize an ambiguity that Plato saw as an either/or choice: the 
tension between love of  an individual or love of  the transcendent universal is no longer 
an either/or option but a necessary aspect of  love: love is always torn between a 
 The vast differences between the two formulations of  the Good, Levinas’ as spread throughout the world 259
in every face of  the Other vs. Marion’s locating it in the transcendent God-Other, or its location as the 
immemorial past or the eschatological future, although interesting in the terms of  their own connections to 
Platonism, will (as I will hope to show) be less important than their shared recovery when it comes to 
reviving an ethical eros. Either can ultimately serve the same goal. My own inclinations are more toward 
the eschatological and transcendent reading.
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contemplation of  the Good (Levinas’ vision-as-discourse of  the Good or Marion’s prayer 
and praise of  God) and the enjoyment of  sexual pleasure. This ambiguity in turn made it 
necessary to silence eros, to relegate to speech which signifies nothing beyond itself  and to 
nobody beyond the lovers themselves. To attempt to speak publicly of  my eros is to cover 
over the ambiguity of  the relationship and, as a result, to fail to reach the Other through 
the erotic approach, instead to reducing him or her to my intentions, to an object to be 
had. 
	 What then, can we make today of  Plato’s eros which found its very structure in 
giving birth to speeches, speeches not just about the ‘sweet nothings’ of  my love, but of  
True Beauty and Virtue itself ? What can we make of  a love which does not merely give 
birth to ethics (through the birth of  the child) and then abandons it to its own devices, but 
which structures ethics through and through? 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INTERLUDE 3: THE PHAEDRUS TEST 
	 As we move into the final part, I will put forward once again the claim that ended 
both Part II as well as chapter 5: an eros that does not correspond to Beauty will never 
succeed as ethical. It is precisely this new ambiguity which shifted many of  the attributes 
of  and attitudes toward Beauty to the Good that draws this new, sharp division between 
public ethics and private eros. Primarily, the Good is now completely independent from 
desire, no longer good-for, and as a result, our response to it is not pursuit, but a quasi-
admiration. Beauty is not redeemed, but condemned anew as the pinnacle of  the old, 
metaphysical thinking. Whereas thinking the Other in the Good beyond being enabled 
me to encounter him in his alterity, thinking him as Beautiful just redoubled his place in 
the totality of  forms, as one part of  a totality. To see the face as beautiful was to fail to see 
the face at all. 
	 Unable to contemplate, that is, to recognize the beloved as a beloved in a way that 
does not fall into ethics and the Good on the one side or enjoyment and use on the other, 
there is no longer room for eros to make its own public contribution. Therefore, just as 
eros’ return required the return of  the Good beyond Being, its reintroduction to ethics 
will require a similar return of  transcendent Beauty—parallel to the Good—to allow for 
lovers to speak meaningfully of  the eros they share, and thus make their own, erotic 
contribution to the ethical.  1
 Throughout this section, I continue to take ‘ethics’ to refer to a Levinasian conception of  ethics-as-1
discourse, the signification of  the face that gives me the originary command of  ethics, ‘do not kill.’
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	 It is my contention that an eros founded on the redefinition of  beauty that I put 
forward better passes the ‘Phaedrus test’ than the views of  eros seen in Parts II and III. 
That is, to recall the words of  Socrates:  
Suppose a noble and gentle man, who was (or had once been) in love with a boy 
of  similar character, were to hear us say that lovers start serious quarrels for trivial 
reasons and that, jealous of  their beloved, they do him harm—don’t you think 
that man would think we had been brought up among the most vulgar of  sailors, 
totally ignorant of  love among the freeborn? Wouldn’t he most certainly refuse to 
acknowledge the flaws we attributed to Love (243c-d)? 
The task then is this: to provide an account of  eros that would be accepted by those who 
are or ever have been in love. 
	 Nevertheless we cannot simply ignore these critiques of  eros as if  they had not 
happened, so let us recount where we have been. Eros and ethics for Plato were closely 
intertwined, a result—I argued—of  Plato’s identification of  the Good Beyond Being of  
the Republic and the Something Wonderfully Beautiful in Its Nature of  the Symposium. 
However, by the 20th century, it began to become clear that both Platonic eros and ethics, 
whatever their value, had fatal flaws. Namely, the beloved became substitutable, and was 
reduced to his role as a stand-in for these first principles, and as a result, ethics became 
problematically egoistic. Thus, what follows is I believe properly called ‘Platonic’ in the 
broad sense, but it cannot simply be an argument for Platonic eros reinstated. We must 
meet the criticisms of  the last two parts, and offer an eros that does not erase the Other.  
	 I have so far shown that, in the work of  Levinas and Marion, the truth of  the 
second thesis of  this dissertation has already been partially shown, we can now provide an 
account of  alterity that describes the encounter of  the Other as taking place on its own 
terms, rather than being mediated by some principle or concept. To fully prove this thesis, 
however, will require that we first re-establish the first. Recall once more all three theses:  
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1. Recognition of  the Other is based on recognizing his or her beauty and goodness 
2. Love of  the Other is love of  the Other as individual, not in light of  some attribute 
3. Love of  the Other forms the basis of  our entering into the ethical attitude. 
Once the link between goodness and beauty is shown, it will be possible to describe the 
precise nature of  the erotic relationship, as well as how eros allows us to reach the Other 
as a unique individual. Having shown these, it will be possible to once again describe how 
our erotic encounters with beauty can enable us to encounter all Others, whether they 
appear as beautiful or not, whether I relate to them erotically or not, to appear as Other, 
as connected to the Good, and to hear, in the encounter, the call of  ethics.  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PART IV: ETHICAL EROS 
Oh, would that you would kiss me  
With the kisses of  your mouth  
‘Cause your mouth is sweeter than wine, and has  
A more complicated history than the American South  2
CHAPTER 7: RECOVERING THE BEAUTIFUL 
	 If  I am right, and beauty is the source and target of  erotic speech, it is no surprise 
that phenomenology has largely imagined eros to be mute, as the development (or better, 
recovery) of  a phenomenology of  the beautiful has lagged far behind that of  the good. 
Whereas Platonic ideals of  the Good have (as seen in the previous chapters) re-entered 
into the vocabulary of  phenomenology, beauty seems to remain a taboo. Even with an 
increasing amount of  work on phenomenology of  art,  these rarely seem to take on a full 3
account of  beauty itself  as a topic-either eschewing it altogether  or leaving it to the 4
reader to impart his own understanding of  the term (either naively or imported from 
 John Darnielle, “New Chevrolet in Flames,” paraphrasing Song of  Songs 1:2. 2
 Michel Henry, most notably, but also Jean-Luc Marion, John Sallis, and many others.3
 Marion’s Crossing the Visible, his first book exclusively on art, contains almost no direct mention of  ‘beauty’ 4
or the ‘beautiful.’ Of  the few that are there, one is in quotation from Malevitch, calling for the construction 
of  a mental space of  viewing art not structured by beauty, while another proclaims that “beauty is a screen” 
preventing the visible from being successfully crossed; preventing the painting from becoming an icon.
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early, Kantian, Hegelian or Heideggerian aesthetic analyses).  However, even if  these 5
works did more explicitly offer their theories of  beauty (drawn as they are from those 
earlier sources), it would seem to only return us to the problems of  chapter five: Beauty is 
what is appropriate to the object, the painting, not to the Other.   6
	 However in the critique, explicit or implicit, of  a Platonic or metaphysical account 
of  beauty, these authors fail to recognize that Plato understood well that the beauty of  
objects was not appropriate to the person. The ascent passage of  the Symposium moves 
from one beauty to the next, it does not merely see the same beauty in different places. The 
through-line that the ‘Something Wonderfully Beautiful in its nature’ offers is a 
connection between one beauty to the next, not a flattening of  all beauty to aesthetically 
pleasing appearances. However, there is a through-line. This is what draws us up from 
one to the next, what enables us, by experiencing the beauty of  the physical world, to be 
conditioned and trained to see the beauty of  souls and of  virtue. This will be the line that 
I will attempt to walk, in offering an account of  beauty that accounts for eros’ ability to 
speak, and its ability to contribute to ethics: It must, retain its connections to the beauty 
of  form and appearance,  but must not reduce it to that. 7
 Sallis’ Transfigurements, which makes frequent references to beauty, seems to adapt this approach, at least in 5
large part. Even here, however, Dennis Schmitt asks critically why Sallis chooses to focus on ‘shining’ rather 
than beauty, and also why, given the Kantian origins of  Sallis’ works, any connection to the ethical seems to 
be absent. “In Kant’s Wake: On Transfigurements” in David Jones, Jason M. Wirth, and Michael Schwartz, 
eds., On the True Sense of  Art: A Critical Companion to the Transfigurements of  John Sallis (Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2016). In his own response, Sallis answers only that beauty is related to ἦθος 
when we take it not as ethics, but in the Homeric sense of  our ‘abode.’ Art shows us elemental nature, not 
the moral principle of  human action, “On Shining Forth: Response to Günter Figal and Dennis Schmidt,” 
Research in Phenomenology 40, no. 1 (2010), 117-119.
 As Heidegger says in “Origin of  the Work of  Art,” “beauty is one way that truth occurs as 6
unconcealedness,” but this is the truth of  metaphysics, of  Being. If  Beauty’s function is to show us the 
captial-T Truth, it is no surprise that it does not show us the Other. Poetry, Language, Thought, 56.
 While it is not a focus of  this work, a necessary corollary of  it will be (it should be obvious) that all 7
experience of  beauty conditions us for and leads us toward ethics, because all experience of  beauty is erotic, 
even if  the inter-personal erotic experience provides the most direct leap toward it.
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	 Here, following primarily on work that Jean-Louis Chrétien has done regarding 
the Platonic tradition, but drawing also from other smaller sources, that beauty is a call 
that asks for a response, and as a result both is and provokes speech.  In the first half  (§1), 8
I will treat the call of  Beauty itself: how beauty speaks, what it speaks of, and whom it 
speaks to. In doing so, I will attempt to differentiate how ‘objective’ beauty speaks from 
the beauty of  the Other, arguing that the Other’s beauty is not their formliness but 
(modifying Marion’s analysis) their haecceital nature. In the second half  (§2), I will begin 
to look at the reverse: at the response to the call of  beauty. This will be a direct 
overturning of  the previous parts, offering a way for eros to speak to—and of—beauty, in 
the voice of  beauty and not (yet) the good. This response enables eros to break free of  the 
dichotomy placed upon in in part III, no longer merely in tension between the 
transcendence of  the Good and the unethical immanence of  desire. In this chapter, I 
treat the response first and foremost as contemplation. 
	 From there, I will transition into the 8th and final chapter, giving the argument, at 
long last that this speech of  beauty is not merely another way of  interacting with the Other, 
but that it is (at least generally speaking) our first way of  interacting: It is only through 
hearing and responding to beauty that we are led to hear (as if  from behind or beyond it) 
the speech of  the Good. Far from placing a screen in front of  the Good, Beauty is the 
spyglass showing us—from across an unbridgeable distance—the Other, the Good, Ethics.  
 In his own work, Chrétien also wishes to ‘give voice’ to silence, suggesting that listening and falling silent 8
too, can be the appropriate responses to the call. In fact silence is necessary for speech to be meaningful at 
all (cf  Christina M. Gschwandtner, “Jean-Louis Chrétien: A God of  Speech and Beauty,” in Postmodern 
Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy, 145-146). While it is beyond the scope to discuss fully 
here, the important distinction between Chrétien’s silence, and the ‘silence’ that Levinas has imposed on 
eros is that for Chrétien silence conditions and makes possible speech, whereas for Levinas, the ‘silence’ of  
eros is its exclusion from discourse. The non-signifyingness of  erotic speech in no way prepares the 
signification of  the voice of  the Other in Levinas’ work.
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§1: The Call of  Beauty 
	 To be beautiful is, at the most basic level, to be appealing, that is, it appeals to 
another, calls upon him or her and makes a demand. Thus across a millennium, and 
across unconnected terms, English has settled on a metaphor that existed already for the 
ancient Greeks, for whom kalon, Plato informs us, is to kaloun, i.e. that which calls (kaleo).  9
Chrétien, in his survey of  the Platonist reception of  kalon, finds references to beauty’s 
‘calling lovers to itself ’ in Proclus, Hermeias of  Alexandria, and Marsilio Ficino, among 
others.  To appeal carries (although in a slightly different sense than kaleo) the sense of  10
both a speaking and a demand to be spoken to. To appeal is to ask for a response or 
judgement. The speech of  beauty is thus always a demand for conversation, an interplay 
between beauty and the viewer (whether this conversation is verbal, bodily, or 
otherwise).  But how does beauty call? What does it say? Unsurprisingly, beauty speaks in 11
many ways, through many voices, since, in the same way, beauty demands many different 
kinds of  responses. The beauty of  a flower is not the beauty of  a gesture of  kindness. We 
should not expect them to speak in the same way. For the sake of  simplicity, I will address 
the two clearest, and most clearly opposed, kinds of  beauty here: ‘objective’ beauty—the 
visible beauty of  an object, either artistic or natural and ‘personal’ beauty, the beauty of  
 Cratylus, 416c. The sense of  ‘appeal’ in the sense of  ‘to be attractive’ is a late 19th/early 20th century 9
development. No romance language seems to share this feature, although several Germanic languages do 
(ansprechen in German is both to address and to appeal to). Plato’s etymology is plausible, although has no 
real etymological basis.
 Jean-Louis Chrétien, The Call and the Response (Fordham Univ Press, 2004), 10-17.10
 In this way, my position is in fact not far from Marion’s position regarding love. Beauty speaks in a 11
perlocutionary way, imposing a demand on me (cf  The Visible and the Revealed, 101-118). However, Marion 
argues that ‘I love you’ perlocutes without locuting: “‘I love you,’ then, neither produces a proposition with 
a reference (a signification), nor does it predicate a meaning, nor does it even mobilize identifiable 
interlocutors. It thus does not constitute a locutionary act,” 107. I argue on the other hand that in the case 
of  both beauty and love, locution and perlocution go together.
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the Other (§1.1). From there, we will look at beauty’s particular voice (§1.2), and how eros 
calls differently than the Good, or the face, as well as how it can lead to the seeing the 
Good (§1.3). 
§1.1: “Plastic” and Personal Beauty 
	 The beauty of  the object, what Ortega y Gasset calls “objective plastic charm,”  12
is that view of  beauty critiqued by Levinas and Marion for the harm it does, when it is 
attached to the other. In the realm of  things however, it is wholly appropriate: paintings, 
statues, natural landscapes show themselves in their forms, their beauty entrances us. At 
no point in seeing these plastically beautiful things are we led upward on a Platonic 
ascent, or outside of  a totality toward something other than the self. What do these 
beautiful things tell us?  It is, as Levinas and others have said, “beauty becomes a form 
covering over indifferent matter, and not harboring mystery.”  The beauty of  a thing 13
announces itself  to us, names itself. As a being, as a thing. In the case of  the person, 
“plastic charm” is “so decidedly esthetic that it converts the woman into an artistic object, 
and by isolating her, places her at a distance.”  At this level, the beauty of  a body or a 14
painting does not draw us any further, it only requires that “we must, at regular intervals, 
come and to re-see it”.  As Marion continues, “things rightly only show a facade, even 15
and especially in art (painting), but never a face.” A painting does not open up like the 
 Jose Ortega y Gasset, On Love: Aspects of  a Single Theme, trans. Toby Talbot, Later Printing edition 12
(Meridian Books, 1964), 91. Ortega, seemingly coincidentally, hits on a second etymology that Plato offers 
of  the Kalon, that it charms (kelein), which Chrétien points out is likewise inextricably connected to speech; 
“there is no magic without words” (12).
 Totality and Infinity, 263.13
 Ortega, On Love, 91.14
 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess, 70.15
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face of  the other, but instead “closes itself,” reducing everything it shows to flatness and 
visibility.  The invisibility from which the face of  the Other gazes at us is covered over by 16
the visibility of  the painting. By announcing itself, it also restricts itself. If  its beauty is an 
announcement of  its own boundaries, any pointing beyond itself  is outside the realm of  
beauty. To see Rublev’s Trinity as a beautiful work of  art, Marion would say, is to 
encounter it only as the Idol, the second type of  saturated phenomenon. By seeing it as 
beautiful, we fail to let ourselves be seen by the gaze of  other (in this case the gaze of  the 
Divine Other). That is, we fail to encounter the Icon, the third type of  saturated 
phenomenon, which is precisely where Marion locates the appearance of  the face as 
Levinas describes it.  Thus, beauty, the idol, does not open us up to alterity, to infinity, to 17
the Good. This beauty, it would seem, does not lead to anything beyond itself.  
	 And yet, in the particular case of  the person, this is not actually so. As we draw 
near to a person, as Plato saw, we begin to see a different kind of  beauty, a beauty of  
character and virtue. Ortega again details this experience:  
It is important to emphasize the role which facial details and gesture play in love, 
because they are the most expressive means of  revealing a person’s true character 
. . . That kind of  beauty which, when viewed from a distance, reveals not only a 
personal character and a mode of  being, but also an independent esthetic value—
an objective plastic charm—is what we allude to by the noun beauty.  18
These words, first published in 1927 in a series of  essays for the newspaper El Sol, clearly 
show how this personal beauty both breaks with and maintains continuity with the ‘plastic 
 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies of  Saturated Phenomena (Fordham Univ Press, 2004), 77.16
 As he puts it succinctly in “Le Phénomène de Beauté,” “quand le phénomène concerne la beauté, il ne 17
s’agit pas seulement d’un cas du phénomène saturé en général . . . mais un type de phénomène saturé très 
particulier: l’idole/ When the phenomenon concerns beauty, it is not a matter of  the saturated 
phenomenon in general, but of  one type of  saturated phenomenon in particular: the idol,” 63 (translation 
my own). As a result, it would be incorrect to speak of  beauty when addressing the appearance of  any of  
the other types of  saturated phenomena (event, flesh, icon). 
 Ortega, On Love, 91, first two emphases added.18
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charm’ of  objects. When the Other is seen not merely as ‘plastically charming’ but truly 
as beautiful, in the sense that Ortega recognizes, we see beyond the physical body in front of  
us, the physical face of  the other draws us in and shows us what is behind it, what Ortega 
calls ‘personal character and a mode of  being,’ what Plato would call the soul and its 
virtue (or lack thereof), but what I will call, partially following Marion, the haecceitas of  the 
Other.  This is the Other specified as the other person, not (as Levinas fears) as a physical 19
body and an object but nevertheless as an unrepeatable, recognizable distinct Other 
among others. I will argue in what follows that it is this haecceitas that serves as the basis for 
all beauty, when properly understood: the beauty of  person, painting or object stems from 
being a unique and unrepeatable individual.  
	 This new beauty also calls to us, not by announcing the Other as a being or a 
thing, but as an individual.  The beautiful Other names herself, not as a what, but as a 20
who.  She names with a personal name, a name which does nothing to define or confine 21
the Other. By not naming herself  as a ‘what,’ the Other gives name to her face (no longer 
the mere physical visage) in a way that shows, by omission, that she is not a mere object.  22
The Other is, as Ortega points out, also seen in the physical face, his gestures and features. 
But in choosing to name themselves with a personal name, and not the name of  species 
or type, the Other immediately shines through his face. And here again, we see the way 
 Recall that, for Marion, however, there seems to be a strict division between the haecceitas and the concept 19
of  beauty.
 Throughout this analysis, ‘individual’ should not be understood a unified self  or whole, but rather a 20
‘unique, unrepeatable.’
 The fact that people’s names are generally given to them without their input is irrelevant here. Parents do 21
not define their children by naming them, but rather give them names to use as their own.
 Despite personal pronouns here (and elsewhere in this chapter), this analysis, as I will make clear at 22
certain points, is equally applicable to paintings and other beautiful ‘things.’ In appearing to us, paintings 
name themselves in the same way as Others do, with personal names—Starry Night, Mona Lisa, etc.—and not 
simply as ‘a painting’ or ‘a canvas.’
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the ascent of  beauty draws the lover from one beauty to the next. We are drawn in by the 
physical body, only to discover, as if  from beyond it,  the face, that, as in Levinas’ 23
analyses, denudes itself  of  its physical form by naming itself  otherwise. And yet, if  it were 
not for our being drawn in by the beauty of  his or her face, I would have never heard the 
call of  Other’s voice in the first place. The face and the physical visage become 
inextricably tied, one leading to the other, calling me to see (to hear) beyond its surface. 
Plastic beauty works in service of  real beauty. The evidence of  this is seen throughout 
history, by those who found faith, who experienced the Divine Other in the beauty of  
buildings in which they worshipped, and in the ceremonies they participated in.  Thus 24
we can see how the call of  beauty reaches us from across the physical, incarnates itself  
within ‘plastic’ beauty, not to trap itself, but to shine through it. It is a result of  rejecting 
the connection between beauty and the face that Levinas and Marion are led to 
condemning the depictions of  the human face in art.  The plastic beauty of  the face 25
seemingly becomes detached from the personal. Behind the eyes of  a painting lies not the 
soul, but simply a canvas. 
	 Yet is even this true? Is it not the case that we hear the cry of  the Other, no less in 
a painting or a photograph than we do face to face? Do we really only see plastic beauty 
 The parallel language to Levinas’ ‘beyond the face’ here is intentional, although the ‘beyond’ is now, it 23
should be clear to the reader, operating in a different way, to be addressed more fully in the following 
section.
 The case of  Augustine comes to mind, when (having within himself  a debate about the plasticity of  24
beautiful music, notes its ability to inspire people, “that so by the delight of  the ears, the weaker minds may 
rise to the feeling of  devotion.” Confessions X,, 33. Likewise, Joseph Ratzinger expresses this view in his essay 
on beauty: “when the last note of  one of  the great Thomas-Kantor-Cantatas triumphantly faded away, we 
looked at each other spontaneously and right then we said: ‘Anyone who has heard this, knows that the faith 
is true,’” “The Feeling of  Things, The Contemplation of  Beauty.”
 Remembering that, for Marion, there is, it seems, a sharp division between icons and art, as two distinct 25
types of  saturated phenomena, and at least in some places, a seeming equation between art depicting the 
human form and the idol. Similarly it is the division in Levinas between the face of  the Other and the face 
that is given in eros.
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in Dorothy Lange’s photograph Migrant Mother, or William Merritt Chase’s portrait-
painting of  The Young Orphan? Or can we hear, coming through these depictions, the exact 
same cry of  “the widow, the orphan and the stranger” that the face itself  confronts us 
with? Portraits, depictions of  human life and human suffering speak to us. They tell us 
their stories and the impress on us the importance of  responding. We may well notice that 
our response must be different in the case of  the artistic portrayal (the depiction of  the 
migrant mother does not need our food, and the woman herself  will not be aided if  we 
offer it to the portrait), but the call is the same.  The expression of  the young girl in 26
Chase’s portrait, sad, distant, almost empty captures my own gaze and confronts me as 
any face would. But, contrary to Marion’s description of  this under the name of  the icon, 
the beauty of  the portrayal does not fade away, nor has it prevented me from seeing it. 
Rather, it is precisely the contrast of  the girls solid black dress against the deep red 
background and chair that pulls me close to see her face in the first place. The beauty of  
composition calls to me, and brings me to see, at a much deeper level, the beaut, the 
unique, unrepeatable individuality, of  the weather-worn migrant mother. Were it not for 
this, I would perhaps have not even stopped, continued walking along the gallery hall, 
and failed to hear the call at all. Instead, the beauty of  the painting itself  has interrupted 
my path, and created a space for me to be confronted by the other depicted.  
	 To deny, as Marion and Levinas have, that a portrait can call to us in the same 
way as the human face does is to deny the connection between these two levels of  beauty, 
to deny that one leads to the next in an erotic progression. On that interpretation, plastic 
beauty always covers over and masks personal beauty (just as eros masks the Face in 
 Again, we must hold off  on the discussion of  how until the following section.26
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darkness), rather than establishing a platform from which it can speak. There is of  course, 
always the risk of  reducing the painted person to his or her plastic beauty, of  failing to see 
in the migrant mother’s face a call to respond to her suffering (and indeed, the suffering 
of  all who are like her) but this is no different than the case of  any Other in the world as 
well.  The potential danger of  overwhelming the face, and failing to see it properly 27
should be the cause of  careful aesthetic and ethical education, and not a prohibition of  
painting faces.  
§1.2: Beauty’s Voice 
	 If  we already hear the call of  ethics in the voice of  beauty, however, how does it 
differ at all from the voice of  ethics and the good, as already developed by Levinas? Are 
we not simply relocating the exact same voice from the undifferentiated Other to the 
other who is in front of  me? Are we not just incorrectly naming ‘beauty’ the suffering or 
vulnerability that the face shows us? Simply put, no, for two reasons. First, because the 
voice of  ethics (that is, the voice that speaks of  the Good) is truly uni-vocal, because it is 
universal.  One and the same call, one and the same voice issues forth from every 28
encounter of  the ethical Face, first and foremost saying ‘Thou shalt not kill me.’ The 
voice of  eros, the haecceital voice (the voice that speaks of  beauty), on the other hand, is 
 In her chapter “Art and the Artist,” Gschwandtner moves from Marion’s descriptions of  ‘authentic’ and 27
‘inauthentic’ paintings byMarion to the proposal for something like ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ ways of  
viewing, to explain why “the same phenomenon can hence appear as saturated to one person but as poor to 
another,” in Christina M. Gschwandtner, Degrees of  Givenness: On Saturation in Jean-Luc Marion (Indiana 
University Press, 2014), 77. These would map exactly onto this discussion of  viewing different levels of  
beauty. There, however, the concern is not levels of  beauty, but levels of  experience of  saturation.
 Here, as in Part III, I follow Marion’s critical reading of  Levinas, in which he links the Levinasian 28
encounter and a almost Kantian form of  duty: “the injunction gives rise not so much to love as to duty, for, 
like duty, the injunction concerns every other, universally,” Prolegomena to Charity, 92. He adds a few pages 
later that “the unconditioned nature of  responsibility implies its universality, from face to face, up until the 
last, whoever that might be,” 94.  
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irrepeatable and unique. Eros issues forth a command (as in Marion’s ‘Love me’) which 
cannot and does not allow for substitution.  It will not do, when the beautiful other asks 29
to be loved, to love any other other in his or her place. From this first reason, a second 
follows: the beautiful voice speaks differently than the ethical voice; because the beautiful 
face names itself  in a personal, haecceital way, the beautiful voice of  necessity must offer a 
call that is different than ethics, is different than a call not based on the differentiation of  
faces.  30
	 Let us first look examine the unique, irrepeatable voice of  beauty, before turning 
to an elaboration of  its call. If  beauty does not speak in a uni-vocal way as ethics does, if  
every beautiful voice speaks haecceitally, how do we hear it at all? If  every beautiful voice 
speaks differently, it would seem that any ‘shared’ sense of  beauty would be impossible. 
Chrétien opens his own discussion of  beauty by citing Joseph Joubert’s aphorism that “in 
order for a voice to be beautiful, it must have in it many voices together.”  From this 31
starting point, Chrétien develops his argument for the immemorial call. But we can also 
understand these multiple voices not just as having always been called ahead of  time; not 
just the call of  the first Beauty in every voice, but of  the many voices we here in every 
encounter of  personal beauty. These multiple voices are nothing else than the voices of  
goodness and beauty, of  ethics and eros. If  beauty spoke with only its voice, the situation 
would be as Levinas or Marion sees it: either it speaks by profaning ethics or it speaks 
 Again, it is precisely this point that Marion critiques Levinas for, noting that “the face itself  neutralizes 29
unsubstitutable individuality,” Prolegomena, 94.  
 This section puts aside the issue (to be addressed briefly in §2, but at length in chapter 8) that, although 30
different, these two calls are connected, one leading to the other, just as recognizing plastic beauty leads to 
recognizing personal beauty.
 Call and Response, 1, the quote is uncited, but from Carnets, 571 (1938 N.R.F edition). The full entry on that 31
day (September 21, 1806) is “Il faut qu’il y ait plusieurs voix ensemble dans une voix pour qu’elle soit belle. 
Et plusieurs significations dans un mot pour qu’il soit beau.”
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merely in its own private vocabulary, at most unfolding into charity, but never leading to 
ethics. The speech of  eros, as we saw in Part III, when separated from the voice of  ethics, 
remains effectively private and individual, perhaps even “solipsistic.”  It is only because 32
of  beauty’s speaking together with the Good that enables each to be heard. This link, 
however needs to be further examined. What does beauty’s voice add to the call of  ethics? 
and further more, in what sense is it necessary for the two voices to go together? To see 
this, we must take a more critical look at the univocal nature of  Levinas’ call of  the other. 
	 The Good’s voice calls, as Levinas envisions it, is the call of  the widow, the orphan 
and the stranger. It is the command ‘do not kill,’ the universal signification that here, the 
place of  the Other, is a place that must not be trespassed, must not be consumed into the 
totality of  being. From out of  this primordial call, grow the more generic, banal ethical 
calls: do not steal, cheat, lie, etc.  This is, it could be argued, already an ensemble of  33
voices (insofar as the Other ‘speaks’ for every other Other) and therefore, by the rule of  
Joubert, already capable of  being beautiful—confirming a similar link between goodness 
and beauty as that in Plato’s writings. While there is some truth to this, it is not the beauty 
to which eros is drawn, but yet another step up on the ascent of  beauty, akin to those steps 
(love of  laws, sciences, or the sea of  beauty) where, on many readings of  the Symposium, 
the metaphor of  eros begins to fall apart (who is the beloved in these cases?). The beauty 
of  the other, however, does not need to be put aside, put outside ethics, as Levinas has 
 As Christina Gschwandtner notes in “Praise—Pure and Personal? Jean-Luc Marion’s Phenomenologies 32
of  Prayer,” prayer, the most proper language of  love, “has to remain an intensely personal, if  not solipsistic, 
exercise,” in Bruce Ellis Benson and Norman Wirzba, The Phenomenology of  Prayer (Fordham University Press, 
2005), 178.
 As Jill Robbins notes, Levinas is concerned with “ethics in the most originary sense—the ethicity of  33
ethics,” in Claire Elise Katz and Lara Trout, Emmanuel Levinas: Beyond Levinas (Taylor & Francis, 2005), 356. 
In other words, Levinas is not primarily concerned with a specific ethical system, but rather the basis for any 
possible ethics. 
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done, in order for the ‘beauty’ of  the Good to be seen.  Rather, seeing the beauty of  the 34
Good enables us to see personal beauty in a different light, just as personal beauty allows 
us to see plastic beauty in a different light. 
	 But even the multiple voices of  the Good only ever speak in unison. In the cry of  
the Other I hear my indebtedness to every Other. I am put in an asymmetrical relationship 
to each and every Other I encounter, a fact that is given to me already in the very first 
encounter with the face.  The recognition that I am obligated to give the bread from my 35
mouth to the Other in front of  me immediately (in hearing the cry of  every Other in his 
voice) awakens me to the fact that I owe the same to every other. There is no step between 
my responsibility to the other in front of  me and to every Other I encounter. It is 
immediate, because I hear it already in his voice.  The Other, although not a universal 36
category, is nevertheless flat: to be an Other is simply to be other than the self. Any further 
specification of  who is facing me is outside the bounds of  alterity, and threatens to cover 
over or destroy the otherness of  the Other. There is, as it were, no true plurality in the 
voice of  the Good, in the call of  ethics, every Other speaks in the same voice. 
	 The call of  beauty, on the other hand, precisely supplies this polyphony. This is 
seen even in the different ‘command’ which beauty issues, ‘love me’ rather than ‘do not 
kill.’  At the level of  beauty and eros, the command of  beauty asks for me to respond to 37
 A formulation, to be clear, Levinas would likely never use.34
 This seems to be what Marion means when he notes that “this other remains only the lieutenant of  the 35
other”
 There is, however, a step between this ethical responsibility toward every Other and the reciprocal 36
relationship of  justice, when, rather than discussing each and every other as I encounter him, Levinas 
moves to the discussion of  the third, which goes beyond what I am discussing here.
 In the case of  beauty, this is not truly a command, but a simple calling, Beauty does not command itself  37
to be loved, but offers its self  up to be loved freely. This distinction will be discussed in more length in 
chapter 8.
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nobody but the speaker.  I hear (again, still at the level of  eros) no other voices. It is truly 38
the beauty in front of  me (visible or otherwise) that speaks to me, and that imposes on me 
to respond. Even although this voice issues the same ‘command’ as every other beautiful 
voice, every voice is heard differently, it is as if  the timbre of  the voice comes through for 
the first time.   39
	 What is this timbre? As above, we can think of  this timbre as the haecceital quality 
of  beauty—of  the Other. As Marion describes haecceitas, it is no mere reduplicating of  the 
I, no alter ego,  but is simply what makes him “just such an other.”  Here, Marion follows 40 41
(developments aside) the original description of  haecceitas. Haecceitas is a primary 
difference-marker—that is, it shares no common term with any other haecceitas, unlike 
species which resolve into a shared genus. As Emmanuel Falque adds, “this makes 
otherness the most elevated form of  all haecceitas.”  The connection seems obvious, 42
however we should not mistake them simply for their familiar formulations. Haecceitas is 
not Levinas’ alterity, it is not only a primary difference-marker, but also the principle of  
unity and self-identity. Every haecceitas is unique. This means that haecceitas is otherness 
only if  we understand every Other to also be other to all other others. On this 
formulation (and this was Marion’s objection to a beauty-based love), the links between 
levels of  beauty would need to be broken. If  beauty and haecceitas, understood this way, 
 As I will show in the final chapter, the beautiful Other also issues an ethical command, to which I must 38
also respond.
 This raises a question, far beyond the current project, and perhaps without a satisfactory, why we 39
sometimes hear this call and other times do not. There seems to be no connection between some objective 
standard and beauty, and the voice we hear. It may well be, in a ‘no-reasons’ kind of  way (cf  Aaron Smuts) 
that we simply hear some voices and not others. And that, of  those we hear, we simply respond to some and 
not others. 
 Prolegomena to Charity, 97.40
 A phrase Marion employs repeatedly in Prolegomena, 94-99.41
 Emmanuel Falque, God, the Flesh, and the Other: From Irenaeus to Duns Scotus (Northwestern University Press, 42
2014), 279.
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are identified, then each ‘beauty’ is primarily different, and even naming them all by 
‘beauty’ would be to cover over or destroy each one.  
	 This objection can, however, be avoided, if  we understand not beauty itself  as the 
haecceitas of  the other, but the Other’s particular voice. Again, to return to Scotus’ original 
formulation, he was adamant that the haecceitas was not its own form or entity, but as it has 
been more recently understood, something akin to the actualization or modalization of  
the common nature.  Thus, in speaking of  haecceitas of  ‘this beauty,’ of  “just such an 43
other,” it is no mistake to allow that these final terms are shared or common, so long as 
we understand the this to be truly and primarily different.  Or, to return to the metaphor 44
of  voice and timbre: the command given, the song sung can be a shared song, so long as 
the timbre is truly unique. In this way we can speak of  beauty, the voices of  beauty, as 
speaking together, even although each is their own. Every beautiful face encountered is 
different, the lines and features and expressions, the character that shows from beneath it 
is irrepeatable, but they all indicate, in their own ways, a common beauty. 
	 In fact, it is only because the other is this other that he or she is beautiful. To speak of  
a Universal Beauty exterior to individual beautiful faces becomes a fruitless endeavor.  45
What we encounter instead is a face that is beautiful because it is this face and no other. It is 
the recognition of  this face as unrepeatable that makes it beautiful. And it is this 
 See, for example, Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual Differentia,” 43
Philosophical Topics 20, no. 2 (1992): 51—76 for a discussion of  this point in Scotus’ thought
 That is this beauty has a single referent, it is not an abstract general term. In fact, we should, in theory 44
always name the this, a practice that has some traction among Scotus scholarship, to speak not of  Socrates’ 
haecceitas and Plato’s haecceitas (Socrates’ and Plato’s thisness) as if  it is a shared thing, but simply the 
‘Socratizer’ and ‘Platoizer,’ which are simply distinct from each other. King, “Duns Scotus on the Common 
Nature,” 60.
 This however, does not rule out something like a theory of  the transcendentals (Good, Beauty, One). 45
Beauty is not an external Universal term, however, the beauty of  the face is not simply pure difference from 
every other face. In medieval terminology, beauty is common, without being universal. The significance of  
this point would need to be worked out in further detail elsewhere.
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unrepeatability that is heard in the voice of  the Other when it cries out ‘love me,’ which 
in eros is always followed by an (at least) implicit “and no other.” Beauty speaks its own 
unsubstitutability. However, do not forget that alongside this voice is the voice of  ethics, 
through which the Other declares just the opposite: that she is an Other among Others, 
or rather, which announces her non-I.  46
§1.3: Toward the Good, Toward Ethics 
	 But it is not enough to simply say that the two voices speak beside each other, as if  
in equal pitch. In fact, it is the voice of  Beauty that we hear first, that announces itself, but 
carries with it the call of  ethics. For Plato, this was obvious. Recalling the myth of  the 
Phaedrus, it is the sight of  the beautiful boy that brought us back to The Beautiful itself, 
and in turn, it is in and through beauty that the Good beyond being reveals itself.  The 47
Good, which is unreachable (recall the discussions of  the previous part) is made reachable 
by its appearance in beauty. As Chrétien, in one of  his first books, a work focused on 
beauty in Plato, reflects on the event in which the ‘recent initiate’ sees the face of  a 
beautiful boy, and is thrown immediately back to the sight of  that which is ‘beyond the 
heavens,’ noting “the manifestation of  beauty suddenly renders the furthest thing near.”  48
 Marion’s mistake, in declaring that the Other’s haecceitas does not declare its own unsubstitutabilty, its 46
irreplaceability (95-99) is not recognizing the simultaneity, the harmonization, of  these two voices. The 
Other’s unsubstitutability is always self-contradicted by his replacability. The full implication of  this paradox 
cannot, unfortunately, be taken up here.
 This is seen in the Philebus, and developed to the extreme by Plotinus and others. In its extreme form, the 47
Good and Beauty are distinguished more than I intend, Beauty does not announce the Good as if  it were 
the one to come after itself, but rather as a side of  itself  not immediately grasped.
 Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’effroi du beau (Cerf, 1987), 55. All translations from this work are my own, and often 48
lean toward literalness over style. I include the originals in footnote for comparison.  “La manifestation de la 
beauté rend soudain proche le plus lointain.”
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Whereas the Good “blinds and dazzles” us, beauty “accommodates itself  to our vision.”  49
Beauty allows itself  to be heard, speaks in order to be heard, whereas the Good deafens 
us, overwhelms us. The Good, however also remains that which is farthest off. Either it or 
we must be moved in order to hear it. And this is precisely what beauty does. Beauty calls 
to us, announcing the Good, and giving way to the Good to announce itself. Thus there is 
a double shock: The first, Chrétien’s “shock of  beauty,”  which breaches and bridges the 50
gap between being and non-being, and then secondly, the ‘shock of  the good,’ which is 
exactly Levinas’ shock at encountering the Face, where we are overwhelmed, 
overpowered. But this second shock could not happen without the Good first being 
brought near.  51
	 And yet, paradoxically, it is beauty that demands more of  us: beauty’s call to be 
loved is a command without end, without limit. It calls for excessiveness, calls for me to 
give without holding back, and then to give more. Thus Chrétien calling beauty 
‘accommodating’ cannot merely mean that it is quieter, as if  it is the easier yoke. Rather, 
beauty accommodates us by preparing us for the Good, by bringing us to the face of  the 
Other, where we can encounter him in his alterity. Beauty is able to announce this infinite 
demand in a way that not only sounds possible, but in fact, like one that is no burden at 
all. I want to love beauty, I do not even for a brief  moment feel that I am obligated to love 
 Ibid. “Elle [la beauté] s’accommode à notre vision, tandis que . . . le Bien par lui-même aveugle et 49
éblouit, comme le dit la République.”
 Referencing Phaed. 251a “when he sees a godlike face or form which is a good image of  beauty, shudders 50
at first, and something of  the old awe comes over him . . . ”
 Levinas himself  felt that the face itself  could bring the Good near. But the face’s distinction from any 51
physical face does not yet answer the question of  how I ever encounter it in the first place, to see from 
where it shines.
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beauty.  And in that accommodation, beauty has prepared the way for the command of  52
ethics: what will inevitably come as the blinding, deafening call of  the Good will 
nevertheless arrive as the easier command. If  I have already been called to love the 
beauty that I see infinitely and excessively, the call to not violate or to not murder seems, 
in comparison, the least I can owe. What would not merely shock us but actually paralyze 
us can now be surmounted. The command, to be clear, remains the infinite demand that 
it is for Levinas, but is nevertheless (as Marion also sees) not as large—not as demanding
—as the call to love. 
	 In fact, however, the call of  beauty never calls only ‘at the level of  beauty’ that we 
have been addressing so far. The call of  beauty already contains in it the call of  the Good. 
These two calls are not walled off  from one another as they have been described by 
Levinas and Marion, instead, the call of  the Good is nested within the call of  beauty. This 
is the full meaning of  beauty’s accommodating me to the call of  the Good: the call of  
beauty carries with it the call of  the Good, enabling me to hear it for the first time. Thus 
although my encounter with beauty may fail, although I may not respond with love 
(which I am in no way obligated to do), I have at the same time received the call to ethics, 
to treat this beautiful Other, if  not with love, than at least with respect (with regard to the 
call of  ethics, I am obligated to respond). The call to love just such an other already contains 
the ethical command of  any such Other. While the call to love, the call of  beauty is 
individual—it asks only for this one to be loved—it is not isolating. Love’s command 
already insists that the lover, if  he is to love right, must also be disposed ethically to the 
Other. But this command that I treat the Other if  not with love, at least with respect 
 Here again we run up against, and must prematurely postpone a discussion of  our response to beauty 52
until later.
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opens me up to all others. In moving from love to respect, I move from the irreplaceability 
of  the beautiful Other to the shared place of  height of  all others. As a result, the 
experience of  beauty opens me up to the ethical command to treat all others with the 
same ethical respect. Indeed love demands that I treat all Others according to the 
command of  ethics. While the call of  beauty calls me to love this beautiful Other and no 
one else, if  in the call of  beauty I also hear the call to treat the beloved ethically as any 
such Other, it follows from this that I ought to relate to all such Others in the same way. 
Indeed, for love to truly be love, it demands that I acknowledge this fact. This can be seen 
at the level of  everyday experience: were I to be loved by somebody who universally 
treated all others unethically or disrespectfully, I would not only not love her in return, I 
would question the very truth of  her supposed love for me. It would occur to me, 
inevitably, that her disposition toward me is not out of  some response of  love, but out of  
some pursuit of  benefit. I would immediately ask myself  ‘what does she want from me?’ 
Love calls for the single individual alone to be loved, but it demands that I treat all others 
in a certain manner, recognizing their status as persons, as the Other (that is, it carries 
within it the demand of  ethics). 
	 From these observations, we can begin to make clear where this call of  beauty 
situates itself  with regard to its two closest cousins: Levinas’ face and Marion’s eros. 
Beauty takes up a kind of  middle ground between them, granting to Marion that Levinas’ 
Face of  the Other is too abstract, not only in principle, but in fact, too abstract to even be 
heard: I will never encounter this abstract Face, but only the individual’s face in front of  
me. It does not however, grant Marion’s objection that an ethics of  the face itself is 
therefore too abstract to be a part of  love, that only eros or charity, freed from duty, can 
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reach the fully individuated other.  Rather, beauty (no longer the complete radical 53
individuality of  Marion’s haecceitas) offers that individual entry point into the universal 
command of  ethics. Ethics, beholding (that is, hearing) the Good is rendered possible by 
its being brought near by beauty. 
§2: Responding to Beauty 
	 All that is left to ask, then, is how we are to respond to that call. If  I have 
succeeded in finding a phenomenological description of  beauty that both echoes what 
Plato sought to develop and accounts for the objections of  section II that it ought not 
reduce the other to an object, I still have not yet addressed the objections of  section III, 
that love (in order to be love) needs to remain silent. I have argued extensively for 
understanding beauty as a call, particular to an individualized face. However, there is, so 
far, no reason why the response to this call must be love and, even if  it is, why the response 
must be sayable. After all, Levinas’ eros responded to voluptuosity (a kind of  substitute for 
beauty), but only by signifying nothing. Insofar as it said anything at all, it responded via 
ethics, not eros. To meet this objection and return to a Platonically-inspired ethical eros, 
we must proceed, then, on two levels: first, we must show that it is love, and not some 
other attitude, that responds to beauty, and then secondly that, when love responds, it 
responds by signifying. This second task—which will be the content of  the final chapter-
can itself  be subdivided, between love-speech that testifies to beauty itself, and its broader 
discourse, which introduces ethics. 
 As he notes, “the formal universality of  the obligation becomes thinkable only once persons have been 53
abstracted from it, such that the other opened by the injunction can be played by anyone,” whereas 
correctly speaking, “the injunction therefore must be singularized for my gaze,”Prolegomena, 92-3
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	 We have, at times in the previous chapters, run up against a fundamental 
distinction drawn by Platonic philosophy: that good things inspire desire, while beautiful 
things inspire admiration or contemplation.  This schema—complicated by Plato’s 54
assertion that all beautiful things are also good —is seen most clearly by approaching it 55
negatively: things are only desired insofar as they are good, and thus, we do not desire 
beautiful things because they are beautiful. Our attitude must therefore be something 
different than straightforward desire. The Platonic alternative, evidenced by some 
translators’ desire to simply translate kalos as ‘admirable’ rather than ‘beautiful,’ does not 
concern a desire to possess, but a satisfaction in beholding (as the gods are said to do 
toward true virtue in the Phaedrus, and men are said to do toward the ‘something 
wonderfully beautiful in its nature’ in the Symposium). Beauty can be said, in Plato, to 
inspire a ‘desire’ (misusing the term) to see, to behold, whereas the Good inspires a desire 
(rightly said) to possess. I want good things, I want to see beautiful things.   56
	 However, Plato never intended these two attitudes to be split (this was, recall, the 
main response to the objection of  Part II), in splitting the Good and the Beautiful, we split 
desire and and ‘contemplation,’ that is, split eros in to sexual desire and ‘romantic’ love. 
Ever since this split has occurred (both in this work but also in the course of  history itself), 
it has been nearly impossible to speak of  love and eros as synonymous, without first 
making a string of  qualifications. This split was only reinforced by Levinas’ attempt to 
absolve the encounter with the Other from any sort of  desire. Eros is problematic precisely 
because it involves desiring the Other. To be ethical, one has to encounter the Face without 
 See Rachel Barney “Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good,” for a discussion of  this point.54
 Even if  they are not held as strictly identifiable, as I have argued (see chapter 2).55
 Insofar as I say I ‘want’ this, what I am actually saying is that seeing beautiful things is itself a good. Thus, 56
I do not desire beautiful things as such, I desire vision of beautiful things, as a kind of  meta-act.
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desiring it. The first way this is done is by reversing the intentionality of  the act. The Face 
confronts us, not from within our intentionality, but from beyond it. We no longer, like the 
follower of  Diotima’s higher mysteries or Socrates’ charioteer, go out in search of  ever 
more—more in number but also in quality—beautiful things, rather they confront us, 
shock us from our slumber, and surprise us. This reversal is completed by Marion’s 
development of  the saturated phenomenon, an event that always overwhelms us and our 
intentionality, and in particular, the gaze of  the icon, where we no longer look at a 
painting, but rather are seen by the icon, seen by the Divine itself.  By reversing the 57
direction of  intentionality, by no longer placing the Other at the end of  a ‘search,’ 
Levinas and Marion succeeds in separating out desire, which is precisely the ‘going in 
search of.’ The Other arrives despite my projects, not because of  them. 
	 The task for an ethical eros therefore becomes clear: it must reconcile desire and 
love (since, as seen in Part II, each fails if  separated) but must not do so at the expense of  
destroying Otherness (which, as seen in Part III, was the main reason for not fully 
reintegrating eros). Anything less, and we do not arrive back at eros, anything more and 
we fall short of  ethics. This can be shown in two steps, firstly, that the beautiful-Other is in 
fact the locus of  a kind of  contemplation or admiration, and secondly, that this 
contemplation necessarily carries with it a kind of  desire—love—that nevertheless does 
not destroy the Other or reduce him to an object. This task, however must be further 
subdivided, and I will deal in this section only with what can properly called 
‘contemplation,’ that is, a ‘disinterested’ appreciation for beauty, (§2.1), as well as the 
immediate action inspired by contemplation, the creation of  new beauty (§2.2) before 
 The ‘crossing’ of  gazes, as Marion speaks of  it in GWB.57
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showing in chapter 8 how this represents only the first steps of  eros, and serves to draw us 
further to love and finally to ethics.  
§2.1: Contemplation of  Beauty 
	 As we saw in section 1, beauty is not a fully univocal term: we can speak of  plastic 
beauty or haecceital beauty. Nor, however, is there a complete break between these terms 
(they are not simply equivocal), rather, plastic beauty has the power to lead us to haecceital 
beauty. Nor is it simply an issue of  looking at the same beauty differently. An object or a 
person that is plastically beautiful may not be haecceitally beautiful. That is, plastic beauty 
may mask evil, as Snow White’s poisoned apple or even the original ‘poisoned’ fruit of  the 
Garden of  Eden.  This insight, perhaps simple, highlights a difficulty to be overcome: 58
being able to recognize plastic beauty is not yet enough to move us toward haecceital 
beauty. Similarly something or someone that is haecceitally beautiful may not immediately 
strike us as plastically beautiful. The face of  the Other, marred by violence, hunger, or 
pain is difficult, if  not impossible to see as beautiful. And yet, each and every person, 
insofar as he or she faces us, must ultimately be haecceitally beautiful.We must therefore 
develop some sense of  the link between these two beauties, in order to know when plastic 
beauty or plastic ugliness is simply plastic, and when it might serve as a guide to see 
haecceital beauty.  59
	 This is the importance of  the shock of  beauty, which Chrétien, interpreting Plato, 
develops.  Beauty never simply appears in front of  us, it unsettles us, and forces us to 60
 Joseph Ratzinger uses this latter example in “Contemplation of  Beauty, Feeling of  Things.”58
 Or, as Plato would put it, when what appears beautiful is not in reality beautiful.59
 As we will see in the following, this same shock is also what accounts for the reversal of  intention and the 60
kind of  desire appropriate to eros.
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gather our bearings, reassess what we are seeing.  This disruption, however, is not the 61
same as confusion, and our reassessment is not to be taken as an attempt to understand 
and comprehend: Beauty does not elicit rational knowledge. What beauty does elicit, on 
the other hand, is eros. This eros is a Platonic mania, explicitly opposed to the cool-headed 
rational thinking of  the non-lover in the Phaedrus. Although, as Chrétien says, “eros, for 
Plato, is indivisibly both a seeing and a knowing,”  it is also a knowing that  62
at first knows nothing at all, prey to the obscurity of  its passion. It does not know 
exactly what it loves nor even what eros is [ . . . ]. 
Indeed, eros begins only in the lover finding his origin in beauty itself. It is not the 
lover who gives the beloved their loveliness, but the loveliness of  beauty that gives 
the lover the ability to love. Beauty would be lovely even if  nobody was standing 
there who could love it. Eros is born from the force with which beauty 
manifests.  63
Our response to beauty then, is not the egoistic desire as Levinas argues, but in is given to 
us in the vision of  beauty.  Eros does not seek out beautiful things; on the contrary, it 64
results from being first confronted by beauty. Eros reacts to the appearance of  the 
 As Sallis says, “Beauty—in art and in nature itself—can let the elements be seen or heard in their 61
elemental character, in contrast to the way in which ordinarily they are more or less passed over and taken 
for granted.” “Response to Figal and Schmidt,” 119.
 L’Effroi, 52. “L’amour est pour Platon solidairement et indissociablement un voir et un savoir.” I de-62
translate amour here as eros rather than love as I think it better captures Plato’s thought. Chrètien’s 
mention of  “la mania de l’amour” makes it clear that he is using amour to translate Plato’s eros. Lost in the 
English translation is the French play on voir and savoir. 
 L’Effroi, 53. “L’amour est savoir qui d’abord ne sait rien, en proie à l’obscurité de son pathos. Il ne sait pas 63
ce qu’au juste il aime, ni ce qu’est l’amour . . .  
L’amour ne commence en effet dans l’amant qu’à prendre dans la beauté même son origine. Ce n’est pas 
lui qui donne à l’aimé d’être aimable, mais l’amabilité du beau qui nous donne de pouvoir aimer. Aimable 
serait le beau même si nul ne se tenait là qui sût l’aimer. L’amour naît de la force même avec laquelle le 
beau se manifeste.” I translate aimable and amabilité as lovely and loveliness here, rather than the more 
natural lovable, in order to better capture the intrinsic nature of  the loveliness, vs a potentiality with respect 
to a lover.
 Here I deviate from both Plato and Chrétien, at least insofar as he takes his task to be interpreting Plato 64
and not critiquing him, who both fall into the trap that Levinas spies for love, noting that beauty functions 
as “the light in which we have access to the Ideas and to Being/le beau . . . devient pour nous . . . la lumière 
en qui nous avons accès aux idées et à l’Être,” 53. See the previous chapter for the further discussion of  
Beauty’s lighting not Being, but the Good.
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beautiful-other. This is initial disruption is what leads to its first manifestation in 
contemplation.  
	 But what is this contemplation? Firstly is what we are not looking for: what the 
painting is, or is of. Fully understanding an artist’s intentions in a painting rarely makes a 
beauty more beautiful.  This is perhaps the greatest insight of  recent phenomenology of  65
art’s focus on non-figural art: Beauty is a result of  appearing to us, the being of  what 
appears does not factor in.  Even in plastic beauty, we are not contemplating what a thing 66
is, but its beauty.  This is to say that, in order to see something as plastically beautiful, we 67
must simply allow its visible appearance to appear, to let the beauty speak. Learning of  
the methods of  its creation (i.e. its origins) will not aid me. Nor will learning the telos for 
why it was created. When I glimpse the beauty of  a painting, I glimpse the painting as a 
whole. This is the first positive attribute of  contemplation: Contemplation takes hold of  
the beautiful painting all at once, as an indivisible whole.  Here we can see the first point 68
of  connection between plastic beauty and haecceital beauty: beauty is the experience of  
individuality. But, whereas (as we shall shortly see) haecceital beauty refers to something 
truly individual, contemplation of  plastic beauty gives us something merely as a self-
contained ‘whole,’ something that plays no role in something bigger. The beautiful work 
of  art seems, in our contemplation, to give us something outside of  Levinas’ totality. But if  
we do not first shed the painting of  its status as an ‘object,’ it will never be able to appear 
 Regardless of  whether it makes the painting more “meaningful” in any number of  other ways.65
 This point is, on the other hand, often taken too far, by rejecting figural art for preventing this showing, or 66
at least making it more difficult to occur.
 What Sallis and others call merely its shining.67
 On the contrary, in art criticism we are immediately and inevitably sucked into the what of  a painting, so 68
that we can describe its parts in their minute details. Learning the various ballet positions will therefore be a 
great boon to the art critic, who’s job is not to see beauty (it is taken as a given) but to explain what makes a 
particular work of  art ‘good,’ that is, well-executed. 
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as a whole, because it will always be contextualized into its context as a created object, the 
intentions of  its creator, etc.  It is only once we let the beauty itself  show, when we 69
separate the painting from its context as a created object, that we can see the painting for 
itself, standing apart from everything outside of  it. But at the level of  plastic beauty, this 
sort of  individuality is mere unity. But none of  this truly shows me an unrepeatable face. 
A replica of  the Mona Lisa would look just the same as the original. If  we are to find a 
beauty that would show us more than this, show us something that is truly other, 
something that might lead from beauty to the Good, we must find a beauty that does not 
merely withdraw from its connections and networks, but that shows us something truly 
individual, something unique and unrepeatable. 
§2.2: Creation of  Beauty 
	 As mentioned already previously, so much of  phenomenology has remained only 
at the description of  what might be called plastic beauty, and why eros has been so widely 
criticized as a result. But if  eros can be, as I am claiming, something more, how do we 
escape from plasticity? How do we ascend? The answer lies in the creative element of  
eros. When we first encounter the beauty of  a painting, our response can be diverse, but it 
always has one thing in mind: the creation of  beauty. Whether this creation takes the 
rather ordinary form of  trying to reproduce the beauty for another (whether it is by 
calling a painting to a person’s attention, or by sharing a print or photograph of  what I 
 Notice although that this definition of  contemplation is a complete reversal of  Levinas’ conception of  69
beauty, where beauty was the way we understood an object as ‘fitting’ in the sense of  ‘fitting into’ the whole. 
Levinas’ view has its Platonic roots in Socrates’ remarks in the Hippias Major that a wooden ladle is more 
beautiful than a gold one, because it functions better as a soup ladle. In lieu of  a much longer discussion of  
why defining beauty fails in that dialogue, allow me to simply note here that Socrates immediately starts 
asking about the beauty of  parts (why are a statue’s eyes made out of  one material, but the torso another?) 
showing that we have already left contemplation.
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have seen with him or her) or perhaps, or by attempting to create something beautiful 
myself  (why so many museums encourage their visitors to sketch something during their 
visit).  Thus, our response to beauty now has two aspects: both the quiet contemplation, 70
a listening to the way that beauty announces itself, but also a creative drive, which seeks to 
repeat or reproduce the beautiful. But these are not two separate acts, but really one and 
the same eros, the recognition of  beauty, and the desire to give birth to it.  71
	 However, whereas contemplation does not concern itself  with the what of  a 
painting, dissembling it into parts,  the desire to reproduce it immediately raises the 72
questions of  archai and tele. In the most banal sense, this is the museum-goer looking 
beside the painting to the tag that tells us of  painting’s creator, or gives the story of  why it 
was painted in the first place. Such questions, as I have argued, are unnecessary for 
contemplating the plastic beauty of  the paining, but they become essential if  we are to 
reproduce it. Because in attempting to reproduce it, we immediately raise for ourselves 
the question of  why the painting is beautiful. Why was it made? For what purpose?  
	 These questions show the way that (merely) plastic beauty has led us to something 
deeper, because we are no longer concerned only with how the painting appears to us. It 
is enough that we feel the ‘shock’ of  seeing it. Our response, understandably, amounts to 
finding our footing anew, having been shaken from our relative comfort. In attempting to 
recreate it however, we now need to understand. But we do not need, as Levinas sees the 
 Note that, even when the encounter is at a gallery, and my response is to purchase the painting, this is not 70
a desire to possess, but to repeat the experience of  beauty for myself  (and perhaps others) repeatedly in the 
future. Beautiful art is bought not to have, nor to consume, but to behold.
 I am reminded here of  Gabriel Marcel’s formulation of  creative fidelity, which seeks to renew by returning 71
to what has always been, “as before, but differently and better” (Homo Viator, 61). The erotic encounter with 
beauty seeks always to recognize what it is, but also to repeat it in the future in new ways, to new people.
 Or if  we do, we—like Plato and Hippias—find that the parts cannot explain to us where the beauty of  72
the whole came from.
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issue of  love and beauty, to understand what the painting is, rather, we go in search for why 
it shocks us.  
	 This question, as we shall now see, leads to yet another ambivalence when we say 
that we attempt to ‘understand beauty.’ Just as in the first case, our understanding was not 
rational knowledge but erotic contemplation, here to, our ‘knowledge’ is a kind of  
unknowing. Since, if  we attempt to comprehend the beautiful object, we miss its ability to 
shock. The more familiar it becomes, the less beautiful it seems (or at least, the less we 
recognize its beauty).  Thus, we abandon the contemplation-response, if  we ask not 73
about the beauty of  the object, but rather the object of  beauty.  
	 The contemplative search for the source of  our shock, is the very search for origins 
described by Plato in the Phaedrus when, having seen a beautiful boy, the lover is 
transported back to his prior life of  Beauty itself, a beauty that (if  it is truly identified with 
the Good as I have argued) is free of  all being. Thus, the second attribute of  our response 
to beauty: we leave behind considerations of  Being.   74
	 What does it mean to leave Being behind, although? The first thing to notice is 
that it is in part the leaving behind of  plastic beauty. We are now witness to a beauty that 
is more than superficial, because we are witness to a beauty that has a power. Whereas 
merely plastic beauty announces an object as itself, as a whole to be contemplated, now, the 
painting announces itself  as something other than itself. It gives us our eros, not in order 
to respond to it as an object, but to something beyond its surface. Thus we can even more 
accurately separate the beauty of  an object from the object itself, since the beauty here 
 Again, recall Sallis’ point that art can show us nature by making it un-ordinary.73
 This attribute straddles the action/passion line, as it could equally be said that beauty transports us. 74
However, note that for Plato, it is only the well-dispositioned lover who is transported. There is thus still 
something of  activity even in the passivity
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speaks through the object, not from it. That is, it is now haecceital beauty that speaks from 
beneath the surface. Note here that the kind of  ‘individual’ we are now contemplating 
changes as well from the previous analysis. In plastic beauty, we took an object ‘as a 
whole,’ something that was at once indivisible and complete. It needed to reference 
neither its parts nor a larger system to explain its beauty. But this is in reality a kind of  lie. 
As Plato’s golden ladle example points out, once the ladle is considered in the context of  a 
pot of  soup, we learn that a wooden spoon is in fact more beautiful, because the system of  
‘pot, soup and wooden ladle’ is more beautiful than that of  ‘pot, soup and golden ladle.’  75
The wooden ladle adds a fragrance to the soup and does not risk damaging the pot. Thus, 
although when considered separately, the golden ladle had a greater plastic beauty than 
the wooden one, if  we instead consider it as one part of  a larger whole, we find that the 
situation is reversed. Thus, contemplation of  plastic beauty, the beauty of  being, always 
involves a kind of  abstraction.  With haecceital beauty, on the other hand, beauty does not 76
only appear as indivisible and complete, but truly individual: unrepeatable and unique. 
The golden ladle is no longer beautiful because it glistens, nor the wooden one because it 
functions well as a ladle, but each because they are themselves, they are beautiful because 
they show us a unified, unrepeatable individual—in short they show us something other, 
something outside a totality.  77
 Hippias Major, 290d.75
 However, it is not, as a result, an act of  will. Beauty impresses itself  on us. We do not control in what 76
context it appears. Whether my eyes are drawn, upon entering into a room, to the beauty of  the whole, or 
merely to the beauty of  a particular painting on the wall is the result of  no conscious decision. 
 It may seem absurd to claim that a ladle might give us the alterity structure, be a possible face, or even at 77
the more basic level that something as mass-produced as a ladle should be seen as unrepeatable. While it is, 
I grant, more difficult to have an experience in reference to an ordinary object, it does not seem to me 
impossible. The limit is on our ability to see beyond plastic beauty in this case, not on the object itself.
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	 This also introduces the new reason why our erotic response cannot be a 
comprehending: we cannot grasp the truly individual by any means other than 
acquaintance. As unique and unrepeatable, there is no predicate term that could 
accurately be attributed to it. To assert ‘Starry Night is a painting’ is true, but it has no 
bearing on Starry Night’s haecceital beauty. Its haecceital beauty comes from beyond or 
beneath the painting, not from the physical canvas itself, and thus, facts about the painting 
(as a type of  object) have no bearing. Our erotic contemplation thus becomes one of  
drawing near, becoming acquainted to, so that what I can say of  the erotic experience is 
that ‘Starry Night’s beauty shows itself  in and through the canvas.’  
	 That I cannot ‘know’ the beauty becomes apparent to me in my attempts. If  I 
begin to analyze the canvas, the brushstrokes, the paint, I quickly find myself  back in the 
realm of  plastic beauty, and soon, out of  contemplation altogether. My search is 
frustrated, and I come away knowing only that, somehow, I missed the beauty that I 
originally saw. Instead, I respond to the beauty by chasing after (or better, allowing myself  
to be thrown after) the beauty itself, beyond the surface of  the painting. My goal, once 
again, does not have any quality of  a desire to possess or contain the beauty of  the object, 
rather, having received this ‘shock’ of  beauty, having been destabilized and thrust into the 
erotic attitude, what I go in search of  is solid ground to stand. 
	 This is why I go in search of  achai and tele. If  I can understand the why and for 
what, perhaps I can learn something about it itself  as well. But here too, our erotic search 
will come to a dead end: while I can certainly come to understand the details of  Starry 
Night’s origins, and what Van Gogh hoped to convey through it, I once again find these 
facts utterly useless in understanding its beauty. These are facts about what it is, not about 
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its beauty. My erotic search, inevitably, leads me to only one conclusion: beauty has no 
telos beyond itself, and no arche other than itself.  This, ultimately, is the meaning we 78
should take from Marion’s claims that idol and icon show us the Divine: beauty shows us 
the radically unconditioned. It also accounts for Plato’s description in the Phaedrus, which 
begins to show us how this contemplation, which has brought us to seeing beauty itself  
(although no longer as a universal concept, but as a haecceital identity), opens us to the 
second half  of  eros, its desire: the lover “reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if  he did 
not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a 
god,” and later “he fashions [the beloved] and adorns him like a statue, as although he 
were his god, to honor and worship him.”  The beautiful is recognized as divine, and in 79
this, the desire to give proper homage arises. 
	 To see this in its fullness, however, it is necessary to transition from the beauty of  
paintings to the beauty of  the other person. But this is not an entirely unfair shift. It is 
only natural that, in becoming attuned to beauty, to feeling the shock more often, we will 
begin to experience this shock not only in a museum, where beauty is the goal of  the 
painter, but in the world as well, in nature and in others, whose beauty is not designed. 
Thus, we should, at long last, move to seeing how exactly, the response to beauty leads to 
love and to ethics.  
 Let us not misunderstand this, however, as the impoverished “art for art’s sake” movement.78
 Phaed, 251a, 252d-e.79
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CHAPTER 8: LOVE 
	 Thus far we have been talking only about contemplation of  beauty, a kind of  
removed viewing. This, it should be obvious, should not be taken as sufficient as a 
definition of  love. And yet, contemplation is erotic, contemplation leads to love, and is itself  
part of  love. Love recognizes, and stands in view of, beauty. Common experience should 
make it obvious that this is the usual way that love begins at all. Our brief  discussion of  
art should also show that contemplation is not merely a looking-at, but an attunement of  
myself. The more beautiful things I see, the more I contemplate them, the more well-
disposed I am to recognize any beauty at all. Since every beauty is a whole or individual, 
this means (see the previous section) that finding or even approximating a universal theory 
of  beauty is impossible. Each new beauty will shock me, just as  the first did, because each 
beauty is unique. We will never be able to ground ourselves in any kind of  knowledge that 
would, in advance, prevent us from being shocked, that would let us encounter beauty on 
our terms instead of  its. Thus, the word ‘attunement’ is well-chosen here, rather than any 
kind of  knowing or learning. I do not learn how to not be surprised at beauty, but only (if  
we are to speak of  learning at all) to let myself  be shocked and to prepare a proper 
response to our inevitable shock; to find our ground when it happens. The only ‘learning’ 
that can be properly spoken of  is the un-learning of  our desires to search for outside archai 
or tele. We begin to learn that, when we find a beautiful object, that our questions ‘from 
where’ and ‘for what’ are of  no use. We learn to be at peace and to contemplate. 
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	 This is what Plato attempts to describe, in metaphysical terms, by the “recent 
initiate, someone who has amply observed things from that past realm.”  This recent 80
initiate is not one who is not shocked, but rather, the one who most acutely feels the 
shock.  Rather than being completely dumbfounded by the feeling however, this recent 81
initiate, the one who ‘understands’ beauty well, reacts almost instantaneously, “rever[ing] 
the beautiful one as a god.” This response, this reverence is nothing else than the opening 
up of  ethics. But what exactly is this response? 
	 The briefest answer, it is already obvious, is that we respond to beauty with love. 
But this tells us nothing. What is love, how does it respond to beauty (at all its levels) and 
most importantly, how, contrary to the analyses of  Levinas, Marion, Nancy, and others, 
does this response speak? How does love of  beauty escape the confined realm of  secrecy 
and shadows, a feat it will have to accomplish, if  we are to have any hope of  claiming that 
it is this love itself  that carries in it the call of  ethics, because this is to say nothing other 
than that the response to beauty is already and in its own way the ethical reply. Not, to be 
sure, the only ethical response (I do not respond to every Face with love) but an ethical 
response nonetheless. In brief, what will be seen is that, having heard the erotic-ethical 
command from the beautiful Other, we take on the ethical attitude in and through our 
attempt to respond with love. That is to say, our becoming ethical is our own attempt to 
become beautiful. We can therefore move now into the final chapter, and at long last 
answer the two questions with which we started: What is it to love (§1), and how does it 
lead to ethics? This second question, following the critiques of  Parts II and III will 
 Phaedrus, 251a.80
 It is the “person who has been corrupted,” who does not understand beauty, that does not feel the same 81
shock, who does not “quickly rise.” 250e.
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proceed in two parts, first, we will see how love transforms desire (§2) to avoid turning love 
into some kind of  egoism, and finally, how language can speak and signify (§3).  
§1: What is Love? 
	 First, let me offer a definition of  love as I will be treating it from here on out or 
rather, an apology for the lack of  a true definition. As we have seen throughout this work, 
love is notoriously difficult to pin down, and each philosopher has drawn the lines 
between desire, love, and eros at different points. While each contributes to a shared 
philosophy of  love, the very definition of  the topic is at stake in each account. However, 
this attempt to arrive at a precise definition of  love will always end up misrepresenting the 
phenomenon in some way. Recall the guiding measure from the Phaedrus: that any lover, 
should he or she read what is said, would recognize the subject as love.  Discussions of  82
precisely where the boundaries of  eros and agape, or eros and love, or love and 
friendship, etc. fall quickly move us away from satisfying this test.  Our various loves 83
inevitably overlap, and to correctly define one particular kind of  love at the exclusion of  
the others will therefore be impossible. As Marion puts it, we must attempt to hold 
together what reason attempts to tear apart.  However, I will offer some general 84
principles that guide what I have to say about love. Above all, what is said here is directed 
 Smuts formulates a similar sentiment more accusatorially, that “the notion is so common, it is fair to 82
doubt the sincerity (or the humanity) of  anyone who claims to not know what I am talking about. Having 
gotten this far in life, I fear that, as Louis Armstrong said about jazz, if  you have to ask what love-the-feeling 
is then ‘you ain't never going to know,’” “In defense of  the No-Reasons View of  Love,” 5.
 As Solomon puts it, discussing eros and agape, “much of  the history of  Western love, written primarily by 83
theological scholars and German philologists, has consisted in the mock battle between these two Greek 
words, complete with shifting definitions, which in any case, would not be recognizable to the Greeks who 
used them in the first place,” Robert C. Solomon, Love: Emotion, Myth, and Metaphor (Prometheus Books), 9.
 EP, 4-5. 84
!269
at an account of  something like ‘romantic love’ or better ‘erotic love’ (properly 
understanding eros). Much can be said about other forms of  love: parental, friendship, 
charity, etc., but they are not the immediate subject here.  As for this kind of  love: first, 85
love responds to beauty. This much should be clear from chapter seven. It is also what 
most immediately puts what follows at odds with the theories of  parts II and III. Secondly, 
there are no reasons for love. If  love is a response, it is a free one, I cannot be criticized for 
my loving or not loving any particular beauty.  Thus, from these two principles—along 86
with a general principle that all persons have haecceital beauty —we can synthesize a first 87
rule of  love: loving a person is always permitted but never required. From the second 
principle follows a third: love is ineffable. ‘Why do you love me’ does not have any more 
of  an answer than does ‘why are you beautiful.’ Both are questions that aim at reasons 
that do not, in fact, exist. Fourth and finally, however, despite its ineffability, love is never 
mute. In this way, the speech of  love will be of  something new; love is a recognition of  a 
person’s beauty, but it is also a creation of  value (what kind and on whom will be fleshed 
out soon).  Thus a second rule of  love: For love to be love, it must be creative.   88
	 That love is a free response puts it somewhat at odds with Levinas’ account of  the 
Face. Every Other represents a face that we ought to see and acknowledge for Levinas, 
this is the first principle of  his ethical stance. Even if, in actual fact, it is only very rarely 
that we are actually struck by the Face of  the Other, and most of  our experiences 
 However, see my introduction for an argument that these, nonetheless, contain something of  the erotic in 85
them.
 Aaron Smuts, in an unpublished draft, “In defense of  the No-Reasons View of  Love,” offers a compelling 86
argument for this view, although from a much different philosophical background than what I address here.
 This follows from the fact that all persons are individual.87
 Marcel’s formulation of  love shows this clearly: ‘To love a being is to say you, you in particular shall not 88
die.’ This is no mere recognition of  personal immortality, or else the ‘you in particular’ would be 
meaningless. Rather, it is a declaration of  a new future.
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transpire without that recognition. At this first moment, love and ethics parallel each 
other. I do not, in fact always see somebody as beautiful. This is not (experience will tell 
us) necessarily because the person is ‘not beautiful.’ The common experience of  there 
being ‘no connection’ or ‘no spark’ when meeting a blind date is not always an 
acknowledgement of  a lack of  beauty (or at least, not when these statements are made in 
good faith), but simply that we have not been moved by his or her beauty. While there are 
certain things we can do (recall the introduction of  this section) in order to dispose 
ourselves into seeing beauty more frequently, we are ultimately not in control of  when we 
feel ‘cupid’s arrow.’ However, even if  we acknowledge that every Other is beautiful, we do 
not admit (indeed we should not admit) that we should respond to every face with love.  89
Few are willing to admit that Don Juan is the best at love due to the multitudes of  his 
‘conquests,’  in fact, we are more likely to condemn him of  not understanding love at all. 90
The usual ideal for love is not the person who has loved briefly and frequently, but the 
couple who have loved each other for decades. Love, it seems, involves some level of  
exclusivity, and is judged by relative intensity, not, like ethics, by its universality. Treating 
all equal in ethics is a virtue, in love, it is a farce. 
	 Nevertheless, our response is not simply a free willing or choosing, in a way that 
makes the whole encounter subject to our own subjectivity. Recall that the encounter is 
sparked, not from my own eros, but from the beauty. My erotic response is free, but it is 
not self-initiated. Eros does not even become a possibility before I feel this shock of  
beauty. For Plato, this event caused a kind of  remembering of  what I once was. Chrétien, 
shedding this ‘past life’ metaphysics, simply describes the present moment when he says 
 Or at least, not with the romantic/erotic love I am speaking of  here.89
 Except in a euphemistic usage of  him as ‘the best lover.’90
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that “the loveliness of  beauty that gives the lover the ability to love.”  In seeing beauty, I 91
am not only given a beauty to love, but indeed the ability to love, and even the 
‘knowledge’ of  what love is. The sudden desire that I feel is a kind of  unexplainable 
madness, a wholly new feeling.  All that I know at first, like Plato’s lover, is that if  we 92
truly acted fully on this sudden flood of  eros,  we would “be thought stark mad.”  We 93 94
can sense rationality leaving us, the calm approach to the world that has defined us up to 
this point, as suddenly the whole world, centered around this singular beauty, appears to 
us completely different. So if  I do not initiate the contact, and if  the world, at an instant, 
is completely changed, in what respect is it free at all? Quite simply, it is this decisive point 
of  the being “thought stark mad” if  we continue on the path that has been laid out for us. 
I can, despite the knowledge of  how I will appear, press on, love this beautiful person 
without reservation, or I can hold back, let calm reason take control, and deny the path of  
eros. 
	 Socrates himself, it seems, advocates the philosopher take this second path, taming 
and reining in the madness of  eros, always pulling back before eros fully takes over.  For 95
Socrates, this was, at least partially, a call to live a life of  virtue. While I think Socrates is 
 L’Effroi, 53. “Ce n’est pas lui qui donne à l’aimé d’être aimable, mais l’amabilité du beau qui nous donne 91
de pouvoir aimer.”
 This is undeniably true, I should think, the first time. However, I think it is equally true for every 92
successive encounter. No encounter of  beauty is the same, and no love-response is the same.
 I want to hold off, at least for the time being, on the question of  exactly how either passion or will (or 93
both) factor into eros
 Phaedrus, 251a. See also any number of  similar remarks in the Symposium about the relative madness of  94
lovers, who will promise the world, sleep in doorways, and all-around act irrationally in pursuit of  their 
beloved.
 Whenever the lover draws near, he sees the beloved “standing with modesty upon a pedestal of  chastity, 95
and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward in reverence” Phaedrus, 254b. The word chastity here, 
ἁγνός, could also be taken to mean ‘holiness or sacredness’
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wrong in offering his highest praise to these philosophers,  here, at long last, we see the 96
central claim to which I have been trying to build from the start, and why it was necessary 
to first detour through love’s failings before returning it to its place: love gives birth to the 
ethical attitude, even when love is denied. 
	 For Levinas, the ethical encounter happens on its own terms, and the erotic 
encounter is either beyond or beneath or behind this. But not so if  I am right about 
beauty and its role in dislocating us and introducing the possibility of  eros. We see the 
face not of  its own accord (or by virtue of  its shining with the Good) but because we are 
first shocked by its beauty. Whereas Levinas cannot provide a sufficient account of  why 
the face sometimes confronts us while at other times we pass by in ignorance of  the Other 
who faces me,  we now have our answer: the person's beauty shines forth, shocking us 97
out of  our monotony. The whole of  my life now hangs in the balance as I choose how to 
respond to this sudden rupture, and while the choice of  which path to take is free, there is 
no heading back, there is no ‘undoing’ the earthquake that has just taken place, only 
deciding how to proceed. 
	 The first option, let us call it the ‘Levinasian’ option,  is to deny the mania of  98
eros, to deny its excessiveness, and unintelligibility.  Instead of  proceeding by eros, we 99
investigate what has just taken place and what is it that has shaken me in this way. In my 
 Or at least, in praising less highly those who live according to eros. See Part I for a fuller discussion of  96
this, and the possibility of  eros as its own route of  ascent within Platonism.
 For Levinas, the face is entirely other, entirely transcendent. Any ‘explanation’ for why the face appears 97
would be to reduce its otherness in some way. This is particularly true since the Face is, ultimately, 
disconnected from any physical faces. 
 However, it should be clear that this is not Levinas’ account of  ethics, given its changed origin in the 98
encounter with beauty.
 These, ultimately, were the complaints of  voluptuosity and the face that signified nothing, or that signified 99
only its nonsignifyingness.
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search, behind the shining of  beauty I find what is brought along with it, the shining of  
the good.  From there, the ethical attitude arises much in the way that Levinas himself  100
outlines it. It is only its origins, its cause, that I wish to contest here. The Good does not 
first speak only for itself, but in and through the more original call of  Beauty. 
	 But to understand this ethical call, to understand how we come to understand 
what the Good demands of  us, it is necessary to look into what happens when eros is not 
denied, when we embrace the mania suddenly appears as a possibility. In this route, it will 
become even clearer how ethics grows out of  eros, since this ‘Levinasian’ option, while 
praise-worthy in its own right, represents more of  a false start than a true success. 
	 So what happens when, faced with our decision, we choose to allow eros to 
continue, not taking into account the potential reaction of  those around us?  Plato 101
repeatedly compares this decision to a deification of  the beloved, setting him up as a god. 
But let us not mistake this for an idolization or idealization. We do not treat him as a god 
by destroying what makes him who he is (to do so would destroy the very source of  his 
beauty, in his individuality), rather we recognize him for what he truly is: an individual 
who has reconstituted my world, with him at the center.  The entirety of  my world now 102
becomes understood in a new, different way.  But this new center also revolutionizes what 103
happens to my desire. In the prior (call it metaphysical) arrangement of  the world, it was 
 See the previous chapter.100
 In a paradoxical fact, which I will return to shortly, those very others with whose reactions we are 101
concerned are but so many other lovers. We expect (perhaps rightly) to be condemned by people who, in 
our situation, also chose to proceed.
 Although, it should be obvious, not by some conscious effort on their part.  As Marcel, notes, hitting at 102
part of  this restructuring, “the only thing worth preoccupying . . . us [is] the death of  someone we loved.” 
Gabriel Marcel, Tragic Wisdom and Beyond (Northwestern University Press, 1973), 131.
 Again, although the structure is the same for each love, note that the different locus will make each love 103
unique.
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myself  at the center, and so desire took the structure of  trying to gather things to myself, 
to form a net out of  my world which connected me to all the good things that I see. 
	 The reversal, placing the beautiful other at the center, also breaks with this sense 
of  desire. I no longer wish to gather everything to myself, nor even is it my desire to place 
myself  at the center (to do so now appears as only a kind of  auto-eroticism, an attempt to 
make myself  the beloved and, I should think, recognizable as a broken eros by all). 
Rather, my desire functions in the same way, desiring to gather things to the center, with 
myself  still on the outskirts. That is, I attempt to gather things not to myself, but to the 
beloved. The whole world becomes structured by the gift. My desire becomes a desire to 
give, not to acquire.  104
	 Perhaps the person who has seen this most clearly is Luce Irigrary, who notes that 
in the suggested change to ‘I love to you’:  
The ‘to’ prevents the relation of  transitivity, bereft of  the other’s irreducibility 
and potential reciprocity. The ‘to’ maintains intransitivity between persons, 
between the interpersonal question, speech or gift: I speak to you, I ask of  you, I 
give to you.  105
  
And again,  
I love to you thus means: I do not take you for a direct object, nor for an indirect 
object by revolving around you. It is, rather, around myself  that I have to revolve 
in order to maintain the to you thanks to the return to me.  106
	 In these two short statements, Irigaray makes a myriad of  important clarifications 
to her suggested grammatical change: the indirectness of  ‘love to’—no longer treating 
love as a verb taking a direct object—does not turn the other into an object to be 
 Perhaps the real meaning behind Diotima’s cryptic ‘giving birth to beauty’ is not to produce a child for 104
myself, but for the beloved, a gift of  new beauty.
 Luce Irigaray, I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity Within History (Psychology Press, 1996),109.105
 “I Love to You,” 110. Despite by and large agreeing with the definition of  love Irigarary is pushing for, I 106
do not see the language change as a necessary move in order to change conceptions.
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possessed, but nor does its indirectness (loving to, rather than loving) put the beloved as 
the rigid center of  our reconstructed world, around which I revolve (to do so would 
amount to the deification I have denied above), lest we are drawn all the way back to 
Sartre's masochism where I become just one more 'good object’ to be gifted to the 
beloved. In other words, ‘I love to you’ does not merely reverse the intentionality of  love. 
Love is no more the Other’s acquisitive desire than it is my own. Instead, as she puts it, I 
continue to ‘revolve around myself,’ as if  an eddy in a larger body of  water, swirling, but 
nevertheless aware that I am not the true center-point. I self-revolve, not as the all-
important subject I was in my previous world, but in order to maintain myself  in an 
orbital relation to the beloved. I must exist in perpetual distance to the beloved to 
continue to love her, to fulfill the purpose which has become apparent to me. Only in this 
way, can love avoid falling into the trap of  the objectification of  either lover or beloved. 
To do this however, means to no longer view the world as merely a collection of  good 
objects to be possessed. Love, if  it is to be good, cannot be structured on a desire-as-lack.  
	 In fact, it is in the continual insistence throughout parts II and III that we can see 
how the whole thread of  love presented here has taken its start from the wrong place: 
Plato’s Symposium which continues to be much more commonly referred to in 
contemporary philosophy of  love than the Phaedrus.  In the Symposium, Plato is equally 107
guilty of  defining eros by a desire to possess what one lacks. It is only in the Phaedrus (and 
even then, only with a generous reading of  some of  Socrates’ remarks), that we begin to 
see a different kind of  desire being developed for eros. By following the Symposium, and a 
love defined by lack and possession, we get the critiques of  Sartre and Beauvoir where 
 As noted in the previous section, Levinas’ references to Platonic eros are universally to the Symposium, 107
despite the Phaedrus being used in his parts about signification in the middle sections of  Totality and Infinity.
!276
love objectifies the beloved, forcing him or her into just another ‘good thing’ to be desired. 
Levinas, in attempting to free alterity from these problems, can only do so at the expense 
of  eros altogether, which he cannot free completely from desire.  By returning to Plato, 108
and starting from a new point, we see how it can become possible to circumvent many of  
the problems that have been found with eros, and instead, put forward a theory of  love 
which can plausibly play a role for ethics. 
§2: Beautiful Desire 
	 What might an erotic desire structured not by lack, but by the gift look like? As 
already said, this is not just a kind of  alter ego desire, where I “wish good things” for the 
beloved,  it is not only the target that is changed, but it ceases to be a desire structured 109
by need or lack altogether. I do not wish good things to the beloved because I think he or 
she needs them in some way, but out of  a kind of  excessiveness, because it is, in some 
sense, good for me to give the gifts. This is seen in Socrates’ analogy between the lover’s 
immediate reaction to the beautiful beloved and divine sacrifices, where we do not 
sacrifice to the gods because the gods lack or need our offerings, but because we have an 
existential need to offer them.  Our purpose is fulfilled in the giving, which is to say our 110
love is enacted by the offering.  
 The “Ambiguity of  Love” that Levinas speaks of  is not between two competing conceptions of  love, but 108
of  a necessary ambiguity within love itself. Love is always a mix of  Need and Desire.
 Such as in Aristotle’s account of  friendship.109
 This claim is perhaps contentious in a more ordinary sense of  greek mythology, and Plato himself  will 110
occasionally write (such as in Aristophanes’ speech) that the god’s need the sacrificed food, or at very least, 
need to be appeased by the act of  offering. The comparable statement in the Phaedrus however, seems to 
suggest the offerings go the the god-beloved simply because we wish to honor her, not because she has any 
need for them.
!277
	 But beyond simply enacting our love by the giving, it seems that this desire has a 
second aspect: we seek to make ourselves lovable to the beloved. It simply will not do if  our 
attempted gifts are rejected by the beloved. While we may continue on with our 
unrequited love, it is always with the desire to be loved in return. Being loved by a third 
(and experience should tell us this as well) is no salve for being rejected by the one I 
love.  Thus, we also cannot substitute this need to be loved with the much simpler desire 111
to become lovable, that is to say, to become beautiful. Rather, I must become lovable for 
the beloved, appear as beautiful to the beloved. But here we run into a problem: the 
appearance of  her beauty to me was not structured by any logic. It was a kind of  ecstatic 
moment, not governed by my intention or foresight.  Given that this is the case, my own 112
attempt to appear to the beloved as beautiful seems off  to a hopeless start, as I do not 
know how to create the same moment of  ‘shock’ which happened for me. Thus, although 
it is for this particular person that I want to appear beautiful (so that I may appear 
lovable ), all that I can try to do is become more beautiful in general. 113
	 It is this attempt to become more beautiful that, at long last, introduces ethics: 
returning to Ortega’s definition of  what I have called haecceital beauty, “that kind of  
beauty which, when viewed from a distance, reveals not only a personal character and a 
mode of  being, but also an independent esthetic value.”  Although common experience 114
will tell us that the person looking to ‘become beautiful,’ looking to ‘find love’ will often do 
so by working out, grooming, and otherwise preening, this is clearly not enough, and 
 It would, however, be fascinating to dwell more on the very real phenomenon of  ‘moving on.’ At what 111
point do we sever the ties with an uninterested love, how does it affect us?
 Why Marion has called the encounter with art a saturated phenomenon.112
 We will see soon the distinction between wanting to be seen as lovable, and wanting to be loved.113
 On Love, 91, emphases added.114
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indeed, is a relatively small part of  what seems to be required, rather it is that whatever 
outer, plastic beauty we have—Ortega is particularly concerned with facial features as a 
kind of  window to the soul —needs to be transformed and put into service of  a deeper 115
beauty. This beauty, I claim here, is accomplished by becoming ethical.  116
	 But why does becoming ethical make us beautiful, and not merely good? Firstly, 
because it its origins are precisely in recognizing the beautiful Other. Our escape from 
egology, from solipsism is sparked by beauty, and thus, it should only seem appropriate to 
call this escape itself—our entering into the ethical attitude—beautiful. Thus, even 
although we can speak of  the ethical attitude as good, it also, and perhaps primarily 
involves the beautiful. However, more importantly, how we become ethical shows its 
structure in beauty. Our connection to the Other more generally is now no longer 
structured by a purely universal command ‘do not kill,’ but instead is first structured by 
this new erotic desire to give gifts. To truly arrive at ethics from eros, however, it is 
necessary to link these two commands. The call that we hear must move us from the 
desire to give gifts to the beautiful beloved to our response to the widow, the orphan, and 
the stranger. This is the point that it seems Marion cannot follow through on: for him, my 
love will always remain only a deeply personal thing between the people involved; my love 
can neither be witnessed by, nor witness to others. As a result, Marion’s erotic call will 
 One could think of  Aristotle’s ‘sufficient external goods’ here, and indeed one of  his claims is that a 115
person needs to be attractive enough to not be outcast from society, but by no means needs to be a beauty 
such as Helen. Ortega likewise notes that it is in fact only rarely that it is the ‘official beauties’ who we fall in 
love with, On Love, 91.
 Key to this claim although, is that, as Ortega spells it out, haecceital beauty is not ‘merely’ the inner 116
beauty, but involves the plastic beauty. This is important, because without the connection, the whole system 
falls 
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never lead to a Levinasian discourse ethics.  Whatever is involved with my particular 117
love relationship, structured around the Other’s haecceitas, will remain radically individual.  
	 In transforming mere haecceitas to haecceital beauty however, a single beauty can 
open me up to others.  In my new-found erotic desire to love the beloved, I must put 
myself  among others, now recognizing the contingency of  this particular appearance of  
the shock. An eros that does not situate itself  amongst others, that is to say, in which the 
lovers find themselves surrounded by a community of  others, will always end up in a false 
idealization or idolization. While it is true that I only love (and wish to be loved) by this 
one person, I am aware that I might have equally first encountered a different beautiful 
face, given any number of  variables. It is not the case, however, that upon recognizing this 
relativity, I come to love every Other. Erotic desire remains essentially restricted.  Upon 118
recognizing that I could have loved another, I cannot now choose to love everyone. The 
excessive nature of  the giving means that I cannot possibly have a plurality of  poles 
around which erotic desire is structured. If  I am to interact with other Others as a result 
of  my love, it will have to be through a different attitude. 
	 For Sartre, this was the death of  my love: upon recognizing that my love is 
ultimately relativized by all other possible loves, I found no more reason to love. However, 
this followed only because Sartre conceives of  love as giving something ‘deserved’ by the 
beloved. In the relativity of  love, Sartre claims, I discover that the beloved is no more 
‘deserving’ than any other, and my love becomes meaningless. As spelled out here 
 As we saw in the previous part, it may, in some ways lead to charity, but not in a way that will be 117
analogous to what follows.
 Whether it is essentially ‘monogamous’ or not would in part depend on what we include in eros properly 118
speaking. I am inclined to say that romantic love requires a kind of  serial monogamy. It is not possible to 
love multiple romantic partners at once (the gift structure of  the erotic world cannot be shared or split in 
any way that would be acceptable).
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although, I do not gift to the beloved because I think she ‘deserves’ these good things, I 
give beyond any sense of  desert, freely and excessively. Thus it is of  no consequence that I 
see that these gifts could have been given to another instead, since—despite being sparked 
by an encounter of  beauty—my giving is in no way commensurate with any quality of  
the beloved. Thus the beloved seems no less ‘deserving’ of  the gift simply because her 
quality is outshone by another. 
	 This rules out three alternate ways of  interacting with others from out of  my 
relationship of  love: they cannot be included in my love nor wholly excluded from it. 
Further, their connection to it does not invalidate the love itself. Then how does love 
branch out to these others? By universalizing the drive that I ‘appear as lovable.’ This is 
the new first principle of  ethics.  This is nothing other, however, than acknowledging the 119
same inversion that happened in the encounter of  love with the beloved. No longer am I 
the center of  my universe, but I become even further de-centered. Having already been 
dislodged, and put into an orbit around the beloved, it immediately becomes clear that 
this cannot be a kind of  égoïsme à deux. I cannot simply substitute the dyad of  lovers into 
the privileged place at the center. Rather lover and beloved together, if  we are to love 
rightly, must now similarly position ourselves among a world of  others. Aware of  the 
accidental features of  our love, that this love was formed spontaneously and freely, I now 
must comport myself, in a similar (although not identical) way, toward all others, whom I 
am now able to encounter on their own terms, as unique, unrepeatable others. There is a 
demand placed on me to comport myself, not just toward the beloved Other, but toward 
 I hesitate to label this in the form of  a command “thou shall be lovable,” since, if  we imagine the 119
command being issued from the beloved, the gift exchange becomes extremely transactional. Whether we 
could imagine a command being issued from somewhere else, I’m not sure.
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all Others. My love for this beautiful other enters me into an ethical attitude, surrounds 
me in a world of  others, who each have, as a result of  their equal status as the Other 
person, as a beautiful (that is to say, a unique and unrepeatable) Other. While it is not 
required that I love each one in the way that I love my beloved, I must nevertheless 
acknowledge them as others, and treat them with the respect deserved by such a person. 
This command goes beyond the traditional formulation that Levinas gives in Totality and 
Infinity, ‘do not kill,’  since merely keeping one’s distance will not fulfill the mission of  120
appearing lovable. We are instead brought closer to the revised command of  Otherwise than 
Being, where not merely distance, but giving the bread from my mouth is required. To be 
lovable, to be ‘worthy’ of  love requires that I take on a positive disposition toward the 
other, not merely refraining from doing harm, but actually owing something to her. My 
ethical relation with all Others, although necessarily attenuated compared to my love for 
the beloved other, remains structured by what I owe the Other, a duty that is impressed 
upon me by the very fact of  their status as others. 
	 Here, however, another mistaken view needs to be rejected, which might on first 
glance appear: that the structure of  this new ethical formulation reduces my relations 
with others to simply a matter of  a means to my being loved by the singular relationship 
of  love. However, the obvious absurdity of  such a reading should instantly become clear 
if  we analyze the first moment of  this new erotic ethics: the erotic desire to appear as 
lovable to the beautiful other. If  the corresponding drive to appear as lovable to all other 
Others were used as a mere means to this goal, it would ironically fail in its purpose—
common sense tells us as much: if  a person is treating others well, not out of  a disposition, 
 See the previous part for a discussion of  how the command may change in Otherwise than Being. 120
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but in order to gain something from me, the moment that becomes clear to me, the other 
would become despicable. By observing their relations with others as never escaping the 
transactional (which Sartre believed would always be the case), I would have no reason to 
believe that interaction with me (supposedly structured by the gift) is anything different. 
Any gift that she has offered immediately becomes just so many favors to be called in at a 
later date. Thus, while my ethical treatment of  Others may be used as proof  of  the 
sincerity of  my erotic desires, I cannot cultivate it in order to be used as proof. In short, 
having encountered this first principle only because of  my erotic desire to appear as 
lovable to the beloved, it is now necessary that I act ethically toward all others regardless of  
its effect on my relationship to the beloved, since (paradoxically) it is only in that way, that 
it can affect the love relationship at all. 
	 There is one further distinction that needs to be made here, before moving to the 
last section, on love’s speech, on ‘appearing lovable’ as compared to a number of  other 
dispositions. The easiest to set aside is that instead I desire to be loved. As Marion has 
analyzed quite well,  it simply is impossible to do anything to cause another person to 121
love me. As noted in §1, love is without reason, or more specifically, without any justificatory 
reasons. There may well what Smuts calls “causal or explanatory reasons,” which would 
include biological or neurological explanations, but I can never give an account of  why it 
is impermissible, morally or otherwise, not to love.  Love may very well have an 122
explanatory or causal connection to the sight of  beauty, however, it is never required of  
 And therefore why his investigation changes track from the question “does anybody love me?” to “can I 121
love first?”
 Smuts “No-Reasons View,” 2-3, Smuts describes this as arguing against love’s ‘appropriateness,’ but as he 122
himself  acknowledges, this word opens up to confusions and misinterpretations. The word ‘fittingness’ is 
perhaps better, although still not perfect.
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me that I respond with love.  As discussed above, love, if  it is to be love worthy of  the 123
name, must be a free choice. As a result, there can never be any blame placed on a person 
for not loving something, even the most lovable thing.  Thus, if  my drive is to be loved by 124
the beloved, I am placing a perverse demand on her, asking for something that she cannot 
fully control. Next, we should not mistake ‘appearing lovable’ with ‘being worthy of  love.’ 
Again, this creates a structure whereby I make a claim that I ought to be loved, or at very 
least that it would be good for me to be loved. Yet what we find is that, if  love has no 
justifying reasons, we cannot speak of  good or bad loves.  Lastly, I have consistently 125
spoken of  ‘appearing lovable’ rather than ‘being lovable’ primarily to reinforce the point, 
made above, that in fact, I cannot control the situation. I can make myself  ‘objectively’ 
beautiful (by becoming ethical), but I cannot make myself  lovable, as I am in no way in 
control of  whether my beauty affects any person. And yet, it is not my desire to simply be 
beautiful, but to appear to a specific other as beautiful, that is, as lovable. 
	 With these distinctions in mind, we can progress, at long last, to the benefits of  an 
ethical eros, the ability of  eros to speak publicly, to bear witness to itself  and to the ethics 
which it births. 
 The important distinction here is that, although the love may have been sparked by beauty, It is still 123
incorrect (or at least deficient) to answer that I love ‘because you are beautiful.’ This does not explain why I 
chose to respond to the beauty, only the bare fact that something was there to be responded to.
 This must entail, and I think rightfully so, that we cannot interpret the commandment that we love God 124
as an absolute dictum.
 Indeed Aaron Smuts, who I follow for many of  the definitions of  this ‘No-Reasons Account of  Love,’ 125
goes so far as to say we cannot call the love of  an abusive spouse or even Hitler bad, although we might 
otherwise argue that the relationship is harmful.
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§3: Eros Speaks 
	 Recall the reasons for silencing eros in the first place: that public eros inevitably 
gives rise to pornography or voyeurism, letting the public in on an act that is meant to be 
the most intimate. This is true even on a reading like Marion’s, where eros becomes 
almost completely divorced from physical sex. Thus, although tempting, we cannot 
circumvent the issue by reclaiming the full extent of  eros as we have done with regard to 
the private recognition of  beauty. Even in its speech, Marion says, it cannot signify, eros 
speaks in vulgarities, childish babbling, or mysticism.  Eros could never escape the 126
radical individuality of  the haecceitas. Even the birth of  the child itself, born from eros, 
proved unable to bear witness to its origins. 
	 Given how I have laid out some basic definitions for eros in this chapter, namely 
its ineffability, it seems that even in this new ethical form, it will be relegated to the same 
silence, the same non-signifyingness. But recall the second maxim about eros’ speech, 
that, despite being ineffable, it never stops speaking. The question then, cannot be simply 
how to make eros speak, since all will have to agree that it in fact never stops, but how can 
it signify, how can it attest to its love? Much later, having given his own interpretation of  
this key passage of  the Phaedrus, Chrétien poses the question for himself  as well, “But has 
love, if  it remains mute, truly responded? What is the place or the word that could speak 
this proximity of  the unreachable?”  If  the encounter of  beauty, already an erotic 127
 EP, 148-150.126
 L’Effroi, 70. “Mais l’amour s’il restait muet, lui répondrait-il en vérité? Quel est le lieu où la parole peut 127
dire cette proximité de l’insaisissable.” Chétien’s answer, similar to how Marion develops his negative 
theology, is that all speech must become praise, a word that calls without ‘naming’ in the sense of  defining. I 
will not follow that analysis here, as I think it falls into the same ‘non-signifying’ trap as Levinas and 
Marion’s work on eros. He will go on to develop that theme much more fully in the later Call and Response 
(see above for the discussion of  beauty as a call).
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experience, can so radically reshape our world, it only makes sense that our language 
would likewise be revolutionized. This is what I want to develop here, that love’s speech is 
not simply speaking about love, but speaking out of  love.  The beauty of  love’s voice is not 128
in what it says, but how it says it. 
	 In brief, what this should mean is that, even when a lover and the non-lover say 
the ‘same thing,’ it is said differently, differently enough to have a different signification. 
This claim should not seem immediately absurd, as we are very likely to acknowledge that 
someone who has loved deeply could deliver Juliet’s balcony monologue in a way that 
non-lover never could. Indeed, we should also expect to find that Shakespeare could only 
have written such a monologue if  he first had loved. To imagine what it is to love is not like 
imagining ourselves in a different time or a different place. It would be to imagine 
ourselves in a totally different mode of  existence. There is, it seems, no analogy between 
how the lover and non-lover view the world.  If  this is correct, we must find out why. 129
What is it that we hear in the writings of  Shakespeare that we would not in the writings 
of  a person who has never loved? What witness do they bear to love? Nothing other than 
the very fact that the lover’s world has been revolutionized in the way described above. 
When the lover speaks of  her love, she do not speak of  simply another person in her field 
of  vision, nor even of  an Other, either unique or in general, who evades her 
comprehension, but of  the unique beautiful other who takes up a very specific fixed point 
 Marion frequently reduces love’s speech to this, a perlocutionary act that does not signify anything. 128
However, as will become clear, I want to suggest that we cannot separate the locutionary and perlocutionary 
aspects of  love.
 In the same way, we could note that Levinas could have never written his ethics of  the face if  he had 129
never himself  encountered the face, if  he had lived his whole life in the ontological, egoistic attitude. One 
could not imagine themselves in the face-to-face.
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of  a world that can no longer be called her own.  The world of  things is transformed, so 130
that the standard division drawn between object and subject no longer makes any sense 
from either direction. It now no longer makes any sense to speak of  subjects (following 
Levinas’ and Marion’s critiques) nor now even of  objects and certainty.  
	 If  we allow for the erotic reduction to bring the world of  objects with it, so that 
even ‘objects’ are not primarily wrapped up in the “the certainty of  the world of  beings 
[that] works like the ‘call of  being,’”  but instead in their ability to be given as a gift, all 131
of  a sudden, we introduce a whole world to talk about. While it is still possible for the 
lover to (as Marion puts it) return to the world of  certainty to make his “owner’s 
rounds,”  dealing with a world of  scientific or logical argument, this world is not only not 132
the world I inhabit, it is not even the one that things properly exist in. The lover has 
discovered, and attempts to communicate to others (both the beloved and the outside 
world) that they are not merely existing objects, indifferent to the human world, but are in 
fact more primordially structured by their gift-nature, where their transference from one 
person to another is not merely an economy of  exchange, a changing of  ownership, but 
in fact that in the giving itself  the ‘object’ takes on its proper form as an expression of  love 
rather than a being. 
	 Thus, love’s speech does not need to be restricted to trying to speak its love, 
looking to establish a relationship with a third-party to whom we could give an account of  
the erotic act, or who could later himself  bear witness on my behalf, as Marion searches 
 It is important to keep Irigaray’s warning that the lover does not orbit around the beloved in mind here, 130
lest this description become on of  an abusive subordination or subservience. The lover must retain his own 
independence in order to remain a giver of  gifts.
 EP, 17.131
 EP, 17.132
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for, but rather the witness to my love can be made by the entirety of  my speech, which 
signifies the world in its fullness as a world of  the gift, which has only been given to me in 
the erotic encounter with beauty.   For erotic love, this is the essence of  what Gabriel 133
Marcel calls ‘creative fidelity.’ Faithfulness, in this case faithfulness to the promise of  love 
made to the beloved, cannot be mere preservation.  I cannot content myself  with 134
maintaining a status quo, crystalizing a moment in time. Love’s ineffability ensures this: 
my inability to speak to the oath’s basis in the first place (the ‘why’ of  my love), any 
attempts at merely preserving it will be doomed to fail, I cannot actually express the oath, 
and in my failing to express it, will fail also to uphold it.  If  love is truly a promise of  an 
eternity, we must continue to reaffirm it at every moment of  love.  But, love does not 135
accomplish this by finding a way to speak of  what it cannot, but instead continuing to 
speak of  something new, something future, in response to its inability to speak of  itself. As 
Marcel notes, “in reality the truest fidelity is creative.”  He elsewhere provides a very 136
specific definition of  what it is to be creative, noting that “it denotes the active 
contribution each soul is at liberty to bring to the universal work which is accomplishing 
 A separate question is whether this speech could be understood at all by the non-lover, or whether it 133
would only be reduced to the economic exchange of  a world of  objects. As with the ladder of  beauty in 
general, it seems the best we can do is try to put the non-lover in a disposition to encounter beauty. Thus, 
while he/she may not understand our speech fully, it may have a rhetorical function of  pointing to 
something which they have not yet attained.
 “A fundamental error or illusion must be disposed of  concerning fidelity. We are too much inclined to 134
consider it as a mere safeguard, an inward resolution which purposes simply to preserve the existing order. 
But in reality the truest fidelity is creative,” Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of  Hope, 
trans. Emma Craufurd and Paul Seaton,(South Bend, Ind: St. Augustines Press, 2010), 90.
 Marion has provided an excellent account of  love’s lasting forever (even if  a relationship ends), as well as 135
the need to continually reaffirm the process, although in the case of  this second point, comes to a 
significantly more pessimistic conclusion than I do here. EP, 187.
 In Homo Viator, Marcel analyzes creative fidelity in terms of  familial relations, noting that we must repay 136
our indebtedness to our parents not directly, but by ‘transmitting’ what we have been given, by passing on 
the gift we ourselves have been given. When fidelity is viewed in this lens, the idea of  ‘indebtedness’ is 
erased by the gift, as no person is the rightful possessor of  anything which she may give, but merely its most 
recent steward. Indebtedness only returns when a person fails to understand their situation, and views as 
‘hers’ something which she in truth have no ownership over (“the denial of  the more than human by the 
less than human,” Creative Fidelity, 10), a parallel situation to those here who do not love.
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itself  in our world and doubtless far beyond it.”  Although his own metaphysics differs 137
rather substantially from what has been outlined here, the common thread can be spotted 
here, in the free giving that is made possible only by the transformation of  love. It is only 
in this creative love, only in a love which speaks about a possible future structured by the 
gift, which can truly claim the name. 
	 Without wanting to state the case too strongly, the situation is analogous when we 
look at the ethical speech of  the lover and the non-lover. If  ethics is birthed in the erotic 
encounter of  beauty, we should question whether it is possible at all for a non-lover to be 
ethical, or whether we simply read an ethical signification into actions. Ethics, to use 
Marcel’s phrase, is precisely that ‘active contribution’ that we can contribute with our 
speech of  love; our love enables us to participate, for perhaps the first time, in a universal 
discourse of  ethics. It is my love for a particular beautiful other that enables me to see, 
and to speak to, the status of  all others as beautiful, unique and unrepeatable others. My 
love for the beloved provides me the insight to speak ethically about my altered 
relationship toward all others. However, this raises some problems since we cannot expect 
everyone to have this encounter, and certainly not at any early age. Is all hope lost for 
those who have not encountered beauty, who have never loved? Recall that above we have 
already differentiated two different routes to ethics, the ‘Levinasian option,’ where an 
ethics of  the good falls out from the encounter with beauty without having loved, a 
second, which came about from the full restructuring of  the world, and a desire to appear 
as lovable to the beloved. Yet, even the ‘Levinasians’ cannot fully be called non-lovers. 
 Homo Viator, 88. Marcel often waivers between claims that can be interpreted in many ways and ones that 137
strike as quite theological. Despite the claims of  a ‘universal work’ operating far beyond our world, he also 
notes that, in his view, “creative fidelity . . . depends in no way upon the acceptance of  any special religious 
belief.”
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They have not loved, but they have had this erotic encounter.  Their ethics is born out 138
of  a kind of  false-started love, and draws its logic from the roots of  love. Its relationship to 
the Good, shining in and through the Beautiful, ensures that it is never fully separated 
from love.  
	 Thus, when the ‘Levinasian’ talks about ethics, she uses a much different language, 
and one which, as I have argued in part III, is deficient in many ways, in particular, its 
inability to distinguish the Other in any personal way. All Others have an infinite claim on 
me, and ethical language cannot find a way (without simply allowing it to be reduced to 
simply practical reasoning) to demand that we (for example) give money or aid to those 
who are most in need of  it. The language of  substitution and duty is not the language of  
gift, and the language takes its signification directly from an attempt to relate to the Good 
beyond Being, which has been spied in the encounter with the beautiful-Other. This 
attempted relation, even mediated by the Other, accounts for the abstractness or 
disinterested way in which ethical language addresses the Other. The Other is simply that 
by which we hear the Good. By comparison, the true lover’s ethical relation is not 
structured by a relation to the Good, nor some ‘Beauty,’ but a single, beautiful-Other. 
While this immediately personalizes and singularizes my love-speech, it also singularizes 
my ethical speech, because (as said above) my relation to every Other is now structured by 
my seeing him or her as somebody before whom I desire to appear lovable. Not simply, 
before whom I desire to be beautiful in some universal sense, but a person who could (as 
if  I could control such a thing) cause the ‘shock of  beauty’ which I myself  felt in 
connection with the beloved. Thus the distinction between the true lover, and the one 
 It should be noted once more that this erotic encounter is much broader than what Levinas would have 138
had in mind when he spoke of  eros, which was nearly reducible to sexuality.
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who has simply had an erotic encounter with beauty, is the distinction not between ethics 
and a lack thereof, but the difference between an ethics which treats the Other as a 
particular and one that treats the Other as an abstract entity. 
	 The situation however, is much worse for the true non-lover, the one who has 
never had this erotic encounter with beauty. Without this encounter it is impossible to see 
further to the Good, it is impossible to see the proper ordering of  the world as structured 
by the gift, and it is, as a result, impossible to encounter the face of  the Other.  This fact 139
becomes important because it tells us how we should direct our language in order to have 
the most effect on the world: the public speech of  the lover, far from descending into 
pornography, or opening up to voyeurism, ought to be directed, toward inspiring the 
encounter with beauty in those who have not felt it.  Nor should we think that this 
encounter is so rare that we have suddenly made ethics unattainable for the many. Beauty 
is perhaps one of  the first things we encounter.  The task then, is first: to get others to 140
encounter beauty, and second, to move them from the encounter of  plastic to haecceital 
beauty. 
	 This first task is perhaps the more complex, since, as I have said, beauty is (usually) 
one of  our first encounters. Here, then, we must follow Aristotle’s own advice for ethical 
education, that ethical education begins, first of  all, with the training of  the passions, to 
feel pleasure and pain at the right sorts of  things.  But what else is this except to return 141
to where we started, in Plato, to the lover taking the role of  educating the beloved, of  
 I have already offered at least a partial critique, via Marion, of  Levinas’ claim that the Other can appear 139
on its own in Part III. 
 Young children are continually ‘shocked’ by experiences of  beauty, whether it be a sunset, or fireworks, 140
or simply a place they have never been before. 
 Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b.141
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introducing him into ethics, not in its deficient form of  the Symposium, where he became 
just the route to my own transcendence, but to that of  the Phaedrus, where I try to shape 
the beloved and myself  after the god who we follow, growing together and becoming 
more perfect? The lover then, first and foremost toward the one whom he feels the shock 
of  beauty, but then to the world as a whole, takes up his role of  transitioning the 
uninitiated to first feel the call of  beauty, and then to follow it to its end, in love and ethics. 
Thus, eros gives birth to love, not only in the lover himself, but to the whole community, 
providing, from his own experience of  love and beauty, a discourse to lead others where 
he has already gone.  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POSTLUDE 
	 This new, phenomenological description of  eros is one that is both itself  an ethical 
encounter with the Other as well as the basis for the encounter of  other Others. Eros 
encounters the haecceitally beautiful Other, unique and unrepeatable; it also teaches us to 
better see all Others as beautiful, that is, to see each face, when it appears to us, as the 
face of  an Other who commands us. Eros’ encounter with beauty better disposes us to see 
the Good to which it accommodates us.  
	 In this new formulation, we have arrived back at an eros that is Platonic in spirit, 
even if  its specifics differ significantly in certain aspects. Plato’s initial concern—the 
description of  how eros can lead the philosophical soul to true virtue—returns in a 
Levinasian ethical project structured by the discourse of  the Other. Eros leads to ethics, 
no longer as leading the ascent of  a soul toward perfect virtue, but by leading the self  to 
recognize and submit to the command of  the Other. In this transformation, we have 
responded to the dilemmas first raised in Part I. Whereas Platonic eros remained 
ambiguous, moving back and forth between the love of  the individual beloved and love of  
the Forms, eros as I have argued for here is unquestionably an eros for the beautiful 
beloved standing in front of  me. It is her uniqueness, her unrepeatability that I respond 
to. Whereas finding other people, customs or knowledge beautiful led Plato to posit a kind 
of  serial infidelity where I ascend the ladder by leaving behind our previous loves,  since 
all beauty ultimately sprang from a single source, recognizing the haeceital beauty of  
another makes the beloved no less unique or unrepeatable. His or her beauty is not 
lessened at all by the existence of  other Others. Each beauty is singular and unique, even 
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if  they are all structured by the same logic (thus enabling us to continue speaking of  their 
beauty as being a common term, even when it is not a universal one). Likewise, Plato, 
frequently spoke of  eros as ultimately valuable only to the lover, with the beloved serving 
only as a tool for the advancement of  the lover, particularly in the Symposium (as seen in 
Part I). Eros as described in Part IV however, supplements eros with an account of  alterity 
that not only allows for eros to be directed toward the beloved himself, but also requires 
that any account of  an ethical eros not be reduced to a narcissistic drive for perfection. 
	 By making these alterations to the Platonic account, eros is better able to 
overcome the strong objections against even love’s possibility made by the philosophers 
included in Part II of  the dissertation. destabilizing subjectivity, by putting the encounter 
with Other before the  subjectivity of  the self, Levinas creates the possibility for a “non-
allergic relation” with the Other.  The reunification of  the beautiful and the good, with 1
one leading to the other, made it possible for eros to no longer remain a divided 
phenomenon, of  sexual desire on the one hand and a romantic passion-love on the other. 
Instead, these two halves could be brought together, ensuring that desire did not become a 
purely destructive encounter nor that love became simply idealization. Rather, the 
admiration of  beauty and the desire of  the good can work together, each leading the lover 
toward ethics, as the Good reveals itself  (as in Part III) to actually be the figure of  alterity, 
of  that which goes beyond the realm of  the same and the self. Love’s supposed 
impossibility was overcome by this reunification, its viciousness by the argument (in Part 
IV) that eros leads not to perversion or imprisonment, but the ethical attitude. Eros no 
longer corrupts the Other, nor plays out as a kind of  masochistic desire for self-negation. 
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Rather eros’ seeking beauty enters the lover into an ethical encounter with the Other, 
where interpersonal relations become possible for the first time. 
	 Likewise, although the accounts of  eros in Part III and IV share many similarities, 
we see the primary difference in the possibility of  speaking of  and from our eros. It is this 
fact that allows eros to once again play a role in ethics, allowing for a link between the 
singular relationship of  love and the global relationship of  ethics. For Marion, eros, even 
as charity, speaks only to induce a response. As a result, eros never goes beyond the one-
to-one relationship, as eros’ speech can only impress upon the person to whom it is 
addressed. Levinas’ ethical discourse similarly requires a response from me—the Other 
faces me, commands me, and requires a response of  me. However, unlike Marion’s erotic 
speech (which follows Levinas’ own account of  erotic speech), ethical speech also signifies. 
First and foremost, the speech of  the Other signifies the other himself. The Other 
announces himself  and addresses me. But his self-signifying and his commanding are not 
two separate acts, but two parts of  the same act. Thus, when Levinas suggests that erotic 
speech is non-signifying, he is saying that erotic speech does not announce the Other. The 
face we meet in eros is not the properly ethical face described in the first three sections of  
Totality and Infinity. In Part IV, however, I have offered an account of  how eros too might 
signify in its speech. This is not to say that eros does not speak in a perlocutionary way. 
Rather, that it does not speak only in a perlocutionary way. Eros also announces itself. The 
lover announces herself  in her speech, the beautiful beloved announces himself  as an 
Other when he appears to me (or rather, his announcing himself  is his appearing to me). 
Whereas ethical speech signifies the Other as other than myself, erotic speech signifies 
beauty, signifies the Other as this one here. The beloved other signifies his very haecceitas as a 
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unique and unrepeatable Other among others. The lover likewise signifies herself  in 
response. However, love’s speech is not restricted (as the case seems to be for Marion) to 
the lovers themselves. Rather, through the erotic encounter of  beauty, the lovers have 
been opened up to seeing the world in a new way, to seeing the Other in a new way. The 
encounter with beauty enables the lovers to see every other they encounter as beautiful, to 
recognize the unique, unrepeatability of  every other. This quality, which Marion likewise 
sees as essential to his account of  love and missing from Levinas’ account of  ethics. By 
linking the good and the beautiful together; however, by allowing them to be encountered 
one through the other, we no longer have to maintain the distinction that Marion 
describes between the encounter of  the icon (the face of  the other) and the idol (the 
beautiful). Rather, beauty can lead us to the good, to the face of  the other, and as a result, 
our speech about beauty, can likewise contribute to the discourse of  ethics. 
	 Thus what has preceded has made the case for the three theses laid out at the 
beginning of  the project. By defining beauty as haecceital beauty, and by linking it to the 
other’s role as the trace of  the Good, the trace of  God, we can now understand the 
encounter with the Other as the recognition of  the Other as good and beautiful, and 
likewise, we can describe the encounter of  love as an encounter strictly with the alterity 
and individuality of  the Other as other than myself. Although we can describe it as an 
encounter with beauty, this beauty is nothing other than his or her own individuality, and 
thus, the encounter of  love, like the encounter of  ethics, is one that takes place on the 
terms of  the Other him or herself, and not by the structure of  beauty-as-formliness or any 
other ontological structure. Finally It is this encounter with beauty, this possible love, that 
first leads us from beauty to goodness, and first enables us to enter into the ethical 
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attitude, showing us, for the first time, the face of  the Other, and disposing us to 
encounter the face of  the other throughout the world, by coming to experience the beauty 
of  the face of  the other as the radical individuality, the unique, unrepeatable character of  
every other, who, regardless of  whether this recognition turns into love, is heard as the 
other who commands my response. 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